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MAKING "REGIME CHANGE" MULTILATERAL. THE WAR
ON TERROR AND TRANSITIONS To DEMOCRACY
PETER MARGULIES*
Since September 11, American policy at home and abroad has centered on
engineering transitions from political contexts that spawn hatred and violence to
those that promote peace and the rule of law.' Unfortunately, the current Admmi-
stration has proceeded without considering the experience of countnes making
transitions to democracy This article suggests that heeding the lessons of their ex-
perience would produce policies that are both different and more effective.
To effect transitions, the Administration has relied heavily on military force
abroad and the expansion of legal sanctions at home - a top-down set of strategies
that comprise what I call the preemptive model.2 In relying on such strategies,
however, the preemptive model also effectively preempts recognition of the crucial
role played by global inequality Pervasive media and technology allow groups to
perceive inequality transnationally. 3 Inequality shapes social identities, sharpens
social comparisons that prod groups to act, and mobilizes social capital dedicated
to violence. Pursuit of a preemptive model stressing military force obscures the
role of inequality thereby promoting polarization, not transition.
The preemptive approach has attracted criticism from scholars associated with
Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Kevin Johnson, Diane Orentlicher and partici-
pants at a workshop at the Society of American Law Teachers Conference on Pedagogy and Crisis in
October, 2002 for their comments on a previous draft.
1. This project encompasses number of related areas, including the intervention in Iraq, anti-
terrorism enforcement, and immigration policy. See infra text accompanying notes 2-15 (analyzing
these issues).
2. Use of the term "preemptive" in this Article dovetails with the Administration's espousal of a
doctrine of preemptive force against perceived threats throughout the globe. See The National Security
Strategy of the United States (2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited
Apr. 26, 2004). While this national security doctrine is not centerpiece of my discussion here, its ap-
plication to justify the United States military intervention in Iraq set the stage for the issues involving
Iraq' transition to democracy that I analyze in the final section of the piece; See infra text accompany-
ing notes 98-140; For a succinct theoretical and historical defense of the preemptive model, see ROBERT
KAGAN, PARADISE AND POWER 75 (2003) ("[T]he United States has had the difficult task of trying to
abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing
military force against those who refuse to abide by such rules.").
3. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 459-73
(2002), citing BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991) (discussing globalization
of information and information's role in formation of global "imagined communities"); Michael C.
Hudson, Imperial Headaches: Managing Unruly Regions in an Age of Globalization, 9 MIDDLE E.
POL'Y 61, 68-70 (Dec. 2002) (discussing impact of media transmission of images that depict suffering
by Arabs and Muslims); Larbi Sadiki, Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization, 32 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 71, 83 (2000).
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what I call the state-skeptical view While the state-skeptics often advocate for
state measures such as increased foreign aid that seek to remedy material mequal-
ity they typically oppose new state initiatives involving the use of force or legal
sanctions to deter transnational networks' violence against civilians. 4 In their con-
cern with constraining state force, however, the state-skeptics fail to adequately
address the threat to equality posed by violent transnational networks, such as Al
Qaeda, Hamas, or Kach.5 These groups, led by "authenticity entrepreneurs, fo-
ment violence based on nationality, ethnicity, or religion, and frustrate transitions.6
This article advances a multilateral transition model that refines and extends
the literature on transitions to democracy 7 Transitions of the kind that the current
Administration seeks are multilateral, requiring the cooperation of a multitude of
constituencies, including Muslim and Jewish 9 communities that spill across na-
tional borders. Law and policy should frame this dialogue of diasporas to promote
transitions.
The transition scholars identify three factors as crucial to democratic transi-
4. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44 (asserting that post-September II legislation designed to disrupt terrorist
groups ability to raise funds and recruit new members "sets out new, breathtakingly vague and broad
definition of terrorism" and is "not consistent with our established laws and values").
5. See Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for
Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 197-200 (2003) (discussing violent transna-
tional networks).
6. Id.
7 See GERARD ALEXANDER, THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION (2002); JUAN J.
LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN
EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 7-9 ( 1996); Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry
Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is and Is Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 3 (Geoffrey Pndham ed.,
1995); Gerard Alexander, Institutionalized Uncertainty, The Rule of Law, and the Sources of Democ
ratic Instability, 35 Comp. Pol. Stud. 1145 (2002); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Democracy, Law, and
Comparative Politics, 36 STUD. COMP INT'L DEv. 7 (Spring 2001); Peter Margulies, Democratic Tran-
sitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3 (1999). A valuable complement to the
comparative politics literature is the law and development literature, in which the theme of inclusion
stressed here is a significant focus. See AMY L. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003); Amy L. Chua,
Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE
L.J. 1 (1998); CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE (2003) (for comprehensive
study that analyzes transition and polarization from historical and social science perspective);
MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Run G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 225 (2000) (for work centering on
the appropriate forms of redress for abuses committed by prior regimes); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Ju-
risprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009 (1997).
8. See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 236 (2002) ("It is
international neglect of the Muslim interest in the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts, the presence of US
troops on Saudi soil and the frequent double standards of the big players that have legitimized the use of
violence.").
9. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 100-01 (1998) (reporting a speech in Los Angeles by
Rabbi Meir Kahane, the New York native who founded the Israeli extremist group Kach, that "de-
scribed Arabs as 'dogs' as people who 'multiply iike fleas' who must be expelled from Israel or elimi-
nated").
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tion and consolidation. The first is institutional repertoire, defined as the range of
a country's social and political institutions, from the nongovernmental organiza-
tions of "civil society" to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 10 The
second is inclusiveness, defined as the degree to which the country m question
treats all of its constituents as full members." The third element is redress, defined
as the access to remedies for victims of inequity.' 2 Successful multilateral transi-
tions offer all sides a stake in peaceful dispute resolution through inclusion and re-
dress, and deploy force and sanctions authorized by law where necessary to con-
strain authenticity entrepreneurs who are unwilling to invest in peace.13
Transitions are never easy The element of redress, in particular, creates trou-
blesome cross-currents. Ignoring redress can engender disillusionment that un-
dermmes transitions. 14 However, scholars of transitional justice have also recog-
nized that the quest for perfect redress can destroy the mutuality on which all
transitions depend.' 5 For a transition-centered view, balance is everything.
In keeping with this pragmatic outlook, a transition-centered approach mte-
grates difficult measures that might seem mutually exclusive when viewed from
either a preemptive or state-skeptical perspective. For example, a transition model
would require accountability, acknowledgment, and redress from groups that target
civilians for violence, and would uphold the crimmalization of assistance to groups
such as Hamas, Kach, or the "Real IRA that use violence to undermine efforts at
peaceful change.16 However, a transition-centered model would also stress the im-
portance of fair procedures m the adjudication of charges against alleged terrorists,
to do justice and to build perceptions of legitimacy among transnational communi-
ties. 17 The integration of such measures bridges fault lines in order to promote
peaceful change.
This Article is in three parts. Part I analyzes the problems with approaches to
transitions that have sprung up m the wake of September 11. This Part critiques
the preemptive model's failure to address mequality, and the state-skeptics' failure
to acknowledge the pernicious role of authenticity entrepreneurs. Responding to
these flaws, Part II outlines a transition-centered approach based on institutional
repertoire, inclusion, and redress. Part III applies the transition-centered approach
to three pressing global issues: changes in immigration policy after September 11,
regulation of violent transnational networks, and the adjudication of alleged viola-
tions of the law of war.
10. See Margulies, supra note 7
11. Id
12. Id
13. See Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After Septem-
ber 11, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 481, 507-10 (discussing fairness, transparency, and transitions in transna-
tional humanitarian organizations).
14. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 893 (2003) (dis-
cussing complexities of transitional redress).
15. Id.
16. However, a transition-centered approach would regulate such efforts carefully to guard against
the perils of vagueness and law enforcement overreachmg. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 84-91.
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1. TERRORISM, TRANSNATIONAL VIOLENCE. AND PROBLEMS OF
TRANSITION
Since September 11, 2001, the policy of the United States government has fo-
cused on the challenges of transitions m law and culture on an international scale.
In Iraq, United States military intervention sought and accomplished a "regime
change" that deposed Saddam Hussein and aims to establish a democratic federa-
tion. President Bush and his advisors persistently linked the Iraq war to the effort
to curb the power and resources of transnational organizations such as Al Qaeda
that carry out violence against civilians. The Bush Administration and its intellec
tual allies have also argued that the Iraq intervention and other steps involving the
use of force will aid the cause of transition throughout the Middle East.
After September 11, a transition to democracy, peace, and the rule of law
from political environments that generate hatred and violence may be a necessity,
not merely an idle aspiration. However, the manifest need for such a transition
should not obscure the challenges inherent in the task. The Administration's ap-
proach to meeting these challenges has been disturbingly one-dimensional. Adopt-
mg a preemptive approach, the Administration has relied on military force and
broad legal sanctions applied by the United States and its allies. Inspired in part by
the neo-Platomc conception of a natural political aristocracy developed by the phi-
losopher Leo Strauss, 8 champions of the preemptive approach have frequently
disdained consultation, consensus, and international law Often, the Administra-
tion has acted m a stark manner that discounts human nghts and civil liberties at
home' 9 and abroad,20 and incurs opportunity costs through the alienation and re-
sentment of those whose support the Administration will need to achieve its
goals.2 ' Indeed, in a worst case scenario, the preemptive approach threatens a
downward drift in which accountability and civil rights are honored more in the
breach than in the observance. 22 This combination of resentment in affected com-
munities and erosion of American democracy is a recipe for global polarization,
18. See Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33, 49 (Leo Strauss & Joseph
Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (noting the differences between Platonism and liberal democracy, and ob-
serving that for Plato "[tihe founding of the good city started from the fact that men are by nature dif-
ferent, and this proved to mean that men are by nature of unequal rank [als result, the good city
comes to resemble a caste society"); James Atlas, Leo-Cons; A Classicist's Legacy: New Empire Build-
ers, N.Y TIMES, May 4, 2003, Sec. 4, at I (noting the intellectual debt of influential Administration
figures, such as Paul Wolfowitz, to Strauss, while asserting that the Administration may have neglected
Strauss's own warnings about the abuses of empire).
19. See Cole, supra note 4 (critiquing detention of immigrants after attacks); Margulies, supra note
13; Volpp, supra note 4 (describing the marginalization of particular communities after September I I);
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and lmmigration Law After September 11,
2001. The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 295 (2002).
20. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. THE PARADOx OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 35 (2002) (arguing that preemptive approach by the United States
will result in the loss of "important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems
such as terrorism").
21. Id.
22. See Dworkin, supra note 4.
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rather than the mutuality required for successful transitions.
In addition to the war m Iraq, the preemptive approach has been evident m
Administration legal and policy initiatives on three other fronts. In the uninigra-
tion sphere, the Administration has used nationality, religion, and ethmcity as crite-
na to selectively register, apprehend, detain, and deport immigrants.23 By seeking
to regulate transnational networks carrying out violence against civilians, the Ad-
ministration has relied on broad and sometimes vaguely defined statutory language
barring "material support" of groups designated by the Secretary of State as terror-
ist organizations. 24 To prevent future terrorist attacks, the Administration has es-
tablished military tribunals that lack fundamental procedural safeguards. 25 Each
policy has undermined perceptions of legitimacy crucial to the success of antiter-
ronst efforts.
A. Inequality and Social Dynamics
The core problem with the Administration's strategy is its lack of regard for
equality as a factor m the social dynamic that produces violence. The certainty
animating the preemptive approach leaves little room for understanding the com-
plex process underlying the formation of social identity in regions, such as the
Middle East, that acolytes of the preemptive approach hope to shape. Compound-
mg this lack of comprehension is a failure to appreciate the role of identity in fos-
tering social comparisons that provoke concern about unfairness, and the role of
social identity and comparison in turning social capital toward violence.26
Social identity is the first component in the terrorism dynamic. Social iden-
tity theory suggests that people are essentially social beings, concerned with how
they relate to others.27 While the ruling elites that have been the traditional focus
23. Patrick J. McDonnell & Russell Carolio, An Easy Entry for Attackers; Immigrationflaws gar-
ner attention as authorities track the Sept. I I hijackers' movements through the United States, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 30, 2001, at Ai (discussing the new policy, which purported to respond to indications that
many of the September I 11
± 
attackers manipulated Umted States immigration law to enter this country,
but has attracted widespread cnticism by academics and government officials); See Cole, supra note 4;
Akram & Johnson, supra note 19; Margulies, supra note 13; Volpp, supra note 4. Cf Office of the In-
spector General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of
Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks
(June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/analysis.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2004>.
24. Cole, supra note 4; Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. den. sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001) (upholding statute
against facial challenge, but finding that certain statutory tems were unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied).
25. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
26. Cntics of the Administration's reliance on force and legal sanctions, whom I refer to collec-
tively as the "state-skeptical" school, also suffer from an incomplete picture of.the interaction between
inequality and social dynamics. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
27 See David 0. Sears, et. al., Cultural Diversity and Multicultural Politics: Is Ethnic Balkaniza-
tion Psychologically Inevitable?, in CULTURAL DivIDES: UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING GRoUP
CONFLicT 35, 40-41 (Deborah A. Prentic & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999); Michelle Adams, Intergroup
Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct, and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1100-04 (2002);
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of American law and policy contribute to the formation of social identity, popu-
larly shared experiences of trauma, oppression, or inequity can also play a signifi-
cant role.
The role of trauma is evident in the way the tragic events of September 11
contributed to some Americans' sense of their own identity as a people embattled
in a hostile world. The experience of displacement has also been constitutive for a
broad range of other groups, including African-Americans, 28 Jews,29 and Palestim-
ans, each fashioning narratives of hope and resistance. For Arabs and Muslims
throughout the globe, the Palestinian experience in particular has been a compel-
ling metaphor for threats posed by the West.3i Media technology makes instances
of trauma or perceived disparate treatment, such as the attacks of September 11
against the United States by Al Qaeda, the Israeli government's measures against
alleged Palestinian militants, or the United States military's causing of civilian
casualties during the war in Iraq, immediately available, graphic, and vivid.32
The "social comparisons" fueled by such images can spur change for better or
worse. Identification with a group, coupled with the perception that the treatment
accorded that group is unfair or unjustified, impels people to take action.33 Human
history and experience teach us, however, that intuitions about equity and fairness
can all too easily degenerate into envy, resentment, and rage.34 Particularly when a
group within a society or region that is dominant in terms of numbers, culture, or
historical pedigree feels threatened by those perceived as outsiders, social com-
Diana C. Mutz & Jeffery J. Mondak, Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group Based Judgments of
Fairness and Well-Being, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 284 (1997); James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social
Psychology of Organizations and Inequality, 57 (3) Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 190, 196-98 (1994). See Tilly,
supra note 7, at 32 (discussing political identities as "networks deploying partially shared histories, cul-
tures, and collective connections with other actors").
28. See Adams, supra note 27
29. See generally ANTON LA GUARDIA, WAR WITHOUT END: ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR A PROMISED LAND (2001).
30. Graham Usher, Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On, 32 J. PALESTINE STUD. 21, 22
(Winter 2003).
31. See Sadiki, supra note 3 (discussing influence of the Palestinian intifada on expressions of
popular sentiment in Jordan and Egypt).
32. See Berman, supra note 3, at 459-73; Hudson, supra note 3, at 68-70; Sadiki, supra note 3.
(This is not to say that any reaction to such trauma or injustice is acceptable. The contours of the right
of self-defense and proportionality will always be crucial in evaluating possible responses. Dispropor-
tionate responses, such as the attacks of September 11, are a sure sign that organizations with their own
agenda have hijacked the formation of social identity.).
33. The Afican-American struggle for civil rights stemmed from just such dynamic. See Ad-
ams, supra note 27 The Zionist movement stemmed from the sentiment that Jews needed home that
could serve as a refuge from the persecution they had encountered in Europe. LA GUARDIA, supra note
29. The yearning of Palestinians for meaningful sovereignty and an end to the displacement caused by
Israeli settlements has an analogous origin. Usher, supra note 30. (discussing Palestinian unrest com-
mencing in September, 2000 as in part a reaction to increased settlement activity subsequent to signing
of the Oslo peace accords).
34. See TILLY, supra note 3, at 141 (discussing "[aictivation of available us-them boundaries" in
course of Rwandan genocide).
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pansons can fuel murderous and even genocidal hatred.35
Where social identity and social comparison go, social capital soon emerges.
Social capital is the constellation of groups, networks, and organizations that help
provide the infrastructure for action.36 Social identity and social comparison can
skew social capital m either positive or negative ways. For example, profound
feelings of powerlessness can turn networks toward self-destructive and risk-prone
behavior.37 When the future looks bleak, many people refuse to invest time and
effort in building long-term institutions.
Instead they adopt an apocalyptic perspective, creating a vacuum between to-
day and eternity 38 This is the temporal domain of the suicide bomber. Suicide
bombings and other acts of coordinated violence require social capital of a special
kind.39 Discipline and coordination are necessary to construct munitions, select a
target, avoid detection, and execute an attack.4° Unfortunately, this brand of social
capital is not readily transferable to the construction of institutions that nurture
democracy and the rule of law.
Modes of social capital and the frammg of social comparison and identity thus
exist in a dialogic relationship. While substantive perspectives on equality and be-
longing shape the form taken by social organizations, the form that emerges also
influences the framing of definitions and claims. For example, highly hierarchical,
secretive, or homogeneous groups are likely to perceive both identity and griev-
ances in a far more polarized fashlon.4i In homogeneous groups, new elites can
emerge, instilling and exploiting a hunger for "authenticity" within the group - a
yearning for an imagmed triumphalist past.
These "authenticity entrepreneurs" can help inaugurate social cascades that
culminate m extreme violence or even genocide.42 Indeed, the twentieth century's
35. See James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages
within the South African Mass Public, 44(2) AM. J. POL. Sci. 278, 289 (2000) (discussing linkage be-
tween social identity and intolerance among South African whites).
36. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNiTY 307-18 (2000) (discussing importance of social capital).
37 See Hudson, supra note 3, at 70 ('the network [of Islamists] produces the social-capital re-
wards for membership in addition to the instrumental agendas being put forth [c]odes of dress and
deportment are among the social cues and pressures that attract and consolidate commitment to the
cause[djunng repressive periods Islamists migrated into the subaltern and protected spaces ")
38. See ANDERSON, supra note 3.
39. See TILLY, supra note 7 (discussing "violent specialists"); Bruce Hoffman, The Logic of Suz-
cude Terrorism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2003, at 43 (quoting a journalist who observes that, "We
hardly ever find that the suicide bomber came by himself. There is always a handler.").
40. Hoffman, supra note 39.
41. See Cass R. Sunstem, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 429 (2002).
42. See TILLY, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing role of "political entrepreneurs" who "promote vio-
lence by activating boundaries, stones, and relations that have already accumulated histories of vio-
lence; by connecting already violent actors with previously nonviolent allies; by coordinating destruc-
tive campaigns; and by representing their constituencies through threats of violence"); Timur Kuran,
Ethnic Norms and their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1998) (discussing how small changes in perceptions and behavior prompted in part by signals from
2004
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experiences of genocide, from the Nazis in Germany to the Hutu machete-wielders
m Rwanda, often had roots in perceived oppression at the hands of "inauthentic"
others. 43 The lay-person Bin Laden's campaign against infidels m the West, ar-
ticulated m fatwahs" that traditional Islam allows only clerics to issue,45 and
Kach's calls for the expulsion of Palestimans, 46 along with other grim examples,
illustrate how secrecy, homogeneity, and the rhetoric of authenticity have pro-
moted violence against innocents.
B. The Failures of the Preemptive Approach and Its Critics
Unfortunately, the preemptive style, rooted in coercion and legal sanctions,
does little to dislodge the processes of social identity construction and social com-
parison that create a fertile ground for asymmetric violence. Because of this negli-
gible impact on underlying processes, the Administration's approach to disrupting
the social capital of groups practicing asymmetric violence is meffective. Indeed,
the punitive approach in some ways enhances the social capital available for
asymmetric violence, by sharpening the social comparisons that serve as the best
recruitmg tools for those committed to extremism.47
The recent war with Iraq offers an example of a transition that risks spiraling
into polarization. The problem started with the focus of Administration policy-
makers on efficiently achieving a military victory 48 Having geared their efforts
toward war against the Ba'athist regime, policymakers were ill-prepared for the
consequences of the regime's collapse. 49 In particular, policymakers failed to an-
ticipate grass-roots reactions to the power vacuum, such as the protracted cascade
social and political leaders can snowball into massive political upheavals and ethnic strife); Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstem, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)
(analyzing role of "availability entrepreneurs" m shaping public policy by leveraging stones and images
that are cognitively salient). Ironically, authenticity entrepreneurs often appropriate images and group
structure from those they identify as enemies. See, e.g., Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Ter-
ror, Islam, and Democracy, 13(2) J. DEMOCRACY 5, 7-8 (2002) (discussing the influence of Fascism
and Communism on theorists of violent Islamism, including Sayyid Quth); JOHN Es'osrro, UNHOLY
WAR: TERROR iN THE NAME OF ISLAM 20, 32 (2002) (noting Islamic strictures against killing noncom-
batants and Osama bm Laden's disregard of these rules); KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND
VIOLENCE N ISLAMiC LAW 338-39 (2001) (analyzing Qutb's revision of Islamic jundical doctrine on
tolerance for rebellion).
43. See CHuA, supra note 7.
44. See ESPOSITO, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. See Margulies, supra note 5.
47 See, e.g., Michael P O'Connor & Celia M. Rumani, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting
Burned By the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOzO L. REV.
1657, 1677 (2003) (noting that restrictive legislation enacted by the British to deter terrorism "alienated
broad swaths of the Northern Irish community, thereby providing assistance to. paramilitary
groups").
48. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Aftereffects: Reconstruction Policy; Looting Disrupts De-
tailed U.S. Plan to Restore Iraq, N.Y TiMEs, May 19,2003, at Al.
49. Id.
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of looting that damaged the nation's infrastructure. 50 The devastation deprived
post-Ba'athist civil authorities of essential tools of transition, such as the means to
provide power, water, and basic services to the populace. 5' These failures trig-
gered Iraqi resentment, hmderng the cause of effective transition. Analogous
problems with the preemptive approach beset issues of immigration regulation m
the wake of September 11, efforts to disrupt the human and financial capital of
groups practicing violence against civilians, and attempts to adjudicate violations
of the law of war by alleged terrorists.
The defects of the preemptive perspective cry out for an alternative. Unfortu-
nately, the alternative most vigorously pressed, what I call the state-skeptical ap-
proach, also suffers from significant flaws. The state-skeptical approach is wary of
any expansion of government power. For this reason, champions of the state-
skeptical approach oppose measures that would restrict the financial and human
capital available to organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, or Kach.52 However,
state-skeptics fail to acknowledge the increase in violence against innocents pro-
moted by the "authenticity entrepreneurs" leading such groups, the hateful stereo-
types authenticity entrepreneurs invoke to encourage violence, or the way in which
organizational hierarchy, homogeneity and secrecy facilitate violence. 53  State-
skeptics also forget that groups practicing violence against innocents provide pow-
erful rhetorical ammunition to advocates of the preemptive approach pressing for
punitive responses. This perverse dynamic encourages polarization, and prejudices
the prospects for peaceful transitions. Neither the preemptive nor the state-
skeptical view deals adequately with the challenges of a violent world.
II. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO THE PREEMPTIVE APPROACH: THE
TRANSITION-CENTERED VIEW
A transition-centered perspective is better able to respond to these challenges.
50. Id See also TILLY, supra note 7, at 134 (noting that opportunistic "seizure or damage of
property" is a hallmark of "low-capacity regimes, like the chaotic governance arrangements in Iraq
immediately after Saddam's fall, that exert little or no authority over the conduct of their constituents).
51. TILLY, supra note 7, at 134.
52. See Cole, supra note 4 (conceding that A] Qaeda is an organization so intrinsically devoted to
violence that regulation of its access to financial assistance may be appropriate, but offering no readily
cognizable standard that would allow courts to separate permissible from impermissible regulation, un-
plicitly conferring upon A] Qaeda the impunity conferred upon organizations such as Hamas).
53. Id. (Cole acknowledges that security is a legitimate concern of government. However, he re-
gards as suspect measures that crnmmalize the development of an institutional capability for violence.
Moreover, he argues that the First Amendment bars legislation prohibiting financial aid to organizations
like the Palestinian extremist group Hamas, which sponsor both violence and social services. In making
this argument, he ignores both the difficulty of regulating the accounting of organizations based outside
the United States, and the way in which the provision of social services legitimizes the violence perpe-
trated by such groups.) 1d. See Margulies, supra note 13 (discussing organizational synergies within
organizations providing both violence and social services); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective
Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 313, 330-32 (2000)
(explaining why regulation of transnational organizations practicing violence does not violent first
amendment); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcrofl, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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Unlike the preemptive perspective, the transition-centered strategy recognizes that
regime change - either national, regional, or global - is necessarily multilateral.
For this reason, a transition-centered strategy requires reflection about the oppor-
tunity costs uposed by the use of force. While force and legal sanctions have a
role, the transition-centered approach recognizes that using them can set in motion
a dynamic that the side using force cannot fully control. The transition-centered
approach recognizes that a more refined menu of responses is necessary to move
social identity, comparison, and capital away from violence and toward the rule of
law. At the same time, the transition-centered approach acknowledges that when
the state must use force or sanctions against entities practicing violence, it should
use only those measures tailored to the occasion, and should also support the
emergence of alternative entities committed to peaceful change.
A transition-centered approach stems from the substantial body of literature
striving to make sense of the governmental changes occurring throughout the
world in the last quarter-century. Considering regime changes in regions as dispa-
rate as Eastern and Southern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Afica,
scholars have identified crucial elements in the transition to democracy 54 These
dynamic models recognize that change is complex and unpredictable. As one
commentator has pointed out, "[D]emocratic evolution is [not] a steady process
that is homogeneous over time. temporal discontinuity is implicit.,
55
Creating and maintammg the right mix of elements is a matter of art and
chance, not science. The traditions, institutions, and actors that affect the process
of transition do not necessarily respond to the seeming certainties embodied in
formal law or the application of force. Indeed, this literature explicitly borrows
from conceptions of regime change developed over the centuries by political theo-
rists who viewed such change not as a function of structural or material forces, but
instead as the "contingent product of human collective action,' ' 6 which can movefrom despotism to democracy, or just as readily travel m the opposite direction.57
The account of democracy and the rule of law developed by the transition
theorists involve both popular participation and constraint on popular choices. The
transition theorists believe that human beings fulfill themselves when they partici-
pate m decisions regarding the well-being of the community 58 This expression of
self is dynamic, because no mechanical formula - no shorthand of class, race, or
economic interest - can conclusively determine how people speak and act as they
54. See Margulies, supra note 7.
55. See Dankwart A. Rustow, Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in
TRANSiTiONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 67.
56. See Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go? 53 SLAVIC REV 173, 174 (1994).
57 See id. ("There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more
dangerous to administer than to introduce a new system of things: for he who introduces it has all those
who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in those who might
profit from the new system. quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. VI, 21 (1950)).
58. See O'Donnell, supra note 7, at 113 (arguing that "the discharge of public duties is an enno-
bling activity" and that "dedication to the public good demands and nurtures the highest values").
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engage with the speech and action of others. Regimes must provide for this dy-
namic element, by permitting political expression, and providing avenues for
changing a particular government that incurs popular dissatisfaction. At the same
tune, the rule of law requires institutions such as courts that can check the popular
will m the name of abiding values.5 9
The multilateral transitions required to deal with worldwide issues of asym-
metric violence add new layers of uncertainty. Transitions are unpredictable even
when they hinge largely on the interaction of institutions and actors within a par-
ticular, relatively homogeneous state. When transitions involve ethnic conflict and
links with transnational communities, complexity and unpredictability increase ex-
ponentially
In multilateral transitions, developments within one country can exert a pow-
erful impact on events abroad. This impact is inescapable when, as in efforts to
combat asymmetric violence, one of the countries involved is the world's lone su-
perpower. Moreover, when the locus of transition resides in popular sentiments,
matters of tone and imagery become crucial. Such intangible concerns can be de-
cisive in the formation of social identities and the framing of social comparisons.
This dynamic process can make the difference between the spiraling violence of
polarization and the progress of transition.
While there is no single template for democracy or the rule of law, we can
create an operating definition. 60 A pathway to democracy must ensure input from
all stakeholders and offer protections against overreaching by government and
powerful private groups. The three central elements advanced by the transition
theorists for realizing this definition are 1) inclusion, 2) institutional repertoire;
and, 3) redress. I address each in turn in the following paragraphs.
A. Inclusion
The premuse that participation m politics is the hallmark of democracy mdi-
cates the importance of inclusion. All stakeholders must have the opportunity to
participate. 61 Multilateral transitions expand the pool of persons who should be
considered stakeholders in the process.
Inclusion is important not only for its own sake but because of its instrumen-
tal value. The lessons of social identity, comparison, and capital teach us that ex-
cluded groups despairing about gaming a stake in government may respond to the
urgings of authenticity entrepreneurs.62 In contrast, the shared stakes promoted by
59. See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 157-58 (2003) ("Constitutions were meant to tame the passions of the public, creating not
simply democratic but also deliberative government.").
60. See Tilly, supra note 7.
61. The importance of participation in transitions suggests the need for regulating institutions such
as markets that can exacerbate inequality. See Chua, supra note 7; Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Ta-
manaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (book review).
62. See generally William P Alford, Book Review, 113 HARV. L. REv 1677, 1704 (2000) (noting
that "ethnic tensions" can disrupt transition to democracy).
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inclusion give otherwise disparate parties an incentive to cooperate m shaping new
institutions.63 For example, in Northern Ireland, Catholics' resentment over their
exclusion from power fueled violence that in turn provided an easy justification for
the Umomsts' violent response." Recently, more inclusive processes have en-
couraged Umonists and Catholics to cooperate m a range of complex areas, includ-
Ing health, education, and finance.65 In Sn Lanka, while violence shows signs of
ebbing, decades-long marginalization of the predominantly Hindu Tamil minority
by the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese majority has prompted brutal attacks by
the extremist Tamil group the "Liberation Tigers." 66 The Sinhalese have responded
in kind.67 Stopping the violence will require inclusive measures such as progress
toward a federated system, allowing autonomy for both groups.68
The situations in Northern Ireland and Sr Lanka are examples of multilateral
transitions. In multilateral transitions, policymakers and actors m the legal system
must appreciate that they have multiple audiences. One audience will consist of
persons designated as members of the polity, such as citizens who can vote in na-
tional elections.69 Another audience consists of lawful permanent residents, who
cannot at present cast a vote m national elections but typically have or will have
the option of becoming citizens m the future, and who participate in the cultural,
social, and political life of the polity in a variety of other ways. 70 However, for a
nation engaged m a multilateral transition process with other countries, entities,
and institutions on a global level, the audience for government decisions is actually
far broader. It includes foreign governments and transnational communities with
members held together by ties of nationality, ethnicity, religion, or ideology.7 I
The expansion of audiences for multilateral transitions has significant unpli-
cations for global initiatives undertaken by the United States and other countries.72
In some cases, policymakers will seek the approval from international bodies such
as the United Nations, as the Bush Administration did both before and after the
63. See Tilly, supra note 7.
64. Id.
65. See Colin Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Local Meets Global: Transitional Justice in
Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 871, 886 (2003).
66. See Neil DeVotta, Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 84, 90-91
(Jan. 2002).
67 Id
68. See id. at 97 (arguing that solution to conflict will involve "a policy of credible devolution that
promotes Tamil self-determination").
69. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 177-81 (2002) (arguing that many legal distinctions between citi-
zens and lawful resident aliens stem from faulty premises).
70. Id
71. See Tilly, supra note 7 (discussing how emigre communities, such as Insh-Amencans who
supported the Irish Republican Army, can contribute to polarization); Philippe C. Schmitter, Civil Soci-
ety East and West, M CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMoCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
239, 250 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997) (discussing "transnational civil society").
72. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
(discussing the need for transnational mutuality and reciprocity in legal doctrine and practice).
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Iraq war .73  Other initiatives, such as global anti-terronsm efforts, also require
transnational agreements and cooperation. Aspects of United States law regarding
foreign nationals, such as refugee law and policy, incorporate provisions from in-
ternational law.74 In addition, policymakers in the United States operate within m-
formal dimensions of accountability. Initiatives by the Umted States, for example
those proposed as elements of antiterrorist enforcement, are subject to judgments
about legitimacy by an array of audiences including the members of transnational
nongovernmental organizations and grass-roots communities abroad. Consent and
meaningful participation by each group is often necessary to the success of the un-
derlying multilateral project.
The virtue of this kind of inclusion is evident even m ostensibly domestic
judgments. 75  Matters generally viewed as at the heart of the polity's self-
definition, such as the admission and removal of immigrants, can shape the effec
tiveness of multilateral transitions. For example, United States immigration poli-
cies that target undocumented immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia
may then intensify the view that anti-terronsin efforts constitute a "war against Is-
lam. 76 Sending a more inclusive message offers transnational communities a
stake in the success of anti-terronism efforts.
77
B. Institutional Repertoire
For transition theorists, inclusion also prompts a healthy development of so-
cial and political organizations that I have elsewhere called "institutional reper-
toire. Policymakers and theorists sometimes equate democracy with the occur-
rence of elections. However, elections are only one facet of a durable transition to
democracy. A repertoire of institutions, including courts, administrative agencies,
and nongovernmental organizations, is necessary.
A varied institutional repertoire of both state and nongovernmental organiza-
73. See Bob Deans, Bush UN. Speech Targets Iraq, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 12, 2002, at 18A.
74. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F Supp. 2d 584, 591-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grozds
sub nom., Beharry v. Ashcroft 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. In this fashion, policymakers recognized that domestic battles over inclusion, such as the civil
rights struggles of the mid-twentieth century United States, had an impact on transnational judgments of
legitimacy regarding the Cold War. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, in
CRITIcAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 110, 115-16 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1995) (discussing international controversies spurred by racial discrimination within the United States).
76. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, In Palastan, It's Jihad 101, in LONGITUDES AND ATTITUES:
EXPLORING THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 100, 101 (2002) (quoting student in Pakistan madrasa,
or religious school, who described Americans as "unbelievers [who] do not like to befriend Mus-
lims, and want to dominate the world with their power"); GUNARATNA, supra note 8, at 236 (dis-
cussing roots of resentment of American policies m Muslim world); Abbas Amanat, Empowered
Through Violence: The Reinventing oflslamic Extremism, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE
WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER ELEVEN 25, 51 (Strobe Talbot & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) ("The U.S.
could only benefit from promoting the cause of democracy and open society in the Muslim world and
encouraging voices of moderation, religious tolerance, and human rights.").
77 See infra text accompanying notes 99-118 (discussing immigration and multilateral transi-
tions).
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tions refines deliberation about public issues. It gives participants in the polity a
menu of opportunities for nonviolent engagement, 78 and a multitude of perspec-
tives for fostering reflection. 79 The "horizontal accountability" yielded by institu-
tional repertoire also nurtures commitments to both formal and informal separation
of powers, thus reducing the risk that any single institution will impose an oppres-
sive homogeneity 8
Experienced architects of transitions understand the importance of mstitu-
tional repertoire. In East Timor, for example, where crimes against humanity on
curred in the course of a bitter struggle with Indonesia for independence, the
United Nations has invested substantial time, effort, and funding to promote the
development of an independent judiciary.80 In Islamic countries, hopes for wansi-
tion have been bolstered by the development of indigenous women's organiza-
tions.
8 1
Authenticity entrepreneurs whose regimes and organizations embrace violent
exclusionary practices tend to narrow institutional repertoires. Authenticity entre-
preneurs can come in all shapes and sizes, from the genocidal demagogues of
Rwanda8 2 to government officials who invoke fear of violence committed by oth-
ers as a justification for expanding state power.8 3 Authenticity entrepreneurs ac
cumulate power not through the peaceful resolution of disputes, but through the
ratchetmg up of violence.
In a multilateral context involving disputes between groups, countries, or re-
gions, this narrowing of repertoires is often contagious. As the Israeli-Palestmian
conflict demonstrates, escalating violence discredits those seeking peaceful means
for resolving disputes.8 The result is not transition, but polarization. Confronting
78. See TILLY, supra note 7, at 120-27 (noting that ethnic or religious violence in areas such as
Northern Ireland has historically been linked with a narrow repertoire of occasions such as holidays that
sparked rival public demonstrations).
79. See Ziad Abu-Amr, Pluralism and the Palestinians, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1996, at 83, 90-91
(noting that the Palestinian Legislative Council has the potential to operate as counter-weight to ex-
cesses within the Palestinian Authority).
80. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1223 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/re-
ports/2002/sgrepO2.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
81. See Janine Astrid Clark & Jillian Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism m
Islamist Parties, 35 COMP. POL. 293 (2003).
82. See TILLY, supra note 7.
83. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concumng) (observing that "emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies"); see also Cole,
supra note 4 (criticizing policies of Attorney General Ashcroft); Akram & Johnson, supra note 19; Lely
T. Djuharl, President Hints She Will Back Vigilante Teams, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 2003, at A3 (quot-
ing Indonesian president as suggesting that the mobilization of armed groups of citizens, which has al-
ready led to substantial human rights violations in the last 5 years in East Timor and elsewhere, may be
necessary to deal with separatists in Aceh); Jane Perlez, Indonesia Says Drive Against Separatists Will
Not End Soon, N.Y. TiMEs, July 9, 2003, at A3 (discussing United States efforts to deal with human
rights abuses of Indonesian military, complicated by need for military's cooperation in anti-terrorist
efforts).
84. See Andrew Kydd & Barbara F Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics ofExtremist Vio-
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violence, policymakers aid the cause of transition by deterring authenticity entre-
preneurs, nurturng alternatives, and guarding against their own surrender to au-
thenticity entrepreneurship's temptations.
C. Redress
When authenticity entrepreneurs twist transition into polarization, redress is
crucial in putting the process back on track. Redress signals both a commitment to
inclusion, and an "all-clear" for those brave souls willing to invest their time, ef-
fort, and well-being in the development of a rich and varied institutional reper-
toire.8 5 In this sense, remedies to uphold the claims of the weak against the power-
ful are a bulwark of democracy and the rule of law.8 6 A transition without redress
is inherently unstable - a camouflaged continuation of the status quo that will
eventually give way to violence. However, demands for complete redress can also
destabilize the transition agenda.
Transitional redress is most effective in conjunction with commitments to
both inclusion and institutional repertoire. To serve inclusion, avenues for redress
should be the product of dialogue. For example, debates about reparations in the
United States have brought to the surface subjects submerged in generations of op-
pression, such as corporate complicity with slavery. Transitions that approach re-
dress in a top-down fashion, categorically ruling out classes of remedies, suppress
conversations that are difficult, but necessary. Consider here the eventual failure
of the Oslo peace process in the Middle East: the politicians that signed the Oslo
accord sought to glide by wrenching issues such as settlements and the return of
refugees to Israel. When these crucial issues re-emerged, they combined with fail-
ures of leadership on both sides to fuel the polarization of the second Palestinian
intifada.8 7
Institutional repertoire also plays a central role in transitional redress. Truth
and reconciliation commissions developed in Latin America, South Africa, and
elsewhere to supplement and supplant legalistic vehicles for redress such as repara-
tions and crimmal prosecution of human rights violators.88 Such innovations may
be particularly appropriate as touchstones for transition in multi-ethnic conflict, m
which authenticity entrepreneurs on both sides have fostered a discourse of stereo-
typed narratives. Allowing people at the grass roots to break through those narra-
tives and model a different kind of conversation for the future can consolidate tran-
lence, 56 INT'L ORG. 263 (2002).
85. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 34,
36-37 (noting that democracy must "include an intertemporal dimension: the generalized expectation
that. freedoms will continue into an indefinite future").
86. See id. at 45 (noting many states with ostensibly democratic elections still deprive people of
rights and participation, citing examples including "[t]he rights of battered women to sue their husbands
and of peasants to obtain a fair trial against their landlords, the inviolability of domiciles in poor
neighborhoods, and in general the right of the poor and various mmonties to decent treatment and fair
access to public agencies and courts").
87. See Usher, supra note 30.
88. See Teitel, supra note 14, at 902-03.
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sitional momentum. However, redress of material inequality should accompany
the symbolic and affective benefits of truth and reconciliation commissions. In an
emerging democracy such as South Africa, persistent economic inequality has
eroded some of the good will accorded post-apartheid reforms, with a rising num-
ber of blacks telling pollsters that their lives were better under apartheid. 9
A pragmatic repertoire of remedies is also vital because the search for perfect
redress can undermine transition. In some Eastern Bloc countries, for example,
"lustration" - the exposure and prosecution of ex-Communist officials - became a
kind of fetish for ostensible reformers such as Solidarity once they acceded to
power. The result was a neglect of other policy goals, such as economic develop-
ment.90 In dealing with the remnants of a dictatorship, punishment of key figures
will send a powerful message of transition, while sparing people who had little
choice but to serve the regime and whose help is required for a successful transi-
tion.9i Indeed, in a multilateral transition involving at least two organizations or
entities, the demand of one or more sides for complete redress may foster not tran-
sition, but increased polarization.
III. APPLYING A TRANSITION-CENTERED APPROACH
The criteria of inclusion, institutional repertoire, and redress can mform law
and policy on multilateral transitions. Employing a transition-centered analysis
can illustrate the limits of relying on force and legal sanctions. Yet, a transition-
centered analysis can also provide a clearer case for state intervention to level the
playing field between groups practicing violence and groups seeking non-violent
alternatives. This section explores the relevance of transition-centered analysis for
three problems related to transnational asymmetric violence: 1) immigration policy
after September 11, 2) the regulation of organizations that practice violence against
civilians; and 3) the adjudication of alleged violations of international humanitar-
ian law.
A. Immigration Enforcement after September II
Viewing the struggle against asymmetric violence as a process of multilateral
transition can furnish support for a re-frammg of bodies of law traditionally left to
the discretion of the government, such as laws governing immigration. As noted
above, the relevant audience for United States immigration law is not merely do-
89. See Robert Mattes, South Africa: Democracy Without the People? J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2002,
at 22, 32; Brandon Hamber, Dealing with the Past: Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery
in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1074, 1074-87 (2003) (discussing disap-
pointment felt by some victims of apartheid in work of South African truth and reconciliation commis-
sion).
90. See Denise V Powers & James H. Cox, Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Sat-
isfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV 617, 627-28
(1997) (discussing disillusionment engendered by undue focus on rooting out former Communist func-
tionaries).
91. Id.
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mestic m nature, but transnational.92 Perceptions of unfairness shared by the trans-
national audience undercut the legitimacy of United States law, and the effective-
ness of United States antiterronst policy The use by courts of international in-
struments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child to inform the interpretation of
statutory rights under United States immigration law would bolster international
perceptions of the legitunacy of United States law by promoting the values of in-
clusion, institutional repertoire, and redress.9 3
Current United States immigration jurisprudence gives plenary substantive
authority to Congress and broad enforcement discretion to the executive branch.94
Substantial authority and discretion are not necessarily inconsistent with the multi-
lateral transition paradigm.95 However, the degree of authority exercised by the
political branches in the United States over immigration can also frustrate multilat-
eral transitions.
This frustration stems from the way m which the authority over immigration
exercised m the United States by the political branches of government lends itself
to the scapegoating practiced by governmental authenticity entrepreneurs. When
government faces challenging problems, officials can target immigrants.9 6 Princi-
ples of liberty and equality that typically constram the government are. often not
available to check such measures m the immigration context. 97 The Justice De-
partment's effort in the wake of September 11 to detain and deport undocumented
Immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia and conduct minigration pro-
ceedings in secret was a product of this lack of accountability 98
92. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force Mar. 23, 1976, available
at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/accpr.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
94. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimnation Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
95. The ability of sovereign states to define themselves through criteria for entry preserves an m-
ternational repertoire of heterogeneity, providing useful check on the homogenizing force of trends
toward globalization of culture and commerce. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). Furthermore, some authority over entry is necessary
to deter authenticity entrepreneurs and their organizations outside the polity from using the immigration
system to stage violent attacks on the polity's population and institutions. The ability of the September
II attackers to "game the system" through the use and abuse of student and visitors' visas demonstrates
the importance and difficulty of immigration enforcement.
96. See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 33-38 (2001) (discussing invocation in
public discourse of "us versus them" stereotypes that justify restrictive immigration measures).
97. See Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that Congress has "plenary
power" over immigration); Alemikoff, supra note 68 (critiquing plenary power doctrine); Linda Kelly,
Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of lmmigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 185 (1998);
Linda S. Bosmak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv
1047, 1130-33 (1994) (analyzing disparities in First Amendment rights between aliens and citizens).
98. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002) (critiquing detention of immi-
grants after attacks); Margulies, Uncertain Arrnalssupra note 13; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Ter-
rorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (describing the marginalization of particular communities after
September 11); Akram & Johnson, supra note 19. See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutionai? 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (arguing that gov-
ernment officials should fashion criteria for national emergencies justifying relaxation of constitutional
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The government's reliance after September 11 on nationality, ethncity, and
religion as criteria for immigration enforcement has uprooted many persons with
no connection to asymmetric violence. 99 For example, the government's registra-
tion program, which requires Immigrants from designated countries with substan-
tial Muslim populations to register with the government, will result in the deporta-
tion of thousand of Pakistanis who are not documented, but have often been living
and working in this country for a number of years.1°° Many of these immigrants
have been performing low-paid jobs that in effect subsidize American consum-
ers. I0' Many immigrant children also find themselves in this hapless group.
10 2
These children, who often came to this country at a young age, had no control over
their parents' decision to seek to emigrate from their country or origin. The gov-
ernment's policy of registration followed by deportation fails to take into account
the ties immigrants have developed in this country, the value of the work they have
performed, or the hardship immigrant children would undergo in returning to a
country that they barely know.'
0 3
In addition to its direct human cost, the harshness of post-September I I im-
migration policy frustrates the process of multilateral transition required to reduce
the threat of asymmetric violence. A harsh immigration policy buttresses the
widespread view in the Middle East and South Asia that the United States has tar-
geted Muslims. Repeated disavowals by the Administration of an intent to trigger
a "clash of civilizations" have little resonance when juxtaposed with the spectacle
of thousands of displaced people. 104 In a worst-case scenario, such policies make
the "clash of civilizations" a self-fulfilling prophecy, alienating crucial communi-
ties abroad.
A greater judicial role in reviewing iunmigration decisions in light of interna-
tional agreements could remedy the myopia that afflicts current Administration
regimes, and be held accountable for defending those criteria and implementing them consistently).
99. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F Supp.2d 94, 98 n.4
(D.D.C. 2002) (noting government concession that many aliens detained or deported after September II
had no terrorist ties), rev'd on other grounds, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Stephen J. Ellmann, Ra-
cial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 675, 724-26 (2003) (discussing lack of concrete
information about terrorism yielded by government's immigration measures); Adam Liptak, The Pur-
suit of Immigrants in America After Sept. 11, N.Y. TiMES, June 8,2003, at 4.
100. Cathenne Utley, Fear and Loathing of US Immigrant Rule, BBC World Service News, Jan.
27, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/2698467.stm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
101. See HONIG, supra note 95.
102. Id
103. Post-September II immigration restrictions have also had an adverse impact on other groups,
such as Mexican immigrants who, before the attacks, had hoped for greater coordination and coopera-
tion between the United States and Mexico on opportunities to earn legal status. See Kevin R. Johnson,
Beyond Belonging: Challenging the Boundaries of Nationality: September II and Mexican Immigrants:
Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REv 849, 858-59 (2003) (discussing new obstacles
for approval of visas for prospective Mexican immigrants after attacks).
104. While the Administration states the law accurately in asserting that undocumented immi-
grants have no legal expectation of remaining in the United States, these assertions are unconvincing as
a policy matter. Given the small percentage of undocumented immugrants from South Asia or the Mid-
dle East, policy that did not single out these individuals would be at least as effective from an immi-
gration enforcement perspective.
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policy and the polarization thereby produced. Recent Supreme Court precedent
provides a narrow window for such efforts to broaden the institutional repertoire
available in immigration law, particularly on the issue of executive discretion.'
05
At least one venturesome court has sought to deal with the problems of displace-
ment of immigrant children and families created by draconian pre-September 11
legislative measures by reading into legislation the anti-displacement mandate in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the Interna-
tional Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).' °6 While the Court's effort
foundered on appeal because of both doctrinal and procedural obstacles,'0 7 this re-
sult does not preclude a renewed effort centering on post-September 11 enforce-
ment actions by the executive.
Courts could read the statute authorizing removal of undocumented immi-
grants to allow for a hearing on the issue of disruption to families and hardship to
immigrant children.10 8 This initiative would also provide a form of redress for
immigrants used as low-cost labor in the United States economy and then cast
aside because authenticity entrepreneurs in government reacting to the trauma of
September 11 needed to "round up the usual suspects. Alternatively, courts could
focus on inclusion directly by holding that the clear intent to target immigrants
from the Middle East and South Asia, the discrimiatory effect of such targeting,
and the lack of fit between such targeting and bona fide antiterrorism efforts, fall
within the narrow ambit of selective enforcement claims that the courts would en-
tertain i the immigration context.
While significant difficulties, including the courts' tendency to view any os-
tensible anti-terronsm measure as a function of the war and foreign affairs power,
would attend such a judicial approach, the effort is worth making. Even if unsuc
cessful, a case could provide a focus for mobilizing people and narratives that
105. See Reno v. Amencan-Arab Anti-Discnimnation Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (argung for
wide prosecutonal discretion, but suggesting that some cases may be sufficiently egregious to warrant
judicial intervention),
106. See Beharry v. Reno, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) citing CCPR Article 23(i) (noting the fun-
damental nature of the family) and CRC Article 3 (asserting that best interests of child should be the
"primary consideration" of courts, agencies, and legislatures)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Be-
harry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Maria v. McElroy, 68 F Supp. 2d 206, 219-20
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing role of international law in determining whether immigration legislation
that expanded grounds for deportation should be retroactive); Sonja Start & Lea Brilmayer, Family
Separation as Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213 (2003) (discussing Be-
harry and Maria district court opinions). See Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L.
REv. 943 (2001) (discussing limitations of conceptions of family in American immigration law); Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of US. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23 (1997)
(analyzing invidious gender consequences of United States immigration policy).
107. See Beharry v. Reno, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
108. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv 1103 (1990); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481
(2003) (invalidating sodomy law as invasion of privacy, citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1981), which held that anti-sodomy laws were invalid under European Convention on Human
Rights).
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could prompt legislative or administrative reform.10 9 Legal reform would promote
the good will of transnational constituencies vital for a multilateral transition in the
struggle against asymmetric violence.
B. Regulating Organizations That Practice Violence
A multilateral transition approach can also help shape the legal and policy
landscape populated by terrorist organizations and governments seeking to combat
terrorist threats. Governments can appropriately regulate the flow of human and
financial capital to transnational authenticity entrepreneurs who practice violence.
A multilateral approach would recognize, however, that the application of legal
sanctions is merely one element in a repertoire of responses. Over-reliance on le-
gal sanctions can promote polarization and provide a vehicle for government offi-
cials tempted by the advantages yielded by authenticity entrepreneurship. A transi-
tion-centered approach would restrain government officials here and abroad who
Invoke the threat of terrorism as a basis for repressive measures. In addition, a
transition-centered approach would seek out and support indigenous, inclusive al-
ternatives to the violent enterprises of authenticity entrepreneurs.
Authenticity entrepreneurs in government or oppositional roles who practice
organized violence undermine core transition values. The violence they authorize
and promote damages inclusion, often targeting civilians on the basis of ethnicity,
nationality, or religion. For example, in the Israeli-Palestmian conflict, one op-
positional group has targeted Jews,' i0 while another group seeks to evict Palestini-
ans.II Violence against innocents also narrows institutional repertoire. As the Is-
raeli-Palestmian conflict demonstrates, the use of violence on one side bolsters the
credibility of those on the other side who wish to reply in kind, and discredits
moderates.' i2 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers convincing evidence that the
trauma wrought by violence multiplies claims for redress on each side of a multi-
lateral transition, creating further hurdles for a peaceful outcome.
The polarizing violence sought by authenticity entrepreneurs emerges not
only from substantive grievances, but also from an infrastructure of social capital
common to most "coordinated destruction." '' i Whatever the sentiments of those
109. Reform could occur through special legislative action to provide relief to the substantial
Pakistani undocumented community. Concerns about hardship and fairness produced significant legis-
lation of this kind in the 1990's. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, H.R.
2607, 105' h Cong. (1997) (enacted), discussed in Kelly, supra note 105. Administrative reform could
occur through adopting a regime of deliberative enforcement that focused on the opportunity costs, such
as alienation and resentment, of mechanical application of immigration law to communities selected
on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion.
110. See LA GUARDIA, supra note 29, at 295 (noting that the Palestinian extremist group Hamas
claims that, "Tlhe Jews were the instigators of the First World War, which led to the destruction of the
Islamic caliphate, and set up the United Nations as a means of ruling the world").
111. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9 (discussing Kach).
112. See Andrew Kydd & Barbara F Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Vio-
lence, 56 INT'L ORG. 263 (2002).
113. See TILLY, supra note 7.
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persons persuaded by authenticity entrepreneurs to destroy themselves m order to
kill others, executing attacks requires a core cadre of "violent specialists," who
have a vested interest m continuing their activities and discouraging other forms of
dispute resolution. This cadre performs an array of organizational tasks, including
selecting a target, making explosives, producing the bomber's valedictory video-
tape, conferng financial rewards on the bomber's family, and soliciting financial
contributions to the enterprise, sometimes from unwitting donors. 114 Violent spe-
cialists often require secrecy, and rarely sponsor reflection. " 5
To allow each side of a multilateral dispute to foster inclusion and develop a
richer institutional repertoire, governments must stem the flow of human and fi-
nancial capital to violent authenticity entrepreneurs. The United States Congress,
for example, has prohibited the provision of "material support" to organizations
such as Kach and Hamas designated by the Secretary of State as pursuing a strat-
egy of asymmetric violence. 1 6 Such legislation is permissible if it does not bar
purely political speech, but instead focuses on the organization's command struc-
ture for acts of violence, its solicitation of financial services and support, and its
provision of logistical assistance and specialized instruction such as explosives
training."17
Stemming the flow of human and financial capital to groups practicing vio-
lence has aided the progress of multilateral transitions in places as diverse as
Northern Ireland and Sr Lanka. 1 8 Regulating capital flows prompts greater trans-
parency in fund-raising and accounting, denting the secrecy and deception central
to violent organizations. Regulation of capital flows can encourage transnational
communities that support such organizations to become more vigilant, asking
probing questions about the activities funded by their contributions.i" 9 When or-
ganizations cannot furnish satisfactory answers, underwriting communities may
start new organizations that promote nonviolent reform.
However, regulating capital flows to organizations practicing asymmetric vio-
lence also has perils. In some cases, government designations of groups as terror-
1st organizations may be hasty or inaccurate. Such "false positives" can create ir-
remediable harm, particularly where organizations, such as Al Barakaat in
Somalia, are central to the economy of a country or region. 120 Investigations of
114. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9.
115. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2003).
117 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9n Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcrofl, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). But see Cole, supra note 4 (arguing
that statute violates first amendment).
118. See Thomas L. Friedman, Lessons from Sri Lanka, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A17 (noting
moderating force on LTTE "Tigers" group in Sn Lanka when "Tamil diaspora started choking off
their funds").
119. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30-43 (1970) (discussing role of "voice" in curing group com-
placency).
120. See Margulies, supra note 13, at 510 (noting lack of fairness in Somalia episode); Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: Sanctions; How Blocking Assets Erased a Wisp of Prosperity, N.Y
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suspected groups may be unduly mtrusive, such as the F.B.I. raids on Muslim or-
ganizations m the Spring of 2002 that have thus far yielded no indictments, but
created substantial fear and resentment in the community 121 Statutes that expand
the threshold of culpability by prohibiting activity such as "material support" of
terrorist organizations can also be vague as applied, chilling protected activities
such as legal defense or expressions of solidarity from members of the public.
122
In such cases of overreaching, anti-terronst enforcement becomes a tool to enhance
the authority of authenticity entrepreneurs within the government.
Regulation of capital flows to organizations engaged m multilateral disputes
can also prompt polarization if transnational constituencies perceive regulation as
favoring an oppressive status quo. By definition, such regulation does not target
friendly governments that may pursue inequitable policies subsidized directly or
indirectly by the regulating country's taxpayers, such as the Israeli government's
expansion of settlements on the West Bank. To rectify such imbalances, regulating
countries must use their leverage to promote more equitable policies on the part of
friendly regimes.
A pragmatic approach to redress is also important in regulating organizational
violence. If a regulating government erroneously classifies an organization as a
terrorist group, it should seek to compensate persons and entities affected by the
resulting dislocation. By the same token, to consummate a transition, an organiza-
tion that has practiced violence should be prepared to acknowledge the harm it has
caused and implement procedures that reflect accountability, transparency, and a
commitment to non-violence. Groups that take this route should be eligible to seek
a legal safe harbor. This legal device, which the approach suggested m this Article
would refer to as "transition relief," would operate much like bankruptcy, limitmg
claims for organizations that sought to make a fresh start. Groups that reject such
transitional steps should not expect relief from regulation. 123
The justifications for regulation and redress regarding organizations do not
extend to extralegal remedies. The "targeted killing" or assassination of suspected
practitioners of violence by government, including the Israeli government's killing
TIMEs, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10 (discussing hardship in Somalia caused by asset freeze); See Nat'i Coun-
cil of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Secretary of
State had to provide organization with an opportunity to present evidence demonstrating it does not
support terrorism prior to freezing assets).
121. See Panel, Civil Liberties and Muslims in the U.S. After 9-11: What is Really Happening?,
Sponsored by Karamah and the Journal of Law and Religion, El Hibn Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
(Jan. 3, 2003); See Douglas Farah & John Mintz, U.S. Trails Va. Muslim Money, Ties; Clues Raise
Questions About Terror Funding, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2002, at At (quoting members of Muslim com-
munity who criticized what they viewed as heavy-handed government methods).
122. See Margulies, supra note 5, at 203-06.
123. To ensure that redress is also effective to curb abuses by friendly governments, survivors of
such excesses should be able to pursue claims under statutes such as the Alien Tort Claims Act to hold
multinational corporations accountable for participating in or benefiting from repressive practices. See
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, III YALE L.J.
443 (2001) (arguing that multinational corporations should be held accountable for human rights viola-
tions resulting from enterprises over which they have control).
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of Hamas leaders, 124 suffers from the same flaws as killings carred out by transna-
tional oppositional organizations. Such summary measures do not comfortably fit
within the procedural safeguards of law enforcement, the temporal and geographic
bounds of most wars, 12 or the obligations to a civilian population undertaken by
an occupying power.126 Targeted killings shrink institutional repertoire by decreas-
ing the stake of each side in peaceful means of dispute resolution. They also un-
dermine inclusion, because they tend to affect not only specifically intended tar-
gets, but also civilians from the same communities who happen to be in the way.
Finally, the regulation of organizational asymmetric violence must also entail
assistance to nonviolent organizations. Such assistance expands institutional reper-
toire, and combats the exclusion that can stem from blanket assumptions about
transnational communities.127  For example, conventional wisdom in the West
seems to hold that Islamic parties offer women few opportunities for voice, and
reject democratic values. 128  However, the reality is far more complex. Women
have been able to develop substantive roles in many Islamic organizations, and
124. See Laia El-Haddad, Israel Continues Assassination Policy, Aljazeeranet at
http://english.aljazeera.netlNR/exeres/75B25D3C-IFF3-4F75-9B1E-9E7AI60FODBF.hin (Jan. 4,
2003) (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
125. See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War 25 HARe. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457
(2002) (discussing uneasy fit of both terrorism and anti-terrorism enforcement within "war" or "crime"
paradigms).
126. Some experts defending the Israeli government's use of "targeted killings" argue that the
situation in the West Bank and Gaza is tantamount to what in the law of war is called "belligerent occu-
pation, under which substantial parts of the disputed temtory are under the control of the enemy. A
state of belligerent occupation would give the occupying force more leeway to take lethal action against
suspected enemy personnel, subject to the constraints of proportionality and reasonableness. Even un-
der this more permissive standard, however, substantial doubt exists as to whether the IDF has taken
into account the likelihood of civilian casualties resulting from targeted killings. See generally Kath-
leen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 934, 943-44 (2003) (citing Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, Sec. Ill, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539). Cf Emanuel Gross, Democracy m
the War Against Terrorism - The Israeli Experience, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1161, 1194 (2002) (arguing
that the IDF has acted consistently with proportionality and reasonableness). In Gaza in the Summer of
2002, for example, more than ten civilians died when IDF aircraft attacked an apartment complex to kill
Hamas military leader. Other punitive measures pursued by the IDF including the demolition of the
houses occupied by the families of accused terrorists, are equally troubling. While the legality of tar-
geted killing is sub judice at the Supreme Court of Israel, the Court has upheld the practice of house
demolitions. The Court's holding, while requiring some showing of a link between other residents of
the household and the alleged terrorist, accepts the military's contention that house demolitions have a
"deterrent" effect on violence. See, e.g., Alamarn v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip, HCJ 2722/92
(IDF commander has discretion to destroy single-family home if one occupant has committed terronst
act, but may lack authority to order destruction of multiple-unit dwelling absent proof that residents of
separate units were complicit in behavior). However, both the law of occupation, with its limits on col-
lective punishment, and the msights of the transition scholars, demonstrate the contrary. Each holds
expressly or implicitly that over-broad punitive actions will merely galvanize occupied communities to
engage in further violence.
127 See Adrien Katherine Wing, The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism, 31
CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 383, 392-94 (1999) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of disparate Pales-
tinian civil society).
128. See Volpp, supra note 4 (critiquing this view as essentialist).
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scholars have articulated visions of Islamic law that embrace women's rights.129
The same can be said for democratic values. Governments can nurture such efforts
not only with direct assistance, but with reforms in their own policies that respond
to legitimate grievances.13
0
C. Adjudicating Violations of the Law of War and Crimes against Humanity
Few matters since September 11 have excited more scholarly commentary
than issues regarding the appropriate forum and procedures for the adjudication of
alleged violations of the law of war. In the wake of the United States-led military
intervention in Iraq, analogous questions have begun to arise about the adjudica-
tion of alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Saddam Hussein and his
subordinates. Much of the debate has conflated issues regarding the appropriate
forum for such decisions and the fairness of procedures applicable In a particular
forum, such as the military tribunals established by the current Admimstration.
1 3 1
129. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Janine A. Clark & Jillian
Schwedler, Who Opened the Door? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties, 35 COMP. PoLITICs 293
(April 2003); Heiner Bielefeldt, "Western Versus "Islamic Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique
of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights, 28 POL. THEORY 90, 109-12 (2000). See
generally NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICAN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY
62-68 (2003) (discussing gender, political, and religious equality in Islamic polities).
130. In the Middle East, for example, Israel's creation by the United Nations offfered both neces-
sary redress for the worldwide persecution of Jews and sanctuary from future persecution, See LA
GUARDIA, supra note 29, at 360 (noting that "the U.N. partitioned Palestine to create a Jewish state as
an act of expiation for the Holocaust") However, it also displaced significant numbers of Palestinians;
George E. Bisharat, Lana Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 467 (1994) (discussing history of displacement of Palestinians); Benny Mors, The Rejection,
NEw REPUBLIC, April 21, 2003, at 31 (book review) (critiquing persistent hold of authenticity entrepre-
neurs over Palestinian nationalist efforts, while acknowledging that Israeli government policies suc-
ceeded in "ultimately displacing more than half the Palestinians from their homes" inside Israel). Such
actions have compounded processes of social comparison that increase the credibility of violent authen-
ticity entrepreneurs on each side. Crucial steps taken by Israel, in conjunction with reforms undertaken
by the Palestinian Authority, could include an apology for the government's role in spumng the outflow
of refugees in 1948, compensation for Palestinians displaced at that time, and the recognition of en-
hanced but not absolute immigration rights for Arab Israelis seeking to sponsor relatives, including
refugees from 1948 and their descendants, for lawful residence. Such fimily reunification policy,
phased in over time, would be limited version of "right of return" for Palestinians that would also
preserve the sanctuary for Jews contemplated in the United Nations' creation of the State of Israel; In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, Article 12(4) (1966)
(providing that refugees wishing to return to their country of origin have right to repatriation, although
countries of origin can derogate from their obligations upon declaration of state of emergency); Cf
Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and Customary International Law, 29 DENVER J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 115, 142 (2001); John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and Right of Return, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 171 (1998).
131. For sampling of this extensive debate, compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249 (2002) (arguing for validity of
Administration's Military Order establishing military tribunals); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstem,
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261, 274-75 (2002) (discussing statutory authority for military tribunals); Kenneth Anderson, What to
Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United
States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 613-20
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A transition-centered approach would disaggregate those issues. In the realm of
procedure, it would consider whether safeguards exist to assure the international
community that a forum's determinations are fair. To resolve issues of forum se-
lection, a transition-centered approach would consider the stake of a particular
state m adjudicating such cases, as well as the accuracy and reliability of the forum
proposed. 132
Critics have rightly focused on the problematic nature of procedures for the
military jurisdiction of the tribunals, which encompass not merely violations of the
law of war such as the killing of civilians or the conduct of hostilities by forces act-
mg without appropriate identification, but also expressions of status such as mem-
bership in Al Qaeda. 133 This broad jurisdiction takes the tribunals far beyond the
adjudication of cases involving "enemy belligerents" engaged m specific opera-
tions directed at United States persons or property. 134 A second procedural prob-
lem is the treatment of counsel for the accused, who are subjected to monitoring of
conversations with clients. 35 Thirdly, Administration sources have indicated in
undocumented conversations with journalists that core guarantees of the criminal
justice system, such as access to exculpatory evidence, might be unavailable. 36
Finally, the Administration has resisted any express provision for judicial re-
view,137 and has argued, thus far successfully, that the courts lack jurisdiction over
proceedings at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 138 These
(2002) (arguing that military tribunals are appropriate under international law); Neal K. Katyal & Laur-
ence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259 (2002)
(arguing that express legislative authority, including declaration of war, is required); Jonathan Turley,
Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in Madisoman Democ
racy, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 649, 735-39 (2002) (critiquing Quirm); Diane F Orentlicher & Robert
Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War- Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2002) (critiquing Quirm).
132. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1869-71 (2003) (discussing institutional aspects of interaction be-
tween human and constitutional rights).
133. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). cf Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain
Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39, 374 (March 21, 2002).
134. See Exparte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (authorizing military tribunals in cases involving "en-
emy belligerents").
135. See Jonathan D. Glater, A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights in Cases Tried By Tribunals, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 13, 2003, at A18.
136. See Philip Shenon, White House Called Target of Plane Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at
A7 (reporting that alleged "twentieth hijacker" Zacanas Moussaoui would be tried before military tri-
bunal if civilian courts required government to grant Moussaoui access to detainee allegedly in posses-
sion of exculpatory information).
137 No provision for judicial review is contained in the Military Order. Counsel to the President
Alberto Gonzalez has indicated that the Adminmistration believes that habeas corpus review is available,
although the Administration has argued that the applicable standard on habeas review is exceedingly
deferential. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh g and reh'g en banc denied,
Pagels v. Morrison, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 13717 (4th Cir. July 9, 2003) (supporting Administration's
position).
138. See Rasul v. Bush, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4760 (S. Ct. June 28, 2004) (holding that federal courts
had jurisdiction under the habeas statute to hear petitions from Guatanamo detamees).Cf Paul Schiff
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problems undermine the global legitimacy of the military tribunals established by
the Administration.
Critics of the Administration have combined concern about these procedural
problems with concern about the appropriateness of military tribunals as a forum
for adjudicating cases involving alleged terrorist activity. They argue that either
civilian courts or international tribunals are more appropriate.139 In particular, crit-
ics assert that judges in military tribunals are intrinsically biased, because they re-
main part of the military command structure. 140
Arguments that military tribunals are per se inappropriate ignore contrary evi-
dence and countervailing values. Historical evidence suggests that when the right
procedures are m place, military tribunals can make accurate determinations of
culpability In Ex Parte Qurin, for example, a military tribunal convened during
World War II found after a three-week trial that the defendants had undertaken a
mission on orders of the German High Command to operate clandestinely in the
United States for the purpose of harming persons and property essential to the war
effort. 141 While scholars have criticized aspects of the role played by the civilian
judiciary in the case, 142 no scholar has expressed doubt about the accuracy of the
military tribunal's finding.
14 3
The Framers of the Constitution recognized that military tribunals had devel-
oped a tradition of adjudicating violations of the law of war, and found no conflict
between performance of that specified task and a sound constitutional order. 44 In-
deed, for the detainees at Guantanamo Bay captured on the battlefield, a military
tribunal with a grasp of the exigencies of combat is arguably a far more appropriate
forum than a civilian or international court lacking such knowledge. For cases re-
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 459-73 (2002) (arguing that juns-
dictional distinction between cases within U.S. temitory and cases outside that terntory has been ren-
dered obsolete).
139. See, e.g., Laura M. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407 (2002).
140. See ORENTLICHER & GOLDMAN, supra note 131, at 660.
141. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S., at 20-21.
142. See TURLEY, supra note 130, at 735-39 (discussing series of ex parte contacts between Jus-
tices and Administration).
143. See id. (Two of the Quirm petitioners introduced evidence at their trial that they had with-
drawn from the conspiracy by contacting the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They sought to with-
draw, however, only after attempting to buy the silence of Coast Guardsman who had observed their
surreptitious landing in the United States. Under the law of conspiracy, withdrawal is an affirmative
defense to liability for subsequent acts committed by co-conspirators, but not complete defense to the
charge of conspiracy itself); U.S. v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2000). Cf Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1379 (2003) (arguing that withdrawal is appropriately
only partial defense because public interest favors deterrence of initial entry into conspiracy). The ef-
forts of the two defendants, while not sufficient to convince the finder of fact to acquit, ultimately re-
sulted in pardons dispensed by the President. TURLEY, supra note 130.
144. See Exparte Qurin, 317 U.S., at 31 (noting the case of British Army Major John Andre, who
was tried and convicted before a military commission convened by George Washington in 1780 after
being apprehended in disguise and with false papers within United States lines on mission to contact
the traitorous General Benedict Arnold).
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moved from the battlefield paradigm involving collateral activities such as fund-
raising for Al Qaeda, military tribunals may not be appropriate. 45 However, the
analysis of appropriateness should turn on procedural issues such as the scope of
jurisdiction asserted in the President's Order, not speculation regarding the inher-
ent nature of the forum.146
The usefulness of disaggregatmg choice of forum and procedural concerns is
even more apparent when one considers the flaws of a proposed alternative such as
an international tribunal for alleged Al Qaeda combatants apprehended on the bat-
tlefield. Problems with an international tribunal in this context emerge in the in-
terpretation of governing law and the choice of law rules that such a tribunal might
adopt. The Geneva Convention provides that combatants without uniforms may
still be considered lawful if they have taken up arms "spontaneously" to resist an
invading military force, and respect the laws of war. 147 A federal court has found
that members of the Taliban cannot invoke protection under this provision, since
they violated the laws of war by targeting civilians.148 However, an international
tribunal may be tempted to downplay the disqualifying effect of the Taliban's ac
tions. 49  An international tribunal may also apply to the Taliban and their Al
Qaeda allies the Protocol added to the Geneva Convention that protects combatants
in "wars of national liberation, even though the United States expressly declined
to ratify this Protocol because of concerns about terrorism.150
Commentators who argue that an international tribunal is inherently superior
also offer a flawed account of accuracy in adjudication. While courts and com-
mentators have rightly focused on the importance of mmimizmg "false positives" -
individuals incorrectly convicted of an offense' 51 - they have also acknowledged
the importance of mmmizmg "false negatives" - culpable individuals wrongly ad-
judicated as blameless. 152 Particularly in low-level cases of persons captured on
145. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 130, at 1260-66 (discussing problems with jurisdictional
sweep of President's Military Order); Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 130.
146. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 613-20.
147 See Multilateral Prtotection of War Victims, Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3322, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138-40.
148. See U.S. v. Lmdh, 212 F Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002).
149. In so doing, members of an international tribunal would be echoing two distinguished
American law professors who made similar omission in an otherwise incisive analysis of the flaws in
the President's Military Order establishing military tribunals. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 130, at
1264 (suggesting in passing that members of the Taliban might qualify for protection under the Geneva
Convention, while failing to note that the provision protecting combatants who "spontaneously take up
arms" also requires that such combatants refrin from targeting civilians).
150. See Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2003) (dis-
cussing unratified Protocols). See also Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Regan to the the
U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims
(Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) (explaining rationale for recommending
against ratification of Protocol).
151. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires that the prosecu-
tion show a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) (Justice Harlan concurring viewed the Court's
holding as "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.") Id at 372.
152. See Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (asserting that the government, in
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the battlefield, international judges may have incentives to unduly discount the risk
of false negatives.
Consider here the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, an apparent American citizen
allegedly apprehended with a weapon on the battlefield in Afghanistan, now de-
tamed by the United States as an "enemy combatant" without charges. 153 While
Hamdi should be either charged or released, if he were charged an international
tribunal would not necessarily provide a more accurate determination than a mili-
tary court. Hamdi's father has argued that his son was actually providing hunam-
tartan aid to Afghans. 154 International judges whose countries have not been tar-
geted by transnational networks such as Al Qaeda may wish to credit this account,
either to avoid retaliation against their countries,1 55 or because of a reluctance to
scrutinize allegedly humanitarian work. 56  A judge influenced by these factors
could make an maccurate determination of culpability Of course, the govern-
ment's indefinite detention of Hamdi or of individuals held at Guantanamo Bay
might itself be based on maccurate or biased mformation.i57 Addressing that issue
requires adequate procedures, not necessarily an international forum.
The same analysis obtains for the prosecution of officials m Saddam Hus-
sem's regime m Iraq. Here the most appropriate forum is neither a military nor an
deciding to apprehend an individual suspected of plotting terrorist activity - in that case an alleged pre-
September II plan to bomb the World Trade Center - could consider not only the probability that an
individual had engaged in such activity, but also the extent of the destruction that might have resulted if
the plan had been successful); ALAN DERSHOWrFZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 187-96 (2002) (acknowledging constitutional concern with
false positives, while arguing that the challenge of terrorism complicates issue); Laurence H. Tribe,
Trial By Fury: t4'0, Congress Must Curb Bush Military Courts, THE NEW REP Dec. 10, 2001, at 18,
20 (arguing that public interest requires adjustment of balance between false positives and false nega-
tives in terrorism cases); but see generally Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y REv.
BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44 (warning against lowering standards of proof in terrorism cases).
153. See Hamdi 316 F.3d, reh 'g and reh 'g en banc dented; Pagels 2003 U.S. App. Lexis (uphold-
ing indefinite detention with evidentiary hearing or access to counsel); cf Padilla v. Bush, 233 F
Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (upholding indefinite detention but requiring hearing and assistance of
counsel); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror 2003 Wis. L. REv. 257 (2003) (discuss-
ing enemy combatant detention).
154. Other detainees have made similar claims, asserting that they were caught up in the chaos of
war, and either denying that they possessed weapons at the time of their apprehension or preserving
their option to justify the need for firearms in the delivery of humanitarian aid. See Richard A. Serrano,
Detainees Launch Legal Step, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at 1 (describing Kuwaiti nationals detained at
Guantanamo Bay who claimed that tribesmen had turned them over to American forces in Afghanistan
in exchange for bounty).
155. See Charles Hill, A Herculean Task: The Myth and Reality of Arab Terrorism, in THE AGE OF
TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPT. It 83, 104 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds.,
Basic Books 2001) ("European countries have taken a benign view of the presence of foreign terror-
ist organizations in their cities in a kind of tacit agreement that 'we won't bother you if you don't target
us. ").
156. See Don Van Natta Jr. with Timothy L. O'Brien, Flow of Saudis' Cash to Hamas is Scruti-
ntzed, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al, 10 (quoting an American diplomat as saying that, "It is con-
sidered rude in the kingdom to inquire about the motives behind charity, and so Saudis don't do it.").
157 See generally LEwis, supra note 152 (criticizing Hamdi's detention and appellate court's
deferential review).
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international tribunal, but an Iraqi court.Si No other tribunal has a comparable
stake in such prosecutions, which will help set the tone and direction of subsequent
regimes. 5 9 An American military tribunal may err on the side of culpability, lack-
mg a comprehensive understanding of the pressures experienced by Iraqis under
Saddam Hussein. An international tribunal will not provide the sense of empow-
erment that will emerge from Iraqis confronting and coping with challenges from
their own past.'
60
In choosing the appropriate forum, a transiton-centered approach would con-
sider 1) the stake of the entity sponsoring the forum,'16' 2) the likelihood of error, 162
and, 3) the availability of a functional forum in the entity with the greatest stake. 163
Procedural protections such as limits on the jurisdiction of military tribunals, judi-
cial review, access to exculpatory evidence, and unimpaired access to counsel
would also obtain. These conditions would fulfill the transition-based criteria of
inclusion, institutional repertoire, and redress.
Considering these factors promotes a forum-selection process that can adapt
to changing contexts and circumstances. For matters regarding September 11 and
related Al Qaeda efforts to attack persons or property within the United States,
America clearly has the greatest stake. However, other nations also have an inter-
est, given the presence of nationals from many countries among the victims of Sep-
tember 11.164 Assuming that both the United States and the international commu-
nity could provide a functioning system the dispositive factor would be the
likelihood of error.
For alleged low-level Al Qaeda combatants purportedly captured on the bat-
tlefield, such as those held at Guantanamo Bay, an international tribunal might
yield too many false negatives, if judges unduly discounted the threat posed by
"little fish."' 65 A military tribunal operating with the benefit of procedural safe-
guards would be appropriate for trying such individuals. However, limiting the
jurisdiction of military tribunals to cases of "enemy belligerents" would require
trials in United States civilian courts for alleged Al Qaeda operatives engaged not
158. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick E. Tyler, lraqis Plan War-Crimes Court; G.L.s to Stay
Until Elections, N.Y TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A9.
159. See generally Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing for the prosecution of primary perpe-
trators of human rights abuses).
160. See MINOW, supra note 7, at 61-83 (discussing importance of redress and voice for victims in
developing democratic traditions).
161. See Gary J. Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United States: Notes on Rereading
Von Mehren, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 126-28 (2003) (discussing choice of law principles).
162. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (one element of procedural due process
analysis is "risk of error").
163. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that long-time resident of Indiana with no
demonstrated ties to Confederate military could not be tried before military tribunal when civilian
courts were functioning).
164. Mark A Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neightborhood: Terroritst Crim, Taliban Guilt, and the
Asymentires of the Internaional Legal Order, 81 N.C.L. Rev 1, 67-69 (2002).
165. See Tribe, supra note 151, at 18.
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in active hostilities but instead m collateral activities such as fundraismg. Al
Qaeda higher-ups, including those presently confined m undisclosed locations sub-
ject to United States control, might be more appropriate candidates for eventual
trial before international tribunals. Animus against such individuals rmght run too
ugh in the United States to control the nsk of false positives. In contrast, factfind-
ers on an international tribunal might be sufficiently dispassionate to control this
risk, while also being cognizant of the danger posed by major players in Al
Qaeda. 166
In considering the appropriate forum for the trial of former Ba'athist officials,
considerations of stake are paramount, making Iraqi courts the best choice. Al-
though a desire for retribution might increase the risk of false positives, such a risk
would be mmunized by procedures to ensure representation of a cross-section of
Iraqis, including members of the Sunm minority most supportive of the Ba'athist
regime. However, years of Ba'athist rule and the chaos attending military Inter-
vention have required the rebuilding of the Iraqi judiciary. 167 Trial by Iraqi courts
could challenge the fragile security framework in Iraq and exacerbate ethmic strife.
If Iraqi or coalition officials could not respond to such concerns, Iraq would be left
without a functional forum for trying such cases. An international tribunal would
be the second-best choice, given the international community's stake in holding
major Ba'athist officials accountable for the crimes against humnamty committed
during Saddam's rule.Disaggregating forum and procedure in this fashion would
promote transitions. The flexibility built into the forum-choice factors would serve
inclusion, as would commitment to norms of procedural fairness accepted under
international law. The forum-choice factors would expand institutional repertoire,
avoiding the rigid consequences risked by both the Administration and its critics.
Finally focusing on stake would emphasize redress for the victims of attacks on
civilians. 168 Disaggregating forum and procedure would build legitimacy for anti-
166. This might hold especially for mainstream Islamic jurists, who understand the corruption of
Islamic teaching wrought by Bin Laden. See ESPOSITO, supra note 42, at 20, 32 (noting bin Laden's
departures from mainstream Islamic thought); EL FADL, supra note 42, at 205-09 (analyzing arguments
of jurists that persons who kill innocents in pursuit of political goals lose the consideration accorded
rebels under Islamic teaching); GRAHAM E. FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 60 (2003)
("[E]rroneous and distorted understandings of Islam can emerge that can serve to justify violence or
even terror.").
167. See Hassan bm Talal, Can Democracy Take Root in the Islamic World? Seeing Iraq's Future
By Looking at Its Past, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2003, at Al 7 (focusing on need for functioning judiciary in
Iraq); cf. Ahmed Hashim, Saddam Hussain and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legiti-
macy and Power, 57 MIDDLE EAST J. 9, 29-32 (2003) (discussing Saddam's efforts to destroy the Iraqi
military as an institution that could challenge his rule). See generally KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF
FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ 46-72 (1998) (discussing torture and repression under Ba'athist
regime).
168. In addition, redress would require compensation for "false positives" wrongfully detained
and for civilians harmed in the course of antiterronsm efforts. The failure to spend money appropriated
by Congress to assist civilians injured by the United States military intervention against the Taliban and
A] Qaeda in Afghanistan is a vivid example of a recent failure of redress. See April Witt, After the Air-
strikes, Just Silence; No Compensation, Little Aid for Afghan Victims of US. Raids, WASH. POST, April
28, 2003, at Ai 7 In Northern Iraq, United States Army commander operating largely autonomously
from the central occupation authonty has been successful in part by promptly compensating Iraqi civil-
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terrorism efforts, and defuse processes of social comparison that exacerbate polari-
zation.
CONCLUSION
Measures to effect transitions toward democracy and the rule of law have
dominated United States policy m the aftermath of September 11. The current
Administration has generally pursued a preemptive approach, emphasizing force
and punitive measures, dealing largely with elites, and downplaymg demands for
equality made by popular movements abroad. Unfortunately, the preemptive ap-
proach often generates polarization, not transition. Social science research indi-
cates that excessive reliance on force and punitive measures can spawn social iden-
tities shaped by opposition to American interests and social comparisons such as
views of the Arab-Israeli conflict that portray the United States as subsidizing un-
just policies. The preemptive approach also yields forms of social capital such as
authenticity entrepreneurship that leverage oppositional identities and comparisons
to produce violence against innocents. Critiquing the preemptive approach is eas-
ier than devising a constructive alternative. One alternative, the state-skeptical ap-
proach, abjures force and punitive measures. While state-skeptics may ease transi-
tions through the re-framing of social identities and comparisons, they fail to
address the "spoiler" role played by authenticity entrepreneurs.
To avoid these blind spots, a multilateral transition approach integrates the in-
sights of social science research and comparative law and politics. Responding to
social identity, social comparison, and social capital formation requires a multilat-
eral perspective focused on transnational communities. In a diasporated world knit
together by technology, attention to the transnational flow of people, information,
and resources is crucial.
A multilateral approach seeks to influence these flows, guided by three over-
lapping factors identified by comparative scholars: institutional repertoire, mclu-
sion, and redress. Institutional repertoire requires a range of organizational struc
tures, strategies, and discourses, each operating as a check on the power of the
others. The flourishing of civil society is one element of this repertoire, comple-
mented by a viable governmental authority that can resort to force and legal sanc
tions when necessary to achieve legitimate public objectives. Inclusiveness re-
quires a polity such as the United States, which seeks to exert influence around the
world, to acknowledge that its relevant audience is not merely domestic but trans-
national, by acting to minimize global inequality
Redress requires the most delicate balance of the transitional elements. A
polity such as the United States that seeks to defend its interests and effect transi-
tions on a global scale should acknowledge responsibility for damage to innocents
ians for losses suffered dunng ongoing efforts to defeat guerilla forces; Michael R. Gordon, 101" Air-
borne Scores Success in Northern Iraq; A Reconstruction Effort is Led by the Military, N.Y TiMES,
Sept. 4, 2003, at Al, (analyzing approach used by Army unit, which also includes substantial delega-
tion to newly established Iraqi local governmental units).
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caused by efforts to vindicate these goals. Redress also mandates that survivors of
past abuses and overreaching have access to remedies, to effect closure on disputes
and clear the way for new mstitution-building.
A multilateral transition approach clarifies analysis of current issues such as
the enforcement of immigration law after September 11, the regulation of terrorist
organizations, and the adjudication of alleged violations of international humani-
taran law. A transition-centered approach to immigration policy would curb na-
tionality-based umigration enforcement and promote family unity, thereby lever-
aging immigration to the United States to give other areas in the world a broader
stake in the struggle against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Regulation
of terrorist organizations would stress not only legal sanctions to disrupt the infra-
structure relied on by violent authenticity entrepreneurs, but also support for non-
violent alternatives, reform of governmental policies that catalyze violent opposi-
tion, and a fresh start through "transition relief' for organizations that
demonstrated that they had implemented substantial and durable institutional re-
forms to materially reduce violence. Adjudication of alleged violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law would disaggregate issues of forum selection and proce-
dure, allowing for flexibility in the forum selection process and requiring
procedures in all forums to ensure justice and preserve legitimacy.
Adopting a multilateral transition approach stressing institutional repertoire,
inclusion, and redress will not ensure the rule of law or erase transnational vio-
lence. Transitions are unpredictable. Forms of social capital that foster violence
and undermine the rule of law can always emerge from the social identities and
comparisons generated by collective human endeavors. However, a transition-
based approach at least highlights the right questions. That is a necessary first step
in setting the course of transnational law and policy after September 11.
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IF THE NON-PERSON KING GETS No DUE PROCESS,
WILL INTERNATIONAL SHOE GET THE BOOT 9
JAMES COOPER-HILL
In Price v. Socialist People s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,I a terrorism suit
brought against Libya under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate court to unequivocally
hold that a foreign sovereign is not a person entitled to due process pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.2 In order to weigh the import of the
holding, one must indulge m a two-pronged historical analysis, focusing first on
the concept of sovereign immunity and second, on the due process entitlement of
any entity, sovereign or otherwise. Of further interest is whether Price will affect
the benchmark case, International Shoe v. Washington,3 which established the
concept of minmunum contacts consistent with the traditional notions of fair play
and justice.
BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The concept of sovereign immunity is said to stem from the quasi-theological
notion of the divine right of kings.4 It was held from the Middle Ages forward that
the King could do no wrong, although modem legal scholars differ on the exact
origin of sovereign immunity and whether it is truly based on the divine right of
kings.5 Sovereign immunity was supposedly imported to the United States by way
of the often cited Russell v. The Men of Devon.6 However, at least one court has
James Cooper-Hill, B.A., Univ. of Nev., M.B.A, Univ. of St. Thomas; J.D. Univ. of Denver; formerly
Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Dayton. Cooper-Hill was counsel for the plaintiffs in Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, Dadesho v. Government of Iraq (post judgment) and Price v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahirya. He argued the Price case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.
1. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Price II].
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (2004).
3. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. See Wilcox v. United States, 117 F Supp. 119-20 (S.D.N.Y 1953).
5. See Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 769 N.E.2d 372, 374, 378-379 (Ohio
2002); Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 558-59 (Ohio 2001); Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 30 S.E.2d 726,
728 (W Va. 1944).
6. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) (Numerous states have cited to
Russell v. Men of Devon in cases of first impression involving sovereign immunity including
Massachusetts (Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 346 (Mass. 1877)), West Virginia (Long v. City
of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851 (W Va. 1975)), Ohio (Bd. of Comm'rs of Hamilton County v.
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stressed that the first adoption of the Russell theory of immunity was misplaced.7
The United States has witnessed all three branches of its government
wrestling with the issue of foreign sovereign immunity The concept has evolved
over three distinct time penods. First, the U.S. Supreme Court accorded absolute
immunity to sovereigns in 1812.8 Second, in 1952, the U.S. Department of State,
on behalf of the Executive branch, imposed a system of qualified immunity 9 In
1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) laid out broad exceptions to
immunity as did further amendments in 1996.l° Under the concept of absolute
immunity noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 19th century and later
during the period of qualified immunity the U.S. Department of State wielded the
power of the Executive branch."
At least in part, commercial activity in the United States conducted by foreign
sovereigns m direct competition with American private enterprise eroded absolute
immunity 12 That many foreign states engaged in quasi-private enterprise resulted
in the governmental-propnetary dichotomy that prevails at both the state and
federal level today '3 Commencing in 1952, the Tate Letter established a qualified
immunity that the Executive branch, acting through the State Department,
controlled. 14 During the twenty-four years of qualified immunity the Executive
branch was clearly in charge of and had apparent authority over the Judicial
branch.iS Qualified immunity was codified by the enactment of the FSIA in
Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 122 (Ohio 1857)) and Texas (City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118
(Tex. 1884)).
7. Wilcox, 117 F Supp. at 119 (mistakenly basing sovereign immunity in the United States on
the maxim of the king: "Immunity of the sovereign from suit stemming from the political doctrine that
the King can do no wrong, had been transplanted and preserved inviolate as part of the American
common law until relatively recent times. Id. at 120). However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in Hayes, 30 S.E.2d at 728, had earlier taken an opposite position.
8. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 124 (1812).
9. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments,
Letter from Attorney General Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate to Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, 26
Dept. State Bull. 984-85 (1952) available in Dunhill v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-16 (1976)) [hereinafter
Tate Letter].
10. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611, as amended by the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
11. See Tate Letter, supra note 9.
12. The governmental/proprietary dichotomy is based on the following distinction: an activity that
generates revenue in competition with private enterprise is subject to liability while an activity which is
mandated by law as a governmental service is immune. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 167 at 670 (2d ed. 2001). Note the commercial exception in the FSIA
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).
13. See Thon v. Los Angeles, 21 Cal.Rptr. 398, 400 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (concluding that
fire-fighting is clearly governmental function); Byrnes v. Jackson, 105 So. 861, 863 (Miss. 1925)
(finding that operating a zoo is an implied governmental function.).
14. Tate Letter, supra note 9.
15. The position of the Department of State was accorded great weight by the court in Ocean
Transport Co. v. Gov. of the Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F.Supp. 703, 704 (E.D.La. 1967) and other
cases discussed infra.
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1976.16 However, the FSIA was interpreted m such a way that no plaintiff
prevailed during the first four years of its enactment. 17 Even then, the first non-
commercial plaintiff's verdict involved a car-bombing assassination in the District
of Columbia, eliminating the minimum contacts-due process issue from
consideration. 
18
Similar acts of terrorism perpetrated upon U.S. citizens outside the United
States were not successfully prosecuted under the 1976 FSLA. 19  The only
plaintiff's judgment for what could be considered terrorism under the 1976 FSIA
can be attributed to the foreign sovereign's failure to timely seek to set aside a
default judgment.20 It took the enactment of the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death
Penalty Act of 199621 for the first plaintiffs to obtain judgments against a foreign
sovereign. 22  Even then, the basis for bringing such actions, and the trial court
exercising both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, was very limited. The
four criteria which established subject matter jurisdiction were: extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, and torture.23 Even when horrendous acts
16. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602, 1604.
17. See generally Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F Supp. 981 (N.D.
III. 1980).(finding that government could not waive sovereign immunity based on FSIA waiver
provision because Iranian defendants still lacked mnimum contacts); Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F
Supp. 309 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (finding that none of the exceptions in the FSIA operate to deprive Saudi
Arabia of sovereign immunity from suit in the United States); Carey v. Libyan Arab Republic, 453 F
Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds based on
immunity provided under the FSIA).
18. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1980).
19. See generally Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Cicippio 11] (granting defendant Iran's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for suit
involving U.S. citizens who were kidnapped in Beirut); Hall v. People's Republic of Iraq, 80 F.3d 558
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction);
Pnncz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over suit involving Americans kidnapped in Nazi Germany under either
retroactive application of the FSIA or pre-FSIA law of sovereign immunity).
20. Dadesho v. Gov't of Iraq, 139 F.3d 766, 767 (9th Cir. 1998).
21. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (1996)) (allowing lawsuits against any nation
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, even when the conduct took place outside the United States
and was perpetrated against a U.S. citizen).
22. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F Supp. 1239, 1247 (S.D. Fla- 1997); see Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, 146 F Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter Daliberti I1]; Sutherland v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 151 F Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 WL
33674311 (D.D.C. 2000); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001);
Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahmya, 180 F Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2001); Wagner v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
175 F Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2001); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001); Mousa
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2001); Boin v. Quramc Literacy Institute, 127
F Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. II. 2001); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 110 F Supp. 2d
10 (D.D.C. 2000); Elahl v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2000); Eisenfeld v.
Islamic Republic ofIran, 172 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000); Anderson v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 90 F
Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
[hereinafter Flatow 1]; Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998)
[hereinafter Cicippio 111].
23. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C § 1605(aX7). See also Alejandre,
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of violence were inflicted upon U.S. citizens without justification, foreign
sovereigns pleaded "police brutality" and relied on a pre-1996 decision, Nelson v.
Saudi Arabia.24
Finally, in a logical opinion, a trial court held that a foreign sovereign was not
a person for purposes of due process, but then went on to consider the m mum
contacts analysis, suggesting that the diplomatic relations with the country in
25question, Iran, were sufficient to find personal jurisdiction. It was not until
Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq26 that a contested case was brought before the court
and the issue of due process was raised. In Daliberti, after the denial of Iraq's
motion to dismiss, Iraq chose not to participate m the trial.27 Subsequently, in
Price et al v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,21 the due process issue
was raised by the defendant sovereign and addressed by the U.S. District Court.
The same court which had held that a foreign sovereign was not a person entitled
to due process m Flatow I,29 denied Libya's Rule 12 motion to dismiss, based in
pertinent part, on the due process argument. 30 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit became the first appellate court to hand down a
decision squarely facing the due process issue and ruling that a foreign sovereign
was not a person for purposes of due process. 31 This ruling was not appealed.
Given the mandatory venue of the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia
in terrorism suits brought pursuant to the FSIA, this decision should be the last
word on this issue. However, disingenuously Libya has raised this same issue
both in the remand to the district court,32 and in other similarly situated cases now
pending in the district court. A more detailed analysis of the Court of Appeals'
analysis in the Price case follows.
Russell v. Men of Devon and its Progeny Both Legitimate and Otherwise
Russell v. Men of Devon33 was cited by courts in the United States over 150
tunes before a federal statute adopting any concept of foreign immunity was
enacted. The Russell decision is a far better one on which to provide a foundation
for municipal government law than for crossing the Atlantic with a theory based on
the power of the King. Factually, the Russell decision is simple. A local bridge
966 F Supp. At 1247
24. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993).
25. Flatow/, 999 F Supp. at 22.
26. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38,42 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Daliberti 1].
27. Daliberti II, 146 F Supp. 2d at 20.
28. Price v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 110 F Supp. 2d 10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000)
[hereinafter Price 1].
29. Flatow 1, 999 F Supp. at 19.
30. Price II, 294 F.3d at 96-100
31. Id. at 96 (stating "with the issue directly before us, we hold that foreign states are not
'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
32. See Price v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 274 F Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003)
[hereinafter Price II1].
33. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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fell into disrepair resulting in the plaintiff's wagon being damaged.34 Because
Devonshire had no fund with which to compensate the owner of the damaged
35wagon, it was held immune from judgment. Many of the subsequent citations in
American courts have opmed that Russell was the foundation for the concept of
sovereign immunity m the United States but have erroneously added the maxim
that the king can do no wrong, which does not appear in Russell.36 However, the
first case reciting the infallibility of the king in the newly formed United States
was handed down without mention of the Russell decision less than a month after
George Washington became the first president. The case of Benedict Calvert's
Lessee v. Sir Robert Eden3 7 resolved a knotty title and possession problem which
arose under a grant of the Province of Maryland from King Charles 1.38
The Court went to great lengths to stress the continued importance of the
English king's exercise of appellate jurisdiction as had been done since the earliest
days of the colonies.39 Of course, the exercise of appellate authority over land title
disputes by the King of England could hardly have continued longer,
notwithstanding the Maryland court's genuflection to the king in this case.
While Benedict Calvert's Lessee is the earliest case in the United States to
refer to the king being unable to commit a wrong, the first United States Supreme
Court decision regarding sovereign immunity was Chisholm v. Georga.40 In
Chisholm, it was argued that "until the time of Edward 1. the King might have been
sued in all actions as a common person. but now none can have an action
against the King ,41 Justice Wilson finds that it is the people of the United
States who are the true sovereign and not the government or the State, thus
allowing the suit against Georgia to go forward.42
Two decades later the first American citation to the Russell case is found in
Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River 43 in which
no mention of the authority of the king is made. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated that while a county, referred to as a quasi corporation, can be
held liable on an indictment for neglect of a public duty, no private action can be
maintained, citing Russell as the settling authority.44 A scant two years later,
Massachusetts again found that there was no liability for quasi corporations, in this
34. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362.
35. Id.
36. For example, see cases supra note 7.
37. Benedict Calvert's Lessee v. Sir Robert Eden, 2 H. & McH. 279 (Md. 1789).
38. Id. In the argument before the court: "The king cannot by his writ command himself Id
at 290. Further argument was made: "A tenant in tail, making a feoffinent, discontinues the estate-tail.
But if the king, being tenant in tail, grants patent of the land, it does not operate as discontinuance,
being a wrong, for it is a maxim that the king can do no wrong. Id. at 3 10.
39. Id. at 334. The Court noted: "It has been the prevailing doctrine here that the lord proprietary,
like the king at home, cannot be disseised.
40. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
41. Id at437.
42. Id. at 454.
43. Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. 169, 187 (1810).
44. Id. at 187.
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case the inhabitants of Leicester, absent a statute to that effect, citing Russell but
without any mention of the King.45
Countless cases for the next century and a half cited to Russell and many
others referenced the maxim, "the king can do no wrong."46 Often both were
joined together as if it were the king whose authority prevented the damaged
wagon's owner from recovery in Russell. Over time, the authority of the king has
been invoked in a democratic republic that, since its inception, has never had a
king.
Only a few decades after independence from the king, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky found the theory of sovereign immunity more than simply a good idea. 7
Contrary to the conventional wisdom both before and after, however, that court
found that the king can indeed do wrong; it is just that when the king errs, he goes
unpunished:
[S]overeignty has a fictitious perfection and purity, which must be taken as real,
and which can not be controverted, and of course the abuse of its power can be
imputed to a sovereign, in restraint of its legitimate energies. The maxim, that
'the king can do no wronf' is not an idle device of royalty, formed to amuse or
beguile the multitude
The same court noted:
It is not, that the king, m a monarchy, or the people in a democracy can do no
wrong it is the sovereignty with which they are invested, and in which they are
merged, that is incapable of error; and this capacity in the sovereign to err is
matter of necessity.
4
Clearly, a difference of opinion existed just beneath the surface, with one
court stating that "[ilnimunity of the sovereign from suit stemming from the
political doctrine that the King can do no wrong, had been transplanted and
preserved inviolate as part of the American common law until relatively recent
times."50 Note a pragmatic and different approach yet a decade earlier: the
State should not be deprived or dispossessed of its property without its consent; not
on the maxim of the English law that the king can do no wrong, a maxim which
has no existence in American law.
' '5i
It took a twenty-first century Ohio court to provide the most thorough
historical analysis of both the American concept of sovereign immunity and the
reliance on the Russell case, although it overlooked the Riddle case as the initial
mention of Russell. The Ohio Supreme Court in Butler v. Jordan2 recited that the
45. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass 247, 250 (Mass. 1812).
46. See supra notes 6-7.
47. See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 2 A.K. Marsh 75,93 (Ky. 1819).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Wilcox, 117 F Supp. at 119.
51. Hayes, 30 S.E.2d at 728-29.
52. Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554 (Ohio 2000).
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doctrine of sovereign immunity was associated with the English common-law
concept that "the King can do no wrong., 53 While that is not an accurate portrayal
of the first two American cases citing to Russell, the Ohio court did allude to the
analogy now found m the sovereign immunity privilege in the U.S. courts of
immunity extending to freedom from trial and not just from judgment. 4 In the
English feudal system, any lord of the manor who held his own lower level court
could not be brought into his own court." The king, being the highest authority,
likewise enjoyed such "protection on the theory that no court was above him."' 6
The Butler court explained m detail the Russell decision and concluded that
"[t]his rule of local government immunity then became the general American
rule." 57  Sovereign immunity in the Umted States was born starting with
government at the most local level. It quickly led to a higher level. Soon
thereafter, the same court stated that the concept of sovereign immunity had
evolved from the English common law concept that "the king can do no wrong"
and cited to Russell.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding that sovereign immunity law of Nevada
was not applicable to a cause of action ansing in the State of California, 
5
foreshadowed the coming conflict that would arise out of the passage of the 1996
FSIA Amendment. Mr. Justice Stevens speaking for the Court found that
sovereign immunity has two faces: "The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an
amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's
own courts and the other to suits m the courts of another sovereign.,
59
The Absolute Immunity Period
The Absolute Immunity era began with the involvement of a foreign
sovereign, albeit not a king. The government involved was that of France and the
case condoned piracy on the high seas based on sovereign immunity 60 The year
was 1812 and the case The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.6 1 McFaddon and his
partner Greetham were the owners of the schooner Exchange that was forcibly and
violently taken from them by the French pursuant to orders from Napoleon.62 The
vessel, having been converted to a military vessel for France, encountered great
stress of weather and sailed into the port of Philadelphia for repairs.63 McFaddon
and Greetham filed suit for the vessel's return. 64 At the time the schooner sailed
53. Id. at 564.
54. See id at 566.
55. Id. at 559.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 560.
58. Nevada v. HaHl, 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
59. Id at 414.
60. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116 (1812).
61. Id at 116.
62. Id. at 117.
63. Id
64. Id
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into port, a state of peace existed between France and the United States.65
McFaddon lost in the trial court but appealed to the Circuit Court of the United
States, which reversed and ordered the vessel returned to McFaddon and
Greetham. 66
Justice Marshall, m reversing the Court of Appeals, concluded m part: "It
seems then to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national ships of war,
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered
as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction., 67  Justice
Marshall's holding is that the vessel of a foreign sovereign entering a U.S. port in a
friendly manner during a time of peace should be exempt from the jurisdiction of a
United States Court. 68 This demonstrates a serious regard for a foreign sovereign
whose ownership of the vessel m question arose from piracy on the high seas. If
the Schooner McFaddon were put in the context of the 1996 FSIA amendment, and
if the French had treated the owners of the schooner accordingly the result might
have been different, provided that the ernng sovereign was designated a terrorist
state and thus amenable to an exception from immunity
The Tate Letter and Qualified Immunityfrom 1952-1976
In 1952, there was a shift from absolute immunity In a letter issued by Jack
B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman, the State Department unilaterally purported to restrict
mimunity to governmental or public acts, thus creating a qualified sovereign
immunity 69 While the State Department's position was justified by the increase in
commercial activity by nations competing with private enterprise of the capitalist
countries, the letter itself clearly reflected an extension of power by the U.S.
Department of State.70  The State Department's success m this regard was
enhanced by an abdication of Congressional power for twenty-four years and the
courts' acquiescence during the same period.
The Tate Letter required a foreign sovereign to seek a ruling of immunity
from the State Department, which in turn would file with the court in wuch that
sovereign had been sued, a "suggestion of immunity,,' 7' not unlike a suggestion of
bankruptcy to stop judicial proceedings against one who has sought the protections
of the Bankruptcy Act. Courts differed in their reaction to the Tate Letter, but by
65. See id. at 118.
66. Id. at 117.
67. Id. at 145-146.
68. Id. at 147.
69. Tate Letter, supra note 9 (suggesting that immunity be recognized with regard to sovereign or
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with regard to private acts (jure gestionis)); see also Pan
Am. Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 296 F Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y 1969) (applying
restrictive interpretation of sovereign immumty set forth in the Tate Letter).
70. See id Although Congress constrained State's authority by enacting the FSIA and its
subsequent amendments supra note 2, at 10, the State Dept. has been reluctant to cede authority.
71. See Pan Am. Tankers Corp., 296 F Supp. at 363.
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and large concurred with the authonty of State. 72 The courts' deferential attitude
towards the State Department was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China.73 This attitude led to critical
commentary by noted legal scholar and jurist, Michael H. Cardozo. 74
The general attitude of the courts was that whatever suggestion was made by
the State Department, the courts lacked discretion to take a differing position.75 A
trial court in the District of Columbia, in finding an absence of immunity noted:
"The State Department's determination that immunity need not be extended is
binding on 'this Court." 76 The appellate court m the same jurisdiction concluded:
"In delineating the scope of a doctrine designed to avert possible embarrassment to
the conduct of our foreign relations, the courts have quite naturally deferred to the
policy pronouncements of the State Department., 77 Another court, while finding
immunity, agreed with the process: Accordingly, both parties agree that a
suggestion of immunity is conclusive and binding on the courts.,
71
Other courts criticized the absence of criteria by which public acts could be
distinguished from private acts, whether by the courts or by the State Department,
but one court concluded that the suggestion or absence thereof of immunity by the
State Department was "highly persuasive and the authorities dictate that it must be
given great weight.,
79
The Tate Letter differentiated the public acts of foreign governments, jure
imperin, from private acts, jurt gestionts.80 Similar differentiation has been
followed regarding the liability of state governments engaged in quasi or non-
governmental activity 81
That a foreign government should escape liability and even trial while
engaged in commerce and competing with non-government business entities is
hardly justified and seems to warrant inroads into absolute sovereign Immunity. It
seems questionable today that the interests of American business or U.S. citizens
72. See id
73. See Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1955).
74. See generally Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 498 (1963) (advocating
judicial deference to the State Department in foreign relations to present unified voice, not as abdication
ofjudiciary's responsibility but as recognition of the executive's prerogative).
75. Id
76. Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
77. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimentos Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358
(2d Cir. 1964).
78. Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F Supp. 382, 383 (D. D.C. 1974).
79. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Gov't of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F Supp. 703, 705 (1967).
80. Tate Letter, supra note 9
81. See REYNOLDS, supra note 12, at 670. For an activity which is exclusively governmental in
nature, there is generally no liability for a tort which causes injury or damage to a person. Id
However, for an activity which is proprietary, such as the operation of business which competes with
private enterprise, there can be liability. Id. The difficulty arises in those cases which do not clearly
fall into one category or the other, such as garbage collection. Id. The distinction has been extended to
the federal law as applicable to foreign governments doing business. FS1A, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2)
imposes liability on foreign sovereigns engaged m commerce.
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injured at the hand of foreign governments should be left to the State Department
instead of the judicial system. However, at least one court justified its deference
on the grounds of separation of powers:
Just as the Executive is not permitted, under the separation of powers, to interfere
with the Judiciary, so also the Judiciary should avoid any conflict with the
Executive in the field of international relations. The President, as the elected
representative of the people of the United States, is the final word on the subject in
the absence of Congressional legislation.
8 2
The concept of separation of powers is a subject somewhat blurred today in
light of the position of the State Department regarding the 1996 amendments to the
FSIA and Congress' action permitting judgment creditors against foreign terrorist
states to have such judgments satisfied from the terrorist states' frozen assets. 3
One troublesome aspect of the theory of qualified immunity was the
diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the State Department for political
considerations." This resulted m the State Department issumg a "suggestion of
munmunity" which would ordinarily not be available in similar circumstances absent
the political considerations. 85 The other difficulty arose when foreign sovereigns
ignored litigation in U.S. courts. Absent a diplomatic note to the State Department
seeking a suggestion of immunity, it was left to the State Department to determine
whether immunity should be extended or not.s6 The two-branch approach in these
situations failed to establish consistent standards or uniformity of application.8
7
Litigation with Foreign Sovereigns under the FSIA 19 76-1996
In 1976, Congress codified the previous policy and eliminated the "suggestion
of immunity" procedure which the State Department had unplemented for twenty-
four years. 88 This act of Congress clearly put the courts in charge instead of
having to yield to the dictates of the State Department. For the first time, the bases
for immunity were established by statute.
89
The first case clearly worthy of the terronsm label resulted in a plaintiff's
verdict due to the fact that the event, a car bombing assassination, occurred within
82. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. and Republic of Cuba, 197 F Supp. 710, 724 (E.D. Va. 1961).
83. Price II, 294 F.3d at 99. In holding that a foreign State was not a person entitled to due
process, the appellate court referred to the frozen assets of such nations, which have long been the goal
of virtually all plaintiffs who filed suits based on terronsm after the 1996 Amendment to the FSIA. The
Price II court said: "For example, the power of Congress and the President to freeze the assets of
foreign nations, or to impose economic sanctions on them, could be challenged as deprivations of
property without due process of law. Id.
84. Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of Nigena, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 488.
88. See id.
89. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611.
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the District of Columbia.9" Chile's ambassador to the United States under the
Allende government, who was m disfavor with the usurping Pinochet regime, was
assassinated. 9
Although the judgment entered against the Republic of Chile was the first
under the FSIA for an act of terrorism before the 1996 amendment, it is less
significant in that during the qualified immunity period, it is unlikely that Chile
would have been afforded immunity for an act of assassination.
The important cases of this era are the ones involving American victims of
foreign terrorism that occurred outside the United States but that the courts
dismissed for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Some of these cases
returned for a second bite at the immunity apple after the enactment of the 1996
Amendment.92 Only one case reached judgment for an act of intended but
unsuccessful terronsm. 93 That judgment continued to accrue interest and became
one of but three judgments to receive satisfaction from Iraq's frozen assets upon
the commencement of the second war against Iraq.94 Others were resolved without
further litigation,95 while some are still pending.
96
90. Letelier 488 F Supp. at 665.
91. See Vernon Loeb, Documents Link Chile Pinochet to Letelier Murder, WASHINGTON POST,
Nov. 14, 2000, at Ai6.
92. Joseph Cicippio's pre-1996 case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993 WL 730748, *3 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter Cicippio Il].
However, it reached judgment in a later suit. Cicippio III, 18 F Supp. 2d at 70. Likewise, the disrmssal
of Chad Hall's 1992 suit was affirmed without opinion in Hall v. Iraq, 80 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Hall later became a successful plaintiff in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F Supp. 2d 19, 27 (D.D.C.
2001).
93. Dadesho v. Gov't of Iraq, 139 F.3d 766, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing defendant's
appeal of judgment for plaintiff). Sargon Dadesho was the intended victim in hired assassination
case. After the assassin was apprehended and incarcerated, Dadesho filed suit in 1992 against the
Government of Iraq for plotting to murder him. Id at 766. A default judgment was entered in the
plaintiff's favor. Id. at 767. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to default judgment, but
granted judgment for plaintiff on one count of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id Iraq was
tardy in attempting to set aside the default. Id at 767 Dadesho was one of three judgments against Iraq
which were within the parameters of the President's Executive Order which confiscated Iraq's frozen
assets. See Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 § 1(b) (Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Exec.
Order 13,290]. Dadesho, having levied on frozen bank account of Iraqi funds and qualified under the
exception spelled out in the Executive Order, was paid his judgment in full, $2,407,000 from Iraqi
funds controlled by the U.S. Treasury. Sargon Dadesho v. Government of Iraq; Garnishment in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Execution with Notice to Garnishee,
based on a federal judgment in California, Action No. CV- 92-05491 -REC.
94. Exec. Order No. 13,290 at 14,307 § 1(b).
95. See Prncz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 813 F Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992). Princz would not
have qualified as plaintiff after the 1996 amendment since his defendant was the Republic of
Germany, not terrorst nation. However, it was reported that Princz was ultimately paid a settlement
from the re-unified government of Germany.
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 886 F Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), affd, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir 1991). The initial suit brought by the families of the victims of the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the bombing
having occurred in Scotland in 1988. Smith, 886 F Supp. at 315. However, after the passage of the
1996 amendment, the suit was re-filed as Rein v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 995 F
Supp. 325, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 162 F3d 748 (2d Cir 1998).
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Litigation under the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
After the enactment of the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, half a dozen cases reached judgment, all in cases against Iran,97 except
Alejandre v. Cuba,98 known as the Brothers-to-the Rescue case. In 2000, Congress
addressed the issue of satisfaction of these outstanding judgments with the passage
of what amounted to special legislation for a few victims of terronsm. 99 The act
provided for payment to judgment creditors of several judgments against Iran from
taxpayer funds although a subrogation clause provided that ultimately the
compensation would come from frozen Iranian assets.10° However, two suits
against Iran that had not reached judgment were also included so that when
judgment was entered in those suits, satisfaction was made. While mentioned m
the Conference Committee report, pending suits against Libya and Iraq received no
authorization for payment m the 2000 legislation. 101
THE EARLY DUE PROCESS CASES
The issue of due process arose with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 10 2 Until that time, the only
issue of due process arose out of the Fifth Amendment, applicable only to the
federal government. 103 However, the Fourteenth Amendment extended this
requirement to all the States of the Union. 1 4 Given commerce across borders
among the citizens of the States, conflicts were inevitable. A resolution of these
conflicts and a system used for such resolution ultimately giving rise to such
phrases as "traditional notions of fair play and justice" and "substantial contacts"
97. See, e.g., Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F Supp. 2d 107, 113-4 (D.D.C. 2000);
Cicippio III, i8 F Supp. 2d at 70; Flatow 1, 999 F Supp. at 34.
98. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
99. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
100. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464, 1541 § 2002 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 8, 20, 22,27, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
101. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2002(b)-2. The Conference
Committee Report stated:
The Committee intends that this legislation will similarly help other pending and future
Antiterrorism Act plaintiffs as and when U.S. courts issue judgments against the foreign
state sponsors of specific terrorist acts. The Committee shares the particular interest of
the sponsors of this legislation in ensuring that the families of the victims of Pan Am
flight 103 should be able to collect damages promptly if they can demonstrate to the
satisfaction of a U.S. court that Libya is indeed responsible for that heinous bombing.
The Committee is similarly interested in pending suits against Iraq.
H.R. REP. No. 106-939 at 118 (2000).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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arose primarily m three cases: International Shoe v. State of Washington,10 5
Milliken v. Meyer 106 and Pennoyer v. Neff.0
7
The effectiveness of service by publication to establish in personam
jurisdiction arose in the Pennoyer case. 1" Pennoyer brought an action against Neff
in the state courts of Oregon and effected service by publication on the defendant
who was a California resident.i09 Neff failed to appear and the court entered a
default judgment resulting in an execution sale by the Oregon sheriff of land Neff
owned m Oregon. " Neff subsequently brought suit to recover title to the land,
asserting his ownership based on a patent issued by the United States."' The
controlling issue was the effectiveness of a judgment based on obtaining personal
jurisdiction against a non-resident by publication of service."12
The Oregon statute provided that subject matter jurisdiction was established
over a non-resident who owned property within Oregon through publication.1
3
Oregon law also provided for in rem jurisdiction if the subject matter was property
located within the State of Oregon. However, in rem jurisdiction was inapplicable
since the suit was brought in personam and the real property became involved in
post-judgment proceedings.' "4  The language of the opinion setting forth the
possibility of an Oregon court's jurisdiction over persons outside the temtory of
the State sovereign is analogous to the process established by the 1996 FSIA
Amendment. "
5
In distinguishing between subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the
Pennoyer court relied on a Massachusetts decision, 116 one of the earliest to
distinguish the two types of jurisdiction. That case, Bissell v. Briggs,"7 required
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction m order to issue a judgment entitled
to full faith and credit in other states.ii8 The Pennoyer court adopted that same
simple prnciple." 9
105. Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
106. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
107. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
108. Id. at 715.
109. Id. at 714.
110. Id. Neff was sued in Oregon at time when he was resident of California. Id at 717 He
was served by publication and never given personal or actual notice. Id. at 716.
111. Id. at 715.
112. Id. at 720.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 221(a).
116. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 731.
117 Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1 Tyng ) (Mass. 1813).
118. "In order to entitle the judgment rendered in any court of the United States to the full faith and
credit mentioned m the federal constitution, the court must have had jurisdiction, not only of the cause,
but of the parties. Id. at 468.
119. Pennoyer 95 U.S. at 731 (citing Bissell, 9 Mass. at 468-469) ("[ilt was held that over the
property within the State the court had junsdiction by the attachment, but had none over his person; and
that any determination of his liability, except so far as was necessary for the disposition of the property,
was invalid.").
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The conclusion that could be asserted by a foreign sovereign, relymg on the
Pennoyer case alone, is that the Constitution demands due process for its citizens,
thus precluding the exercise of authority over persons, or property, outside the
territory of the United States.
120
Following this logic, one must determine, ipso facto, that the 1996 FSIA
Amendment is unconstitutional.' 2' The escape from this inevitable conclusion is
the absence of status as a person, eliminating the need for due process.
Fourteenth Amendment due process based on service on a non-resident gave
rise to the phrase "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" in
Milliken v. Meyer 122 turmg on factual considerations and the adequacy of notice
given. That the defendant Meyer was personally served and received actual notice
of Wyoming proceedings while located in the State of Colorado gave hun the
opportunity to assert his defense in the Wyoming court. 123 The Court found that
Meyer had in fact been afforded due process and noted the difference between its
holding and the earlier finding in Pennoyer based on service by publication.
24
Next, in the case of International Shoe, the Court distinguished Pennoyer and
said that previously, the presence of a defendant within the territory of the court's
jurisdiction was a prerequisite to a binding personal judgment. 125 However,
International Shoe did not require the physical presence of the defendant in the
territory of the court's jurisdiction, but only that the defendant have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 126
Further, International Shoe extended the concept of the due process
requirement beyond humans to corporations without addressing the issue of who is
120. See id.
121. If a foreign sovereign is person requiring due process, it follows that it must have minimum
contacts for the U.S. Courts to have jurisdiction. Since the 1996 amendment to the FSIA provides for
junsdiction over foreign sovereigns for acts outside the United States in a setting which precludes any
contacts, then it follows that either the act is unconstitutional or the sovereign is not person entitled to
due process. It must be one or the other.
122. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
123. The court said:
Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the form
of substituted service provided is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied. Here there can be no
question on that score.
Id. at 463 (internal citation omitted).
124. Id.
125. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
126. 326 U.S. at 3i6. Moreover, the court concluded:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
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a person for purposes of due process. The appellant, International Shoe Company,
was a Delaware corporation which had no office in Washington. 127 However,
during the pertinent time period, it did employ salesmen in Washington who were
merely order-takers. 28  All contracts for the purchase of merchandise were
consummated In Missoun.' 29 The merchandise was shipped f.o.b. from Missouri
to Washington so that the corporation had no dominium over the merchandise once
it was delivered to the shipper.
1 30
The issue, ansing out of a suit to collect a portion of the commissions paid
pursuant to Washington's Unemployment Compensation Act,13 was whether
personal service on the salesmen m Washington and service by registered mail in
Missouri conferred personal jurisdiction of the Washington court over the
International Shoe, so that it was afforded due process. 132 Because International
Shoe's activities in Washington were neither casual nor irregular; and, because the
service by registered mail was reasonably calculated to give such defendant actual
notice, it could not be said that the corporation was not afforded due process.
1 33
The Court noted of the demands of due process:
Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of
the forum as make it reasonable, m the context of our federal system of
government, to require the- corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there. An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection.
The concept which evolved in Pennoyer Milliken, and International Shoe,
was logically extended in the FSIA substituting "direct effect" for minimum
contacts, thus enabling litigation in U.S. courts for conduct occurring wholly
outside the United States but perpetrated upon U.S. citizens. i35
The Early Non-Human Persons Afforded Due Process
Until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, due process existed only
in the context of the Fifth Amendment, limiting the focus to the federal
government. 136 International Shoe extended Fourteenth Amendment due process
arismg from State action to various entities other than corporations: partnerships, 
37
127. Id.
128. Id. at 313-14.
129. Id. at 314.
130. Id.
131. Washington Unemployment Compensation Act, Wash. Rev. Stats., §§ 9998-103a-9998-123a,
(1941) (codified as amended at WASH. REV CODE § 50.24.010 (2004)).
132. 326 U.S. at 311-12.
133. The Corporation received due process so status as a person was not a deciding factor. Id. at
316.
134. Id. at317.
135. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V
137. Kaffenberger v. Kremer, 63 F Supp. 924,926 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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mutual life insurance companies,' 38 and labor unions. 139 The issue of whether a
State of the Union was considered a person entitled to due process was raised when
South Carolina filed suit to avoid enforcement of recently passed civil rights laws.
A State of the Union is not Entitled to Due Process: Katzenbach v. South
Carolina
140
The case which acted as a benchmark for the Price decision was Katzenbach
v. South Carolina. South Carolina had brought suit against the Attorney General
to suppress enforcement of certain civil rights acts passed during 1964-1965.141
One basis for resisting enforcement of these acts was the denial of due process. 142
The Katzenbach decision squarely addressed the issue, holding that a State was not
a person for purposes of due process. 143 The case left little doubt that if a State of
the Union could not be a person for purposes of due process, then neither could a
foreign sovereign. 144
The Weltover Conflict
The next case to address the due process issue took a giant step backwards by
merely assuming that a foreign sovereign was in fact a person entitled to due
process.145 Making the due process assumption for a foreign sovereign would have
rendered the provisions of the 1996 FSIA Amendment unconstitutional, except for
acts that occurred within U.S. territory. This might have been the last word on this
issue but for a cryptic "but see" reference in the Weltover case, citing to
Katzenbach.'46
In Weltover the holders of bonds payable in dollars issued by the Republic of
Argentina's central bank, which extended the date of payment, brought suit against
the Republic of Argentina.147 Issuing government bonds sold in the United States
was considered a commercial activity, because Argentina was acting as a private
player and not as a regulator of the bond market.' 48 The unilateral extension of the
payment date by Argentina caused a "direct effect" in the United States, thus
creating jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).149 But did the statutory "direct
effect" equate to minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice? Or was Argentina even required to be afforded due
process?
138. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 551(1948).
139. American Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 60 F Supp. 1010 (1945).
140. Katzenbach v. South Carolina, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
141. Id. at307.
142. Id. at 323.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
146. Id. at 619.
147. Id. at 609.
148. Jd. at 620.
149. Id.
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The Court assumed, without deciding, that a foreign state was a person for
purposes of due process but side-stepped the issue by holding that the issuance of
bonds sold in the United States and paid m U.S. dollars amounted to sufficient
minimum contacts to satisfy the constitutional test.15 0  It is the reference to
Katzenbach which raised the issue by pointing out that States of the Union were
not persons for purposes of due process. This not only left the door open to a
finding that a foreign sovereign could not be a person for due process purposes, but
also it gave subsequent courts a road map for resolvmg these issues.
THE THREE CASES LEADING TO A DUE PROCESS RESOLUTION
Personal due process hardly created an issue m the context of the 1976 Act, in
that most cases were commercial m nature, thus creating either the mmnmum
contacts or direct effect m the United States. In non-commercial cases, until
Letelier there was a finding of no jurisdiction by the courts, so that due process
did not anse.' 15 However, in the context of the 1996 FSIA Amendment, due
process clearly became an issue for courts and commentators. The reaction was
wide and disparate, ranging from supportive 152 to critical153 to indifferent.
154
However, a series of three cases dealt with the issue.
The first, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,15 5 was unchallenged by the
defendant but the issue was raised sua sponte. In the second case, Daliberti et al.
v. Republic oflraq,156 the defendant Republic of Iraq raised the issue in its Rule 12
motion to dismiss but abandoned its defense upon an unfavorable ruling and failed
to appeal. In the third such case, Price et al. v. Socialist People s Libyan Arab
Jamahtriya,157 the defendant not only asserted the absence of due process, but
appealed when the court denied its motion to dismiss on such grounds. Price
yielded the only appellate decision.
150. Id. at 619.
15 i. Letelier, 488 F Supp. at 672 n.6.
152. See Kevin Todd Shook, State Sponsors of Terrorism are Persons Too: The Flatow Mistake, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1301 (2000) (describing 1996 Amendment as compatible with due process based on
general jurisdiction and the reasonableness prong of the minimum contacts analysis); Lee M. Caplan,
The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 420-22 (2001) (asserting that the 1996
amendment withstands constitutional scrutiny because minimum contacts should not control personal
jurisdiction over foreign states).
153. Keith Sealing, State Sponsors of Terrorism is Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism
Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than it did Before 9/11, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 119, 141
(2003) (cnticizlng the FSIA and arguing that foreign states are "persons" entitled to due process).
154. See Karen Halverson, Is Foreign State 'Person'? Does it Matter? Personal Jurisdiction,
Due Process and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 115, 142 (2001)
(arguing that junsdiction over foreign states should be analyzed not on due process grounds but under
international law).
155. Flatow 1, 999 F Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998)
156. Daliberti 1, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2001).
157. Price 11, 294 F.3d at 85.
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Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Since the 1996 FSIA Amendment, the issue has remained whether the foreign
sovereign defendant is a person for purposes of due process, raising the substantial
contacts factor. In order for a foreign sovereign to be exempt from traditional
immunity under the FSIA, that sovereign must be on the list of terrorist states. t s
Once on that list, diplomatic relations no longer exist with the country, with the
exception of Syria, thus limiting or eliminating contacts between that nation and
the United States. 59  If a foreign sovereign lacks the presumed substantial
contacts, how can that nation be subjected to trial, that which immunity avoids?
While two trial courts dealt with the issue more than peripherally, neither utilized a
finding that a foreign sovereign could not be a person for purposes of due process
as the basis for the court's ruling. 16° Further, it is a less onerous task for the court
to raise sua sponte the issue of due process in a matter being tried without the
presence of the defendant in the courtroom.
In the Flatow I case, Iran had never appeared and the matter was tried with no
defense whatsoever on its part. 6 1 The court, quite properly, conducted the trial as
if there were a defendant present, raising sua sponte those issues which required
resolution in order to enter a judgment. The court in Flatow I said that the U.S.
Supreme Court had only addressed the issue of due process for a foreign sovereign
twice, citing to both Verlindin162 and Weltoverl63 and in those cases only in
dicta. 164 Weltover the Flatow I court noted, particularly avoided the issue by- (1)
assuming without deciding that a foreign sovereign was a person for due process;
(2) finding minimum contacts sufficient to establish the due process requirement;
and (3) contradicting itself through the Katzenbach reference. 165
The Flatow III court then found it unnecessary, much like the court in
Weltover to base its decision on the non-person status of the foreign sovereign, but
gave a cogent discussion of the merger of subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction and the confusion this has caused courts and legal scholars.' 66
Particularly, the Flatow 11I court did find a close resemblance between "minmum
contacts" and "direct effects" by finding that m fact and in law due process had
been afforded to Iran.
67
It should be noted that while the Flatow III court gave a thoughtful and
thorough analysis of its many considerations, the argument was all raised sua
158, FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A_ § 1605(a)(7)(A).
159. Glenn Kessler, Powell to Detail Concerns to Syria; At Meeting Intended to Ease Tensions,
Secretary to Seek Specific Action, WASHINGTON POST, May 3,2003, at A14.
160. Flatow 11, 67 F Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 1999); Flatow II1, 74 F Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
161. Mona Conway, Terrorism, the Law and Politics as Usual: A Comparison of Anti-Terrorism
Legislation Before and After 9/11, 18 TOURO L. REv 735, 743 n.46 (2002).
162. Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
163. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
164. Flatow III, 74 F Supp. 2d at 19-20.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 20-21.
VOL. 32:3
WILL INTERNATIONAL SHOE GET THE BOOT?
sponte, as Iran filed no pleadings and made no appearance whatsoever m the
Flatow III case. Its importance is that it is the first post-1996 FSIA amendment
case in which personal due process is mentioned.169
Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq
The next such case, Daliberti v. Republic oflraq, went one step further in that
Iraq, as it had done in two previous FSIA cases, both pre-1996, sought dismissal
and vigorously contested the plaintiffs' assertions.170 Iraq had appeared by counsel
and had argued a motion to dismiss m Hall v. People s Republic oflraq'7' and had
appealed, without success, the entry of a default in Dadesho v. Government of
Iraq.172 However, once its motion to dismiss in Daliberti I had been denied, Iraq
abandoned the courtroom, rendering the trial for all practical purposes a default
hearing. 1
73
Iraq sought dismissal on constitutional grounds m the Daliberti case,
including the denial of equal protection by treating state sponsors of terronsm
differently from other nations and by abrogating the mminimum contacts
requirements essential for personal junsdiction.174 It is the latter of these that is
germane to the appellate case of first impression and the question that decision
raises. 175 Iraq's motion to dismiss specifically alleged that because the behavior of
that which Plaintiffs complained occurred outside the United States, and within the
Republic of Iraq (as well as in Kuwait for at least one plaintiff), that the defendant
did not have fair warning that a particular activity would subject it to the
168. Conway, supra note 166, at 743 n.46.
169. See Flatow 1ff, 74 F Supp. 2d at 19.
170. 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D. D.C. 2000).
171. 80 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir..1996).
172. 139 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. Judge Oberdorfer commented at the commencement of the Daliberti I trial:
I have been sensitive to the fact that-to the effect on the trial of there being no defense
counsel present. I've been tempted but haven't interjected what would be, in effect,
objections to leading questions and to the admission of what-if there were alert defense
counsel, they would probably be tested as to whether the evidence or the material was
hearsay. I'm toying with an idea. I want to mention it to you now so you may think
about it, of having you, maybe you've done it anyway, annotate your findings with
reference to the transcript or document that is the item of evidence which would when
you look at it as a lawyer you would believe conscientiously to be manifestly admissible.
Trial tr., at 273, Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000). Judge
Oberdorfer also engaged trial counsel in a dialogue as if objections were made by an
opposing counsel and ruled upon: "Court: Now what would your objection be if you
were defense counsel to the admission?" Cooper-Hill: If I were the defense counsel I
would object on the basis of hearsay and if I were the Court I would overrule the
objection on the basis of business records. Court: You are a lawyer. What would you
answer? Cooper-Hill: It's a business record, your Honor, under 803 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Court: So I ratify the Order reeiving it.
Trial tr., at 306, Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
174. Daliberti, 1,97 F Supp. 2d at 52.
175. See id.
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jurisdiction of the United States, citing Burger King.17 6 Iraq further alleged that
maintenance of the Daliberti I suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, citing International Shoe.177 When the testimony adduced at
trial demonstrated that one of the plaintiffs was stripped naked, blindfolded and
threatened with electrocution through his testicles if he did not sign a confession of
espionage,1 78 it is difficult to suggest that Iraq had no warning that such conduct
might subject it to the jurisdiction of an American court.
Judge Friedman, in denying Iraq's motion to dismiss, quoted from the
Congressional Report 79 on the 1976 enactment of the FSIA which equated the
conduct giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction with sufficient contacts. He went
on to state:
In the context of this statute, the purpose for which it was enacted, and the nature
of the activity toward which it was enacted, and the nature of the activity toward
which it is directed, the Court concludes that it is reasonable that foreign states be
held accountable in the courts of the United States for terronst actions perpetrated
against U.S. Citizens anywhere.'
8 0
Further, m the opinion denying Iraq's motion to dismiss based on due process,
the judge m Daliberti I first cited to Flatow, Weltover and Katzenbach but stated:
"It would seem that a foreign sovereign should enjoy no greater due process rights
than the sovereign States of the Union. As Judge Richey noted: 'If the States of
the Union have no due process rights, then a "foreign mission" qua "foreign
mission" surely can have none."""il
Daliberti I was the first post-1996 FSIA Amendment case in which the
defendant sovereign raised the issue of due process; this makes Daliberti I the
second of the three case evolution on the due process issue. Notwithstanding that
the opinion in Daliberti Idenying Iraq's motion to dismiss was straightforward and
did not hesitate to hold Iraq to trial in a United States court, it still is but a trial
court opinion. It fell to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to make the first appellate ruling as to the lack of due process being
afforded a foreign sovereign.
176. Id at 53 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
177. Daliberti 1, 97 F Supp. 2d at 53 (citing lnt' Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
178. Chad Hall: "He said to get started we'll pull your fingernails out. If that doesn't work we'll
cut your knuckles off one at time. Question: Cut your what? Your fingertips off one at a time? Chad
Hall: Yes. He said if that doesn't work. .(indicating). Question: What did he say9 Chad Hall: He said
we'll take an electric cord to you and shock you. Question: Shock you where? Chad Hall: In the
gonads. Question: In your testicles, correct? Chad Hall: Yes. in Tnal tr., at 121-122, Dalibeti v.
Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
179. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976) (footnotes omitted), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6612, quoted in Thos. P Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1255 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980).
180. Daliberti 1, 97 F Supp. 2d at 54.
181. Id. at 49 (citing Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 674 F Supp. 910, 919 (D.D.C. 1987)).
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Price v. Socialist People s Libyan Arab Jamahirya
The Price I case became the first post-1996 FSIA Amendment case in which
the defendant designated terronst state not only appeared by filing a motion to
dismiss, but also appealed the denial of such motion.1 2 After first reciting the
International Shoe criteria of certain minimum contacts, and in their absence, the
protection a person has from the burden of litigating in the forum m which suit has
been commenced, the Price I court first found that Libya has no contacts,
minimum or otherwise, sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 183
However, Libya's argument asserted that, as a matter of law, it was a person
for purposes of due process. 1 4 The court acknowledged having previously
proceeded as if this were true but had never so held.18 5 The U.S. Supreme Court m
the Weltover case, as noted above, assumed without holding that Argentina was
entitled to due process, notwithstanding its cryptic footnote to Katzenbach, but did
not find due process lacking.' 8 6  The same court which decided Price had
previously stated that a foreign state being entitled to constitutional due process
was an unchallenged assumption in Creighton Ltd. V Government of Qatar 187
But in Price H the issue of due process, as a means of challenging the personal
jurisdiction over Libya, was placed squarely before the court and contested by the
plaintiffs.
188
Noting that prior decisions had danced around the issue both before and after
the Katzenbach case, the Price H court found nothing equivocal about its ruling
which could conceivably support Libya's position.' 89 The incongruity of holding a
State of the Union not a person entitled to due process but providing due process
comfort to a foreign state alien to our system of constitutional law was pointed
out. 190
Of all the compelling arguments the court put forth to justify the negative
finding regarding a foreign sovereign, the most significant in the context of an
FSIA suit brought for acts of terrorism was related to the practical problems arising
182. Price I, 110 F Supp. 2d 10 (D. D.C. 2000); aff'd Price 11, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
183. Price I, 110 F Supp. 2d at 14 (noting that "Libya has no presence in the United States, does
not conduct any business in the United States either directly or through an agent, and has no other
affiliating contacts with the United States").
184. Price 1, 294 F.3d at 95.
185. Id.
186. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
187. 181 F.3d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
188. Price 1, 294 F.3d at 85.
189. See id at 90. The Court of Appeals in Price acknowledged the absence of due process, if
applicable, by stating: "Thus, §1605(a)(7) now allows personal jurisdiction to be maintained over
defendants in circumstances that do not appear to satisfy the 'minimum contacts' requirement of the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 90. However, the Court of Appeals further stated that the term 'person' did
not include a sovereign, and, unequivocally denied the nght of due process to foreign sovereign:
"Indeed, we think it would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to foreign
nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional system, than are afforded to the states, who help
make up the very fabric of that system. ld. at 96.
190. Price Il, 294 F.3d at 96, 99.
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from vesting a foreign state with such constitutional protections as Libya sought.19'
Foremost among these was the power of the executive branch to freeze the assets
of foreign nations or to impose sanctions upon them, thus giving rise to the
argument that such executive conduct deprived the foreign state of its property
without benefit of due process. 92 It should be noted that ultimately the issue of
granting U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns coincided inextricably
with the right to collect judgments from those frozen assets.
In an earlier draft of an FSIA amendment that never made it to the floor of the
senate, the sponsor Arlen Specter (R.-PA) testified that his then pending bill would
not only grant a forum but a means to satisfy any judgment awarded. 193 The form
of the FSIA under which Flatow, Daliberti and Price were brought included
language instructing the Secretaries of State and Treasury to use their best efforts
to "fully, promptly and effectively assist any judgment creditor ,,t94 The
refusal to so do and the relentless resistance to be of any assistance to former
hostage judgment creditors resulted in additional litigation m the Daliberti I case
against those Secretaries in a mandamus action.' 95 This internal conflict was
resolved by two events involving the frozen assets of Iraq. First, the enactment of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 amended by the addition of the
Terrorism Victims Access to Compensation 96 clearly conferred upon judgment
creditors that right which had only been hinted at in committee reports and the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The Senator noted:
This legislation would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by giving Federal
courts junsdiction over any suit brought in this country against any foreign country that
has been formally listed by the State Department as supporter of international
terrorism, if that foreign state has committed, caused, or supported an act of terrorism
against an American citizen. The legislation would also enable the court to freeze all
assets of the defendant country located within the United States sufficient to satisfy
judgment.
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary; for
Consideration on S. 825 S. Hrg. 103-1077 June 21, 1994 (statement of Senator Arlen Specter). While
approved by the committee, the bill was never brought to the floor of the Senate and thus died at the end
of the session in 1994.
194. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(f)(2)(A). The FSIA sets out:
At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect to
claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every effort to fully, promptly
and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued any such
judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that foreign state
or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(t)(2)(A).
195. When the Secretaries of State and Treasury refused to comply with the requirements of 28
U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), the plaintiffs in Daliberti, post-judgment, collectively filed Civil Action 02-CV-
I 120-(LFO) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Daliberti et al v. Colin L. Powell,
Secretary of State of the United States and Paul H. O'Neil, Secretary of Treasury of the United States, a
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The matter was continued on several occasions at the request of the
Department of Justice for ten months, at which time plaintiffs received satisfaction of their judgment.
The mandamus action was then dismissed.
196. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 1610, 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2002).
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suggestion of help from State and Treasury- access to the frozen assets for
purposes of satisfaction of judgments. 197 Even after that statutory enactment, the
combined resistance of State and Treasury was only overcome by the Executive
Order of the President. 98 That Order confiscated all frozen assets of the Republic
of Iraq, over 2 billion m U.S. dollars, except for assets previously located by
judgment creditors, accomplished in three cases without the aid of State and
Treasury, and subject to levy or writ. 199 Had Iraq been afforded due process, the
Daliberti plaintiffs and plaintiffs in two other cases could not have been paid. The
confiscation of Iraq's frozen assets by Executive Order would in and of itself have
been a denial of due process.
The same Court of Appeals earlier had said: "No one would suppose that a
foreign national had a due process right to notice and a hearing before the
Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of coercing a change in
policy ,200
IS INTERNATIONAL SHOE IN DANGER OF LOSING ITS EFFECT9
Judges and lawyers should not construe the Price II case to mean the end of
International Shoe's requirement of mimmum contacts so that the maintenance of
a suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and justice. The Price I
court specifically left open the prospect that entities other than a specific
government of a foreign sovereign might still be considered persons for purposes
of due process.20 1 Consistent with this specific reservation by the Price 11 court,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in post-judgment
proceedings in Daliberti allowed bank accounts of the government of Iraq, frozen
by Executive Order,20 2 to be disbursed forthwith to satisfy the Daliberti and
Frazier judgments, while requiring specific notice, translated into Arabic, and
thirty days opportunity within which to come into such court and be heard by
subsidiary corporations which were wholly owned by the Republic of Iraq.
20 3
197. See id
198. Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003).
199. Id.
200. Price 17, 294 F.3d at 99 (citing People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17,
22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
201. Price II, 294 F.3d at 99-100.
202. Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990). President Bush's Executive
Order No. 12,724 included the agencies, instrumentalities, controlled interests and the Central Bank of
Iraq.
203. The District Court in post-judgment proceedings in Daliberti v. Iraq and Frazier v. Iraq
required thirty day notice in Arabic, with the opportunity to be heard, for the Central Bank of Iraq,
Bank Rashid and Raffidan Bank, all wholly owned and operated agencies of the Republic of Iraq. Judge
Spnzzo's Order for providing notice to the banks which were wholly owned by the Republic of Iraq
provided alternative means of notice as follows:
(a) [B]y delivery by U.S. Global Express Mail, together with the Cover
Memorandum. .initiated by the Clerk of the Court and by JPM Chase and Bank of New
York. with proof of delivery to be provided with the procedures established for U.S.
Global Express Mail; (b) by delivery by any other mail or courier service. that will
provide either proof or acknowledgment of delivery; (c) by delivery to the Permanent
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While not specifically expressing the issue of due process, the Court m those
proceedings clearly set forth a procedure of its own design which would
undoubtedly have been held to amount to due process for the Iraqi subsidiaries
whose assets were subject to levy and execution. The Price II court left open the
possibility that a subsidiary corporation, such as Rafidain Bank m the Daliberti
case, might require treatment affording due process.
20 4
The Price II court finally reiterated the availability of forum non conveniens
not withstanding the unavailability of due process for foreign sovereigns, thus
mitigating the concern that "United States courts will become the courts of choice
for local disputes between foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereign defendants and
thus be reduced to international courts of clains."
20 5
Given the possible exceptions to the opinion which the court left available m
Price II, it is unlikely that International Shoe, and the rule regarding minimum
contacts, will fade away Conversely, if a designated terrorist sovereign mistreats
U.S. citizens in a manner which fulfills the criteria of the FSIA that such treatment
amounts to having a direct effect in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that
the contacts occur outside the United States, minimum contacts should not be an
issue. International Shoe still has many miles to travel.
Mission of Iraq to the United Nations and to the Iraq Interest Section of the Algerian
Embassy to the United States with instructions for transshipment of same to the Iraqi
bank; (d) by delivery to any agent appointed for service of process or to any other person
designated by the Iraqi Banks to receive notification with respect to any activity in their
accounts within or outside the United States in connection with accounts maintained in
New York, or identified in agreements entered into with JPM Chase or BNY by any of
the Iraqi Banks; (e) by delivery to the branch of Rafidain Bank located in Amman,
Jordan; (1) by delivery to the branch of Rafidain Bank located in Amman, Jordan, with
instructions for transshipment of same to the Iraqi Banks' head offices in Baghdad, Iraq,
as per BNY's arrangement with Rafidan Bank for delivery of periodic account
statements to the Central Bank of Iraq, Bank Rafidan or Bank Rashead; and, (g) by
electronic delivery (including fax, e-mail and/or telex) to the Iraqi Banks
Judge Spnzo's Order, In re Daliberti v. J.P Morgan Chase & Co., et al., Cause No. 2002 CV 9778 rn
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After service of such notice but
before the thirty days had expired, the Executive Order carved out an exception to the President's
confiscation of all of Iraq's frozen assets which was applicable only to Daliberii v. Republic of Iraq,
Frazier v. Republic of Iraq and Dadesho v. Government of Iraq. Exec. Order No. 13290: Confiscating
& Vesting Certain Iraqi Property, March 20,2003.
204. Price 11, 294 F.3d at 96 (noting that with the issue directly before us, we hold that foreign
states are not 'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment").
205. The Price II court, after noting the remaining availability of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, concluded: "the forum non conveniens doctrine helps mitigate the concern that 'United
States courts will become the courts of choice for local disputes between foreign plaintiffs and foreign
sovereign defendants and thus be reduced to international courts of claims."' Id. at 100 (quoting
Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir.
1985)).
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TOWARD A DEFINITION OF NATIONAL MINORITY
JOHN R. VALENTINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Viktor Orban, Hungary's former prime minister, recently said that protecting
national minorities is a "European value"' and one that Hungary will work to have
enshrined in the constitution of the European Union.2 But what is a "national
minority"9 Is a purely ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority a national minority9
If not, how can we tell the difference between these minorities and a national
minority9
There appears to be no easy answers to these questions. The Council of
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (the
"Framework Convention, or the "Convention"), which came into effect in 1998, 3
"contains no definition of national minorities, none having received the consent of
all Council of Europe member states."4 Because there is no agreed upon definition
of national minority, we are left to wonder: What is this "European value" that is to
be protected and what minorities may receive protection under the Framework
Convention? This paper will discuss the possible meaning of the term "national
minority, with special emphasis given to the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities.
I will argue that a national minority is distinct from an ethnic, religious, or
linguistic minority,5 and I will suggest some possible characteristics that can be
looked at to discern what is a national minority This paper will begin in Part I1
Mr. Valentine is an associate at Holme Roberts & Owen LLP in Denver, Colorado. I would like to
thank Professor Cole Durham for his suggestions and encouragement in writing this article.
1. Ahto Lobjakas, Hungary: Ex-Prime Minister Says EU Enlargement Will Solve the Hungarian
Minority Issue, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/
2003/10/17102003164603.asp (Oct. 17, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, opened for signature Feb. 1,
1995, C.E.T.S. No. 157 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.intl
Treaty/EN/cadrepnncipal.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Framework Convention].
4. Francesco Capotorti, The First European Legislation on the Protection of National Minorities,
in THE CHALLENGES OF A GREATER EUROPE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY
147 (Council of Europe Publ'g 1996) (emphasis added).
*. At least one scholar suggests similar distinction: "The [Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities] protects only 'national' not religious minorities Thomas
Giegerich, Freedom of Religion as Source of Claims for Equality and Problems for Equality, 34 ISR.
L. REV 211, 227 n.66 (2000).
6. The definition of "national minority" may have a significant impact in the freedom of religion
area, particularly for those religions which actively proselytize converts. Proselytizing religions are
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by generally discussing the differing approaches to minority rights. Part III will
focus on efforts to protect minority rights between World War I and World War II.
Part IV will focus on developments between World War II and the end of the Cold
War, and Part V will focus on the period Immediately following the Cold War.
Part VI will be devoted to a discussion of efforts to protect national minorities
following the Cold War. Finally Part VII will offer a brief conclusion.
II. GENERAL APPROACHES TO PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS
Protection of minorities' rights can follow one of two general approaches: an
individual rights or a group rights approach.7 The individual rights approach
requires that a person who has been discriminated against petition the government
(usually the courts) for redress. By granting that individual relief, the court (at
least theoretically) sends a message to all would-be discriminators that such
discrimination will not be tolerated. As a result, discrimination in society as a
whole, as well as discrimination against the specific minority group the petitioner
represents, should decrease based upon the government's efforts to protect the
rights of that one individual. 8
The group rights approach, on the other hand, "guarantees the rights of
groups, by name, [and] specifically reserves for groups a certain proportion of
posts in government, in civil services, in the universities, [and] in business." 9 The
group rights approach operates by way of a quota or some other preference for
stated minorities, guaranteeing those minorities representation in the major centers
of power within a country (in the government, universities, etc.) Individuals from
each minority group who hold these positions of power will, it is rationally
assumed, act to protect the rights of the minority they represent. The idea behind
the U.S. affirmative action movement is arguably based upon a group approach to
minority rights.'
0
An individual rights approach is responsive by nature. Courts may only
respond to an individual's complaint of a violation of his/her minority rights after
the violation has occurred. An individual rights approach will punish
discrimination after-the-fact, but it does not contemplate positive action to prevent
such discrimination from happening again. A group rights approach, on the other
likely to draw converts from all racial, cultural, and linguistic groups within a country. While the
adherents of a proselytizing religion are likely (at least iniially) to be minonty within given country,
they are also likely to have only one characteristic in common, namely religion.
7 For a good discussion of both the individual rights and group rights approaches to minority
rights, see Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights against Group Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
CULTURES 123, 123-24 (Will Kymlicka, ed., 1995).
8. In questioning the validity of the individual rights approach, Glazer asks, "Does not every
other individual who is a member of the group also require satisfaction and compensation?" Id. at 124.
9. Id. at 126.
10. See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 580-81 (acknowledging and challenging the argument that affirmative
action is based on group rights approach to minority rights and is therefore violation of the equal
protection clause).
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hand, is prospective by nature. By guaranteeing each minority a certain number of
positions within government, education, etc., the group rights approach acts
prospectively to guarantee minority representation in these vital institutions of
society even before specific acts of discrimination are alleged.
Nathan Glazer argues that "the form of a nation's response to diversity-
individual rights or group rights-should have no bearing on whether we consider
that nation responsive to human rights and to civil rights.""l Furthermore, he notes
that neither approach is more consistent with democracy, as is evidenced by the
fact that the some democracies (for example, the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Australia) tend to prefer the individual rights approach
while other democracies (Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and India) prefer the group
rights approach.'
2
Which approach to minority rights a country chooses will, however, have a
profound effect upon the future of that country If the country sees itself (or hopes
to see itself) as a single, unified society, a group rights approach would defeat that
goal by further ingraining group identities rather than helping to dissolve them. A
group rights approach
makefs] a statement to all [of a country's] individuals and groups that people
derive rights not only from a general citizenship but from another land of
citizenship within a group. And just as laws and regulations are required to
determine who is a citizen of the state and may exercise the nghts of a citizen, so
would laws and regulations be required to determine who is a citizen of subsidiary
group, and who may exercise the nghts of such a citizenship.1
3
However, if a country sees itself as a "confederation of groups"' 14 rather than
as a single, unified society, a group rights approach would be appropriate. Thus,
the individual rights approach is the proverbial "melting pot. In terms of human
rights, each person has the same rights as every other person, regardless of
individual characteristics such as race, creed, nationality, language, or religion.
The group rights approach sees society as something more akin to beef stew, with
each group (like the carrot, the potato, and the beef) maintaining its integrity while
still being mixed in the same pot. The individual rights approach seeks to be
"color-blind, while the group rights approach openly acknowledges the full
rainbow of human diversity and seeks to have each "color" respect the other.
While Glazer acknowledges that both approaches to minority rights can
legitimately provide protection for minorities, he also seems to acknowledge that
the group rights approach has certain drawbacks of its own:
If we choose the group-rights approach we say that the differences between some
groups are so great that they cannot achieve satisfaction on the basis of individual
rights. We say, too, that-whether we want to or not-we will permanently
11. Glazer, supra note 7, at 133.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
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section the society into ethnic groups by law. Even if advocates of group rights
claim this is a temporary solution to problems of inequality, as they do in India
and in the United States, it is inconceivable to me that benefits given in law on the
basis of group membership will not strengthen groups, will not make necessary
the policing of their boundaries, and will not become permanent in a democratic
society, where benefits once given cannot be withdrawn. 15
Because the Framework Convention adopts elements of a group rights approach, it
is just this policing of boundaries that makes the definition of national minority so
important to understanding the protections provided by the Framework
Convention.
The human nghts movement for most of the latter half of the twentieth
century approached minority rights through individual rights avenues. This
approach may be necessary given the international nature of most human rights
instruments: A group rights approach to minority rights requires a micro-managed
system for determining how many persons from each minority should be allocated
positions within government, education, etc. Such decisions are probably better
left to individual countries to make, and a pure group rights approach would
therefore be a less suitable mechanism for an international treaty on the protection
of minority rights.
III. BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II
The term "national minority" appears to be a peculiarly European term, as it
does not appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the "UDHR"),
16
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "ICCPR"), 17 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
"ICESCR"'),is the American Convention on Human Rights, 19 or the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.20  Besides the Council of Europe
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, it appears that
the term "national minority" is only used with the same meaning 2' in the European
15. Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
16. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(IlI), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art.
2 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/nghts.htmi (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
UDHR].
17. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S 171(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.hrweb.orgilegal/cpr.html
(last visited Feb. 24,2004) [hereinafter ICCPRI.
18. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a cescr.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter ICESCR].
19. See American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasmstr/zoas3con.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
20. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2004).
21. The term does appear in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minonties, but it appears to carry a different meaning than that
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the
"ECHIR") 22 and m the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which
notes that "[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as ethnic or social
origin [or] membership in a national minority shall be prohibited., 23 Thus,
a basic understanding of the history of minority rights, particularly in the context
of European history, is important to understanding the Framework Convention and
the term "national minority
A. Nationalism
The prevailing theory at the end of World War I was nationalism; that is, "the
notion that the boundaries of the nation and the state should comcide. 24  A
nationality (or nation) is "a people having a common origin, tradition, and
language and capable of forming or actually constituting a nation-state. 25 The
goal at the end of World War I was to give each nation a state and thereby make
each state nearly homogenous in terms of the characteristics of its inhabitants.
However, the Paris Conference was soon faced with "the practical
impossibility of a coherent territorial division of Europe given the difficulties
connected with the multiplicity of nationalities, ' 26 and the result was that "some
20-30 million people found themselves continuing in, or newly cast in, the role of
national minorities., 2 7  For example, the Allies "placed German-speaking
minorities under the rule of weak central and east European states. ' 28 The Jewish
minorities in these newly created states were also a concern.29 In the early stages
of the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the existence of these
minorities m the newly-defined countries of Europe was recognized as a threat to
international peace.3 °
During the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, some of the
contemplated by the Framework Convention. See discussion mfra Part V
22. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at
http://conventions.coe.mt/treaty/en/Treaies/Htmi/005.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
ECHR].
23. Draft Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe, art. 11-21(1), CONV 850/03, at
http:/leuropean-convention.eu.intldocsfrreaty/cvOO850.enO3.pdf (July 18, 2003).
24. David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV
597, 599(1997).
25. Memam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
btn/dictionary?book='Dictionary&va=nationality (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
26. Study of Control and Monitoring Systems in International Conventions: Proposals for a
Control or Monitoring System Under a Framework Convention on the Protection of Minorities, para
22, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities, CAHMIN (94) 7 (Apr. 12, 1994) (photocopy on
file with author) [hereinafter CAHMIN (94) 7].
27. Wippman, supra note 24, at 599. Wippman also notes that "the vagaries of history,
geography, and politics made it impossible to give every nation a state of its own. Id
28. Hugh Miall, Introduction to MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 2 (Hugh Miall, ed., 1994).
29. See MALCOLM D. EvANs, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 104
(1997).
30. Id. at 86.
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participants suggested that protecting freedom of religion was also important to
protecting international security 3' They recognized that religious persecution
could lead to open conflict and even war.32 A clause providing for the protection
of religious freedom was considered33 but ultimately rejected.34
B. The Minorities Treaties
Also absent from the Covenant of the League of Nations was a provision for
the protection of minority rights. Instead, protection for minority rights was
provided through a series of Minorities Treaties signed by the newly-created and
the newly-expanded nations of Europe.35  The Allied and Associated Powers
negotiated minorities' treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-
Slovene state, Romania, and Greece.36 All of these treaties were based on the
treaty with Poland, but each varied somewhat according to the specific needs of the
newly-created (or newly-expanded) country and the specific concerns of the Allied
powers for that country.37
Although the Polish treaty is termed a minorities treaty the main concern of
the treaty was the protection of Polish Jews:
38
Above all else, [the Polish minorities' treaty] was designed to protect the Jewish
population in the new State of Poland and it was the Jewish lobby that made the
treaty a reality. Its applicability to other minority groups was little more than a
side effect. Although concern was expressed for other minorities and their needs
made known, they had little impact upon the discussions and some amendments
distinctly disadvantageous to other minorties were accepted in order to placate
Polish unease at the extent of the protection being offered to the Jews.
3 9
The Jewish minority was of particular concern given the centuries of anti-Semitism
that had persisted in Europe. The fact that the Jewish minority had in common a
single culture, religion, and language was not without significance. It was
precisely because of the combination of the Jews' unique culture, religion, and
language that they were separated from and feared by the communities in which
they lived.
31. See td. at 90.
32. See id.
33. See generally id. at 93-103 (explaining that the drafters' attempts to include a include a
provision concerning religious freedom were hindered by disagreements about the scope of protection
that the Covenant should afford).
34. Id. at 104.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 125. Other states joining the League were requested to comply with the Minorities
treaties as well. Id. at 139. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joined and made declarations for the
protection of minorities within their borders. Id. at 142. One final minonties declaration was made by
Iraq in May 1932. Id.
37. See id. at 125.
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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Despite the relatively large population of Jews within the country, Germany
was not forced to sign a Minorities Treaty because Germany "was still a Great
Power and the refusal of the Allies to accept similar obligations [for the protection
of minonties] would be put into bold relief by imposing a general regime of
minorities obligations upon her., 40 The Minorities Treaties system was thus a less-
than-uniform attempt at protecting minorities.
The absence of a provision within the Covenant of the League of Nations for
the protection of religious freedom 41 was probably due to the belief that freedom of
religion would be a part of the protection of the rights of minorities through the
Minorities Treaties. Thus, the Minorities Treaties stayed far clear of recognizing
freedom of religion as a fundamental right. Religious freedom was, in essence,
guaranteed to minorities as an aspect of their minority status, but no provision was
made for religious freedom for those in the majority Persons not covered by the
Minorities Treaties could protect their freedom of religion only through the
political process (that is, through the legislative and executive branches) rather
than through the judiciary.
The Minorities Treaties technically followed an individual rights approach to
42minority rights. However, because the rights protected could only be asserted by
minorities, the Minorities Treaties "had the practical effect of advancing the
interests of minorities as collectivities. Thus, as a practical matter, the League
of Nations' protection regime superimposed some elements of collective rights on
aformally individual rights approach to moderating majority-minority tensions. 43
Although the Minorities Treaties were concluded with the Allied and
Associated Powers, the League of Nations was responsible for treaty
enforcement. 44  This move was significant as it was the first time that the
protection of minorities had been given to an international organization. 4
However, League of Nations oversight of the Minorities Treaties was unpopular
with many of the States bound by them. Delegates from Romania, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state argued that allowing the League
of Nations to oversee the implementation of the treaties would undermine their
sovereignty by giving minorities the right to look beyond national governments to
the international community for the protection of their rights.46 While these
arguments did not prevail,47 the opposition of these states to international
supervision of minority rights shows dislike of the system from the outset.
40. Id. at 129.
41. Id. at 104.
42. Wippman, supra note 24, at 600.
43. EvANs, supra note 29, at 104 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 129.
45. CAHMIN (94) 7, supra note 26, at para. 23.
46. See EVANs, supra note 29, at 127.
47. See id.
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C. League Assembly Resolution of September 1921
Despite the Allied Powers' reluctance to take upon themselves the obligations
of the Minorities Treaties, a resolution was passed during the Second Session of
the League Assembly m September 1921 which stated:
[T]hose states which are not bound by any legal obligation with respect to
minorities treaties will nevertheless observe, in their treatment of their own racial,
religious and linguistic minorities, at least as high a standard of justice and
toleration as is required by any of the treaties and by the regular action of the
Council.
48
It is interesting here to note the difference between the Minorities Treaties and this
League Assembly resolution. The Minorities Treaties were crafted with the
protection of one minorty in mmd, namely the Jewish minority and, as noted
above, the applicability of the Minorities Treaties to other minorities was
attenuated at best.49 The League Assembly resolution was meant to apply only to
those states in the League of Nations which were not already bound by a
mimonties' treaty, which suggests that the resolution was meant to impose upon
these countries the same obligations that the parties to the Minorities Treaties had
undertaken. Unlike the Minorities Treaties, however, this resolution requires states
to treat with justice and toleration three distinct kinds of minorities-racial
minorities, religious minorities, and linguistic minorities.50 It is unclear whether
this difference was intended or even noted by the members of the League of
Nations. However, since the resolution appears to have been intended to impose
the same obligations on the members of the League of Nations as imposed by the
Minorities Treaties, it could be argued that even the Minorities Treaties themselves
were meant to protect purely racial, religious, or linguistic minorities. However,
the actual practice of the Minorities Treaties shows little support for this
interpretation.
D. The Demise of the Minorities Treaties System
The September 1921 Resolution of the League Assembly did not satisfy the
Minorities Treaties countries' demands for a uniform system of minorities'
protection. During the fifteenth Session of the League m 1934, Poland went as far
as to propose a resolution that a general minorities' convention should be
concluded. 5' Such a convention would have provided uniform protection for the
rights of minorities among all members of the League of Nations and not just the
states of Europe. Although the suggestion received some degree of support,
Poland ultimately withdrew the resolution.52 "The lack of a general and uniform
48. Id. at 142.
49. See id. at 105.
50. EvANS, supra note 29, at 142.
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id.
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system of obligations regarding minorities provided a convenient weapon for those
States who wished to avoid their own treaty obligations and Poland ultimately
withdrew from the supervisory mechanisms of the League on this basis,
undermining the entire system."5 3 The lack of uniformity within the Minorities
Treaties system ultimately proved to be the system's downfall. Although the
system failed, it was important as the first international effort to protect minority
rights.
IV WORLD WAR II TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR
World War II proved that the concerns over minority rights expressed at the
end of World War I were well founded. Germany invaded its neighbors to the east
under the pretext of protecting the rights of German minorities living there,5 and
the Holocaust accompanying the war was the most violent expression of anti-
Semitism in world history The human rights movement, particularly the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), was a direct response to these
tragedies. The UDHR adopted a purely individual rights approach, within which a
discussion of the rights of minorities as minorities would have had little meaning.
Bv adopting a universal and uniform approach to human and minority rights, the
UDHR (discussed m depth m the next section) addressed the biggest defect in the
Minorities Treaties system, namely lack of uniformity and universality
The end of World War II also led to the beginning of the Cold War:
The Cold War subsequently froze the political map, incidentally bequeathing to
the [European] continent the most stable borders it has enjoyed since the French
Revolution. Simply put, self-determination was not a real issue between 1945 and
1989. States were sovereign, or if they were not, there was nothing that could be
done about it.
55
Thus, states rather than nations were sovereign, regardless of the mix of peoples
occupying the state. The Cold War pushed the idea of minority rights to a position
of secondary importance as the superpowers vied for political and ideological
supremacy
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted an individual
rights approach to minority rights, no mention is made of minority rights in either
the UN Charter56 or the Umversal Declaration of Human Rights.57 The most
53. Id. at 143-44.
54. James Mayall, Sovereignty and Self-Determination in the New Europe, in MINORITY RIGHTS
IN EUROPE 7, 9 (Hugh Miall ed., 1994).
55. Id.
56. Charter of the United Nations, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf'UNcharter.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2004).
57. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 2. See also Patrick Thomberry, International and European
Standards on Minority Rights, in MINORrrY RiGHTs IN EUROPE 14 (Hugh Miall ed., 1994).
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
unportant right enumerated in the UDHR for the protection of minorities is the
principle of non-discrimination. Article 2 of the UDHR declares: "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."5 8 The
principle of non-discrimination protects the rights of minorities because a country
that cannot discriminate cannot give greater rights to the majority than it gives to a
minority As the noted minorities scholar Patrick Thornberry has argued, the UN
Charter and the UDHR do not mention minority rights because "the principle of
universal human rights on the basis of non-discrimination on racial, ethnic,
religious and other grounds was deemed to be sufficient protection for minority
groups." 59  However, Thomberry also argues that "the principle of non-
discrimination is only a first step in the protection of minorities, but is not
sufficient in itself to deal with the question. 60
B. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR, by contrast, provides more protection than the mere
nondiscrimination principle of the UDHR. Article 27 of the ICCPR specifically
provides for the protection of the rights of minorities as minorities:
61
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.
62
Article 27 clearly distinguishes between three kinds of minorities: A minority may
be an ethmic (or cultural) 63 minority, a religious minority, or a linguistic minority,
and "persons belonging to such minorities' 64 are given certain rights. The use here
of the plural term "minorities" makes it clear that Article 27 contemplates three
distinct kinds of minorities and that a minority need not have culture, religion, and
language in common in order to receive protection. Article 27 further emphasizes
the distinctness of each of these kinds of minorities by guaranteeing each minority
the right to enjoy that quality which makes the minority distinct. Thus, a cultural
minority has the right to enjoy its culture, a religious minority has the right to
58. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 2.
59. Thomberry, supra note 57, at 14. Of course, if a country does not guarantee the rights and
freedoms listed in the UDHR to the majority, the principle of non-discrimination will not protect the
rights of minorities. The UDHR accounts for this weakness by stating first that the rights and freedoms
of the UDR apply to everyone in every country, be they part of the majority or minority. UDHR,
supra note 16, at art. 2.
60. Thornberry, supra note 57, at 20.
61. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 27
62. Id.
63. Article 27 refers to an ethnic minority in the introductory phrase and then provides in the
predicate of the sentence that the members of such a minority shall have the right "to enjoy their own
culture. Id. Article 27 thus seems to equate ethnic minority with cultural minority.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
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practice its religion, and a linguistic minority has the right to use its own
65language.
1. Article 2 of the UDHR vs. Article 27 of the ICCPR
Article 27 of the ICCPR differs significantly from Article 2 of the UDHR in
the kind of protection provided for (or the rights guaranteed to) minorities. Article
2 of the UDHR does not specifically mention the term "minority, nor does it
provide any substantive rights but merely provides every person the right to assert
every other right listed m the Declaration. 66 Article 27 of the ICCPR, on the other
hand, affirmatively provides minorities with the substantive right to enjoy their
culture, religion, or language.67
These two sections also differ with regards to who can assert protection under
them. Article 2 of the UDHR prevents discrmination against any individual,
regardless of whether that person is part of the majority or a minority. Article 27
of the ICCPR, on the other hand, protects only those belongmg to one of the three
stated minorities. 68 Furthermore, Article 27 of the ICCPR only applies "[i]n those
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,, 69 suggesting that
these rights "may not be universal since the groups may not 'exist' in all
states." 70 Thus, Article 2 of the UDHR appears to provide broader but less specific
protection than Article 27 of the ICCPR. The fact that minority rights lack
universality may help to explain why they were omitted from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Despite the reference in Article 27 to a person's right to enjoy his or her
culture, religion, or language "in community with the other members of their
group, '7 1 the rights guaranteed under Article 27 must be asserted individually
Thomberry notes that "[t]he text refers to the rights of persons and not of groups,
thus limiting the community or collective dimension of the rights."7 2 Thus, like
Article 2 of the UDHR, Article 27 of the ICCPR contemplates an individual-rights
approach to minority rights.
2. Article 18 vs. Article 27 of the ICCPR
Article 18 of the ICCPR (providing for freedom of religion and belief) and
Article 27 of the ICCPR have a significant amount of overlap with respect to
religious minorities. Article 18 provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
65. Id.
66. UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 2.
67. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 27
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Thomberry, supra note 57, at 15.
71. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 27
72. Thomberry, supra note 57, at 15.
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This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching.
73
While Article 18 does not specifically mention religious minorities, General
Comment 22 to Article 18 suggests that the Article contemplates protection of
religious minorities:
Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions
and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of
traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency
to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that
they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the
subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.
74
Under Article 18, as under Article 27 members of religious minorities must assert
their rights individually- Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion to everyone, not to every group.75 However, both Article
18 and Article 27 provide the right to practice one's religion m community with
others.
76
Because both Article 18 and Article 27 apply to religious minorities, what is
the difference between the two? Article 27 but not Article 18, is subject to
derogation "[iln time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. 77
This fact reveals "[t]he fundamental character of [freedom of thought, conscience
and religion guaranteed under Article 18] "78 and suggests that the rights of
religious minorities guaranteed under Article 27 may not be fundamental.
However, the right of a religious minority to profess and practice its religion under
Article 27 is guaranteed without limitation,79 while the right to manifest one's
religion or belief (but not the right to believe or to adopt a religion or belief)80
under Article 18 is subject to "such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others. " si
These facts are significant, but they do not fully answer the question as to
what protections each Article provides and to whom they are provided. General
73. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 18(1).
74. General Comment No. 22, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 48th Sess., para. 2, (1993), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b I dc7b4043c1256a
450044t331/26bd1328bee3bd13c256a8b0038e0a2/$FILE/GO141468.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22].
75. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 18(1).
76. Id at arts. 18(1), 27.
77. Id at art. 4(l)-(2)
78. General Comment No. 22, supra note 74, at para. 1.
79. See ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 27.
80. General Comment No. 22, supra note 74, at para. 3.
81. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 18(3).
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Comment 23 affirms that the right guaranteed under Article 27 "is distinct from,
and additional to, all the other rights which as individuals in common with
everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant. ' '8 2 So how isan Article 18 religious minority different from an Article 27 religious minority? 8 3
Article 18 applies solely (but universally) to individuals, who may or may not
be part of a religious minority Article 27 on the other hand, applies to individuals
"who belong to a group and who share in common culture, a religion and/or a
language." "Although the rights protected under Article 27 are individual rights,
they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture,
language or religion., 85 Article 27 thus incorporates a group rights element for the
protection of minority rights much like the Minorities Treaties. Furthermore, the
existence of an Article 27 minority group "does not depend upon a decision by that
State party but requires [establishment] by objective criteria."8 6 Although not
specifically indicated, these objective criteria presumably are the minority's unique
ethnic, religious or linguistic charactenstics.
8 7
Inherent in Article 27 therefore, is the existence of a group.88 Group
affiliation for purposes of Article 27 is more than just mutual association, however,
for even the members of an Article 18 religious minority may manifest their
religious belief in community with others.8 9 Article 18, on the other hand, may be
asserted by a person constituting a religion of one. 90
82. General Comment No. 23, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 50th Sess., para. 1 (1994), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043c1256a450044f331/26bdl328bee3bd13cl256a8b
0038eOa2/$FILE/G0141468.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 23].
83. I will refer to a religious mmoniy who qualifies for Article 27 protection as an Article 27
minority; religious minority who does not qualify for Article 27 protection will be referred to as an
Article 18 minority.
84. General Comment No. 23, supra note 82, at para. 5.1 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at para. 6.2 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at para. 5.2 (emphasis added).
87. See id., ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 27.
88. General Comment No. 23 provides that an Article 27 minority must include members "who
share in common culture, religion and/or language. General Comment No. 23, supra note 82, at
para. 5.1 (emphasis added). The use of the "and/or" here in General Comment 23 is significant, for it
suggests that a purely cultural, religious, or linguistic mmonty may constitute an Article 27 minority,
but it is certainly possible that such an Article 27 minority will have more than one characteristic in
common.
89. ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 18(1).
90. The explanation given in this paragraph hinges in large part on General Comments No. 22 and
No. 23 to Articles 18 and 27 of the ICCPR, respectively. General Comment No. 22 was written in
1993, and General Comment No. 23 was written in 1994. General Comment No. 22, supra note 74;
General Comment No. 23, supra note 82. Other international instruments adopted around this same
time (the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minonties
(opened for signature 1995)) use a similar hybrid individual rights-group rights approach to minority
rights. While the interpretation given in General Comments No. 22 and No. 23 is consistent with the
text of Articles 18 and 27, this interpretation is not necessarily inherent in these Articles. Thus, it is
possible (although not certain) that General Comments Nos. 22 and 23 were influenced by the work on
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Article 27 minorities are to receive "positive measures of protection" 91 against
acts by the State and by others within the State that would mfringe on their rights,
and "[p]ositive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the identity of
a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and
language and to practise their religion, in community with the other members of
the group." 92 This Comment reveals that Article 27 is concerned not so much with
protecting religious freedom as with protecting the group identity of cultural,
linguistic, and religious minorities. While such positive measures must respect the
principles of non-discrinimation and equal protection found in Articles 2.1 and 26,
respectively, 93 special treatment of an Article 27 minority "aimed at correcting
conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under
[AIrticle 27"94 is deemed permissible if based on reasonable and objective
criteria.95
Article 27 differs from the Minorities Treaties approach by providing a
uniform system for the protection of minority rights. Furthermore, the ICCPR is
intended to be a declaration of fundamental nghts,96 so an argument could be made
that the rights guaranteed under Article 27 are fundamental (despite the fact that
they are severable), unlike the rights guaranteed under the Minorities Treaties.
C. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") protects minority rights through the mechanism
of non-discrimination: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 97 The ECHR
thus adopts a purely individual rights approach to minority rights, as did the
UDHR.
The ECHR is significant, as it is the first international treaty to use the term
"national minority Religion is mentioned in the ECHR as a separate ground of
prohibited discrimination, possibly indicating that a national minority and a
religious minority should be treated as separate and distinct concepts.
these other international instruments and may be the result of an intellectual trend in the protection of
minority nghts that prevailed throughout the 1990s.
91. General Comment No. 23, supra note 82, at para. 6.1.
92. Id. at para. 6.2 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The preamble to the ICCPR states that "[the] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world. ICCPR, supra note 17, at pmbl. (emphasis added). Consequently, it appears
that the ICCPR, like the UDHR, is meant to enumerate fundamental, universal rights.
97. ECHR, supra note 22, at art. 14.
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V MINORITY RIGHTS FOLLOWING THE COLD WAR: THE UN DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND
LINGUISTIC MINORITIES
The end of the Cold War brought renewed interest in minority rights. James
Mayall notes that "with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism
the protection of minority rights has risen to the top of the political agenda for the
first time since 1945."98
The earliest legal instrument in this flurry of activity regarding minority rights
is the 1992 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities ("UN
Declaration")." While this Declaration refers to the term "national minority, the
term as used here seems to be equated with ethnic minority onlyio° and is likely not
equivalent to the term national minority as used in the Framework Convention.
The UN Declaration is significant because, like the Minorities Treaties and
Article 27 of the ICCPR, it blends individual rights and group rights ideas m
protecting minority rights. The rights enumerated in the Declaration must be
asserted by individuals, not by groups,1°i but the Declaration requires States to
"protect the existence and identity" of national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic minorities. Again, as with Article 27 of the ICCPR, it is the minority's
identity that is to be particularly protected.
The UN Declaration goes a step further than Article 27 however, by requiring
that States both protect and encourage conditions promoting the identity of these
minorities.10 2  Promotion of a minority's identity would likely require positive
measures by States to foster the development of such minorities. This special
treatment "shall not prima facie be considered contrary to the principle of equality
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' 0 3 Furthermore, States
must allow members of these minorities the opportunity to contact other members
of their minority either within the State or across international borders.'0 4
98. Mayall, supra note 54, at 7
99. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92nd plen. mtg. (1992), available at
httpJ/www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47rl35.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter UN
Declaration].
100. The title of the Declaration refers to "National or Ethnic" mmonties, thus appeanng to equate
the two terms. Id.
101. "Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own
language Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at art. 1(1).
103. Id. at art. 8(3). Whether this special treatment is truly fair and non-discriminatory will be for
the reader to decide.
104. Id. at art. 2(5).
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VI. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES FOLLOWING THE COLD WAR
A. Early Attempts to Protect National Minorities
Although the end of the Cold War brought an increased interest m the rights
of minorities generally, as will be shown, special concern was also given to so-
called "national minorities. The term "national minority, however, appears to
have grown out of the period immediately following World War II. As early as
1949, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized the
importance of protecting the rights of national mionties. 0 5  In 1961, the
Parliamentary Assembly recommended the inclusion of an article in a second
additional protocol to the ECHR to guarantee the rights of national mmorities.
10 6
A Committee of Experts was organized to consider the adoption of such a protocol,
but "[i]n 1973 it concluded that, from a legal point of view, there was no special
need to make the rights of minorities the subject of a further protocol to the
ECHR."' 0 7 European leaders then put aside the idea of special legal protection for
national minorities for well over a decade.
B. Political Developments Leading Up to the Adoption of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
1. Copenhagen Document of 29 June 1990
A series of political events in the early 1990s had a significant impact upon
the development of the Framework Convention. In June 1990, the Conference for
Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted an agreement for the advancement of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,'08 which laid the groundwork for what
would become significant developments in the protection of national minorities.
This agreement, called the Copenhagen Document, provides that "[p]ersons
belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and
develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and develop their
culture in all its aspects."1 9 The Copenhagen Document thus clearly anticipates
that a national minority need not have ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious
characteristics in common.
The Copenhagen Document provides that a person belonging to a national
105. Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
para. 1, available at http://www.humannghts.coe.int/Minorities/EngFrameworkConvention/
Explanatory0/o2Oreport/explreport.htm (emphasis added) (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Explanatory Report].
106. Id.
107. Id at para. 2.
108. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, June 29, 1990, available at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope9Oe.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
109. Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added).
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minority may choose whether to be treated as such," 0 a new concept later adopted
formally in the Framework Convention."' Also significant is the fact that the
Copenhagen Document provides national minorities the right "to establish and
maintain unimpeded contacts among themselves within their country as well as
contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share a
common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage or religious beliefs."" 2 This
concept later found its way into the UN Declaration 1 3 and the Framework
Convention." 1
4
2. Recommendation 1134 of the Parliamentary Assembly (1990)
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also began to consider
the need for greater protection of minorities within Europe. In Recommendation
1134 (1990),'s the Parliamentary Assembly noted that with the fall of the
communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe, "grave minority
problems [have] come to light [which] have been ignored and neglected
for many years by authoritarian rule."'" 6 The Parliamentary Assembly noted the
need to implement the Copenhagen Document of 29 June 1990" 7 and
recommended, as it had in 1961, that either the Committee of Ministers draw up a
European Convention on Human Rights protocol on minorities' rights, or that a
special Council of Europe convention be enacted to protect minorities' rights.1
8
This recommendation is probably the earliest suggestion of the need for a Council
of Europe convention for the protection of minorities.
In making this recommendation, the Parliamentary Assembly had in mind the
protection of minorities generally. The Recommendation notes that "[tihere are
many kinds of minorities m Europe. They have certain characteristics which may
be ethnic, linguistic, religious or other which distinguish them from the majority in
a given area or country,"' 19 and the document recommends the protection "[of] the
rights of [all] minorities," 120 not just national minorities.
National minorities did, however, receive special recognition.
Recommendation 1134 defines national minorities as "separate or distinct groups,
well defined and established on the temtory of a state, the members of which are
nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other
110. Id.
111. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3(i).
112. Copenhagen Document, supra note 108, at para. 32.4 (emphasis added).
113. UN Declaration, supra note 99, at art. 2(5).
114. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. 17(1).
115. On the Rights of Minorities, Eur. Par. Ass., 42nd Sess., pt 2, para. 6, Recommendation 1134
(1990), available at http://assembly.coe.mt/Mam.asp?linkhttp%/3A/2F/*2Fassembly
.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FAdoptedText%2Fta9/o2FEREC1i34.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004)
[hereinafter Recommendation 1134].
116. Id.
117. Id at para. 14.
118. Id. at para. 17
119. Id. at para, I (emphasis added).
120. Id. at para. 17 (emphasis added).
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characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population,"'1' and
recommends a number of special protections for national minorities. 2
Recommendation 1134's definition of national minority does not put any
special emphasis on the number or kind of characteristics that the members of a
national minority have in common. Instead, a national minority may have either
"religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics"'123 m common and distinct
from the majority.
The key characteristics of a national minority under this definition are that the
group is "separate or distinct"'24 (the "separateness element") and that it is "well
defined and established"'' 25 (the "temporal element"). By focusing on "well
defined and established" minorities, Recommendation 1134's proposed definition
of national minority focuses on groups with an historical presence in Europe.
Thus, "new" minorities (including new religions or religious groups) would likely
not fall under this definition. Of course, "new" and "established" are relative
terms, and the Recommendation gives no indication as to how long a group needs
to have been in a particular country in order to fall under this definition.
In May 1992, the Committee of Ministers instructed the Steering Committee
for Human Rights to consider "the possibility of formulating specific legal
standards relating to the protection of national minorities."' 126 Thus, despite the
Parliamentary Assembly's concern for the rights of minorities in general, these
early instructions from the Committee of Ministers focused specifically on the
issue of national minorities.
3. Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly (1993)
In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly issued another recommendation,
Recommendation 1201, on national minorities. 27  While the Parliamentary
Assembly had previously suggested m Recommendation 1134 the adoption of
either an additional protocol to the ECHR or a special convention on national
minorities, Recommendation 1201 expressed the Assembly's preference for the
passage of an additional protocol 28 to the ECHR because it would allow minorities
to "benefit from the remedies offered by the convention, particularly the right to
submit applications to the European Commission and Court of Human Rights." 129
121. Id. at para. 11.
122. See id. at para. 1 I(i)-(v).
123. Id. at para. II (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para. 4.
127. Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on
Human Rights, Eur. Parl. Ass., 44th Sess., pt. 4, Recommendation 1201 (1993), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link-http3A*/*2F/2Fassembly.coe.int/2FDocuments%
2FAdoptedText/o2Fta93%2FEREC1201.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Recommendation
1201).
128. Id. at para. 8.
129. Id. atpara. 7.
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Recommendation 1201 proposes the text for such an additional protocol,
which includes a different definition of national minority-
[T]he expression "national minority" refers to a group of persons in state who:
a. reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;
b. maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state;
c. display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;
d. are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the
population of that state or of a region of that state;
e. are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their
common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their
language. 130
While differing on some fine points, the definitions m Recommendations
1134 and the proposed Additional Protocol of Recommendation 1201 have much
m common; Recommendation 1134 talks about national minorities as being
nationals of the state,13 1 while the Additional Protocol of Recommendation 1201
talks about national minorities being residents and citizens of the state. 
132
Recommendation 1134 speaks of national minorities as being "well defined and
established, " 133 while the Additional Protocol talks about them "maintaining
longstanding, firm and lasting ties with [a] state."'134 Thus, both include a temporal
element. Furthermore, Recommendation 1134 speaks of national minorities as
having "religious, linguistic, cultural or other charactenstics" i35 in common, while
the proposed Additional Protocol states that a national minority is a group that has
"distinctive ethmc, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics. " 13 6 Notably, in
both definitions the connector "or" is used in the list of characteristics that might
define a national minority, thus leaving open the possibility that a national
minority may be a group that has only one or a few of the mentioned
130. Id. at Text of the Proposal for an Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning Persons Belonging to National Minorities, § I,
art. I (the "Additional Protocol").
131. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 11.
132. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § I, art. i(a).
133. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 1I.
134. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § I, art. 1(b). Admittedly, the
historical requirement as proposed in the Additional Protocol seems clearly to set a higher standard than
the definition in Recommendation 1134 by requiring not just an established relationship with the state
but "longstanding, firm, and lasting ties. Id. (emphasis added). However, in both cases, relatively
"new" minorities would be excluded from the definition.
135. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 11.
136. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § 1, art. 1(c).
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characteristics m common. Noticeably absent from Recommendation 1201,
however, is the separateness element contained m Recommendation 1134.137
The definition m the Additional Protocol proposed by Recommendation 1201
does add a few nuances to the definition of national minority contained in
Recommendation 1134. Under the definition in the proposed Additional Protocol,
a national minority must be "sufficiently representative"' 138 among the general
population of the country That is, under this definition, national minonties, while
still minorities, are not small, isolated groups but minorities of considerable size.
Furthermore, while a national minority under this definition may have only one or
a few distinctive characteristics in common, the group would have to be
particularly motivated by a desire "to preserve together that which constitutes their
common identity."1 3 9 Thus fact is further underscored in Section 2, Article 2 of the
proposed Protocol which states that "[m]embership of a national minority shall be
a matter of free personal choice. ' i4 Thus, under this definition, a national
minority is not only a group with charactenstics distinct from the majority, but it is
also one that is particularly motivated to maintain those distinguishing
characteristics. 141
Recommendation 1201 noted that the issue of the protection of national
minorities was "extremely urgent and one of the most important activities currently
under way at the Council of Europe. ' ' 14 2 Therefore, the Parliamentary Assembly
recommended the adoption of a protocol at the then upcoming summit of heads of
state and government to be held m Vienna on October 8 and 9 of 1993.i
4. The Final Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the
member States of the Council of Europe, Vienna, 9 October 1993
The Vienna summit did not, however, go so far as to adopt an additional
protocol to the ECHR. Instead, the participants adopted a document entitled "The
Final Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the member States of
the Council of Europe, Vienna, 9 October 1993" (the "Vienna Declaration").
Meeting less than two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
137. See text supra accompanying note 124. Recommendation 1134 defines national miorities in
terms of "separate and distinct groups, which suggests that national minority may live as separate
"community within a community. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 11. In contrast, the
Additional Protocol of Recommendation 1201 mentions only that national minoriies have distinctive
characteristics. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § I, art. 1. The
Additional Protocol thus omits the suggestion that national minorities may live as separate
communities.
138. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § i, art. l(d).
139. Id. § I, art. I(e) (emphasis added).
140. Id. § II, art. 2(1).
141. This aspect of the definition contained in the proposed Additional Protocol is similar to Article
3(1) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which states that "[elvery
person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be
treated as such. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3(l).
142. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at para. 9.
143. Id.
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participants at the summit acknowledged that "the end of the [Cold War] division
of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the
continent."' 44 The participants expressed a desire to have the countries recently
freed from communist oppression join the Council of Europe, provided they bring
their political institutions and legal systems in line with European standards. 45
Among the factors specifically mentioned in this regard was the protection of
national minorities. 146
The Vienna Declaration was primarily concerned with maintaining security
and stability in Europe.' 47 The participants expressed a hope that "Europe can
become a vast area of democratic security."'148 They lamented the fighting in
Yugoslavia and issued a call to leaders to put an end to such conflicts.i49 The
participants also expressed their desire to make the Council of Europe "capable
of contributing to democratic security" and of cooperating with "other
organizations involved in the construction of a democratic and secure Europe.'
'
"
°
They expressed resolve to make full use of the organs of the Council of Europe "to
promote the strengthening of democratic security in Europe"'15 1 as well as a
hope that the political dialogue within the Council of Europe would "make a
valuable contribution to the stability of [the] continent." 152 Finally, the Vienna
Declaration expressed the participants' intent to cooperate with non-European
States in order "to promote peace and democracy." 1i53 Democratic security, if it
means nothing else in this context, is security and stability in a post-communist
(and now democratic) Central and Eastern Europe. The protection of minority
rights was given particular notice in light of the history of minority rights in
Europe and the conflicts that have arisen over the question of minorities in the
past.
Appendix II to the Vienna Summit was dedicated to national minorities.154 It
noted that national minorities have been created by "the upheavals of history" in
Europe and that these minorities "should be protected and respected so that they
can contribute to stability and peace."'155 The "upheavals of history"'156 referred to
here are, undoubtedly, the two world wars that swept across Europe during the
twentieth century New minorities were created when territory occupied by
144. Vienna Summit Final Declaration, Oct. 9, 1993, available at
httpJ/www.coe.int/T/E/human_nghts/Ecri/5-Archives/2-Othertexts/2-ViennaSummilDeclaration/
DeclarationVienna.Summitasp (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. ld. (emphasis added).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See Vienna Declaration, Appendix II, Oct. 9, 1993, available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/decl/1993/
Vienna/o2OSummit%/2ODeclaration.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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members of one nationality was placed within the borders of a country dominated
by a different nationality thus making the first nationality a minority within the
newly-restructured country Good examples are the German
157 and Hungarian' 58
minorities of Eastern Europe created following World War I. These facts suggest
that whenever there is such a kin-state/km-mmonty relationship (e.g., Germany
and the German minorities or Hungary and the Hungarian minonties living outside
of Germany and Hungary, respectively), the kin-minority will be a national
minority. This definition is certainly consistent with the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, but it does not appear to encompass the
entire definition of national minority for purposes of the Convention.' 59
C. The Text of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities
On November 4, 1993, less than a month after the Vienna Declaration, the
Committee of Ministers established the Ad Hoc Committee for the Protection of
National Minorities ("Ad Hoc Committee" or "CAHMIN").160 This committee was
the body responsible for drafting the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities.' 6 i Its terms of reference instructed the committee to draft
both a framework convention for the protection of national minorities and a
protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights in the cultural field.
62
During the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, it was decided (probably in
response to the instruction given in the Final Declaration of the Vienna Summit to
draft a framework convention "with minimum delay") 163 that a clear preference
should be given to the completion of a framework Convention while hindering as
little as possible the completion of a draft protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights.' 64 The result of the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee is the
157. See supra discussion accompanying notes 26-30.
158. Lobjakas, supra note 1. This article includes the following explanation from Viktor Orban of
the creation of the Hungarian minorities:
There is Hungarian issue. The Hungarian issue is that after the World War i, two-
thirds of Hungarian territory and millions of its people belonged to other, newly born
neighboring countries. Now the territories are not an issue, but the people are still there,
the people living there still feel themselves [to be] Hungarian, speak [the] Hungarian
language, and have a Hungarian culture. So from a Hungarian point of view, the
European Union is a possibility to unify the Hungarian nation, in a cultural sense,
without the modification of state borders.
Id. (quoting Viktor Orban). Orban thus seems to suggest that the problems of national minorities may
be somewhat alleviated through the structures of the European Union.
159. See discussion mifra Part VI.C.3.
160. Terms of Reference of the CAHMIN on the drawing up of framework convention and
protocol complementing the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on 4 Nov. 1993, para. 1, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities,
CAHMIN (94) 1 (Dec. 10, 1993) (photocopy on file with author) [hereinafter CAHMIN (94) 11.
161. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para. 6.
162. Id. at para. 5.
163. Vienna Declaration, Appendix II, supra note 154. See also Explanatory Report, supra note
105, at para. 5.
164. Meeting Report, Ist Mtg., 25 Jan.-28 Jan. 1994, Palais de l'Europe, Strasbourg, para- 4, Ad
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Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 165
During the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the participants discussed
whether or not they should define the term "national minority "166 They decided to
begin drafting the Framework Convention "without embarking on a prior
discussion of the definition question."' 167  As previously noted, the Convention
ultimately included no definition of the term. Therefore, this article will look to
the text of the Framework Convention as well as to the history of minority rights to
try to discover the meaning of the term "national minority"
1. Article 1 and Article 3(2)
The protections provided by the Framework Convention include a mixture of
individual and group rights principles of minority rights. Article I of the
Convention refers to "the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to [national]
minorities."' 68 Article 3(2) states, "Persons belonging to national minorities may
exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in
the present framework Convention individually as well as m community with
others."' 169  While each person is entitled under Article 3(2) to enjoy the rights
guaranteed under this Convention collectively (that is, with others), this article
does not guarantee collective (or group) rights: "[Article 3(2)] recognises the
possibility of joint exercise of [the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
Convention], which is distinct from the notion of collective rights."
1 70
However, the Convention applies only to members of specific groups
Hoc Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities, CAHMIN (94) 5 (Feb. 1, 1994) (photocopy on file with
author) [hereinafter CAHMIN (94) 51.
165. While the committee was successful in completing Its drafting of the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, a draft protocol to the ECHR in the cultural field was never
finished, presumably due to a lack of time. See Meeting Report, 7th Mtg., 10-14 Oct. 1994, Palais de
1 'Europe, Strasbourg, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities, para. 19, CAHMIN (94) 32
(Oct. 14, 1994) (photocopy on file with author). However, the Committee of Ministers in its January
1999 reply to the Parliamentary Assembly's Recommendations 1134 and 1201 stated that "an additional
protocol as recommended by the Parliamentary Assembly has proved not to be feasible for several
reasons, inter alia because it contains certain elements (the definition of a national minority .) which
do not muster the general support of all member States. Recommendations of the Assembly, Replies
from the Committee of Ministers, Eur. Par]. Ass., Doc. 8306, (1999), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Man.asp?link-http/3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int2FDocuments%/2FWorking
Docs%2FDOC99%2FEDOC8306.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (emphasis added). Whether
differences of opinion regarding the definition of national minority or lack of time (or both) caused the
Ad Hoc Committee not to complete draft protocol seems unclear. What is clear, however, is that no
definition of national minority arose out of the drafting process.
166. CAHMIN 94(5), supra note 164, at para. 5.
167. Id.
168. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. I (emphasis added).
169. Id. at art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
170. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para. 37 The Explanatory Report also expresses
confidence that an individual rights approach will achieve adequate protection of national minorities as
whole: "The Parties recognise that protection of national minority can be achieved through
protection of the rights of individuals belonging to such a minority. Id. at para. 31.
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(national minorities), thus incorporating a group rights element into the exercise of
the rights under the Framework Convention. While providing protection for
individuals, the Framework Convention requires the additional step of determining
which groups are national minorities eligible to assert the rights of the Framework
Convention. This hybrid individual rights/group rights approach is similar to the
Minorities Treaties system,17' Article 27 of the ICCPR,172 and the UN
Declaration.1
73
2. Article 3(1)
As in the UN Declaration, the Framework Convention allows each member of
a national minority the opportunity to choose whether he or she will be treated as
such: "Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the rightfreely to
choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result
from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that
choice.' 74
While the Framework Convention provides individuals with a choice of
whether they will be treated as a national minority, it does not permit just any
individual or group the unfettered right to choose status as a national minority
Rather, Article 3 allows a person who is already part of a national minority the
choice as to whether he or she will be treated as such:'75 "[Article 3(1)] does not
imply a right for an individual to choose arbitrarily to belong to any national
minority. The individual's subjective choice is inseparably linked to objective
criteria relevant to the person s identity." 176 On the flip side, state parties to the
Framework Convention "do not have an unconditional right to decide which
groups within their territories qualify as national minorities m the sense of the
[F]ramework [C]onvention." 177 Thus, neither the minorities themselves nor the
states of which they are a part have the right to decide whether a minority is a
national minority because the answer to this question must be based upon objective
criteria. Article 3(1) does not, however, list these objective criteria. The
Explanatory Report to Article 3(1) makes it clear, however, that the objective
criteria are linked to a person's self-identity. 17
171. See discussion supra Part III.B.
172. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
173. See discussion supra Part V
174. Framework Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
175. Seeid.
176. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para. 35 (emphasis added). Compare this reference to
"objective criteria" as listed in General Comment 23, supra note 86, at para. 5.2.
177. Rights of National Minorities, Eur. Parl. Ass., 2003 Sess., 4th pt., para. 6, Recommendation
1623 (2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link--http/o3A%2F 0/2Fassembly.coe.int
%2Fdocuments%2FadoptedText/o2FtaO3 0/*2FEREC1623.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Recommendation 1623].
178. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para 35.
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3. Article 5(1)
Article 5(1) is probably meant to provide the objective cnteria used in
determining what constitutes a national minority. It states: "The Parties undertake
to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to
maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their
identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural hentage.' ' 179
Article 5(1) thus outlines the characteristics essential to a national minority's
identity religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.180 Since the elements
in this familiar list are now connected by an "and, it appears that, at least under
the Framework Convention, a national minority must have all of these elements in
common. The Explanatory Report further explains that "[Article 5(1)] does not
imply that all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences necessarily lead to
the creation of national minorities."' 8' Thus, a purely cultural, religious or
linguistic minority would not necessarily qualify as a national minority under the
Framework Convention, although the possibility is not completely ruled out.
That the door may still be open for a purely cultural, religious, or linguistic
minority to qualify as a national minority is suggested by the fact that the Ad Hoc
Committee rejected a proposal to extend the protections of the Framework
Convention "to persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,
because the Committee felt that this would prejudge the issue of the definition of a
national minority " 8 2 In other words, to extend the protections of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities to ethnic, religious, and
linguistic minorities could either equate these minorities with the term "national
minority" or could define these minorities as categorically distinct from national
minorities. The Ad Hoc Committee was careful not to make either distinction,
thus leaving open the possibility that a purely ethnic, religious or linguistic
minority could qualify as a national minority. However, the fact that Article 5(1)
lists elements essential to a national minority's identity would seem to carry great
weight in defining what minorities are national minorities.
On its face, Article 5(1) appears to incorporate neither the separateness
element contained in Recommendation 1134 nor the temporal element mentioned
in Recommendations 1134 and 1201. The concept of separateness, however, may
come into the Framework Convention through the back door. A minority defined
179. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(1). Since the Framework Convention uses the
capitalized term "Parties" when referring to the Parties to the Framework Convention, this article will
do the same.
180. Id. At least one expert who participated in the drafting expressed desire "to replace the
words 'the essential elements' by 'other essential elements."' Meeting Report, 2nd Mtg., 14-18 Mar.
1994, Palats, De l'Europe, Strasbourg, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities, para. 11,
CAHMIN (94) 9 (Mar. 23, 1994) (photocopy on file with author). This reading would have added
culture as a fifth essential element of the identity of national minorities, but it was not adopted.
181. Explanatory Report, supra note 105, at para. 43.
182. Meeting Report, 5th Mtg. 27 June - I July 1994, Palats de l'Europe, Strasbourg, Ad Hoc
Comm. for the Prot. of Nat'l Minorities, para. 32, CANMIN (94) 19 (July 7, 1994) [hereinafter
CAHMIN (94) 19] (photocopy on file with author).
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by a unique religion, language, tradition and cultural heritage will likely be
"separate and distinct' 8'3 from the majority However, Article 5(1) does not
appear to "back door" the temporal element. While Article 5(1) does refer to a
national minority's "traditions and cultural heritage,"'' 4 there is no suggestion that
the minority must have existed on the territory for a significant period of tune and
thus be "established"'' or have "longstanding, firm and lasting ties." 
1 8 6
Consequently, for purposes of the Framework Convention, new minorities could
fall under the rubric of national minority as long as they meet the other identity
classification requirements of Article 5(1).
Article 5(1) arguably provides a positive right to national minorities: "The
Parties [to the Convention] undertake to promote the conditions"'8 37 specified in
Article 5(1). Promotion suggests affirmative action, including the use of Parties'
resources for the benefit of their national minorities. The preamble to the
Convention requires Parties to do more than just respect national minorities; they
must also create conditions to allow them to flourish.1s Article 12(1) requires
Parties to the Convention to "foster knowledge of the culture, history, language
and religion of their national minorities."' 8 9 Thus, unlike Article 2 of the UDHR
and Article 27 of the ICCPR, 19° the Framework Convention provides national
minorities an avenue to assert their rights m a positive fashion.
However, the fact that the Convention is only a "framework convention" is
not without legal significance. As Francesco Capotorti points out, "The term
'framework convention' indicates that the principles m the convention are not
directly applicable in internal law. States must implement them either through
bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states or through legislation or
appropriate national policies."' 9 ' The Framework Convention also reflects this
idea in its preamble, which states that the Parties are "determined to implement the
principles set out in [the] framework Convention through national legislation and
appropriate governmental policies. '192 Thus, while the Convention legally binds
all the signing Parties, it may only be implemented through the actions of
individual governments.
4. Article 17(1)
The Framework Convention also provides national minorities the nght "to
establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across fiontiers with persons
lawfully staying in other States, in particular those with whom they share an
183. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 11.
184. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at para 5(i).
185. Recommendation 1134, supra note 115, at para. 11.
186. Recommendation 1201, supra note 127, at Additional Protocol, § 1, art. l(b).
187 Framework Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(i) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at pmbl.
189. Id. atart. 12(1).
190. See discussion supra Parts [V.A and B.
191. Capotorti, supra note 4.
192. Framework Convention, supra note 3, at pmbl.
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ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage."' 93
A similar idea was adopted in the UN Declaration.' 94 Undoubtedly, this provision
particularly considers those km-state/kin-minority relationships created where a
group of individuals of one nationality (the "kin-mmority") is separated from its
nation state (the "kin-state") by the realignment of international borders and
becomes a minority of another country.
A kin-mmonty of a corresponding kin-state would be the quintessential
example of a national minority, an idea consistent with the Vienna Declaration.'95
The members of the km-minonty would share all of the essential elements of
identity listed m Article 5(1) and would be particularly likely to want to maintain
contacts with others of their nationality in the km-state. Indeed, because the term
"national minority" is unique to Europe and because it appears to have arisen out
of the time period immediately following the two world wars and the subsequent
realignment of international borders m Europe, the term probably was originally
meant to apply to such kin-state/kin-minority situations. These facts help explain
why Orban called the protection of national minorities a "European value."' 196
This analysis suggests that the definition of "national minority" is related to
the concept of "nationality, and perhaps the best definition of "national minority"
would be a minority that, if given the opportunity, could become a nation state. At
the very least, it seems clear that for purposes of the Framework Convention,
whenever there is a kin-state/kin-minority relationship, the kin-mmority will be a
national minority of its home country 197 While such a km-state/kin-mmority
relationship is probably sufficient to make the km-mmonty a national minority,
there is no indication that such a relationship is necessary for a group to constitute
a national minority For example, while they do not have a corresponding kin-
state, the Roma are probably a national minority 198 Thus, under the Framework
Convention, the true definmg characteristic of a national minority is the sharing of
a number of attributes between the members of a group (i.e., religion, language,
culture and traditions) and not necessarily the relationships the minority maintains
with other groups or countries.
The dangers posed to international security by the existence of such kin-
state/kin-minority relationships appear to be real and ongoing. As mentioned
previously Germany used the excuse of protecting German-speaking minorities in
the countries of Eastern Europe as a pretext for starting World War II.199 More
recently, the Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary have been an issue.
Hungary recently passed a Status Law giving special privileges to the Hungarian
193. Id. atart. 17(1).
194. See UN Declaration, supra note 99, at art. 2(5).
195. See discussion supra Part VI.B.4.
196. Lobjakas, supra note 1.
197. See discussion supra Part VI.B.4.
198. See Recommendation 1623, supra note 177, at para. 6 (encouraging "states parties to pay
particular attention to the possibility for the most vulnerable Roma minorities to fully benefit from the
protection envisaged in the Framework Convention [for the Protection of National Minorities]").
199. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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minorities living m Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
and Ukraine.200  The law created serious concerns in both Romania and
Slovakia,01 which undoubtedly were worried about the possibility of Hungary
meddling in their domestic affairs. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe responded to the Hungarian law by stating that it generally "welcomes
assistance give[n] by kin-states to their km-minorities '20 2 but also cautioned that
such assistance must be acceptable to the states of which the km-mmorittes are
citizens.20 3 The Parliamentary Assembly further noted "that responsibility for
minority protection lies primarily with the home states. ' '20 4 Nevertheless, this
incident shows that the issue of national minorities remains a real international
concern.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although this review of the Framework Convention does not provide a final
definition of the term "national minority," we can draw some firm conclusions
about what is a national minority, at least for purposes of the Convention. The
members of a national minority share essential characteristics (religion, language,
traditions and cultural heritage) that define the self-identity of the individuals that
make up the minority The members of a national minority most likely have all of
these essential characteristics m common, and they may live separate and apart
from the majorities among whom they live. Thus, the meaning of the term national
minority under the Framework Convention seems to incorporate, through the back
door, the concept of separateness suggested in Parliamentary Assembly
Recommendation 1134. However, because the Framework Convention contains no
temporal element m describing a national mmority, newly created minorities could
potentially qualify if they meet the other elements described m the Convention.
A km-state/kin-mmority relationship is sufficient but not necessary to make a
minority a national minority. Furthermore, a national minority is one that is likely
to have a particular interest in maintaining contacts with others across international
borders, often because of the existence of a km-state, the members of whose
majority population are of the same nationality as the national minority These
facts, together with the fact that national minorities probably have a number of
characteristics in common, suggest that the concept of a national minority is
related to the concept of nationality and that a national minority could best be
defined as a minority that, if given the opportunity, could become a nation state.
200. See Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by the Kin-State: The Case of the
Hungarian Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbourng Countries ("Magyars ") of 19 June 2001, Eur.
Parl. Ass., 2003 Sess., 3rd pt., paras. 3-4, Res. 1335 (2003), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=-http/3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.imnt/2FDocuments%2FAdopted
Text% 2Fta03%2FERESI335.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Resolution 1335]. See also
Lobjakas, supra note 1.
201. See Lobjakas, supra note 1.
202. Resolution 1335, supra note 200, at para. 1.
203. Id.
204. Id. at para. 2.
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The recent Hungarian law shows that continued concern over national
minorities is well-founded. Hopefully, the particular attention the Framework
Convention provides to national minorities and the additional rights it guarantees
to them will help to diffuse future tensions over the question of national minorities.
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MEXICO: A HEALTHY MIX OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
Scott R Jablonski*
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade and investment agreements provide the political, economic and legal
framework for economic integration m the modem international political economy,
and underscore the importance of international law in the integration process. The
proliferation of such agreements among nation-states since the mid-twentieth
century has been a major factor contributing to the increasing volume of business
transactions across borders. The Americas are certainly not an exception to these
trends. There are roughly fifty regional, sub-regional and bilateral trade and
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1. Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in 1948, now
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), there has been continued increase in the number of trade
agreements in the world. "At present, about 97% of total global trade involves countries that are
members of at least one PTA, compared with 72% in 1990. Asian Development Bank, Trends in Trade
and the Expanswn of PTAs, at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2002/pta0200.asp (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Trends in Trade"]. Notably, there was 22-fold increase in world
trade in merchandise from 1948 to 2000. World Bank, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001 at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/mmste/mm01_e/briefe/bnef2l_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2003) [hereinafter "Doha WTO"]. Aggregate world trade in goods in services in 1948 was $58 billion,
compared to $7.6 trillion in 2000. Id. In 2000, total world foreign direct investment flows reached
$1261 billion, which was 53-fold increase from 1973 when such investment totaled $24 billion. Id.
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") between countries
increased from 470 to nearly 2000, and some regional trade groupings such as NAFTA and the EU have
incorporated investment agreements into their broader trade agreements. Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only bit .and they could bite, (June 2003), at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143_wps312 l.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
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integration agreements m the Americas,2 with negotiations underway for other
agreements, including a Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA").3 In 2000,
total trade among FTAA negotiating countries had reached roughly $784 billion,
growing at 11% annually 4
Within the context of multilateral governance of trade and investment and
increasing transnational business transactions lies the following reality- more
transnational transactions mean an increasing need to seek effective, uniform
principles of dispute resolution for disputes between private parties and
governments arising out of a government's obligations under a trade agreement.
This is particularly true in the context of trade-related investment agreements,
through which private parties play a direct role in economic integration. 6 The role
of law in the modem international political economy is therefore paramount.
Several obstacles, however, often hinder or severely detract from efforts to
achieve uniformity of dispute resolution among foreign legal systems. The
greatest obstacle is the phenomenon of differing legal traditions. Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), namely arbitration, has emerged as the preferred
method of dispute resolution among nation-states belonging to trade agreements,
as well as among private parties engaged in international transactions.' Indeed, in
the context of international investment, private parties have long preferred
international arbitration for resolving investment disputes with foreign
governments.9
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")'0 is
unique among trade agreements in that it contains an entire chapter dealing with
foreign investment and the protection of such investment." Chapter II broadly
defines who an investor is and what an investment is in North America, and gives
2. See SICE, Inventory of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Procedures and Legal Texts
Established in Existing Trade and Integration Agreements, Treaties and Arrangements in the
Hemisphere and the WTO, at http://www.sice.oas.org/cpdisp/English/dsm toc.asp (last visited Feb.
23, 2003) [hereinafter "SICE, Inventory"].
3. See infra note 43.
4. Council of the Americas, Free Trade Area of the Americas, at http://www.amrencas-
society.org/coa/publications/testmony.AmbFrechette-9-9-02.htmi (last visited Feb. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter "Free Trade Area"].
5. See Hope H. Camp, Jr., Dispute Resolution and United States-Mexico Business Transactions,
5 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85 (1997); see Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the
NAFTA and the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP L. REv 1, 3, 11-12 (1998).
6. See Camp, supra note 5; see Gal-Or, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part ii.C.2.b (discussing various aspects of international alternative dispute
resolution).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, part 5, chapter 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
(effective Jan. 1, 1994), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 289, 296 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"]. The
Contracting Parties to NAFTA are Canada, the United Mexican States ("Mexico") and the United States
of America ("United States").
11. Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for Sovereignty, 24
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998) (pointing out that NAFTA is "the first comprehensive international trade
treaty to provide to private Parties direct access to dispute settlement as of right.").
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private investors in NAFTA Parties 12 direct access to binding international
arbitration for clatms against NAFTA Parties arismg out of investment disputes.
NAFTA thus seeks to bridge the gap between private individuals and governments
in the resolution of cross border commercial disputes. And, it does so by creating
an opportunity for a private investor to resolve an investment dispute without
litigating in foreign courts or pressuring the investor's home government to resolve
the dispute through diplomatic bargaining.13 The arbitration alternative is also a
pragmatic approach to the pressing need for effective international investment
dispute resolution without engaging in the monumentally difficult task of
harmonizing three different legal systems. 14 Chapter 11 dispute resolution is
indeed representative of the evolving link between international law, economics
and politics m the modem global political economy
Despite its pragmatism and progressive nature, however, Chapter II dispute
resolution has not escaped criticism. In recent years it has come under attack by
various groups and commentators in NAFTA Parties whose arguments are
generally based upon two main assertions: Chapter 11 dispute resolution is a threat
to national sovereignty and an abrogation of democracy s These critics base their
assertions on what they believe are fundamental flaws in the Chapter II dispute
resolution framework. The most often-cited arguments are that Chapter 11
promotes frivolous litigation and permits disproportionate compensation, lacks an
adequate award review process, uses "secret" tribunals to reduce transparency
prevents legitimate governmental regulation, and derogates from notions of
equality and sustainable development.1 6 In recent years, the literature on Chapter
II has increased as the general debate on its dispute resolution framework has
intensified.
The debate has centered primarily on whether Chapter 11 is detrmental to all
NAFTA Parties. A focus on Mexico, however, is particularly mtriguing given
Mexico's history toward foreign investment and its economic status relative to
Canada and the United States.' 7  Interestingly Chapter 11, for all intents and
purposes, runs counter to the traditional Mexican approach to international law and
foreign investment. That traditional approach emanates from conceptions of
international law and economic integration that are quite opposite from the
12. The text of NAFTA refers to Canada, Mexico and the United States as "Parties, therefore for
purposes of consistency I refer to NAFTA countries as NAFTA Parties and a NAFTA country
individually as NAFTA Party.
13. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back,
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43,44 (2001) [hereinafter "Brower I"].
14. Id.
15. See infra Part IV- Brower II, supra note 13, at 44 (noting that Chapter II "has become a
lightning rod for opponents of globalization and the intrusion of international law into domestic
affairs.").
16. See infra Part IV This is not an exhaustive list of the criticisms of Chapter II; however, it
does include the most often-cited arguments and thus the arguments that deserve most attention for
purposes of this article.
17 This is not to de-emphasize the implications of Chapter II on the United States and Canada.
That discussion is simply outside the scope of this article.
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philosophy behind NAFTA.' 8 Indeed, the traditional Mexican approach to
investment dispute resolution has customarily characterized a major line of
demarcation between developed and developing countries in an age of
globalization.
The inclusion of Chapter 11 in NAFTA, therefore, represents a major reversal
in policy for Mexico, and thus begs the question: is Chapter 11 direct access
dispute resolution beneficial to Mexico9 After all, of the NAFTA Parties it is
Mexico which has made the most dramatic changes in accepting Chapter 11 and
which is economically disadvantaged compared to its North American
counterparts. 19  Any detrimental aspects of Chapter 11 arguably would affect
Mexico the most. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to provide an informed
discussion of the criticisms of Chapter 11 dispute resolution and to evaluate the
implications of Chapter 1I for Mexico, focusing on the NAFTA text and the
Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico so far. First, however, this paper presents
important historical and policy foundations behind NAFTA in order to pave the
way for a discussion of Chapter 11 and Mexico.
Part II first provides a brief background on the history of economic
integration in the Americas. This part highlights the interrelationship of historical
political and economic policy interests pursued by the United States and Latin
America. Part II also includes an overview of the traditional Mexican approach to
foreign investment and international law Indeed, history tells why things are the
way they are now, and thus serves as an important backdrop for discussing the
purposes of NAFTA Chapter 11 and its implications for Mexico. Part II ends with
a detailed discussion of the background of NAFTA and its dispute resolution
framework, commenting briefly on the differing legal traditions of NAFTA Parties
and ADR in general. This discussion completes the task of providing the
necessary background information for proceeding to a more narrow discussion of
Chapter 11 and Mexico.
Part III discusses in detail Chapter 11. It first highlights the major substantive
provisions of Chapter 11, and then details its dispute resolution framework. This is
followed by summaries of the first four final arbitral awards involving Mexico.
20
This discussion sheds light on how the process has been handled in real-life
situations in Mexico and serves as a critical reference point for purposes of this
article.
Part IV moves to an informed discussion of the implications of Chapter 11 for
Mexico. It does so by taking into account the major criticisms of Chapter 11, and
then by responding to them using the Chapter 11 text and the first four final
arbitral awards against Mexico as the bases for testing those criticisms. The
criticisms discussed herein are by no means exhaustive. Rather, this article
18. See infra Part ii.B.I.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. At the time of this writing, pnvate investors have invoked the Chapter I I dispute resolution
mechanism against Mexico on nine occasions, and on roughly twenty occasions overall. This comment
is confined to discussion of the first four final arbitral awards issued involving Mexico.
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summarizes the most often-cited concerns with Chapter 11. This discussion
attempts to accomplish several things. It provides further clarity as to how and
why NAFTA Parties structured Chapter 11 as they did. It demonstrates why the
broader concerns with Chapter 11 are unfounded-why Chapter I1 is not a threat
to Mexico's sovereignty or democratic governance.
Further, and perhaps most importantly Part IV also sheds light on how
Chapter 11 is a unique example of how international law is a necessary and
positive force for Mexico in the governance of economic integration m North
America. As an extension of well-established principles of international law to
business activities between private individuals and governments, and as a novelty
in the ongomg trend of economic integration m the Americas, Chapter 11 direct
access dispute resolution is exemplary of what is necessary for Mexico's
successful participation in the international political economy
II. A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS
Globalization is the buzz word for describing the modem international
political economy Although specifically defining the phenomena of globalization
and when it precisely began tends to generate debate, it certainly implies "a
stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers.' In this
sense, economic integration-predominantly accomplished through trade and
investment agreements-is a key ingredient, a critical tool, of globalization.2 2 The
proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas over the last half century
demonstrates an unprecedented push by nation-states of varying wealth and size to
integrate their economies.23 This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in
NAFTA, where two countries with highly advanced economies, the United States
and Canada, entered into a free trade agreement with Mexico, a developing
country 2 4  The history behind NAFTA goes back much further than the early
1990s, however. Historical, political, and economic policy interests of both the
United States and Latin America as a whole set the background for understanding
21. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 15
(1999).
22. There are four basic levels of economic integration, which include (1) free trade area, (2)
customs union, (3) a common market, and (4) an economic union. See generally MICHAEL R.
CZINKOTA ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 256-57 (5 h ed. 1999). A free trade area is the least
integrative model, with focus on eliminating taxes, quotas, tariffs and other trade barriers among
member countries without forming collective policy for relations with nonmembers. See id. In a
customs union, on the other hand, members not only agree to eliminate trade barriers, they also agree to
common trade policy regarding nonmembers. Id. A common market goes step further, as it
incorporates the tenets of a customs union but seeks to integrate further the factors of production-
labor, capital and technology-thus eliminating restrictions mainly in the areas of immigration and
investment. Id. Lastly, "the creation of true economic union requires integration of economic policies
in addition to the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production across borders. Id. A
common monetary and tax policy as well as a common currency among members further characterize
an economic union. Id.
23. See supra notes 1-3.
24. Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18.
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NAFTA and the intended purposes and implications of its provisions.
A. US. Policy and the Economics of Latin America
As Latin America and the Caribbean gamed their independence from
European colonial powers in the first part of the nineteenth century, the United
States faced a critical foreign policy decision: what would be U.S. foreign policy in
a Western Hemisphere of independent countries? 25 The answer to this question,
along with economic trends m Latin America over the last two centuries, helps
explain the policy behind modem economic integration. In 1822, the United States
was the first country officially to recognize Argentina (then La Plata), Chile, Peru,
Colombia and Mexico as new countries. 26 In 1823, President Monroe and
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams fashioned the historic Monroe Doctrine,
which has served as the crux of United States foreign policy in the region ever
since.
27
In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt referred to the Monroe Doctrine as "a
guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas. 28 At the time, there
was brewing tension between European countries and Latin American countries,
particularly Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, arising out of the failure to
repay public debts to European lenders.29  In 1904, President Roosevelt,
anticipating possible military action by European countries, officially reaffirmed
U.S. commitment to intervene against any foreign power that attacked any Latin
American nation, regardless of any general reluctance of the United States to
become engaged m such a military entanglement.3 0  This became known as the
Roosevelt Corollary. 1 Subsequent U.S. presidents acted to strengthen the precepts
of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. For example, President Taft
championed Dollar Diplomacy m Latin America, 2 and President Wilson used
25. See SAMUEL F BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY (1940); see ARTHUR P WHITAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN
AMERICA, 1800-1830 (1941).
26. ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 282 (10th ed. 1999).
27. Id. The Monroe Doctrine "established the idea of American hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere that later U.S. governments would invoke at will to justify policies in Latin America. Id.
The Monroe Doctrine had two major themes: (1) the United States would not tolerate any future
European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, and (2) the United States would regard any attack
on an American nation as an attack upon the United States, and would respond with force against any
country or countries initiating such an attack. The Monroe Doctrine was primarily political doctrine;
however, it also furthered United States economic interests in Latin America by stopping European
colonization and the impenal, protectionist economic policies that accompanied such colonization. Id.
28. THOMAS G. PATERSON ET AL., I AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: A HISTORY TO 1920 243
(5th ed. 2000).
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 243. Dollar Diplomacy included "using private financiers and business leaders to
promote foreign policy, and using diplomacy to promote American commerce and investment abroad.
Id. at 240. Indeed, "[e]xports to Latin America increased markedly from $132 million at the turn of the
century to $309 million in 1914. Id. at 240.
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military force to quiet internal conflicts m the region and safeguard U.S.
commercial interests.33
World Wars and the Great Depression in the first part of the twentieth century
curtailed U.S. involvement in Latin American affairs.3 4 In fact, the economic
effects of these events shocked Latin American economies and set the stage for
major economic policy changes in the region.35 Prior to the mid-twentieth century,
Latin American countries had followed an export-oriented economic model based
mostly on primary product exports.36 This served U.S. needs and commercial
interests, but left Latin American economies at the mercy of international demand
fluctuations.37 As industrialized countries erected trade barriers to recover from
the Depression, Latin American countries experienced serious decreases in export
income which caused severe economic setbacks.38
During World War II, Latin American countries experienced increased export
income from the increased demand for food stuffs, but wartime industrial
production and consumption limited the availability of much needed industrial
imports to Latin American countries. 39 These events stirred nationalistic rhetoric
in many large Latin American countries, and led to the emergence of political
populism, which called for protectionist economic policies geared toward boosting
internal development.40 By the 1940s, policymakers in Latin America, deriving
theoretical support from the tenets of dependency theory and economic
structuralism, implemented inward-looking, protectionist polices that lasted
through the 1970s, known mainly as import substitution industrialization (,,ISI).4
1
33. Id. at 245.
34. FREDERICK S. WEAVER, LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 121 (2000).
35. Id. at 117-121.
36. Id.
37. Id., PATRICE FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 46-47
(1999); Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18 at 129-30.
38. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 46-47.
39. WEAVER, supra note 35, at 121.
40. Id. at 121-25, 137.
41. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 52-55. With regard to dependency theory, Franko comments:
Proponents of dependency theory postulated that a country did not thrive or falter simply
because of its own national endowments. Rather, progress could be attributed to the
power it had to set the rules of the international economic game. Center countries, or the
industrialized countries, defined the rules; the periphery, or developing countries, were
pawns in the international pursuit of profit.
Id. at53.
This led to the emergence of the structuralist school of economic development, headed by Rail
Prebisch, an Argentinean economist who became chair of the United Nations Economic Commlssion
for Latin America ("ECLA") in 1949. Id. 53-54. Franko notes:
Under the leadership of Rafil Prebisch, ECLA analysts looked at the disappointing
economic performance of Latin America in the first half of the century, focusing on the
volatility of primary product exports, and the progressive difficulty of paying for more
technologically sophisticated (and expensive) products with the limited agricultural
returns. Technological progress was controlled by the powerful center-industrialized
countries and spread slowly into the periphery. ECLA researchers in the 1950s were
also fascinated by seeming correlation between the interruption of normal trade
patterns with the industrialized countries during war periods and accompanying robust
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Cold War politics prompted the United States to promote some economic
cooperation with Latin American countries, despite the latters' protectionist
policies.4 2  For example, in 1961, President Kennedy initiated the Alliance for
internal growth in the Latin Amenca regions. Isolation from the international system
apparently helped growth at home.
In part the disadvantaged position of the penphery countries in the international system
derived from the kind of goods they offered. Developing countries principally traded
primary products, such as raw materials and agricultural goods, for more technologically
advanced products in the international arena. Within this unequal framework, they faced
what was seen as declining terms of trade for their products. There are only so many
bananas that people want to eat or so much coffee that they can dnnk. Given the low
income elasticity for agricultural products, as the global economy grows, the relative
demand for primary products declines. Instead, rewards tend to accrue to those engaged
in technological entrepreneurship. Technological sophistication adds value to good,
increasing its market pnice well beyond the cost of basic inputs. Declining terms of trade
for primary products reflected the argument that as the prices of sophisticated goods
rose, developing countries would need to export more and more oranges or wheat to pay
for the more expensive technological machinery. Without mastering technology,
countnes had little hope of advancement.
Id. at 53-55.
The prescription, therefore, according to the structuralists, was for Latin American governments to play
a prominent role in regulating trade and focusing on acquiring technology and improving industrial
capacity. Protectionism and high tariff rates thus swept across Latin America, where "[alverage
nominal protection over consumer and manufactured goods was 131 percent in Argentina, 168 percent
in Brazil, 138 percent in Chile, 112 percent in Colombia, 61 percent in Mexico, and 21 percent in
Uruguay in 1960. Id. at 59. Governments also overvalued exchange rates to promote cheaper imports
and promulgated monetary and fiscal policies that included subsidizing domestic enterprises through
nationalized lending institutions, while also providing such enterprises with tax credits and special
interest rates. Id. at 60-62. These protectionist policies, ironically, had the effect of stimulating foreign
investment in manufactunng in many Latin American countries because multinational corporations
found it profitable to establish a presence in those countries rather than deal with protectionist trade
policies. Id. at 62-64. "In or about 1970, 24 percent of manufacturing in Argentina, 50 percent in
Brazil, 30 percent in Chile, 43 percent in Colombia, 35 percent in Mexico, 44 percent in Peru and 14
percent in Venezuela was under foreign control. Id. at 62; see also MICHAEL C. MEYER ET AL., THE
COURSE OF MExicAN HISTORY 611-614 (6th ed. 1999) (discussing the trends and implications of
industrialization policies in Mexico in the mid-twentieth century). During ISI, Latin American
countres experienced high growth rates and significant industrialization, but the negative effects of ISI
became apparent in the 1970s and 80s. See FRANKO, supra note 38, at 64-8. (discussing numerous
negative effects of ISI on Latin American economies, including high deficits and inflation, balance-of-
payment crises, debt accumulation,the rise of politically oppressive military regimes and government
corruption, to name a few); see also WEAVER, supra note 35, at 169-79 (discussing the demise of ISI
and subsequent debt cnses in Latin America). Nonetheless, the gradual abandonment of ISI policies in
Latin America set the stage for a new discussion of economic integration efforts between Latin America
and the United States.
42. In July of 1947, George Kerman, then director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S.
Department of State and formerly a U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, issued his famous
"Memorandum X" which advocated for U.S. policy of containment of the spread of Soviet
communism. See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 244-45. Coinciding with that policy, U.S. politicians
began speculating that if one country in region fell to communism, the entire region would fall, and
then eventually the rest of the world, which became known as the "domino theory. Id. at 254-57.
Kennan's policy recommendation dominated the U.S. foreign policy mindset throughout the Cold War.
Id. Consequently, any hint of communism in Latin America encouraged U.S. policymakers to take
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Progress through the Organization of American States ("OAS"). 4 3  Kennedy
"envisioned spending $20 billion in funds from the U.S. and international
organizations" to promote economic development in Latin America." The
Alliance for Progress was rather unsuccessful in achieving its goals for economic
development, but it did symbolize U.S. commitment to preserving its interests in
Latin America-a further extension of the Monroe Doctrine, over one hundred
years later.45
In the 1980s, the U.S. began to focus on the vital connection between
democracy and economic integration in Latin America. One commentator notes
that, "despite selective unevenness and all the other caveats, there still was a
significant sea change in U.S. policy in the 1980s: U.S. governments actively
encouraged transitions from military to electoral regimes m South and Central
America and pressured Mexico to clean up its electoral act."46 Specifically, in
response to communist revolutions in Central America, President Reagan instituted
the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"). 47 As one commentator describes,
[Tihe CBI stressed the need for economic development and the development
of free enterprise in the region as a means of combatting communist
expansionism. Twenty Caribbean basin countries were designated as the
beneficiaries of a program that included a combination of foreign aid, investment
incentives, and reduction of barriers to United States markets. This included
twelve years of duty-free access to United States markets for most exports from
designated countries and industries.
48
With the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration faced the task of
developing a new U.S. foreign policy model for Latin America. One author
summarizes that "[t]he Bush administration joined most Latin American states in
adopting a primarily economic foundation for mter-Amencan relationships, with
agreement on the essentiality of continued democratic development.,, 49 In 1990,
President Bush announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative ("EAI"),
action to dispel such political change. Id.
43. See id. at 331.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 332. The Alliance for Progress did not prove to be an economic success for variety
of reasons, some of which included lack of U.S. investor initiative, corruption in Latin American
politics, and the rise of military regimes in Latin America. Id. Nonetheless, it did achieve some
political success in rallying pro-Amencan, as opposed to Soviet, support in Latin America. See, for
example, ANTONIO H. OBAID & NINO MARITANO, AN ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: THE CHALLENGE AND
THE PROBLEM 11 (1963), writing in the first few years after its inception that "it deserves full credit for
the noticeable improvement which is taking place m the political atmosphere The anti-American
feelings prevalent in the 1950's have subsided considerably There is much admiration, respect,
and affection for this country.
46. WEAVER, supra note 35, at 186. This set the groundwork for future negotiations regarding
economic integration under the George H.W Bush Administration. See supra notes 39-41.
47 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).
48. Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles under
NAFTA-Based System, 36 HAR. INT'L L.J. 127, 149 (1995) (internal footnotes omitted).
49. G. POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 130 (3d ed.,
Westview Press 1995).
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which served to spearhead U.S. negotiations for free trade, increased investment
and debt relief in the Western Hemisphere as well as to ignite the modem process
of economic integration.50 Indeed, negotiations for NAFTA arose in the context of
the EAIs
The Clinton Administration continued the push for free trade in the Americas.
In fact, "[t]he Clinton Administration's economic policy toward Latin America
[was] largely a continuation of President Bush's EAI. '52 Not only was President
Clinton successful in getting NAFTA in place, but his efforts also led several
countries m the Western Hemisphere to meet and officially declare their mutual
goal of achieving hemispheric free trade through an FTAA 3 The current
administration has reaffirmed U.S. commitment to free trade and increased
economic integration in the Americas. A free trade agreement with Chile entered
into force at the beginning of this year.54 Most recently, the United States and
50. George Bush, Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1009 (June 27, 1990). O'Hop, supra note 49, at 149 (commenting that "[tihe three
pillars of this initiative were: (1) reduction of trade barriers, (2) increase of investment into the region,
and (3) debt relief," which led the U.S. to actively pursue bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed
at liberalizing trade with countries in the Amencas.). Id. at 150 ("The EAI encouraged rapid
development of subregional associations.").
51. O'Hop, supra note 49 at 149.
52. Id. at 151.
53. See id. In December of 1994, thirty four democratic countries in the Americas met in Miami,
Flonda at the Summit of the Americas, with the goal of fashioning the FTAA. Antecedents of the FTAA
Process, at http://www.ftaa-alca.orgfView e.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "FTAA
Website"] and Summit of the Americas Information Network, at http://www.summit-americas.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Summit of Americas Website"]. "The idea behind the FTAA is
the consolidation of the nearly twenty-five free trade pacts already operating in region of nearly 800
million inhabitants. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 241 Since the Miami Summit, summits have taken
place in San Jose (1996), Santiago (1998) and Quebec City (2001). Summit of Amencas Website,
supra. The FTAA would serve as an enormous regional trade agreement, creating "a market of
[over] 719 million people and could expand trade within the hemisphere to unprecedented levels.
Richard L. Bemal, Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and Promise of Fair vs. Free Trade, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 946 (1996). The Second Draft of the Consolidated Text of the FTAA is
available at the official website for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"),
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml (last visited Mar 2, 2004) [hereinafter "Draft
FTAA"].
Through the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, negotiating states have agreed to
make decisions on a consensus basis, to ensure that the decision-making process is transparent, to
follow WTO-based guidelines, to take into account the needs of less-developed countries, and to
complete negotiations for the FTAA by 2005. Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 1.L.M.
808 (1995) [hereinafter "FTAA Declaration"]; FTAA Website, supra. The Declaration also expresses
the negotiating states' commitment to "build on existing subregional and bilateral agreements in order
to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements together. FTAA
Declaration, supra, at 811. For detailed discussions on the FTAA, dispute resolution and economic
integration, see Frank J. Garcia, Americas Agreements"--An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997), Frank J. Garcia, New Frontiers in
International Trade: Decsionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas:
An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997), and David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
under Free Trade Area of the Americas, 28 U. MiAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 597 (1997).
The implications of NAFTA Chapter II direct access dispute resolution on the FTAA is also
an important and interesting topic, however, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
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several Central American countries signed the Central American Free Trade
Agreement ("CFTA"). 5' In addition, the United States has continued to sign and
negotiate bilateral investment treaties with Latin American countries
5 6
B. Latin America and the Emergence of Trade and Investment Agreements
In 1948, as ISI policies began to emerge in Latin America,57 another
economic trend took hold. Despite encouraging protectionist economic policies as
a means to achieve internal growth, the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America ("ECLA") actually encouraged trade cooperation between Latin
American countries in the form of regional trading blocs. 58 The result was the
formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association ("LAFTA") in 1960, 59
which evolved into the Latin American Integration Association ("LAIA") m
1980.60 The second half of the twentieth century also witnessed the emergence of
various subregional trade agreements in Latin America, including the Central
American Common Market ("CACM") in 1960,61 the Andean Community in
1969,62 the Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") in 1973,63 and the Mercado del
54. For discussion of the negotiations, the signing and the text of the Chile-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, see the official website for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/chile.htm (ast visited Mar. 9, 2004). See also Scott R. Jablonski, iSi Po,
Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution Does Have a Place in Trade Agreements in the Americas:
Chapter 10 of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, __ U. MIAMI INTER. AM. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2004).
55. USTR, "U.S. & Central American Countries Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement, at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/12/03-82.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2003). The Central American
countries are Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica Id.
56. Jame R. Holbein & Gary Carpnticr, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 567-569 (1993). The
authors note that "pursuant to EAI, the U.S. has signed seventeen framework agreements on trade and
investment. Id. at 567 These framework agreements provide the foundation for negotiations of
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") between the United States and Latin American countries. See id.
at 568-69.
57. See supra note 29.
58. O'Hop, supra note 49, at 133.
59. Treaty Establishing a Latin American Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, 1484 U.N.T.S. 223 (1960); O'Hop, supra note 49, at 131.
60. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12,
1980, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 672 (1980). "The long range objective of this process shall be the gradual
and progressive formation of a Latin American common market. Id. at 673. The eleven original
signatory countries to LAIA include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Cuba became the twelfth member in 1999. ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES, TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 118-21 (Jose M. Salazar-Xinnachs &
Maryse Robert eds., 2001) [hereinafter "OAS FREE TRADE"] (discussing LAIA in detail) and Atkins,
supra note 50, at 189-90 (commenting that LAIA provides Latin American countries with political
forum for trade negotiations on many levels, including the promotion of developing strong market-
based economies, special treatment for less-developed countries and participation by nonmember
countries and private parties in some instances).
61. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/tradeagreements/CACM.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004).
62. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 910
(1969).
63. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 17, reprinted in 12
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Cono Sur ("MERCOSUR")6 m 1991. Through the OAS, Latin American
countries have discussed and continue to discuss all aspects of integration,
including the harmonization of private international law and other cooperation
65conducive to economic integration. Moreover, Latin American countries have
been responsive to ongoing negotiations for the FTAA.66
In addition, with regard to foreign investment, "[c]ountnes m Latin America
and the Caribbean have signed approximately three hundred BITs, virtually all of
which were negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s.,,67 As discussed below, the
Mexican approach to economic integration traditionally had been more limited
compared to other Latin American countries. Mexico's policy on the interplay
between international law and foreign investment did, however, influence foreign
investment policies throughout Latin America prior to the 1980s. 68 Those policies
stood in stark contrast to U.S. policy initiatives. Until the negotiation of NAFTA
became a reality Mexico stood firm in its opposition to international standards for
foreign investment dispute resolution.
1. The Traditional Mexican Approach to Foreign Investment
The international-based, investor-friendly provisions found in Chapter 11 and
discussed m detail later run counter to traditional Mexican law regarding foreign
mvestment. 69 It has been noted that "[s]ince the nineteenth century, Mexico has
contested vehemently the traditional principles of international law governing the
protection of foreigners and foreign property ,70 This policy originated from
Mexican dissatisfaction with foreign investors at the end of the nineteenth
I.L.M. 1033 (1973).
64. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Apr. 19, 1991, reprinted in 30 i.L.M. 1041 (1991).
65. O'Hop, supra note 49, at 135-37. The OAS sponsors talks for hemispheric legal
harmonization through its Inter-American Specialized Conferences on Private International Law
(known as "CIDIPs"). Organization of American States, at http://www.oas.org/dil/
privateintlaw interamencanconferences.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter "OAS Website"].
There have been six CIDIPs to date, covering topics such as junsdiction, enforcement ofjudgments and
secured financial transactions, to name a few. Id.
66. See supra note 54.
67. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade Hearing on
the Outcome of the Summit of the Americas and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemisphere, 27 CAN.
U.S. L.J. 313, 18 (2001) (testimony of Daniel M. Price on behalf of the U.S. Council for International
Business).
68. Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 323 (1994); Daniel R. Lontz,
Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under
NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COmp. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2000).
69. Indeed, NAFTA "represents the first time Mexico has entered into an international agreement
providing for investor-state arbitration. Daniel M. Pnce, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter- Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW 727 (1993) (no
pagination electronic version) [hereinafter "Price, Overview"].
70. See NAFTA: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 24-8 (Ralph H. Folsom, Michael Wallace
Gordon, & David Lopez eds., 2000) [hereinafter "NAFTA COURSEBOOK"]. See also Loritz, supra note
69, at 536 (noting Mexico's history of expropriation of foreign investment without compensation).
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century 71 For example, the open investment policy of President Porfino Diaz m
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was a major contributor to
economic and social problems in Mexico, and consequently a significant cause of
the Revolution.72 The view in Mexico that foreign investment was a threat to state
sovereignty and Mexico's economic well-being remained pervasive throughout
most of the twentieth century 71
Developed countries, on the other hand, traditionally have argued it is a basic
principle of international law that a country must provide an investor with just
compensation in the event that a country expropriated an mvestment. 74 Indeed, the
view advocated by the United States and other developed countries 75 was in stark
contrast to that which developing countries, like Mexico, espoused:
At the end of the 1970s, the world remained sharply divided in its view of
international investment policy, particularly the issue of compensation for
expropriation. The developed states asserted that expropriation required payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The socialist states contended
that no compensation was required, although they frequently did agree to pay
compensation in settlement of claims by expropriated foreign investors. The
developing states also rejected the prompt, adequate and effective standard,
generally taking the position that the calculation of compensation should depend
upon a variety of factors, such as the return that the investor already had received
71. See NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 26.
72. Sandrno, supra note 69, at 279-81. The author explains:
Although actual figures are not available, recent studies suggest that by the end of
Porfinato, foreigners owned over half of the total wealth of Mexico and foreign capital
dominated most areas of productive enterprise.
The presence of foreign investors during the Porfinato was largely to blame for many of
Mexico's economic ills at the beginning of this century and fueled the Mexican
Revolution of 1910. The Revolution established the ideological and political foundation
for a fundamentally different state role in the Mexican economy. The new boundaries
for the role of the Mexican state were established in the Mexican Constitution of 1917,
which placed restraints on foreign economic activities and foreign land ownership. By
incorporating the anti-foreign sentiments of the Mexican revolutionaries, the Mexican
Constitution emphasized Mexican sovereignty and independence from foreign economic
control.
Id. at 280-81; see also Loritz, supra note 69, at 535-36.
73. Sandrino, supra note 69, at 279-81.
74. See generally John A. Westberg, International Transactions and Claims Involving
Government Parties: Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 219 (1991) (discussing the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 15 (1987), explaining that
"compensation in the case of expropriation or nationalization [must] be 'appropriate' and 'just' which
means it must be in 'an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken' which means 'fair market
value' where that can be determined."); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the
International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998) (discussing the diffenng views on
international law and investment among developed and developing countries.).
75. Sandnno, supra note 69, at 265 ("Since the end of the nineteenth century, the developed states
have been preoccupied with securing international standards for the protection of investments of their
nationals and firms abroad, fashioned on the traditional rules of the protection of property.").
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pnor to the expropnation and the content of local law on the subject.76
The principle that local law should govern foreign investment disputes thus
traditionally has been the centerpiece of Mexican policy on the issue.
The Mexican Constitution accomplishes this policy in what is known as the
"Calvo Clause." 77 In the mid-nmeteenth century, the Argentinean diplomat and
publicist Carlos Calvo set forth a series of "assertions" that formed the basis of
what became known as the Calvo Doctrine.78 Calvo argued that international law
and principles of state sovereignty prohibited diplomatic and military intervention
by foreign countries to resolve commercial disputes on behalf of their investors.
79
Such intervention exacerbated the inequality between developed and developing
countries by obliging developing countries to give foreigners more protection in
commercial dealings than was given to their own citizens.80 The Calvo Doctrine,
therefore, is based on two key principles: absolute "nonintervention" by foreign
states and "absolute equality of foreigners with nationals" with regard to
foreigners' commercial dealings in another country 8'
The Calvo Doctrine became immediately popular throughout Latin America.
8 2
Latin American countries for years tried to implement the Calvo Doctrine through
international treaties, in national constitutions and in municipal legislation, but the
most popular and successful approach has been to implement Calvo's principles
through contractual stipulation. 3 Calvo's principles are still pervasive in many
Latin American countries today and stand as a point of contention between
developed and developing countries." In Mexico, the Constitution provides:
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican corporations have the right
to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and the appurtenances, or to obtain
76. Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 385-86. Dunng the 1970s this divide was evidenced in the
United Nations system, wherein a number of developing and less-developed countries formed the New
International Economic Order ("NIEO") in an attempt to assert more control over an international
system which those countries viewed as exploitative to their interests and oppressive to their aspirations
for development. Sandrino, supra note 69, at 269-76. In fact, one of the main aspects of the NIEO was
to "challenge[] traditional principles of customary international law that govern foreign direct
investment, such as determining compensation for expropriation or nationalization and settling foreign
investment disputes. Id. at 274.
Interestingly, as result of the NIEO movement in the United Nations, a series of resolutions
were passed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1970s that outright rejected principles of
customary international law regarding foreign investment disputes. See RONALD A. BRAND,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 983-93 (Kluwer Law International
2000) [hereinafter "BRAND IBT"].
77. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Umdos Mexicanos, art. 27 (1976),
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/l1917const.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
78. DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17 (1955).
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 18-19.
81. Id. at 19-20.
82. Id. at21.
83. Id. at 21-32.
84. Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 161, 168-69 (1996).
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concessions for working mines or for the utilization of waters or mineral fuel in
the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same rights to aliens, provided
they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves
Mexicans in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the
protection of their governments in matters relating thereto, under penalty, in the
case of noncompliance, of forfeiture of the property so acquired.
85
Thus, for most of the twentieth century, the Mexican approach to foreign
investment disputes was to handle such disputes according to national law,
disregarding any "international" standards for foreign investment dispute
resolution. Since the NAFTA negotiating process began, however, Mexican policy
has undergone significant changes-namely, the Calvo Clause no longer applies to
investors from NAFTA Parties.8 6  Moreover, the Mexican legal system has
undergone much reform over the last two decades, paving the way for the
application of international law in Mexican courts, comportmg with Mexico's
goals for economic openness and development8 7
85. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Umdos Mexicanos (1976),
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/does/1917consthtm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). See also NAFTA
CoutRsEBooK, supra note 71, at 324 (noting that the Cavo Clause "stipulate[d] that foreign persons
operating in Mexico should be considered in all respects as Mexicans, thus limiting the resolution of
disputes to local courts adjudicating under domestic law provisions and prohibiting any intervention by
the home government."); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing
the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 193-95 (2001) (discussing
the history of Mexico's unfriendly foreign investor provisions and explaining that "the United States
lobbied hard to include Chapter I l's investment protections precisely because it wanted 'to liberalize
Mexican restrictions on investment' ") (internal footnotes omitted). See Sandrmo, supra note 69, at
283-87, for a good discussion of how the traditional anti-foreign investment sentiment in Mexico is
embedded in the Mexican Constitution and in Mexican law.
86. Isidro Morales, NAFTA: The Governance of Economic Openness, 565 ANNALS 35, 50 (1999)
(internal citations omitted), explaining that the traditional Mexican approach:
was completely opposed to the international minimum standard that the U.S. government
has traditionally required all states to comply with when dealing with foreign
investments. According to the U.S. view, even if state does not provide its own
nationals with minimum international rights, it may not escape international
responsibility to guarantee minimum standards to nationals of other countries. Though
Latin American countries, including Mexico, have moved progressively from the
national-centered paradigm to that of the "minimum international standard" approach,
chapter II of NAFTA is a turning point in this regard.
87. See generally Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Mexico, 5
U.S.-MEx. L.J. 137, 140 (1997) (discussing the significant changes in Mexican laws in recent years,
notig that "[f]or over half century, Mexico's absolute temtonalism led to the virtual exclusion of
foreign law from that country's court system" and that "[flrom 1932 to 1988, over fifty years, Mexico
was so territonalistic that no foreign judgments were enforced in Mexico."); Jorge Cicero, International
Law in Mexican Courts, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1035 (1997) (discussing the progressive evolution
of international law in the Mexican legal system); Miguel Jauregui Rojas, A New Era: The Regulation
of Investment in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 41 (1993) (discussing the changes in law in Mexico in the
1980s regarding foreign investment, such as reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic
enterprises, in order to comply more with international practices and enhance foreign investment in
Mexico); Sandnno, supra note 69, at 301-07 (discussing in detail the changing regulatory scheme of
foreign mvestment in Mexico in the latter part of the twentieth century).
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C NAFTA
The idea that modern trade and investment agreements provide the framework
for economic integration in the Western Hemisphere, as discussed, has foundations
m U.S. political and economic interests beginning in the nineteenth century as well
as in efforts at economic integration by Latin American countries since the mid-
twentieth century. The current reality is, nevertheless, clear: globalization has
finally linked historical political agendas and economic trends in the Americas and
countries are seeking structured, legal frameworks within which to control trends
m economic integration. It is within this historical context that NAFTA emerged
as the first official milestone m economic integration m the Americas-the first
official trade agreement between developed countries and a developing country 88
1. Background
Canada, Mexico and the United States began negotiations for a free trade area
in North America in 1991, largely on account of President Bush's EAI.89 The
United States and Canada were already parties to a free trade agreement, the U.S.
Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA"), 90 and the United States led the charge
toward creating a new free trade agreement for all of North America.9I In fact, in
the early 1990s, the United States began to experience increasing economic
competition from a more unified European Community, and it was feared that if
the United States did not act to stimulate more economic cooperation in the
Western Hemisphere, a strong Europe may gain an advantage in Latin American
markets.92 Thus, for President Bush, NAFTA served as a critical maneuver to
counter economic competition in Latin America from an integrating Europe, as
well as a first step toward hemispheric integration. For President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari of Mexico, NAFTA represented a great opportunity to stimulate the
Mexican economy and effectively assure that Mexico could not return to its
protectionist policies of the past.93
Indeed, President Salinas had engineered tremendous fiscal and economic
policy reform in Mexico since his term began in 1988, making negotiations for
NAFTA with the United States and Canada possible m the first place. 94 Both
President Salinas and his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo, were responsible for
opening Mexico's economy in preparation for NAFTA by privatizing state
88. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 228; Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18, at 130 ("NAFTA is the only
example so far of scheme of economic integration involving two advanced economies and one
emerging or developing economy."); Sandrino, supra note 69, at 261-62 (noting that NAFTA "is the
first regional trade pact between Third World state and two industrialized states.").
89. See supra notes 39-42.
90. Dec. 22, 1987, U.S.-Can. (effective Jan. 2, 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
91. RALPH FOLSOM & W DAvis FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS 119 (1996) [hereinafter "FOLSOM & FOLSOM"].
92. See Gwynne & Kay, supra note 18, at 93.
93. See MEYER, supra note 42, at 670-73.
94. See id.
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enterprises, reducing government spending and transforming the Mexican
economy into a free market economy 9' The three countries signed NAFTA in
1993, and after President Clinton spearheaded negotiations for side agreements on
labor and the environment, the U.S. Congress passed NAFTA marking the
beginning of a truly historic cooperative. % Under the direction of President
Zedillo, Mexico continued to liberalize its economy throughout the 1990s m
inplementmg NAFTA. 9 7  Interestingly, because of Chile's stable political and
economic climate, NAFTA countries met with Chile on five occasions to discuss
Chile's accession to NAFTA.98 However, Chile suspended talks regarding its
accession, waiting for the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track negotiating authority
for President Clinton, which never happened.99
Although some commentators opine that "the jury is still out on the effects of
NAFTA," ° trade has increased dramatically among NAFTA Parties since the
agreement took effect, and Parties continue to hold meetings to accelerate the
elimination of all tariffs and non-tariff barrers to trade in North America.' ° l In
terms of stimulating trade and foreign investment, NAFTA has been a positive tool
for Mexican economic policy i02 Ten years after NAFTA went into effect North
American trade has doubled. 10 3  Mexican exports to the United States have
increased by 234% and by 203% to Canada.' 4 Increased exports have generated
new jobs for Mexican workers (one out of five jobs are export-oriented), which
pay on average 37% more than manufacturing jobs in Mexico.'0 5 Mexico also
continues to receive large amounts of foreign investment from its NAFTA partners
in a variety of sectors, ranging from manufacturing to mining to services.
106
95. NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 28.
96. See FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 120-21 (1999); Dr. Elvia Acelia Quintana Adriano,
The North American Free Trade Agreement and Its Impact on the Micro- Small- and Medium-Sized
Mexican Industries, 39 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 967 (1995) (explaining that NAFTA created "the largest free
trade area in the world.").
97. See NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 28.
98. Id. at 746.
99. Id. at 746-47 Thereafter, Chile has entered into free trade agreements with Canada and
Mexico. OAS FREE TRADE, supra note 61, at 103-104. And, in June 2003, the United States and Chile
signed free trade agreement. USTR, Chile Free Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fla/
chile.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
100. FRANKO, supra note 38, at 232.
101. See OAS FREE TRADE, supra note 61, at 89.
102. Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank says NAFTA Has Had Positive Impact On Mexico, U.N.
Wire, Dec. 18, 2003, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20031218/449_11452.asp (last visited May 1,
2004).
103. See United States Trade Representative, "NAFTA at Ten: A Success Story, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/2003-12-08-naftalO-factsheet.pdf (last visited April 7, 2004).
104. See United States Trade Representative, "NAFTA. A Decade of Strengthening a Dynamic
Relationship, at htp://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafia2003/brochure-english.pdf (last visited
April 7,2004).
105. See United States Trade Representative, "Myth: NAFTA was a Failure for Mexico, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa2003/factsheet-myth-nafta-mexico.pdf (last visited April
7, 2004).
106. See U.S. Embassy in Mexico, "North American Free Trade Agreement: Tenth Anniversary,
at http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eNAFTA figures.him (last visited April 7, 2004) (graphing FDI
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Mexico is now receiving three times the amount of capital inflow it received
in the five-year period immediately prior to NAFTA. 0 7 Moreover, Mexico has
"become the third highest recipient of foreign direct investment ("FDI") among
developing countries."' l8 FDI-related jobs in Mexico have grown twice as fast as
other jobs in Mexico and pay on average some 50% more than national average
wages. 1 9 Notably, Mexico has signed free trade agreements with several Central
American countries, has joined the Group of Three with Colombia and Venezuela
establishing a free trade area with those countries, and also has free trade
agreements with Bolivia and Chile." 0
NAFTA itself is a highly technical trade document. It lacks, however, the
institutional framework that characterizes the more progressive European Union,
for example."' NAFTA is, at base, a free trade agreement between the Parties,
with no provisions for additional party accession and no schedules for achieving
higher forms of economic integration such as a customs union, common market or
economic union. 1 2 It does, however, cover a wide range of trade-related topics,
in Mexico by sector).
107. See OECD Global Forum on International Investment, "New Horizons and Policy Changes for
Foreign Direct Investment in the 21 Century, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/52/2424050.pdf
(last visited April 7,2004) [hereinafter "OECD Global Forum"].
108. See id; see also Secretana de Economia de Mdxico, Comisi6n Nacional de Inversiones
Extranjers, "Informe Estadistico Sobre el Comportamiento de la Inversi6n Extranjera Directa en
Mdxico (Enero - diciembre de 2003), at http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p1175/03-dic.doc (last
visited April 7, 2004). That report, which covers foreign investment statistics in Mexico from January
2003 to December 2003, points out a 24.7% estimation of new investment in Mexico. Id. (translation
mine) ("la estimaci6n de la IED realizada en el lapso enero diciembre de 2003 asciende 10,731.4
md, y se integra en un 24.7% (2651.0 md) de nuevas inversiones "). It also notes that dunng that
time period 54.1% of total foreign investment came from the United States. Id. (graphing foreign
investment inflows by country). Statistics regarding foreign investment from U.S. businesses are
particularly staggering. In fact, "[in] September of 2002 there were 15,356 businesses with U.S. capital,
which is 55.0% of all businesses with foreign direct investment (FDI) registered in Mexico (27,936).
Secretaria de Economia, Subsecretana de Normatividad, Inversi6n Extranjera y Practicas Comerciales
Intemacionales, "Direcci6n General de Inversi6n Extranjera: Inversi6n de Estados Umdos en Mdxico,
at http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/pl240/EUASEP03.doc (last visited April 7, 2004) (translation
mine) ("Al mes de septiembre de 2003 se cuenta con un registro 15,356 sociedades con participaci6n
estadounidense en su capital social, esto es, el 55 .0 %o del total de sociedades con inversion extranjera
directa (IED) registradas en Mdxjco (27,936)."). Further, "[bletween January 1999 and September
2003, businesses with U.S. capital realized $51,903.7 million, which represents 68.0/c of all FDI
invested in the country during that time ($76,286.5 million) "). Id. (translation mine) ("Entre enero
de 1999 y septiembre de 2003, las empresas con capital estadounidense realizaron inversiones por
51,903.7 millones de d6lares (md), cantidad que representa el 68.0% de la IED total que ingres6 al pais
en ese lapso (76,286.5 md) "). Moreover, since the inception of NAFTA, U.S. FDI in Mexico
continues to climb: "U.S. investment since 1994 has reached $80,325.4 million, equivalent to 65.1% of
all FDI destined to the country between January 1994 and September 2003. Id. (translation mine) ("La
inversi6n estadounidense acumulada a partir de 1994 asciende a 80,325.4 md y equivale al 65.1% de la
IED total destmada al pais entre enero de 1994 y septiembre de 2003.").
109. See OECD Global Forum, supra note 108.
110. Id. at 95-104.
111. See Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 5-11.
112. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at Ch. 1; see also Gustavo Vega Canovas, Convergence: Future
Integration between Mexico and the United States, 10 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 17 (2002) (discussing the
characteristics and limitations of NAFTA as an integrative agreement).
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some of which include trade m goods and services, foreign investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement, strict rules of origin for products, anti-
dumping provisions, labor issues, environmental issues, and dispute resolution.'
3
The NAFTA Central Trade Commission ("Commission") is the central governing
body charged with overseeing implementation and dispute resolution among
Parties.1 4 The Commission has established several Working Groups dedicated to
promoting cooperation m specific areas of NAFTA and to conducting day-to-day
business." 5  The dispute resolution framework of NAFTA is, of course, of
particular interest for purposes of this article. A discussion of that framework m
general underscores the preference for international arbitration in modem
economic integration and, further, the unique and important character of Chapter
11 dispute resolution.
2. Dispute Resolution
The NAFTA dispute resolution framework serves to facilitate the purposes of
NAFTA-to provide a concrete regulatory structure for the reality of economic
integration m North America in an era of expansive trade and investment. In this
respect, the NAFTA framework underscores how international law is inextncably
intertwined with economic policy. As is the case m most international trade and
investment agreements, the NAFTA framework depends on alternative means of
dispute resolution through which the link between law and economics is
maintained and developed.i6 All three NAFTA Parties have umque legal
traditions, and the differences between Mexico's legal system and the legal
systems of the United States and Canada are tremendous. Thus, it is important to
be aware of these differences in order to understand why NAFTA Parties chose the
ADR framework and why ADR is the best method for resolving NAFTA-type
disputes, especially those involving a pnvate investor and a NAFTA Party.
a. Differmg Legal Traditions
A brief note on the differences between legal systems in NAFTA countries is
appropnate at this point. Some scholars have stated that:
NAFTA at its heart is about changing market forces, but law is the instrument and
to a degree the guarantor of change. It is through legal enactments and
proceedings that the new rules of the business game in North America are to be
realized. Each legal system bnngs with it traditions that can be expected to
influence how the NAFTA accords are interpreted, implemented, and applied.
1 17
113. See Canovas, supra note 113.
114. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2001.
115. USTR, "NAFTA Organizations, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/
organizaions.shtml#committees (last visilted Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "NAFTA Organizations"].
116. NAFTA Secretariat, Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (,A4FTA), at http://www.nafla-sec-alena.org [last visited Feb. 28, 2004].
117. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 32.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The Canadian and U.S. legal systems are based on the common law tradition,
which derives its roots primarily from English junsprudence.s That is, law has
primarily developed and continues to be modified through judicial decisions., 19
This does not mean that Canadian and U.S. law do not rely on other primary
sources of law. On the contrary, the Canadian and U.S. legal systems today are
indeed vast networks of case law, legislation, and administrative rules and
regulations. 20  This, however, does not obscure the tremendous differences
between those countries' legal systems and Mexico's legal system. In contrast,
Mexico's legal system is based on the civil law tradition, deriving its roots mainly
from Spain, France and other Continental European legal traditions.i2  The
principle characteristic of the civil law tradition is that law is developed and
modified through enacted law, or legislative proscriptions.1
2 2
While an elaborate discussion of the differences among the legal systems of
NAFTA Parties is beyond the scope of this comment, it is worth mentioning that
the differences highlight conflicting ideas regarding the role of lawyers and judges
in the dispute resolution process, rules of procedure and junsdictional principles.123
Additionally, there are differences m the legacy of the rule of law among NAFTA
Parties. The United States and Canada can generally boast of individual histones
committed to the rule of law. In Mexico, however, where a written constitution
and general commitment to democracy "has successfully avoided military coups of
the kind that have been common throughout much of Latin America, one-party
rule and elitism have tainted the degree to which the rule of law has been able to
flourish. 124  This difference is especially pertinent in the context of foreign
investment and dispute resolution involved therem.
These differences serve as major obstacles to achieving uniformity of dispute
resolution procedures for suits involving private parties and NAFTA Parties in
order to deal with increased flows of commerce and investment across borders.
One author summarizes the effects of this non-uniformity on private individuals
118. See generally id. at 32-42, 49-56 (providing general overview of some major facets of the
Canadian and U.S. legal systems). Canada is common law country like the United States, and thus
similarly stands in contrast to Mexico's civil law system, but it can hardly be said that the Canadian and
U.S. legal systems are the same for purposes of achieving harmonization of dispute resolution
procedures. Id. Additionally, the Province of Quobec maintains its own civil code, which has roots in
the French Civil Code and is thus something of an amalgamation between the common law and civil
law, baring some similarity to Mexico's legal system. Id. This adds further complexity to the task of
achieving uniform dispute resolution procedures among NAFTA Parties. Id. at 39-42. See also
generally MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 438-764 (1994)
(discussing the foundations and characteristics of the common law tradition).
119. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 33.
120. See FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 92, at 35-38, 53-56.
121. Id. at 43-44. See generally GLENDON, supra note 119, at 44-276 (discussing the foundations
and charactenstics of the civil law tradition) and JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1999) (discussing
the same).
122. See GLENDON, supra note 119, at 192-94.
123. See generally id. at 130-251.
124. See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 48.
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engaged in transnational business in the United States and Mexico:
[Mexican law] limits damages that may be recovered in a civil action, whereas
United States law creates opportunities for unlimited damages, including punitive
damages. In Mexico, an injunction is not available as a remedy in commercial
disputes where damages are irreparable or cannot be measured in monetary terms.
In the United States, an injunction is often the preferred remedy for resolving a
commercial dispute. The jury is not a part of adjudication of civil disputes in
Mexico, whereas it is an integral part of the system in the United States. In
Mexico, trial evidence is mainly presented by documentation in front of judges
who question the witnesses, and pre-tnal discovery is not allowed on the same
scale as in the United States. These differences and others reinforce a party's
doubts that the legal system of his or her counterpart will lead to a definitive
resolution of a commercial dispute that will be fair.
125
The NAFTA dispute resolution framework establishes ADR procedures for
dispute settlement as a means of bypassing the complexities involved in
transnational litigation and legal harmonization. Understanding the basics of ADR
is thus essential to understanding the NAFTA dispute resolution framework.
b. ADR
126
ADR includes methods of resolving disputes without involving litigation in a
particular court system. i27 These methods include consultation, mediation and
arbitration. 128 Mediation, also known as conciliation, is simply "a process in which
parties to a dispute appoint a neutral third party to assist them in resolving their
disputes, and the goal is "a voluntary negotiated settlement."'129 Arbitration also
involves resolution of disputes by a neutral third party, but it is a more formal step
for parties to take. 30 Decisions of arbitration panels can be either binding or non-
binding, depending upon the rules to which the disputing parties have agreed.1 3
1
There are several organizations that offer international arbitration guidelines, such
as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), 132
125. Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp REsOL. 77, 89 (2000)
[hereinafter "Robert Paterson"].
126. For an introductory discussion on ADR, see International Trade Administration, Primer on
International Alternative Dispute Resolution, at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occicladr.hlml (last
updated Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter "InternationalADR"].
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. American Arbitration Association, AAA Glossary of Dispute Resolution Terms, available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15784 (last visited Mar. 1,2004).
131. International ADR, supra note 127.
132. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), general information,
at http://www.uncitral.org/english/commiss/geninfo.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
"UNCITRAL Website"]. UNCITRAL is the main legal body of the United Nations for intemational
trade law. Id. It has set forth several rules and gidelines regarding international commercial
arbitration and conciliation, and, in particular, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted in 1976 are
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and others that offer guidelines and services such as the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA") 133 and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). 134
Given the availability and characteristics of arbitration procedures for the
settlement of disputes involving parties from different countries, international
arbitration is increasingly favored by those involved in international business. One
scholar has summarized the advantages and disadvantages to arbitration in the
context of international commercial transactions:
[Tihe common arguments favoring arbitration include the following:
Arbitration can be simpler and less subject to rules of procedure and rules of
evidence.
Arbitration can be set in a neutral location, thus avoiding either party giving up
the "home court" advantage.
Parties to arbitration can select both the procedural and substantive law applicable
to the dispute.
Arbitration can more often take place without termination of contract
often selected by parties to disputes in international arbitration. Id. NAFTA Chapter II gives private
investors the option to select UNCITRAL rules as the applicable arbitration rules in an investor-state
dispute. See infra Part III.B.
133. American Arbitration Association, available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003).
134. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "ICSID
Website"]. The ICSID was created by the World Bank in 1966, believing "that an institution specially
designed to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors
could help could help promote increased flows of international investment. Id. The ICSID is
particularly important in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, as discussed in Part
III.B., infra. Notably,
ICSID provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member
countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries. Recourse to
ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once the parties have
consented to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, neither can unilaterally withdraw
its consent. Moreover, all ICSID Contracting States, whether or not parties to the
dispute, are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards.
Besides providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration under the ICSID Convention,
the Centre has a set of Additional Facility Rules authorizing the ICSID Secretariat to
administer certain types of proceedings between States and foreign nationals which fall
outside the scope of the Convention.
Provisions on ICSID arbitration are commonly found in investment contracts between
governments of member countries and investors from other member countries. Advance
consents by governments to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration can also be
found in about twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral investment treaties.
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performance, allowing dispute resolution to fill gaps in performance issues in
long-term contracts without otherwise disrupting performance.
Arbitral awards are more likely to be enforceable in the courts of multiple
countries because of the New York Arbitration Convention and the lack of any
similar multilateral convention dealing with the enforcement of court judgments.
Arbitral awards generally are not subject to appeal, thus bringing more certain
finality to the process.
In addition, the following factors may lead to a decision that litigation is more
desirable:
Court decisions are more often a matter of public record, making the interpretation
of the law in a given jurisdiction more predictable than in arbitration where the
arbitrators may have no published record and the institution under which
arbitration is conducted may not make public pnor arbitral awards on similar
issues.
If the other party will agree to jurisdiction in a local court, the "home court"
advantage of litigation may be available.
Preliminary relief, such as prejudgment attachment, has traditionally been more
often available in litigation than in arbitration.
Litigation is most often subject to appeal, allowing for correction or erroneous
application of the substantive law by the tribunal. 13
The preference for and importance of international arbitration m modem trade
agreements, and in particular investment agreements, has been summarized as
follows:
Arbitration has become a fixture in international trade and investment because it
compares favorably to the alternatives. It provides a neutral mechanism
characterized by private proceedings, flexible procedures, expert decision-makers,
relative finality, and enforceability of the result. For a host state, private
adjudication before a learned tribunal within a relaxed procedural framework will
often be preferable to defending against litigation in an investor's home state. 136
135. BRAND IBT, supra note 77, at 584-85.
136. Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic
Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP L. REv. 311, 318
(2000); see also Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing the obvious advantages of such mtemational
arbitration).
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The NAFTA dispute resolution framework is thus not unique to this preference in
that it establishes five different mechanisms for arbitration involving NAFTA
Parties.
c. NAFTA Framework in General
As mentioned, NAFTA lacks a concrete institutional framework. Dispute
resolution mechanisms are thus dispersed throughout the document in five main
areas. 137 Notably, "[tihe NAFTA dispute settlement system is a decentralized
system [It] operates by channeling certain types of trade conflicts into the
appropriate specialized dispute settlement mechanism of limited jurisdiction and
limited powers."'138  Mechanisms are found m Chapter 20, Chapter 19, Chapter
11,139 and m provisions under the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation ("NAAEC") 40 and the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation ("NAALC"). 141
The Chapter 20 mechanism is the general trade dispute mechanism for
NAFTA countries. Parties may seek to resolve disputes on virtually any matter
related to the terms of NAFTA. 142 Dispute settlement under Chapter 20 proceeds
as follows: (1) Parties first undergo consultations; (2) if they cannot agree on
resolution of the dispute, the aggrieved Party may submit the dispute to the
Commission for resolution and recommendation; (3) if the Commission does not
facilitate a resolution, a Party may request that an arbitral panel hear the dispute,
administered by the NAFTA Secretariat; (4) the arbitration panel will then issue a
non-binding decision. 143 A decision by an arbitration panel does not directly affect
national law.'44 Further, if a Party does not comply with the arbitration ruling, the
prevailing Party has the right to withhold temporarily NAFTA benefits from the
non-compliant Party until the situation is remedied.
45
The Chapter 19 mechanism allows Parties to request arbitral panel review in
the first instance regarding dumping and countervailing duties.146 In a Chapter 19
dispute, the arbitral panel will issue a binding decision, as "[p]anels and
committees m Chapter 19 proceedings replace judicial review in the courts of
137 Chene O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an
Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR? 17 N.w. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 854
(1996).
138. Id. at 854-55. For more discussion on the NAFTA dispute resolution framework, see id at
854-58, and Lopez, supra note 54, at 606-09.
139. Taylor, supra note 138, at 854-55.
140. North Amercan Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
arts. 22-36, 32 ILM 1480, 1482 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
141. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 27-
41, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1502 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
142. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2004.
143. Id. at arts. 2006-2017
144. Taylor, supra note 138, at 856.
145. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 2019; Lopez, supra note 54, at 606.
146. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1904; NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 434.
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competent jurisdiction in the NAFTA countries." 147
The NAALC mechanism creates "a four-step dispute settlement process that
progresses sequentially from initial consultations to ministenal consultations,
to expert evaluations to further consultations which may lead to non-binding
arbitration,"' 148 pertaining to labor matters. However, only "controversies
involving occupation safety child labor, or mmimum wage concerns may"
reach an arbitration panel.1 49 Only Parties have access to this mechamsm, and
decisions are non-binding.15
0
In the case of disputes regarding the environment, the NAAEC mechanism
authorizes the Environmental Secretariat "to conduct an investigation and to
prepare a report, potentially for distribution to the public.' 51  Parties may request
such an investigation when another Party allegedly fails to enforce effectively its
own environmental laws or when another Party's environmental laws are arguably
inadequate. 152 Decisions regarding such disputes, if they reach an arbitral panel,
are non-binding, and compliance is left to the threat of monetary damages or
suspension of NAFTA benefits to the Party in error. 
1
53
The common characteristic of the four NAFTA dispute settlement
mechanisms discussed above is that only NAFTA Parties have access to the ADR
proceedings. Moreover, apart from the binding nature of arbitration decisions
under Chapter 19 the other three mechanisms only allow for non-binding
decisions and depend on political and economic pressure for enforcement.154 The
Chapter 11 mechanism, on the other hand, stands in contrast to the general
NAFTA dispute resolution framework in its procedures, results and implications.
Chapter 11 bridges the gap between private parties and governments by
establishing a binding, international law-based dispute resolution regime for
disputes between NAFTA investors and NAFTA Parties. I s In this sense, it is a
progressive and pragmatic approach to incorporating private actors and
international law into the process of governing economic integration.
Chapter 1 1 is thus a distinctive feature of NAFTA, and warrants careful
analysis. More importantly for the purposes of this article, given the Chapter 11
framework and Mexico's traditional outlook on the applicability of international
law to foreign investment, this analysis prompts discussion of whether Chapter 11
dispute resolution is beneficial to Mexico. With the background information now
in place, a more narrow discussion of Chapter 11 and Mexico is in order. A look
at the Chapter 1 1 text m detail and the first four final arbitration awards involving
Mexico provides the proper focus for that analysis.
147 NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 437- NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1904.
148. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607-08. See NAALC, supra note 142, at arts. 27-41.
149. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607-08. See NAALC, supra note 142, at art. 29.
150. See NAALC, supra note 142, arts. 27-49; see also Lopez, supra note 54, at 608.
151. Lopez, supra note 54, at 607. See NAAEC, supra note 141, at arts. 22-36.
152. NAAEC, supra note 141, at arts. 22-34; Lopez, supra note 54, at 606-07.
153. NAEEC, supra note 141, at art. 36; Lopez, supra note 54, at 607.
154. Lopez, supra note 54, at 605-08.
155. See mnfra Part III.B.
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III. NAFTA CHAPTER I I
A. Substantive Provisions
As mentioned, NAFTA Chapter 11 deals specifically with foreign investment
in North America. It creates broad protections for foreign investors in an effort to
stimulate integration beyond trade. 156 Indeed, there is a strong correlation between
foreign investment and trade. As one author notes, "[t]he subject of international
investment arises from one basic idea: the mobility of capital. If there is a
competitive advantage to be gamed, capital can and will get there. ' 1 7 Moreover,
"[t]he flow of capital takes four forms: foreign direct investment, bond
purchases, portfolio equity flows, and lending directly to support trade."' 58
Foreign direct investment ("FDI") represents the deepest form of investment
commitment, as it is "investment by foreigners through ownership of equity shares
or setting up production facilities within a country "'59
Section A of Chapter 11 is devoted to reducing barrers to foreign investment.
In doing so, it broadly defines what constitutes investors and investment.
Investment includes any economic interest in an enterprise, including equity
securities, debt securities, loans, and real estate or other property acquisitions.
160
156. Indeed, one of the objectives of NAFTA is to "increase substantially investment opportunities
in the territories of the Parties. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 102(c); see also Office of NAFTA and
Inter-Amencan Affairs, "Investment, at http://www.mac.doc.gov/naftainvestrnent.htn (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "NAFTA Investment"]:
Chapter 11 of NAFTA addresses investment issues among Canada, Mexico and the
United States. U.S. objectives for the protection of investors and investments in the
NAFTA Chapter 11 were to eliminate barriers to investment within the context of U.S.
policy and law, to encourage adoption of market-oriented domestic policies that treat
investment fairly and in a non-discriminatory manner, and to protect investment through
appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms. The NAFTA Chapter It succeeds in
obtaining these goals, thereby allowing companies to invest throughout the NAFTA
region on a level playing field.
For a detailed review of the provisions in and objectives of Chapter 11, see Rodolpho Sandoval,
Chapter Eleven: Investments under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1195 (1994); see also Price, Overview, supra note 70.
157. CZINKOTA, supra note 23, at 175.
158. FRANKO, supranote 38, at 177
159. Id. at 467" see generally CZINKOTA, supra note 23, at 175-79 (discussing in detail foreign
direct investment and the rationale behind engaging in such investment); see generally JOAN E. SPERO
& JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Ch. 8 (5 h ed. 1997) (discussing foreign
direct investment in detail and the arguments for and against such investment in developing countries).
160. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139(a)-(f). See also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at
302 (discussing the breadth of the definition of investment under NAFTA Chapter 11, pointing out
specifically that "[i]nvestment covers interests that entitle an owner to share income or profits of an
enterprise, assets of the enterprise on dissolution, real estate, and tangible or intangible property,
including intellectual property."). However, investment does not include:
(i) claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in
the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade
VOL. 32:3
NAFTA CHAPTER II DISPUTE RESOLUTION & MEXICO
An investor of a NAFTA Party is "a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national
or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an
investment." 161 In line with the hallmarks of modern trade agreements, Chapter 11
sets forth national treatment 62 and most-favored nation treatment 163 standards for
investors in NAFTA Parties, and mandates a minimum standard of treatment in
accordance with principles of international law.' 64 Article 1106 attempts to
facilitate the free flow of investment across borders by limiting NAFTA Parties'
abilities to establish performance requirements on investments, such as export or
domestic content mmnmums, or restrictions on sales volume and technology
transfer. i61 Other key provisions m Section A of Chapter 11 geared toward
stimulating investment include a prohibition on excluding foreign nationals from
being officers of an investor enterprise 166 and a restriction on placing limitations on
monetary transfers. 1
67
Perhaps most importantly, Chapter 11 establishes firm guidelines for
government expropriation of investments covered by NAFTA. It "covers direct,
indirect, and so-called 'creeping' expropnaton."' (' s Article 1110 provides:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropnate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its terrtory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or
(j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in
subparagraphs (a) through (h).
NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139(h)-(j).
161. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1139.
162. Id. at art. 1102. "Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors Id.
163. Id. at art. 1103. "Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of non-
Party Id., see also NAFTA CouRsEBooK, supra note 71, at 302 (explaining "that treaty-
protected investments will be treated at least as favorably by the NAFTA state as nationals and firms
from any third state.").
164. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1104-1105. For example, under Article 1105(1), NAFTA
Parties must "accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. Id. This is of
particular interest given Mexico's traditional policy on the applicability of international law to foreign
investment. See supra Part II.B.I.
165. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1106(l)-(3); see also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at
303 (explaining that "NAFTA prohibits the imposition of performance requirements includ[ing]
export performance, domestic content, domestic sourcmg, trade balancing, product mandating, and
technology transfer requirements.").
166. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1107. However, "[a] Party may require that majority of the
board of directors, or any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is an investment of an
investor of another Party, be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of the Party Id.
at art. 1107(2).
167. Id. at art. 1109; see also NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 304 (explaining that "[t]his
includes transfers to the investor, such as remittance of profits and dividends, the payment of interest
and capital gains, management fees, and proceeds from the sale of liquidation of an investment.").
168. Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 730.
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(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of
expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occumng because the
intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation critena shall include
going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property,
and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.
169
It should be noted that Chapter 11 also takes steps to protect legitimate
government regulations regarding the environment and public health. Article 1114
provides:
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.170
The substantive provisions in Chapter 11 thus embody established principles
of international law, and carry out a significant policy change for Mexico
regarding the applicability of international law to foreign investment. The direct
access dispute resolution framework set out m Section B of Chapter 11 further
serves to facilitate cross border investment by providing a predictable legal
structure based on principles of international law within which to resolve
investment disputes.171
B. Direct Access Dispute Resolution
The Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution framework derives its
structure from Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") promoted by the United
169. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 11 10(t)-(3).
170. Id. at art. 1114.
171. Id. at arts. 1115-1138.
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States.'72 Notably, such investment treaties "commonly dealt with the key issue[s]
of mechanisms for settling disputes between foreign investors and host
governments, which included provisions for binding international arbitration.
171
The purpose of the Chapter 1 1 dispute settlement provisions is clear: "this Section
establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both
equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principal of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal."' 174  A
principle goal of Chapter 11 is therefore to establish a friendly investment climate
via predictable legal rules and principles as derived from international law.
Articles 1116 and 1117 grant private investors from NAFTA Parties the right
to seek arbitration, on behalf of themselves or on behalf of an enterprise from a
NAFTA Party, against NAFTA Parties for injury or loss due to alleged violations
of the provisions in Section A of Chapter 11, and also m other limited
circumstances arising from Parties' obligations pursuant to other Chapters of
NAFTA.1 75 There is a three-year time limit for filing a claim, running "from the
date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge
172. Currently, there is no multilateral framework for the regulation of foreign investment. See R.
Todd Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures m Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT.
Moving Toward Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REv 541, 544, 567 (1994); see also
BRAND IBT, supra note 78, at 1061. Conversely, the WTO provides a framework for international
trade. See WTO, "Trade and Investment, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/i
nveste/investe.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "WTO Investment"] ("Despite several
efforts since the end of WWII, to date there does not exist set of coherent, substantive, and binding
multilateral rules governing foreign investment."). Absent such a framework to regulate foreign
investment, the United States has signed BITs with several countries, and these agreements contain
standard provisions for dispute resolution in accordance with established principles of international law.
See BRAND IBT, supra note 78, at 1053, 1058-59; see generally Shenln, supra at 541-82 BITs have
thus become a key component of economic integration in addition to free trade agreements:
"The U.S. Model BIT covers five main subjects:
general principles for treatment of foreign investors;
conditions of expropriation and the measure of compensation payable;
the right to free transfer without delay of profits and other funds associated with
investments;
the prohibition of inefficient and trade distorting practices; and
access to international arbitration for settlement of investment disputes.
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANsACTiONS: DocuMENTs 124 (Ronald Brand ed.,
2000) [hereinafter "Brand, FUNDAMENTALS"]. Notably, the Model BIT provides for binding
international arbitration against signatory states. Id. at 125. To view a version of the U.S. Model BIT,
see Brand, FUNDAMENTALS at 126-32; available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/modelbithtml
(last visited May 1, 2004).
173. NAFTA COuRSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 325-26.
174. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1115.
175. Id. at arts. 1116-1117. An investor has standing to submit a claim to arbitration when:
(1) [T]he government of another NAFTA party has breached an obligation under Section
A of Chapter 11; (2) [a] NAFTA party has acted in manner inconsistent with the
party's obligations under Chapter 11 (investment) or Chapter 14 (financial services) in
the exercise of its regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority; or (3) a
state monopoly has acted in a manner inconsistent with a party's obligations under
Chapter II where the entity 'exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other
governmental authority that the Party has delegated to it "
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of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or damage"
m the case of individual claims,' 76 and "from the date on which the enterprise first
acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and
knowledge that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage" in the case of claims
filed on behalf of an enterprise. 77  Thus, the hallmark of NAFTA Chapter 11
investment dispute resolution, which sets it apart from other NAFTA dispute
settlement mechanisms, is that private investors have direct access to arbitration
against Parties.
The procedure for Chapter 11 dispute settlement is set out in Articles 1118
through 1137 Disputing parties are directed to engage in consultation and
negotiation to resolve the dispute before arbitration is commenced. 78 An investor
that decides to submit a claim for arbitration against a NAFTA Party must notify
that Party at least ninety days prior to submitting the claim.179 However, an
aggrieved investor may not submit a claim for arbitration unless a minmumm of six
months have passed since the alleged breach and injury 180 If an investor submits a
claim to arbitration pursuant to either Article 1116 or 1117 the claimant must
consent in writing to the arbitration procedures set forth in Chapter 11, and must
waive in writing any right to litigate before the courts of any NAFTA Party on the
issues submitted for settlement in arbitration. 8 ' With respect to Mexico
specifically, the Chapter 11 text prohibits an investor from simultaneously
submitting a claim in arbitration against Mexico and bringing a similar action in a
Mexican court. 182
Section B of Chapter 11 also sets forth guidelines for appointing arbitrators,
83
NAFTA COURSEBOOK, supra note 71, at 327. See also Gal-Or, supra note 5, at 27-28 (listing scenarios
where investors may have standing under Chapter I1).
176. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1116(2).
177. Id. at art. 1117(2).
178. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1118-1137
179. Id. at art. 1119.
180. Id. atart. 1120(i).
181. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1121(l)-(3) (Under article l121(1)(b) and (2)(b), a private
investor utilizing Chapter 11 arbitration is not barred from obtaining declaratory or injunctive relief
from the courts of NAFTA Parties. Article 1122 assures that NAFTA Parties consent to private
investor arbitration as set out in Chapter 11), available at http://tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/Nafta/I .invest
(last visited May 1, 2004).
182. Id. at annex 1120.1(a).
183. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1123-1125 (Arbitral tribunals consist of three arbitrators,
unless the disputing parties agree otherwise under article 1123); see also Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter
11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared? 2002
B.Y.U.L. REV. 527, 534-35 (2002) (In practice, "each party to the dispute selects one arbitrator, and the
two selected arbitrators in turn choose third arbitrator who will preside over the proceeding."). Thus
the very composition of the arbitral tribunal is neutral. Jones summary of the general procedures that
follow after the arbitration panel is selected:
Once the arbitration panel is selected, it is not uncommon for all interested parties to
meet and allow the panel to hear an outline of each respective case "on the merits.
Before the formal oral hearing, the claimant in the case will submit a "memorial, the
"chief moving document" of the arbitration, containing "a statement of relevant facts;
statement of law; and the submissions. The respondent will then issue his "counter-
memorial. This interaction may take place second time if the parties agree. Also,
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selecting the place of arbitration,'8 consolidating of claims, 8 5 and for the
applicable law." Section B also provides for participation by non-disputing
NAFTA Parties. 18 7 Other provisions in Section B deal with damages awards and
the finality and enforcement of an arbitral decision. 8 8 The arbitration tribunal may
award an injured private investor monetary damages, interest, restitution of
property and costs for arbitration, but it "may not order a Party to pay punitive
damages." 189
The arbitration panel may grant interim relief to a disputing party to protect
rights in property, but it "may not order attachment or enjoin the application of the
measure alleged to constitute a breach 1,,90 Moreover, an arbitral decision is
binding only between the disputing parties, 19 1 and "[elach Party shall provide for
before the oral hearing, post-bnef/pre-hearing conferences may take place to accomplish
the "marshaling of evidence" that the parties plan to present at the hearing. According to
modem international arbitration rules, the parties have the option to forgo the oral
hearing and to rest on their written submissions. However, very few claimants rest on
their written submissions, as the overwhelming majority considers the oral hearing to be
invaluable to their case.
Id. at 535-56.
In addition, disputing parties often submit post-hearing briefs to the arbitration panel in order to clarify
their positions on certain issues. Id. See also Pearce & Coe, supra note 137, at 319-22.
184. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1129 (Arbitration must take place within the territory of a
Party "which is a party to the New York Convention, unless otherwise agreed); Jones, supra note 184,
at 535 (acknowledging that normally "disputing parties will elect to hold the arbitration in the third
country not involved in the dispute to add a measure of neutrality to the proceedings.").
185. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1125; Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 727 (no pagination
electronic version).
186. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1120, 1130, 1131. (Under Article 1120, an investor may
submit a claim to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID or
under the UNCITRAL rules for arbitration, and the relative procedural rules apply to the arbitration.
Article 1130 is the general governing law provision, stating that an arbitration panel "shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law. Article
1131(1) is the general governing law provision, stating that an arbitration panel "shall decide the issues
in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law "); see also
supra notes 133 and 135 (discussing those organizations). Currently, of the NAFTA Parties only the
United States is a signatory to the ICSID. ICSID Website, supra note 135. As Jones notes, "[tiherefore,
and arbitration claim brought by an American investor against either Canada or Mexico would need to
be governed by either ICSID's Additional Faculty Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules. Jones, supra note
184, at 534. Jones also mentions that the number of Chapter 11 arbitrations governed by UNCITRAL
or the ICSID thus far have been about equal. Id.
187 NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts. 1128, 1129, 1133. ("On written notice to the disputing parties,
a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on question of interpretation" of NAFTA. Additionally,
there are provisions for submissions by expert witnesses); Jones, supra note 184, at 536, (commenting
that the arbitration panel has "a great deal of discretion in determining the timing and manner of third
party submissions that will be allowed").
188. NAFTA, supra note 10, at arts 1134-1135; Jones, supra note 184, at 536 (decisions are made
on a majority vote basis).
189. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1134.
190. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1133 (a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal has no authority to require
a NAFTA Party to change its laws).
191. Id. at art. 1135(1) (thus Chapter 11 arbitral have no precedential value. However, tribunals
often look to previous awards for some guidance); see Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 727 (no
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the enforcement of an award m its territory."'192 In order to effect enforcement of
an award, an investor "may seek enforcement of an arbitration award under the
ICSID Convention, the New York Convention or the Inter-American
Convention ,193 Additionally, if a NAFTA Party does not comply with an
arbitral award, the Party of the investor may temporarily suspend extension of
NAFTA benefits to the non-compliant Party under Chapter 20.'94 It is important to
note also that a losing NAFTA Party may bring an action in the country where the
arbitration decision was rendered to have that decision modified or vacated. 95
However, there is no official process for appellate review of Chapter 11
arbitrations. i96
C. Arbitrations against Mexico
At the time of this writing, there have been nine instances when private
investors have invoked the NAFTA Chapter 1 1 dispute resolution mechanism
against Mexico. 197 Arbitral tribunals have made four final awards m arbitrations
involving Mexico so far, one of which is again pending after the claimants
resubmitted their claim.9S This discussion focuses on the first four final arbitral
awards involving Mexico. All of the claims filed against the United States and
Canada have been brought by private investors m those countries-none have been
brought by an investor or enterprise based m Mexico against the United States or
Canada.
199
1. Azintan v. United Mexican States
200
In late 1993, Naucalpan, a suburb of Mexico City, entered into a multi-year
pagination electronic version).
192. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(4).
193. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(6); ICSID Website, supra note 137 (the United States is
the only NAFTA Party that is signatory to the ICSID Convention); SICE, Inventory, supra note 2
(both the United States and Mexico are signatones to the Inter-Amencan Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration); UNCITRAL Website, supra note 133 (all three NAFTA Parties, however, are
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention). Thus, for example, a NAFTA investor who is successful in Chapter
11 arbitration against Mexico may seek to have the award enforced in Mexico pursuant to the New
York Convention or the Inter-Amencan Convention).
194. Price, Overview, supra note 70, at 735.
195. Jones, supra note 184, at 536.
196. See generally NAFTA, supra note 10; see infra Part IV.B.
197 U.S. Department of State, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/ (last visited June 12, 2003) [hereinafter
"State Department Website"] (for an official listing of the pending arbitrations and accessible
documents related thereto); Todd Weiler, NAFTALAW.ORG, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter "Weiler Website"].
198. Weiler Website, supra note 198 (look at "Mexico" under the Dispute link).
199. State Department Website, supra note 198; Weiler Website, supra note 198 (for a list,
background discussion, and links to documents for such arbitrations).
200. Azntan & Davitian & Baca v. Mex., Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), available at
Weiler Website, supra note 198 [hereinafter Azinian Award"]; see generally Robert Paterson, supra
note 126, at 110 (discussing the Aziman Award in detail).
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waste-management contract with Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan S.A. de C.V
("DESONA"), a Mexican corporation that had some U.S. citizen shareholders.20'
From the beginning of its operations, DESONA did not perform according to its
contract obligations. 2° 2  The Ayuntamiento of Naucalpan, dissatisfied with
DESONA's performance, annulled the contract four months after DESONA began
operations, and the State Administrative Tribunal upheld the annulment.0 3 On
appeal, the Superior Chamber of the Administrative Tribunal affirmed, finding
nine "irregularities" by DESONA relating to the contract. 204 DESONA then filed
an action in amparo in the Federal Circuit Court, and that court upheld the
Administrative Tribunal's rulings.205
In 1997 two years after the Circuit Court's ruling, Azinian and other U.S.
shareholders filed a claim in arbitration against Mexico under Chapter 11, arguing
that the Ayuntamiento's cancellation of the waste-management contract was a
breach of the provisions on expropriation and minimum standard of treatment.20 6
The claimants requested damages in an average amount of $16 million plus various
costs and interest.20 7 The arbitral tribunal noted that, as a threshold issue, it first
had to determine whether it had competence to review the dispute.208 Indeed, the
tribunal candidly asserted that "[i]t is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may
be disappointed in their dealings with public authorities, and disappointed yet
again when national courts reject their complaints. NAFTA was not intended to
provide foreign investors with blanket protection from this kind of
disappointment ,,209 Thus, an investor cannot use Chapter 11 arbitration
simply as a forum within which to argue disapproval of government actions or
domestic court decisions with respect to the investor's business dealings in a
NAFTA Party 210
The tribunal found that the claimants had satisfied the notice and waiver
201. Aziman Award, supra note 201, 9 1-9.
202. Id. 10. Specifically, DESONA did not operate with proper or sufficient equipment necessary
to conduct the waste-management services as called for by the contract. Id.
203. Id. IN117-20 ("Ayuntamiento" translates to city or local government).
204. Id. 21.
205. Id. 22 (the Mexican amparo is a legal action whereby an alleged injured party may challenge
judicial decisions and administrative acts, seek protection of constitutional rights, and challenge the
constitutionality of law); see generally Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of
Amparo, 9 CAL. W INT'L L.J. 306 (1979) and KENNETH KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. A CASEBOOK 127-60 (1975) (for more discussion on the Mexican
amparo).
206. Azinian Award, supra note 201, 24, 75.
207. Id. 75.
208. Id. 35. The panel explained:
Arbitral junsdiction under Section B is limited not only as to the persons who may
invoke it (they must be nationals of a State signatory to NAFTA), but also as to subject
matter: claims may not be submitted to investor-state arbitration under Chapter Eleven
unless they are founded upon the violation of an obligation established in Section A.
Id. 82.
209. Id. 83.
210. Id. 84.
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requirements under Chapter 11 arbitration, 2 11 but ultimately ruled that the
claimants did not have a valid claim under Chapter 11.212 The panel had particular
difficulty with the way m which the claimants argued their case. Specifically the
complaint averred, at base, that the Ayuntamiento's actions were a breach of
contract.21 3 The tribunal explained that "NAFTA cannot possibly be read to
create a regime, which would have elevated a multitude of ordinary
transactions with public authorities into potential international disputes. 21 4 The
critical issue was therefore whether the Ayuntamiento's annulment of the contract
violated the Article 1110 provisions regarding expropriation; 215 or in other words,
whether the alleged breach of contract was an expropriation.
The tribunal summarized the problem in 4zinian as follows:
The Ayuntamento believed it had grounds for holding the Concession Contract to
be invalid under Mexican law governing public service concessions. At
DESONA's initiative, these grounds were tested by three levels of Mexican
courts, and in each case were found to be extant. How can it be said that Mexico
breached NAFTA when the Ayunatrmento of Naucalpan purported to declare the
invalidity of a Concession Contract which by its terms was subject to Mexican
law, and to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts, and the courts of Mexico then
agreed with the Ayuntamento's determination?
216
Thus, claimants had to prove that the decisions of the Mexican courts breached
Chapter 11, which, although theoretically possible according to the tribunal, was
not even argued by claimants.2 17
The tribunal also discussed at length the circumstances surrounding the status
of the investors themselves. It found that the claimants mislead the Ayuntamiento
with regard to their background in the waste-management business, the availability
of capital to effect contract performance and the viability of the long-term aims of
the waste-management services. 2'8 Indeed, the tribunal found that claimants were
211. Id. 136.
212. Id. 35, 128.
213. Id. 87
214. Id.
215. Id. 91.
216. Id. 96.
217. Id. 9 97, 100. The panel explained that international arbitral panels can be called upon to
assess the validity of judicial decisions with regard to international law and treaty obligations. Id.
98-99. Given that the claimants in Azntan did not allege misconduct by the Mexican courts, the panel
concluded "[lor if there is no complaint against a determination by a competent court that a contract
governed by Mexican law was invalid under Mexican law, there is by definition no contract to be
expropriated. Id. 100. Further, finding no violation of Article 1110, the panel dismissed fortiort
claimants' Article 1105 claim. Id. 92.
Paterson notes that "[t]he ruling of the tribunal in the Aziman case is characterized by
complete absence of any discussion of the meaning of Anicle 1110. Robert Paterson, supra note 126,
at 116. He notes that the panel's analysis indicates that it did not consider whether the annulment itself
violated Article I 10, but rather focused on the decisions of the Mexican courts. Id. Nonetheless,
Paterson admits that Azinian stands for "effective use of Chapter II to resolve claim that was clearly
found unpersuasive on its merits. Id. at 118.
218. Aziman Award, supra note 201, 9 29-33, 105. The panel also noted various facts regarding
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not "an inherently plausible group of investors., 2 19 Azinian, therefore, is important
for Mexico, and all NAFTA Parties, in that it demonstrates that (1) investors may
not use Chapter 11 as a means of resolving normal business disputes; (2) such
investors may not use Chapter II to eviscerate domestic court rulings regarding
such disputes, and; (3) a Chapter 11 tribunal will scrutinize the plausibility of an
investor and the soundness of an investment when deciding whether the investor
should prevail in a Chapter 11 claim. 220
2. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States22 '
In 1998, Waste Management, Inc. (formerly USA Waste Services, Inc.), a
U.S. corporation, filed a Chapter 11 arbitration clami against Mexico on behalf of
itself and its Mexican subsidiary, Acaverde, S.A. de C.V 222 The claimants alleged
that Mexico, through the actions of the municipality of Acapulco, the State of
Guerrero and Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios POblicos, S.N.C.
("BANOBRAS"), violated Articles 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA.2  In its Notice of
Arbitration, Waste Management averred that Acapulco did not treat Acaverde
according to international standards as required by Article 1105 by failing to make
full payment to Acaverde for services performed under a long-term waste-
management contract and then transfemng Acaverde's contract rights to a third
party 224 Claimants then argued that Acapulco's default on payment was unlawful
expropriation as per Article 1110, as such nonperformance "rendered worthless
Claimants' rights acquired and investments made under the concession" and
"effectively extinguished Acaverde's viability as an enterpnse."2' 5 Waste
Management claimed $60 million in damages plus interest.2 2
6
one of the claimant-investor's business record which clearly indicated a pattern of questionable
conduct. Id. 121.
219. Id. 29.
220. Despite its final ruling, the tribunal did not award costs to Mexico, which it could have done
under Chapter 11. Id. IN 125-26; NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1135(1). Several factors dissuaded the
tribunal from awarding costs, one of which was the fact that the Chapter II mechanism was "a new and
novel mechanism for the resolution of international investment disputes. Aziman Award, supra note
201, 126. Indeed, Aziman was the first investor-state arbitration decided under NAFTA. Id. 79.
221. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 2000 Case No. ARB
(AF)/98/2 (Jun. 2), availabl at http//www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/waste award.pdf [hereinafter
"Waste Management I Award"]. See also William S. Dodge, International Decision: Waste
Management, Inc. v. Mexico, 95 AJ.I.L. 186 (2001) [hereinafter "Dodge, Waste Management"], and
Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management, Inc. v. United
Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirement for Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA,
69 FoRDHlAM L. REv. 2655 (2001) (both discussing the first Waste Management arbitration award in
detail).
222. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, 1.
223. Id.
224. ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility), Notice of Institution ofArbitration Proceedings, Sep.
29, 1998, USA Waste Services, Inc. and Acaverde, S.A. de C.V v. United Mexican States, available at
http://state.gov/documents/organization/3999.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004).
225. id.
226. Id.
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The arbitral award centered on whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to
resolve the dispute, or more specifically, whether claunants followed the proper
waiver requirements set out m Article 1121.227 Under that article, claimant was
required to waive its right to litigate in Mexican courts the claims it brought before
the tribunal. 22' The claimants submitted a waiver with an exception that such
waiver did not bar them from seeking relief against the government entities and
BANOBRAS for alleged violations of Mexican law other than the alleged
violations of NAFTA.229 Mexico contested this waiver and thus the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal.23 °
In fact, subsequent to filing the Chapter 11 arbitration, Acaverde pursued two
pending clains against BANOBRAS in Mexican courts for breach of a letter of
credit until Acaverde lost both claims at the appellate level in March and October
of 1999 2 Acaverde also filed a claim in arbitration against Acapulco in October
of 1998, one month after the Chapter 11 arbitration was filed, from which it did not
withdraw until July 1999 232 The arbitration tribunal ultimately found that
claimants did not comply with Article 1121, and dismissed the claim for want of
jurisdiction.233
In holding that compliance with the waiver requirements of Article 1121 was
a "condition precedent" to the arbitration, the tribunal stated that it had to
determine whether claimants submitted "the waiver in accordance with the
formalities envisaged under NAFTA and whether it has respected the terms of
same through the material act of either dropping or desisting from initiating
parallel proceedings before other courts or tribunals." 2 4  Although claimants
satisfied the formal requirements of Article 1121, they failed to comply materially
with that article.235  Acaverde pursued other legal action with respect to the
conduct of Acapulco and BANOBRAS for more than a year after it filed for
Chapter 1 arbitration.236 Notably, the tribunal summarized:
In effect, it is possible to consider that proceedings instituted in a national forum
may exist which do not relate to those measures alleged to be in violation of the
NAFTA by a member state of the NAFTA, in which case it would be feasible that
such proceedings could coexist simultaneously with an arbitration proceeding
under the NAFTA. However, when both legal actions have a legal basis derived
from the same measures, they can no longer continue simultaneously in light of
227. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, 7, 17
228. Id; NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 1120-1122.
229. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, 5.
230. ld. 6.
231. Id. 925.
232. Id.
233. Id. 3 1. Interestingly, the tribunal rejected Mexico's argument that the arbitral tribunal must,
as one of its duties emanating from Article 1121, notify domestic tribunals of disputing investor's
waiver. Id. 15. It held that such a task is that of the Mexican government, as the tribunal does not
have the authority to preclude a disputing investor from litigating in other fora. Id.
234. Id. 920.
235. Id. 923-24.
236. Id.931.
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the imminent risk that the Claimant may obtain the double benefit in its claim for
damages. This is precisely what NAFTA Article 1121 seeks to avoid.
237
Thus, Article 1121 is clear in that it prohibits a tribunal from entertaining
jurisdiction over the dispute given that Acaverde maintained what were essentially
duplicate proceedings in Mexican courts.238
In September of 2000, Waste Management re-filed for Chapter 11
239
arbitration. Mexico again contested the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal,
arguing that claimants' first unsuccessful attempt at Chapter 11 arbitration barred
them from resubmitting their case to another Chapter 11 panel.240 The first
tribunal did not indicate whether its decision was res judicata as to claimants' re-
filing of its Chapter 11 claims. 241 The second tribunal posited that the issue of its
jurisdiction over the resubmitted claim depended on "what amounts to a
submission of a claim within the meaning of Article 1121 .,,242
It found that Article 1121 contemplates a submission of a claim for
adjudication on the merits, ' '243 and therefore even if Chapter 11 envisaged that
investors have one opportunity to submit a claim for arbitration, a claim that is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for failure to comply with Article 1121 waiver
237. Id. 927.
238. In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Highet argued that claimants did not violate the waiver
requirements, and that the panel had jurisdiction. Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, (U.S. v. Mex.),
Dissenting Opinion, 2000 Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Jun. 2) 39, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/wastediss.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004). He argued that the
Article 1121 waiver requirements should not be read strictly, and also should not be read to include
"that litigations subject to the waiver be affirmatively withdrawn, that no further litigation be instituted,
and that no appeals be conducted. Id. 32. Mr. Highet posited that Chapter I I is not explicit to the
termination of such litigation in light of pending Chapter I I arbitration, as Annex 1120.1 already bars
investors from simultaneously pursuing remedy for expropnation and violation of international law
under Chapter II arbitration and through litigation in Mexican courts. Id. IN 34, 38. Here, claimants'
actions in Mexican tribunals were based on different causes of action than their claims under Chapter
11, and therefore their continued litigation in Mexican courts should not have prevented the panel from
asserting jurisdiction over the claim. Id. 39. Even more, for Mr. Highet, the question of whether
claimants' waiver is valid should go to the admissibility of particular claim rather than to the
jurisdiction of the panel, because the majority's interpretation presents "drastically preclusive effect.
Id. . 56, 9. See also Dodge, Waste Management, supra note 224, at 188. Dodge notes that Mr.
Highet believed "the purpose of Article 1121 was not to bar local remedies for related commercial
claims, but to protect the NAFTA parties from 'parallel actions in their own judicial systems that would
raise NAFTA claims."' Id. Dodge, nonetheless, agrees with the majority's opinion in that claimants
did not comply with the waiver requirements. Id. at 189. He also adds that an investor has three years
to seek remedy from domestic courts before filing for Chapter II arbitration. Id. at 190.
239. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, (U.S. v. Mex.), Award on Jurisdiction,
2002 Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Jun. 26) 1, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/12244.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter "Waste Management II Jurisdiction
Decision"].
240. Id. 9 3. Indeed, Mexico interpreted NAFTA Article 1121 to mean that "an election under that
provision is irrevocable and allows Claimant a single opportunity to vindicate its NAFTA claim
before a Chapter II tribunal. Id. 17
241. Id. $$ 20, 22.
242. Id. 32.
243. Id. 34.
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requirements would still not bar a claimant's resubmission. 24 4 Also, none of the
Mexican tribunals m which Acaverde brought actions entertained claimants'
NAFTA claims,245 and further, under international law "if the jurisdictional flaw
can be corrected, there is m prnciple no objection" to allowing a disputing party
the opportunity to resubmit its claim.' , 246 The arbitral tribunal therefore held that
neither NAFTA nor international law precluded claimants from resubmitting their
case before a Chapter 11 panel. 247  Moreover, the tribunal did not find that
claimants abused process in submitting their claims for arbitration under NAFTA,
and therefore could proceed.248 The tribunal has not yet made a final ruling on the
merits.
3. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States24 9
In 1996, Metalclad (a U.S. corporation) filed for arbitration under Chapter 11
on behalf of Confmamiento Tdcnico de Residuos Insdustriales ("COTERIN"), a
Mexican waste disposal company wholly-owned by Metalclad's wholly-owned
U.S. subsidiary, Eco-Metalclad Corporation ("ECO").25 0 In 1993, Metalclad had
acquired COTERIN via a purchase-option agreement on the basis that COTERIN
had obtained all necessary permits from Mexican authorities to operate a
hazardous waste landfill in Guadalcazar, State of San Luis Potos. 251 Pursuant to
federal and state construction permits and under the assumption that the State of
San Luis Potosi approved of the project, Metalclad began construction of a landfill
in May of 1994 and continued work until October of 1994, when Guadalcazar
ordered Metalclad to stop construction because Metalclad did not have a
construction permit from that city.25 2  Metalclad resumed construction in
November of 1994 after federal officials informed it that its city permit application
would be granted "as a matter of course.
'
,2
3
Both a study conducted by the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi as
244. Id. 33.
245. Id. T 35.
246. Id. 936.
247. Id. 37. The tribunal stated that "there is no doubt that, in general, the dismissal of a claim by
an international tribunal on grounds of lack of jurisdiction does not constitute decision on the merits
and does not preclude a later claim before a tribunal which has jurisdiction. Id. 43. Thus Mexico's
argument that the first tribunal's decision was resjudicata as to the merits of claimants' action failed.
Id.
248. Id. 48-50. The claimants were "open" in the prior proceedings and did not act in "bad
faith" so to give the tribunal reason to reject the resubmission. Id.
249. Metalclad Corp. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30,
2000), available at State Department Website, supra note 203 [hereinafter "Metalclad Award"]. See
Pearce & Coe, supra note 137, at 35 (discussing the arbitral tribunal phase of Metalclad in detail);
William S. Dodge, International Decision: Metalcad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 A.J.I.L. 910 (2001)
[hereinafter "Dodge, Metalclad"] (discussing all phases of Metalc/ad); Brower II, supra note 13, at 51-
69 (same).
250. Metalclad Award, supra note 250, In 1-2.
251. ld. 935-36.
252. Id. 38-40,78.
253. Id. 9941-42.
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well as an audit by the Mexican Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of the
Environment confirmed the suitability of Metalclad's project, and Metalclad
completed construction in March of 1995.254 Protestors m Guadalcazar, however,
prevented the landfill operation from commencing.25 5 Metalclad thereafter entered
into extensive negotiations with independent federal agencies, the result of which
was a detailed agreement ("Convenio") permitting operation of the landfill in
exchange for several concessions on the part of Metalclad. 25 6 The State of San
Luis Potosi denounced the Convemo, and Guadalcazar officially denied
Metalclad's construction permit.
257
In 1996, Guadalcazar obtained an order from a Mexican court enjoining
Metalclad's operation of the landfill.258 Negotiations to resolve the matter failed,
prompting Metalclad to file a claim against Mexico under Chapter 11 m January of
1997 259 Metalclad alleged breaches of Articles 1105 and 1110260 and requested
more than $43 million in damages.26' In September of 1997 just before leaving
office, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued an ecological decree declaring the
area encompassing the landfill an environmentally protected zone "for the
protection of rare cactus" found m the area.262
The arbitral tribunal first ruled that Mexico violated NAFTA Article 1105 in
its treatment of Metalclad.263 It stated that "[p]romment in the statement of
principles and rules that introduces [NAFTA] is the reference to
'transparency' referring that the principle of transparency thus extends to a
NAFTA Party's obligations under Chapter 1 1-type investment. 264 The tribunal
noted that at all times Metalclad operated construction of the landfill with
reassurance from federal authorities that it did not need approval from Guadalcazar
for the project.265 Consequently, the tribunal held:
The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or
procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction
permit, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency
254. Id. In 44-45.
255. Id. 146.
256. Id. 1 47-48. Metalclad agreed to correct certain "deficiencies" existing at the landfill site, to
set aside a significant portion of its land for animal conservation purposes, to provide free medical
advice to citizens of Guadalcazar, to give employment and training preferences to citizens of
Guadalcazar, to give the city a discount for disposal of the city's hazardous waste and to consult with
citizens and government authorities regarding issues arising from the operation of the landfill. Id. 1 48.
257. Id. T 56.
258. Id. Guadalcavar's case was dismissed and the injunction was lifted, but not until May of 1999.
Id.
259. Id. 158.
260. Id. 172.
261. Id. $T 114-16.
262. Id. 159.
263. Id. 74.
264. Id. 76.
265. Id. 85-87.
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required by NAFTA.
266
The tribunal pointed out that Guadalcazar denied Metalclad's permit after
negotiation of the Convenio when construction was basically completed, and did
not notify Metalclad of the denial proceedings or afford Metalclad an opportunity
to be heard at those proceedings. 267  Metalclad was thus not given fair and
equitable treatment in accordance with international law standards imposed on
Mexico under in Chapter 11.268
According to the tribunal, it followed that Mexico violated Article 1 110
through "indirect expropriation" of Metalclad's investment by allowing
Guadalcazar to prevent operation of the landfill.269 In other words, Mexico's
actions were "tantamount to expropriation," in violation of Chapter 11.270 Further,
the tribunal found that, although such a ruling was not necessary, the Governor's
ecological decree covering Metalclad's land was itself "an act tantamount to
expropriation." 27 1 The tribunal then took into account a number of factors in
assessing damages. It noted that Metalclad had been deprived of its entire
investment, and assessed damages in the amount of the clairmant's actual
investment in the landfill operation.272
This assessment did not include future projected earnings, which Metalcad
demanded.273  The tribunal based its determination of "fair market value" on its
analysis of prior international arbitration investment disputes.274 In the end,
Metalclad was awarded almost $16.7 million in damages plus legal interest at a
monthly rate of six percent.275
Thereafter, Mexico filed a petition with the Supreme Court of British
Columbia asking the court to set aside the award. 276 Chapter 11 prohibits final
266. Id. 88. The tribunal found that under Mexican law, the federal government has authority
over projects for managing hazardous waste regardless of whether Metalclad needed approval from
Guadalcazar. Id. 9 82-86.
267. Id. 90-91. The tribunal further found that the permit denial "was denied without any
consideration of, or specific reference to, construction aspects or flaws of the physical facility. Id.
93. Moreover, the tribunal gave weight to the Conveno in holding that the project was not violative of
environmental concerns. Id. 9 98.
268. Id. 99-101.
269. Id. 9 104-07. The tribunal explained what "expropriation" means under Chapter Ii:
[E]xpropnation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged
takings of property but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the
obvious benefit of the host State.
Id. 103.
270. Id. 104.
271. Id. II11.
272. Id. 99 113-22.
273. Id. 122.
274. Id.
275. Id.9 131.
276. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 644, [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359,
available at: www.naftaclaims.com (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter "Metalclad"].
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enforcement of an arbitral tribunal's award until "a court has dismissed or allowed
an application to revise, set aside or annul the award. 277 There is, of course, no
provision in NAFTA for appealing Chapter 11 arbitrations, but nothing m NAFTA
prevents Mexico from proceeding as it did. In determining what law it should
apply, the court reasoned that the International Commercial Arbitration Act was
applicable, given the international commercial nature of the investment dispute m
the Metalclad arbitration.278 The British Columbia court then noted that that Act
permitted the court to set aside the arbitration award only if the arbitral tribunal
decided issues outside the scope of the arbitration or if the award was against the
public policy of British Columbia.279
Under that standard of review, the court first dealt with the Article 1105
claim. It held that the minimum standard of treatment principle set forth in that
article is based on "customary international law," "developed by common practices
of countries, and is not based on "conventional international law which is
comprised of treaties ,,280 The court thus rejected the arbitral tribunal's finding
that Mexico violated Article 1105 based on lack of transparency, as "[n]o authority
was cited or evidence introduced to establish that transparency has become a part
of customary international law. ' , 2si The court then held that the tribunal's Article
1105 ruling "infected its analysis of Article 1110.,,282 Because the tribunal held
that Mexico's actions were "tantamount to expropriation" due in part to the
tribunal's flawed analysis regarding transparency, the court ruled that the tribunal
acted outside the scope of its mandate m ruling that Mexico violated Article
1110.283
At the end of the day, however, Metalclad prevailed. The court upheld the
tribunal's finding that the Governor's ecological decree was itself tantamount to
expropriation.28 It noted that the tribunal's broad definition of expropriation was a
question of law that the court could not review, and that the tribunal's finding of
expropriation based on the ecological decree was separate from its other flawed
findings and within its scope of review. 285 The court then dismissed Mexico's
arguments that Metalclad had acted improperly and against the public policy of
British Columbia by allegedly engaging in corruption, bribery and fraud m
277. NAFTA, supra note 10, at art 1136(b)(3)(ii). The British Columbia Court noted that neither
party contested the jurisdiction of the court given that the arbitration to place in Vancouver. Metalclad,
supra note 277, 39; see also Dodge, Metalclad, supra note 250, at 914-15 (discussing the Canadian
court's decision, noting that Mexico filed its suit in British Columbia because that is where the
arbitration took place).
278. Metalclad, supra note 277, 9 39-49.
279. Id. 50.
280. Id. 62.
281. Id. 68. The court found that the arbitral tribunal wrongly stated the applicable law in
inferring the requirement of transparency in NAFTA, and thus decided a matter outside the scope of its
mandate. Id. 7 70-74.
282. Id. 78.
283. Id. 979.
284. Id. 92.
285. Id. 9 94-99.
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pursuing its Chapter 11 claim.28 6
Mexico also argued that the award should be set aside on grounds that the
arbitral tribunal did not address all of Mexico's arguments.28 7 This argument was
also rejected, as the court found that the tribunal "adequately dealt with the
principle issues before it" and thus did not impair Mexico's case to warrant setting
aside the award.288 Lastly, the court modified Metalclad's damages according to
its holding, reducing the amount of interest Mexico owed on the award by fixing
the date of interest due on the award from the date of the ecological decree in
1997 rather than in 1995.289
4. Feldman v. United Mexican States
29°
Feldman differs significantly from the other Chapter 11 arbitrations discussed
thus far. It raised a variety of complex jurisdictional questions before the tribunal
could rule on the merits. Its complexity and in some instances incomplete factual
286. Id. M 106-118. The court found no evidence indicating such corruption or impropriety and
confirmed the findings of the arbitral tribunal with respect to those issues. Id.
287. Id. 119.
288. Id. 9 130.
289. Id. 137 The court also ordered Metalclad to pay seventy-five percent of Mexico's court
costs because Mexico prevailed in having the court set aside two of the tribunal's findings. Id.
Interestingly, Dodge makes the following observation regarding Metalclad:
One often thinks of courts as being concerned with setting precedents to guide future
conduct, and of arbitrators as being both less concerned with the content of the law and
more willing to fashion compromises to satisfy the parties. In Metalclad, however, those
roles were reversed. The arbitral tribunal tried hard to advance international law
concerning foreign investment by finding that "fair and equitable treatment" required
transparency and by adopting an expansive definition of expropriation. It was Justice
Tyson who gave each party what it wanted most-setting aside for Mexico the
transparency aspects of the award, while giving Metalclad most of its money More
broadly, the case may lead one to wonder whether it is appropriate to allow national
courts to review Chapter 11 awards.
Dodge, Metalclad, supra note 250, at 915-16.
Dodge goes on to argue that the Metalclad proceedings demonstrate the need for NAFTA Parties to
create an appellate body for Chapter II arbitrations. Id. at 918-19.
Interestingly, the court did not rule explicitly on whether Mexico had breached Articles 1105
and 1110, and held that Metalclad had the option of resubmitting its claims to the arbitral tribunal
regarding those issues, excluding any arguments regarding Mexico's alleged lack of transparency. Id. 9
136. In a supplemental decision, the Supreme Court of British Columbia confirmed its ruling to permit
Metaclad to resubmit certain claims to arbitration, and the court postponed its own adjournment until
the arbitral tribunal could rule on those claims in resubmission. United Mexican States v. Metalelad,
2001 BCSC 1529, 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169, 41 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 298, 18-19 (Sup. Ct. Brit. Col. 2001)
(additional reasons to (2001) 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (B.C.S.C.)). Mexico appealed the court's decision
not to set aside the award in whole. Id. 9. However, soon thereafter it abandoned its appeal. Mexico
v. Metalclad Corp., Notice of Abandonment of Appeal, Oct. 30, 2001, Case No. CA028568, Doe. No.
L002904, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited May 1, 2004).
290. Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Final Award
(Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/I/c375 l.htm (last visited May 1, 2004) [hereinafter
"Feldman Award"]
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history291 also provide for a rather lengthy opinion. In April of 1999 Mr. Feldman
(a U.S. investor) filed a claim m arbitration against Mexico on behalf of his
Mexican corporation, Corporact6n de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V
("CEMSA"), which was a reseller/exporter of cigarettes produced m Mexico. 292
Mr. Feldman based his clami on Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110,293 requesting 475
million pesos ($50 million) in damages. 29
4
The dispute involved CEMSA's tremulous relations with the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit ("SHCP"). Mexico's tax laws Imposed a zero percent
tax rate on the resale of cigarettes produced in Mexico sold as exports as well as
granted rebates on the initial taxes the resellers/exporters paid to Mexican
producers or retailers, as long as the resellers met certain invoice requirements.
295
In essence, Mr. Feldman's claim arose from SHCP's refusal to rebate excise taxes
paid by CEMSA on its exported cigarettes, and SHCP's later denial of CEMSA's
export registration license.2 6
In fact, legal action between CEMSA and SHCP began before NAFTA even
took effect.297 CEMSA received rebates from 1990-91, but in 1991 the Mexican
Congress amended the tax laws to deny the rebates and the zero percent tax rate for
resellers of cigarettes.298 CEMSA then filed an Amparo petition in a Mexican
court challenging the validity of the legislation,29 later winning on appeal m
1993.30 In that same year, however, SHCP "shut down" CEMSA's exports on
grounds that CEMSA could not provide separate, itemized invoices of domestic
taxes paid on cigarettes as required by Mexican law, even though it was impossible
for it to comply with the invoice requirement.3 °' SHCP soon after agreed to allow
CEMSA to export cigarettes at the zero percent tax rate, but refused to give it the
rebates.30 2 In 1996 and 1997 however, SHCP paid rebates to CEMSA despite the
fact that CEMSA could not produce the required invoices. 0 3
At the end of 1997 SHCP stopped rebate payments to CEMSA, and in 1998
Congress amended the tax laws, establishing that only "first-sale" retailers could
receive the rebates and that resellers had to register with the SHCP m order to get
the zero percent tax rate on cigarette exports.3 °4 SHCP then denied CEMSA's
registration request and demanded CEMSA to pay some $25 million in rebates that
291. Id. 96.
292. Id. 1 .
293. Id.
294. Id. 24.
295. Id. 7.
296. Id. 997-21.
297. Id. I 11-26.
298. Id. I 9-10.
299. Id. I. CEMSA also filed a criminal complaint against certain SHCP officials alleging
abuse of authority and conspiracy in refusing rebates. Id.
300. Id. 916.
301. Id. 14. CEMSA could not comply with the invoice requirements because it did not have
access to the itemized invoices as a reseller-only producers had access to those invoices. Id. 15.
302. Id. 917
303. Id. 7I 19-20.
304. Id. 21.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
it had received.3 °5 CEMSA then filed an action in a Mexican court to stop SHCP
from assessing criminal sanctions on it.306 That case was still pending at the time
of the arbitration.3 °7
The arbitral tribunal first ruled on several preliminary jurisdictional issues. It
ruled that Mr. Feldman did have standing to bring the claun under Chapter 11 as a
U.S. citizen, even though he was a permanent resident of Mexico. 30 8 It also held
that the three-year time limit on Chapter 11 claims began to run in 1996 when
CEMSA experienced obstacles from the SHCP and therefore claimants'
arguments for relief from Mexico's action prior to 1996 were barred from
constderation.'0 9 Perhaps most interestingly, the tribunal held that it only had
jurisdiction to resolve the disputed matters insofar as they related to measures or
actions taken by Mexico after NAFTA became effective in 1994.3i0
The tribunal had jurisdiction despite CEMSA's pending action in a Mexican
court (regarding SHCP's claim for reimbursement of rebates). 3 " This was
because (1) Mexican law required CEMSA to respond in litigation to SHCP's
demand, and (2) CEMSA had since requested a termination of that litigation,
leaving Chapter 11 arbitration as its only real opportunity for remedy 312 The
tribunal also held that Mexico was estopped from arguing that CEMSA was not
entitled to rebates from 1996-97 for not complying with the invoice requirements,
precisely because SHCP had paid CEMSA despite the noncompliance and because
CEMSA could not possibly have complied.31 3 The arbitral tribunal conceded that
under Chapter 1 's broad investment protection framework, it is difficult to
determine whether certain government actions are "tantamount to
expropriation. ' 's t The tribunal concluded, in taking a variety of facts together as a
305. Id. 21-22.
306. Id. 22. Before that decision, however, Congress amended the challenged law to allow
resellers like CEMSA the rebates and favorable export tax rates. Id. 12-13.
307. Id.
308. Id. 48.
309. Id. 49. The tribunal rejected CEMSA's claim that the three-year time period should be tolled
so to include rebates that CEMSA did not get in the early 1990s. Id. 7 58.
310. Id. 51.
311. Id. % 67-68.
312. Id. T68.
313. Id. 59. The tribunal found reasoning for this in both Mexican law and international law, and
further proffered that "[t]he doctrine of estoppel, based on the fundamental legal interest in
predictability, reliance and consistency, is particularly important in the context of NAFTA, regime
designed to protect and promote trade and investment among the parties Id. 60.
314. Id. 100-101. The tribunal noted that "tax measures, even if they are designed to and have
the effect of an expropriation, will be indirect, with an effect that may be tantamount to expropriation.
Id. 101. Further, the issue of whether such regulatory measures are expropriation is a fact-specific
inquiry. Id. 102. The tribunal summarized the thin line between domestic tax policy and Chapter II
obligations:
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental authorities may force
company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business,
are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or
necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others,
have been considered to be expropnatory actions. At the same time, governments must
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whole, that SHCP's denial of excise tax rebates to CEMSA was not "creeping
expropriation" In violation of Article 1110.' s The tribunal explained that,
although the claimant experienced "great difficulties" as a result of the
government's conduct, that conduct did not amount to a violation of Chapter 11 16
Also, the changes in tax laws adversely affecting claimant were found not to be
prohibited by Chapter 11, as NAFTA Parties have broad discretion over their
respective tax policies.
31 7
Further, NAFTA does not require Mexico to create a market for resellers like
CEMSA to export cigarettes, and in fact Mexico may have a legitimate public
policy reason for limiting such activity 318 The tribunal held that Mexico did not
destroy claimant's investment by refusing to pay CEMSA the excise tax rebates, as
CEMSA continued to generate profit through the benefit of the zero percent tax
rate on exports of its cigarettes. 319 CEMSA still has control of its business. 320 As
to claimant's Article 1105 claim, the tribunal noted that such a claim was not
directly available because the dispute involved a tax measure, and further, an
Article 1105 violation could not be Inferred here because there was no Article
be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new or
modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or
increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable
governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely
affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary international law
recognizes this
Id. 103.
315. Id. 110-111.
316. Id. 113. The tribunal cited Azinman in its discussion:
To paraphrase Azintan, not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or
impossible for an investor to carry out particular business, change in the law or change
in the application of existing laws thatmakes it uneconomical to continue a particular
business, is an expropriation under Article 1110.
Id. 112.
317. Id. 116. Additionally, the tribunal held that the 1993 Mexican court decision regarding the
unconstitutionality of the tax laws pertained only to CEMSA's ability to receive the zero percent tax
rate. Id. IM 120-128. Because CEMSA could not comply with the invoice requirements, it really never
had "right" to the rebates in the first place for purposes of complaining of expropriation. Id. The
tribunal also made reference to previous Chapter II arbitrations against Mexico in dismissing some of
claimant's arguments. It rejected claimant's argument that the lack of transparency in SHCP
procedures was grounds for a Chapter 11 violation, refermng specifically to the decision by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia in Metalclad. Id. 133. It also rejected claimant's argument that it had been
denied justice in Mexico. Id. 139. CEMSA had continued access to Mexican courts throughout the
1990s, and like the claimants in Azinian, claimants here made no argument that the decisions of the
Mexican courts violated NAFTA. Id. 139.
318. Id. 115-16.
319. id. 119. The Mexican law at issue required cigarette exporters to submit their paid taxes on
separate invoices so that tax authorities could determine amounts subject to rebate. Id. 15. CEMSA
did not do this because it was apparently impossible for it to do so because of the means by which it
purchased its cigarettes from first sellers. Id. 17. CEMSA argued that for several years SHCP
accepted this despite the technical flaw. Id. In 18-19. The tribunal did not find invalid the law
requiring the claimant to provide separate invoices for tax purposes invalid. Id. 129.
320. Id. 142.
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1110 violation.32'
In discussing CEMSA's Article 1102 claun, however, the tribunal reached a
different result. Under Chapter I I's national treatment requirement, the issue was
"whether rebates have in fact been provided for domestically owned cigarette
exporters while denied to a foreign re-seller, CEMSA[,]" because "Mexico is of
course entitled to strictly enforce its laws but it must do so in a non-discrinmmatory
manner, as between foreign investors and domestic mvestors. '" 322 The tribunal
found that other Mexican resellers of cigarettes had received rebates and did not
experience any problems with obtaining export licenses from SHCP even though
those resellers could not comply with the mvoice requirements for rebates.323 In
accordance with its reasoning regarding the Article 11 10 claim, the tribunal held
that different treatment of producers and resellers of cigarettes in Mexico does not
violate international law, because Mexico may have legitimate public policy
reasons for doing so.
324
However, Mexico violated Article 1102 when SHCP gave other similarly
situated domestic cigarette resellers rebates but denied the same rebates to
CEMSA, even though the domestic resellers could not comply with the invoice
requirements either-this was defacto discrimination according to the tribunal.32
Interestingly, the tribunal admitted that the evidence of discrimination was weak,
but ultimately decided that the claimant's argument carried the day because
Mexico was unable to refute the allegations with any tangible evidence.326 Thus,
in its lengthy analysis, the tribunal gave great deference to Mexico's authority over
its own tax policies, and found a violation under the national treatment standards
rather than under the expropriation provisions, which amounted to far less
damages.
In assessing damages, the tribunal reasoned that the drafters of NAFTA did
not provide much guidance for valuating damages other than a fair market value
standard for expropriation, signaling confidence in the fact that Chapter 11
tribunals are competent to make such a determination.327 The tribunal held that
321. Id. 1141.
322. Id. 169 (emphasis in original).
323. Id. 99 154.
324. Id. 135-36.
325. Id. 173, 184-88. The tribunal also pointed out that CEMSA was the only reseller that
SHCP audited, which further evinced discnimmatory treatment. Id. 9 174.
326. Id. IN 176, 186. Notably, the tribunal stated that "[tihe majority's view is based first on the
conclusion that the burden of proof was shifted from the Claimant to the Respondent, with the
Respondent then failing to meet its new burden, and on an assessment of the record as a whole. Id.
176.
One tribunal member, however, took an opposing viewpoint In his dissent, Mr. Bravo agreed
with the award except for the finding of discnmmation and hence violation of Article 1102. Marvin
Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/88/1, 1 1, Dissenting Opinion, ( Dec. 16,
2002). available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3751.htm (last visited May 1, 2004). Specifically, Mr.
Bravo argued that claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence that domestic resellers of cigarettes
received sporadic rebates like the claimants, and in fact read the record to indicate that domestic
resellers went through similar hurtles with the SHCP Id. 6.
327 Feldman Award, supra note 291, 194-98.
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claimant's damages for Mexico's Article 1102 breach should be for claimant's
"loss adequately connected with the breach. 3 28 Here, there was no expropriation
and claimant's argument for lost profits was not persuasive given its continued
operation; rather, the only issue regarding damages was the total amount of the
rebates wrongly withheld from CEMSA.329 The tribunal then awarded claimant
16.9 million pesos plus interest, and ordered each party to pay its own costs
because each party was successful in part. 30 The award was substantially less than
the 475 million pesos m damages that Mr. Feldman requested. Mexico
subsequently petitioned the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to set aside the
tribunal's award, however, the court denied the petition and ruled that the tribunal
did not act outside its scope.33'
At this point it should be clear that for Mexico Chapter I1 represents quite a
departure from its traditional approach to international law and investment, and
that the elaborate design of Chapter 11 presents, m the very least, an objective and
alternative approach to international law and foreign investment. 332 The question
that remains is whether Chapter 11 dispute resolution ultimately serves as a benefit
or as a detriment to Mexico.
IV CHAPTER 11 AND MEXICO: THREATENING SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY 9
The text of Chapter 11 and its application are the critical sources for testing
the validity of the concerns with Chapter 11, and then for addressing the real
implications for Mexico. This is a less abstract method of deciphering the reality
behind Chapter 11 dispute resolution, and it is a good way to emphasize the
purposes and positive implications of Chapter 11 for Mexico. Overall, this
analysis supports the argument that the broad concerns with Chapter 11 are
unfounded. Indeed, while a few concerns are noteworthy and while some critics m
the very least offer some pragmatic suggestions for possible reform, most of the
criticisms are unsubstantiated.333 Most Importantly, the following discussion also
illustrates how international law is a positive force in the governance of economic
integration in Mexaco as well as for Mexico's future participation in the
328. Id. 194.
329. Id. In 199-202.
330. Id. 205-08.
331. United Mexican States v. Karpa, [2003] CarswellOnt 4929 (Sup. Ct. Ont 2003) (Doc. No. 03-
CV-23500).
332. For more discussion on the intricacies of Chapter 11 arbitration, see Frederick M. Abbott, The
Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North
American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP L. REV. 303, 305 (2000); Justin Byrne, NAFTA
Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 415,422-23 (2000); Camp, supra note 5, at 86-7.
333. One NAFTA commentator candidly asserts that "[sbo much attention has been paid to the
phantoms and foibles of investor-state arbitration that its very purpose appears to have been overlooked
by both its opponents and the governments that originally agreed to its placement in the NAFTA.
Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law, 2 Bus. L.
Int'l 158 (2002), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
"Weiler, NAFTA Investment"].
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international political economy.
Concerns with Chapter II emanate, at base, from the fact that Chapter 11
provides for binding international arbitration for the resolution of investment
disputes between private investors and NAFTA Parties. Notably, the literature on
Chapter 1 1 illustrates the debate between critics and proponents of NAFTA
Chapter 11 in general, as applied to all NAFTA Parties.334 And, most of the
criticisms of Chapter II stem from two major general assertions: Chapter I I is a
threat to national sovereignty and is an abrogation of democracy 335 The most
often-cited arguments for this are that Chapter 11 promotes frivolous litigation and
permits disproportionate compensation, lacks an adequate award review process,
uses "secret" tribunals to reduce transparency, prevents legitimate governmental
regulation, and derogates from notions of equality and sustainable development.
336
With respect to Mexico, these concerns are summarized and dealt with below.
A. Frivolous Litigation and Disproportionate Compensation
One argument against Chapter 1 1 is that it opens up NAFTA Parties to
meritless, excessive litigation brought by market-hungry foreign corporations bent
on using direct access to control their piece of the market share m a NAFTA Party.
337 This i turn is costly for NAFTA Parties and acts as a check on the
governments' ability to regulate, which infringes upon national sovereignty and
principles of democratic governance.338  More than one commentator has
suggested that NAFTA Parties establish some sort of screening mechamsm, and
Jones has specifically stated that such a mechanism would be useful "to diminish
the ability of powerful U.S. companies to take advantage of a weaker Mexican
government and would provide a level playing field for private investors from all
three NAFTA countries. ' 339 Indeed, one would think that if the result of Chapter
11 has been to encourage finvolous lawsuits, Mexico would be experiencing the
brunt of those suits.
First, however, the text of Chapter 11 reveals that an investor must go through
various procedural requirements in order to utilize the Chapter 11 mechanism
against a NAFTA Party 340 These requirements on their face seem to dispel any
concern that Chapter 11 grants investors free, unconditional opportunities to bring
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Jones, supra note 184, at 545-46; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434; Public Citizen, "NAFTA
Chapter II Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy, available at http://www.citizen.org/
publicationslrelease.cfm?iD=7076 (last visited Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter "Public Citizen"]; Daniel M.
Price, NAFTA Chapter II Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve? 26 CAN.
U.S. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) [hereinafter "Price, Safety Valve"]; Ian Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken
Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223,226 (2001).
337. Jones, supra note 184, at 545-46; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434; Public Citizen, supra note
337; Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 8; Ian Laird, supra note 337, at 226.
338. See Jones, supra note 184, at 543.
339. Id. at 546; Byrne, supra note 333, at 434.
340. See supra notes 178-82.
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frivolous litigation against NAFTA Parties. Even more, the text encourages
dispute resolution through consultation and negotiation before the arbitration
provision is invoked.34 1 For Mexico, this promotes dialogue between a foreign
investor and Mexican authorities so that foreign investment can flourish in a
friendly environment, but in one that is politically acceptable to Mexican
authorities, who are ultimately responsible to their citizens. 42
Second, the facts also refute the criticism that Chapter 11 gives investors the
opportunity to bring frivolous actions against Mexico and take advantage of
Mexico's weaker economic status compared to its NAFTA counterparts. After
eight years of NAFTA, less than ten claims have been filed against Mexico.
343
There has been no evidence of an onslaught of U.S. or Canadian-based
corporations seekmg to use direct access dispute resolution as a means to trample
Mexico's legitimate governance and obtain a greater market share. This in and of
itself dispels the criticism that Chapter I 1 has encouraged frivolous litigation and
opens up Mexico to the mercy of litigious North American investors. The bottom
line here is that there has not been excessive use of Chapter 11 against Mexico.
Moreover, regarding those arbitrations that have proceeded against Mexico so far,
Chapter 11 tribunals have scrutinized investors' adherence to the various
jurisdictional requirements that must be met before an investor could proceed.
The tribunal's analysis in Azinian indicates that Chapter 11 is not to be
exploited by private investors. 3 " NAFTA Parties designed Chapter 11 for the
purpose of protecting and thus stimulating investment activity in order to achieve
greater economic integration. The tribunal's analysis lends direct support to the
competence of a Chapter 11 tribunal to ensure those purposes and guide the
dispute resolution process, and not to permit investor evasion of Mexican courts
where legal actions beyond that which set forth in Chapter 11 should be taken.
The competence of the tribunal to scrutinize these jurisdictional requirements
provides further evidence that frivolous litigation against Mexico, in application, is
not a reality
In Waste Management, the tribunal properly applied Annex 1137.1 of Chapter
11, which specifically protects Mexico against parallel or excessive litigation.345
This is important because it supports the idea that investors must follow the rules
in bringing legal action against Mexico. Mexico has abandoned its traditional
policy regarding foreign investment and made a commitment to rules, despite its
historically skeptical view of foreign investors. Investors must comply with the
rules for bringing Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico. As evidenced in Waste
Management, Chapter 11 in application does protect Mexico from the costs and
burden of excessive litigation with foreign investors.3 46  It also curtails any
perceived advantage an investor may have in bringing actions against Mexico in
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See State Department Website, supra note 198.
344. See Azinian Award, supra note 201.
345. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, § 27
346. Id.
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both arbitration and Mexican courts, m that an investor does not have two chances
to prevail on its claim.
3 47
Feldman supports the argument that a Chapter 11 tribunal engages in
sophisticated legal analysis to decipher whether it has jurisdiction according the
NAFTA. 348  There, Mexico appropriately was not subjected to retroactive
liability 349 Moreover, the investor's claim was narrowed so as to comport with the
tune limit requirements of Chapter 11, and thus Mexico was protected from
possibly paying for the claimant's lack of following the rules. 350 These objective,
balanced conclusions of the tribunal encourage a framework within which
investment and potential compensation for damages to that investment m Mexico
are to be determined with prudence. Such prudence coincides with both the
economic reality of the investment as well as the protection of Mexico from
improper claims.
Third, Weiler comments that an investor must take into account the political
costs of bringing a frivolous lawsuit against a NAFTA Party, as such action could
taint the investor's reputation and future prospects for mvestment. 351 This is
particularly true in the case of Mexico, where history has not been kind to the
reputation of foreign investors. 2  Even more, Price points out that there is a
possibility of frivolous lawsuits in every legal system, every day, but that does not
threaten democracy or sovereignty 353 Again, there has not been excessive use of
Chapter 1 1 against Mexico. Moreover, the text of Chapter 11 and the need of
foreign investors to maintain a good reputation in Mexican markets provide
adequate checks for potentially frivolous litigation. In this respect, a screening
mechanism for Chapter I I disputes is simply not necessary.
Another related criticism of Chapter 1 1 is that the potential damage award
amounts could be astronomical even when there is a legitimate government
measure taken for the protection of society, and thus foreign investors should not
be able to claim such high amounts because taxpayers ultimately foot the bill.
354
Here, the argument seems to be that no compensation, or rather, some nominal
compensation, is in order if a government legitimately acts to remedy a public
problem, regardless of whether the investment is wiped out totally.
First, Brower correctly asserts that Chapter 11 minimizes the inherent risk
NAFTA Parties face in balancing regulation of foreign investment by eliminating
347. Id.
348. Feldman Award, supra note 294, 47.
349. Id. 51.
350. Id. IM 57-58.
351. Weiler, NAFTA Investment, supra note 334, at 158 n.3.
352. See supra Part II.B.I.
353. See Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 8. Price opines that "rather than being a threat to
sovereignty, NAFTA checks the excesses of unilateral exercises of sovereignty by testing measures
against generally accepted public international law standards. Id. at 7
354. Laird, supra note 337, at 228-29; Brower II, supra. note 13, at 80; Public Citizen, supra note
337" "Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy, February 5, 2002, 10:00pm (ET), PBS, transcrpt
available at http://www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/CH__1 I/articles.cfm?D=6687 (last visited Feb. 26,
2003) [hereinafter "Moyers"].
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the possibility of punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.3 5 Also, Laird
appropriately mentions the difficulty an investor faces in making a case for high
damages under principles of international law, where the purpose of compensation
is what makes an investor whole as measured by the value of the investment "the
day before the expropriation, not after. 35 6
This is particularly true where a NAFTA Party legitimately acts to protect the
public from a "hazardous" investment, because "if the product or investment is
legitimately a health or environmental hazard, and this was known before the
expropriation, it would be difficult to assert that on the day of expropriation the
investment had any value. 3 57 These realities seem to dispel the argument that
Chapter II promotes disproportionate compensation at the expense of tax payers.
As for Mexico, the Chapter 11 arbitrations demonstrate that it is difficult to make a
case for high damages, and that Chapter II tribunals have been exercising a high
degree of sophistication regarding damages.
With respect to Azmnan, an important point is that Mexico did not have to pay
damages after successfully arguing its case before a neutral tribunal.'5 8 The
tribunal quickly dismissed the inappropriate claim of $16 million in damages,
without really even discussing the claim on the merits. 9 This is important for the
development of the rule of law in Mexico as well as among NAFTA Parties and
private individuals doing business m North America. It sends a signal to investors
that Mexico is willing to play by the rules, and it sends a signal to Mexico that
when it is in the right it can use the international system and international law to its
advantage and reap the benefits of increased foreign investment at the same time.
Moreover, this reality in application refutes concerns that the Chapter 11 dispute
resolution framework gives "implausible investors" the ability to "bankrupt"
Mexican democracy
In Metalclad, the tribunal awarded the investor $16.7 million for Mexico's
breach of Chapter 11, this instead of the $43 million in damages claimants
demanded.3s ' In this respect, little clout can be given to the argument that the
tribunal was not careful in its damage calculation to decipher what part of
claimant's demand was inflated and non-compensable under Chapter 11. The idea
that investors can obtain disproportionate compensation for investment losses m
Mexico did not hold in application here. Further, Feldman represents an
appropriate distinction in that Chapter 11 seeks to encourage investment and
compensate damages to such investment, but only to the extent that compensation
is fair and makes economic sense.3 6 ' The tribunal was careful not to allow
conditions in which the investor could receive a windfall, subjecting Mexico to the
355. Brower II, supra note 13, at 80.
356. Laird, supra note 337, at 228.
357. Id. at 228.
358. See Azinian Award, supra note 201.
359. Id. 196-200.
360. Metalclad Award, supra note 250, at 131.
361. See Feldman Award, supra note 291, 189-207.
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36possibility of paying disproportionate compensation.62 When Feldman is
considered alongside Metalcad, it is difficult to say, even in those cases where
Mexico has been required to compensate foreign investors, that Chapter 1 1 has
subjected Mexico to disproportionate compensation to the detriment of the public.
B. Lack of Review Process
Another common criticism of Chapter 11, and one that has been put forth in
particular by NAFTA Parties, attacks the binding nature of arbitral decisions.
363
Abbot questions whether democratic NAFTA Parties and their citizens should be
"comfortable" with arbitral decisions given that there is no appellate review
process, and he suggests that NAFTA Parties establish an appellate body or
provide national courts with more of a role in Chapter 11 arbitrations.36 Brower
and Steven note the criticism by Canada and Mexico that tribunals "may not make
the right decisions, and therefore an appellate review process is necessary 365
It may be said that the argument for an appellate review mechanism for
Chapter 11 arbitrations is a pragmatic suggestion to a concern for more
transparency m the dispute resolution process.366 First, however, regardless of
whether an appellate review process is politically necessary or even a viable option
for NAFTA Parties, Chapter 1 1 is not a threat to democracy because it lacks an
appellate review mechanism per se.367 A NAFTA Party may petition a court to
modify or set aside an award if it believes a Chapter 11 tribunal acted outside its
scope--outside the requirements of NAFTA in making a ruling.36 A NAFTA
Party therefore potentially has access to both a highly-sophisticated arbitration
tribunal as well as the courts of a particular NAFTA Party in a given dispute.
Metalclad demonstrates that NAFTA Parties have some type of recourse to a
court system for review of a Chapter 11 award, although critics do not mention
this. 69 It demonstrates that, even if one agrees that Chapter 1 1 arbitral awards
should be reviewed, a NAFTA Party can n fact get review of a Chapter 11
362. See id.
363. Abbott, supra note 333, at 308; Brower I, supra note 13, at 47.
364. Abbott, supra note 333, at 308.
365. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 200.
366. Pending trade promotion authority legislation in the U.S. Congress calls for the establishment
of an appellate review mechanism to review decisions rendered by international arbitration panels in
investor-state disputes ansing out of trade/investment agreements. CRS Report to Congress, Trade
Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority: Summary and Analysis of Selected Major Provisions of H.R. 3005,
April 15, 2002, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10090.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2003) [hereinafter "TPA"]. Interestingly, in an effort to bring greater transparency to the foreign
investment dispute resolution process, the United States and Chile have left open the possibility for
establishing an appellate mechanism for arbitration brought under the foreign investment chapter in the
Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, Chapter 10, at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/final/lO.tnvestment.PDF (last visited May 1, 2004).
367. TPA, supra note 369.
368. Jones, supra note 184, at 536.
369 Metalclad, supra note 277
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award. 370 There, Mexico received the full benefit of the process by prevailing on
two of its arguments. Further, the British Columbia court served not only as a
check on the tribunal's reasoning, but also on the damage calculation.372 The court
modified the damage award amount only slightly to correspond with its
reasoning, 373 which gives further weight to the argument that Chapter II tribunals
are sophisticated and fair when calculating damages against Mexico.
Second, in striking the balance between the need for economic efficiency and
legal certainty, NAFTA Parties chose to side with finality over appellate litigation.
One economic rationale behind this is to deal with an investment dispute in a
neutral forum when it arises and move on, which lessens the likelihood of pending
litigation mhibitmg decisions to invest. Maintaining a steady flow of investment in
Mexico is of course critical to building long term growth. Mexico has successfully
used the two-tiered investment dispute review system and it continues to
experience the benefit of increased foreign investment.3 74 The Chapter 11 dispute
resolution system is working.
In line with this, Brower adds a more abstract argument against appellate
review of Chapter 11 arbitral awards, stating that
heightened judicial review "constitutes an independent violation of Chapter
11. Although heightened review might not, for technical and political reasons,
subject the NAFTA Parties to additional claims for liability, it undermines the
pnnciple of voluntary compliance with authoritative decisions rendered at the
international level by impartial bodies charged with the supervision of treaty
compliance. Thus, heightened judicial review impairs the development of the rule
of law in international economic relations." 375
Thus, if an appellate review mechanism is established, it is possible that Mexico
could be given a small window of opportunity to shy away from its commitment to
comply m all cases with international law, which would hurt its prospects for
economic growth. For Mexico, old ways should not be given a chance to surface
and trump Mexico's commitment toward progress in law and economic policy
since NAFTA.
Third, it is important to emphasize again, as Brower adds, that the expertise of
the tribunals far exceeds that of the courts in NAFTA Parties.37 6 The notion that
Mexico or any NAFTA Party cannot be "comfortable" with an arbitration decision,
given the expertise and the option to get a second review in a domestic trial court,
is unfounded. A close analysis of the arbitrations involving Mexico so far further
underscores the soplhstication, expertise and prudence of the tribunals in sifting
through the facts of the investment disputes and applying the law to make
370. See id.
371. Metalclad, supra note 277, 133-34.
372. 1d. 137.
373. Id.
374. See id.
375. Brower II, supra note 13, at 47
376. Id. at 78.
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decisions. This approach facilitates Mexico's economic goals.
Azinian demonstrates the high degree of sophistication in the tribunal's
analysis, discerning if an investor has a cause of action under Chapter 11 and
whether what the investor alleged is something outside the scope of the tribunal's
competence.377 The complex factual history in Feldman and the tribunal's intricate
analysis of the interlacing of previous court proceedings, tax issues and
government regulations in that dispute further underscores the sophistication of
Chapter 11 tribunals.378 In Waste Management, the tribunal's sophisticated
analysis of the jurisdictional requirements of Chapter 11 lends support to the idea
that the tribunals are highly competent adjudicators and have a sophisticated
knowledge of international law.379 Mexico prevailed on its first jurisdictional
objection, in line with the purpose of Chapter 11 to protect Mexico from excessive
litigation.380 The investors prevailed in round two, but they did so according to
international law.3 8i Another benefit to Mexico here is that Mexico has taken part
in the development of the rule of law among NAFTA Parties and it has made
important arguments, some of which have been successful. In other words,
Mexico now has a stake in the Chapter 11 process and an important role in the
development of international law pertaming to foreign investment.38 2 And this is
all being done through a highly competent adjudication system.
An additional comment on the adequacy of the dispute resolution framework
as is and Mexico's participation in establishing the rule of law under Chapter 11
dispute resolution is important here. Although Chapter 11 arbitrations have no
precedential value, the tribunal in Feldman stated that its decision regarding
Article 1110 was consistent with the decisions in Metalclad, Azinian and other
decisions. 38 3  This reference is both good for international law and foreign
investment. It allows NAFTA Parties to acknowledge a common set of rules in
developing the rule of law pertaining to North American investment activity, and it
further adds to a more predictable legal environment for investors, which promotes
investment. This in turn promotes deeper integration. Further, this reference
supports the idea that even though there is no official appellate review process,
Chapter 11 tribunals have sought "guidance" in prudently rendering their
decisions. 39
C. "Secret" Tribunals
Critics of Chapter II also complain of the confidential nature of international
arbitration. 3 5  Public interest groups and non-governmental organizations in
377 Azintan Award, supra note 201, 81-86.
378. Feldman Award, supra note 291, 6-23, 105-112.
379. Waste Management II Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 240, 26-37.
380. Waste Management I Award, supra note 222, § 31.
381. See Waste Management I1 Junsdiction Decision, supra note 240.
382. See id.
383. Feldman Award, supra note 291, 107.
384. See td.
385. See Jones, supra note 184, at 549; Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11
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particular denounce the Chapter I1 process because, m line with international
arbitration practice, it does not have any provisions for non-government third party
386participation. The Chapter 11 dispute resolution process has been described as
occurring "not in courts of law but before secret trade tribunals. 387 Others contest
the principle of confidentiality in international arbitrations entirely, and
vehemently oppose the confidentiality of NAFTA dispute settlement on grounds
that investors must assume that documents will be made public for purposes of
accountability to democratic governments.3s  In a more pragmatic tone, Jones
recommends the implementation of mechanisms through which non-governmental
organizations can access the proceedings.389
Whether or not Chapter 11 arbitrations should be more transparent with
respect to third-party participation is certainly an issue for debate, but it is a
misnomer to label the process as "secret. First, non-disputing NAFTA Parties
may submit their interpretations of the law in a given dispute to a tribunal. 390 It Is
the NAFTA Parties, after all, who have the responsibility to monitor
implementation and interpretation of NAFTA. 391 They do have access to influence
Chapter 11 tribunals, even if they are not a party to the dispute. Also, there are
provisions for expert witnesses, which further increases the opportunity for outside
mfluences, where proper, to inform better the dispute resolution process in a
particular case. 39
Second, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a clarification statement
of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, explaining that nothing in NAFTA
precludes a Chapter 11 tribunal from accepting amicus curiae submissions.' 9
Third, the argument for more public participation should be balanced with what
others point out regarding confidentiality-that confidentiality m Chapter 11
arbitrations is an essential element in promoting international law along side
foreign investment. 394 Lontz notes that the confidential nature of the arbitrations
serves as an incentive for both parties to submit important documents regarding the
investment dispute that would otherwise not come out in open court.395 The
Arbitrations, 2 CI. J. INT'L L. 213, 217 (2001); Lontz, supra note 69, at 539; Maximo Romero
Jimenez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213,217 (2001); Public Citizen,
supra note 337; Moyers, supra note 357.
386. See Public Citizen, supra note 337; Moyers, supra note 357" Abbott, supra note 333, at 308.
387 Moyers, supra note 357.
388. Fracassi, supra note 388, at 217, 221-22.
389. Jones, supra note 184, at 549.
390. NAFTA, supra note 10, at 645.
391. Id. at 645.
392. Id. at 646.
393. Unofficial Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation, Oct.
7, 2003, available at http//:www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2OO3/statement-
nondisputingparties.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). For example, in United Parcel Service of America
v. Canada, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organzaton/6033.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2004), the Chapter II tribunal accepted written briefs by non-disputing parties.
394. See Camp, supra note 5, at 91-92, Laird, supra note 337, at 225, and Jimenez, supra note 388,
at 250.
395. Lontz, supra note 69, at 539.
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advantages gamed from limited outside intervention in foreign investment
disputes, both with respect to future investment and to the facilitation of dispute
resolution, are perhaps an advantage for Mexico in particular.
The Chapter 11 framework allows Mexico to be forthcoming m the resolution
of disputes without potentially sending a negative signal to foreign investors who
may perceive a disputed governmental measure, although not fully adjudicated, as
a rsk. This, in turn, could cause capital flight, which is not what Mexico wants
3 96
Also, Mexico has and will take measures that are violative of an investor's right
under Chapter 11, and those measures should be dealt with in a way that does not
scare capital inflows while Mexico adjusts to the international rule-based system of
dispute resolution under Chapter 11.
Critics also attack the fact that Annex 1137 4 of NAFTA allows either a
disputing Party or a disputing investor the choice of whether to make the arbitral
award public.397 However, all final arbitral awards involving Mexico thus far have
been published. 398 Further, most documents involving the arbitrations are readily
available on the Internet. 399 Lack of transparency in this respect is simply not the
reality, and the potential economic benefit of a certain degree of confidentially
arguably substantiates a delay in releasing documents to the public. This is not to
say that this is not an area where potential reform of Chapter 11 dispute resolution
may be proper for political purposes. It is just to say that there are strong
economic arguments to the contrary, particularly with regard to Mexico.
D. Prevents Government Regulation
An overriding criticism of Chapter 11, which is related to those discussed
above but is important on its own, is that Chapter II prevents a NAFTA Party
from effectively taking measures to protect the public health and the
environment.40 The argument is, at base, that investors can deter or unfairly make
396. John H. Chun, Annual Survey Issue: International Insolvencies: NOTE. "Post-Modern
Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum? 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2647, 2647-2659 (1996).
397 NAFTA, supra note 10, at annex 1137.4.
398. State Department Website, supra note 198; Weiler Website, supra note 198.
399. Id. It should be noted that NAFTA Parties have released an interpretation of the text regarding
publication of awards, emphasizing that nothing in NAFTA prevents the release of Chapter I I
arbitration documents to the public. State Department Website, supra note 198. Also, although
discussion of Chapter I I arbitrations not involving Mexico is outside the scope of this article, the
parties to the Chapter I I arbitration United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, supra note 396, have
decided to hold the arbitration open to the public via closed circuit television. ICSID Website, supra
note 135, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
400. Jones, supra note 184, at 555; Abbott, supra note 333, at 309; Laird, supra note 337, at 227-
29; Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 198; Public Citizen, supra note 337 Moyers, supra note 357;
Vendiendo El Futuro: Un documento preparado por la Comision de Asuntos Sociales (CCCB-CECC)
en vistas a la conferenica Humamzando la Economia Global, Presentada en La Universidad de
Cat6lica de Amdrica, Washington, D.C., Enero 28 al 30, 2002, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/futuroGerardoTranslation.final.PDF (last visited Mar. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter "Vendiendo El Futuro"].
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governments pay for legitimate government regulation, all in the name of money
For critics, this is a major intrusion on national sovereignty and democratic
401governance. Jones voices his concern regarding environmental regulation and
asserts that direct access "tips the scales too far for investors. 40 2 In fact, with
respect to Mexico, these criticisms are very similar to the justifications Mexico put
forth throughout the twentieth century for rejecting the application of international
law to commercial disputes m Mexico involving foreigners.03
A plain reading of the Chapter 11 text seems to indicate something quite
contrary to the argument that Chapter 11 prevents legitimate government
regulation. Article 1114 deliberately protects a government's right to regulate-it
does not prevent such a right.4°4 Further, Loritz emphasizes that both a close
reading of Chapter 11 and international law supports the legal conclusion that "the
negative economic impact of environmental regulations does not trigger
liability. '405  Brower and Steven also acknowledge critics' sentiments that
corporate interests can 'undermine' legitimate governmental regulations in a
'supranational' forum insulated from the usual domestic political and legal
processes, and respond by properly pomtmg out it is basic customary international
law that states are responsible for indirect expropriation.4°
It is here where Chapter 11 strikes a balance for all NAFTA Parties as the
governments of those countries address the needs of their citizens. Those needs
include not only necessary public health and environmental legislation, but also an
environment where investment can flourish and economic livelihood can prosper.
At base, Chapter 11 gives a qualified investor the right to argue a claim before a
neutral tribunal.4 07 The investor still has to argue its case-there is no blanket right
for investors to strip away categorically a NAFTA Party's right to enact
legislation.
Further, the tribunal cannot prevent implementation of a challenged regulation
during the dispute.40 8  And, if a violation is found, the tribunal cannot force a
NAFTA Party to change its laws.4°  Chapter 11 just requires that a foreign
investor be treated according to international standards of fairness and that when
that does not happen, a NAFTA Party must compensate the investor
accordingly 410 This stands in stark contrast to the lack of investment rules in place
during the Porfinato in Mexico, and hence the threat of foreign investors indirectly
401. Public Citizen, supra note 337" Moyers, supra note 357- Vendiendo El Futuro, supra note
403; Abbott, supra note 333, at 309 (arguing that Chapter II does not take into account social policies
and thus tribunal review should be further limited until the parties establish a more sufficient dispute
resolution structure to account for government regulation).
402. Jones, supra note 184, at 556.
403. See supra Part II.B.I.
404. See supra note 170.
405. Loritz, supra note 69, at 551.
406. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 198.
407. See supra note 175.
408. See supra note 190.
409. Id.
410. See supra Part III.B.
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controlling Mexico's social policies is non-existent. 41
1
The arbitrations discussed hereto reveal the balance in Chapter 11 between
government regulation and the protection of investment. In Metalclad, both the
tribunal and the Canadian court found that Mexico did in fact indirectly
expropriate claimants' investment through the ecological decree. 2 This entitled
the claimants to money damages for their loss, but in the end the State of San Luis
Potosi and Guadalcazar were successful in their goal to shut down the landfill.413
In effect, Chapter 11 dispute resolution here did not prevent local Mexican
governments from doing what was the political will.
In Feldman, the tribunal's reasoning represents a careful analysis of NAFTA.
The tribunal appropriately disallowed a Chapter 11 claim to impede Mexico's right
to regulate its own tax policy.4 1 4  Further, in accordance with its reasoning
regarding the Article 1110 claim, the tribunal held that different treatment of
producers and resellers of cigarettes m Mexico does not violate international law,
because Mexico may have legitimate public policy reasons for doing so. 4 15 Here,
the tribunal showed great deference to the legitimate authority of Mexico to
govern, and did not impose restrictions on Mexico that are not in NAFTA. In
application, therefore, critics' argument that Chapter 11 dispute resolution
categorically strips NAFTA Parties' rights to regulation is not the case. The
tribunal m Feldman was careful to distinguish between an investor's rights under
Chapter 11 and a government's rights and responsibilities in a democratic
society 416
Additionally, Laird points out that the obligation to compensate expropriated
investment according to international standards is a "small price to pay" for the
overall benefits of free trade and open investment.417 This, of course, is especially
so for Mexico, which as emphasized throughout this article needs a predictable,
stable legal climate to encourage foreign investment. Laird further summarizes,
most appropriately, that "governments make mistakes and sometimes they
intentionally create measures that hurt foreigners. 41 8  That is the history of
international disputes. It is misguided reasoning to think that holding governments
accountable is a threat to democracy 
4 19
Overall, the Chapter 11 setup underscores the importance that NAFTA Parties
placed on foreign investment in drafting the NAFTA text. It encourages
compliance with international law, NAFTA and other international conventions in
411. See supra Part iI.B.I.
412. See supra note 271; United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, 89 B.C.L.R.
(3d) 359, 38 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 284, 14 B.L.R. (3d) 285, [2001] B.C.J. No. 950, 94-99 (Sup. Ct. Brit.
Col. 2001) (Doc. No. L002904).
413. See supra Part III.C.3.
414. See Feldman Award, supra note 291, IN 209-13.
415. Id. 171.
416. Id. 185.
417 Laird, supra note 337, at 229.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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an effort to create a balanced regulatory structure within which to govern cross-
border investment. This is what is necessary for Mexico to realize its goals in
becoming more competitive in the international political economy It does not m
the meantime, moreover, prevent Mexico or any other NAFTA Party from
legislating for the protection of the public health and environment.
E. Neglects Notions of Equality and Sustainable Development
One commentator categorically disapproves of the inclusion of Chapter 11 in
NAFTA.42 ° Professor Alvarez argues against Chapter 11 dispute resolution
entirely, contending that its structure does not comport with ideas of equality and
sustainable development, and thus is harmful to Mexico. 421  He characterizes
Chapter 11 as "a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on steroids, the "most bizarre
human rights treaty ever conceived, and as "a human rights treaty for a special-
interest group. 422 He also asserts that Chapter 11 ignores "North/South power
differentials" and merely "reflects U.S. law and perspectives. ' 23 For Professor
Alvarez,
There is no actual symmetry of direct benefits to the national investors of all three
NAFTA parties--at least not for the foreseeable future. As few Mexican
investors are likely to be in the position to penetrate the U.S. market, it is almost
exclusively U.S., not Mexican, nationals that get the benefit of the investment
chapter.
424
Without a substantive commitment to investment rules applicable to all of
North America, the policy interests of countries m North America as expressed m
NAFTA to grow and integrate their economies would not have a chance of being
realized. Moreover, without foreign investment, Mexico cannot realize its goals
for economic growth. After years of opposition, Mexico believed it was necessary
to accept international norms as pillars for governing transnational business
activity in order to stimulate investment. In this respect, the contention that
Chapter 11 is the antithesis of sustainable development and thus derogatory to
human rights is something less than accurate.
First, although Chapter 11 provides broad substantive guarantees to NAFTA
investors, it is hardly accurate to characterize it as derogating from human rights in
420. See Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's
Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAIe INTER-AM. L. REV. 303 (1996); see also Jones, supra note 184, at 544-45
(discussing Professor Alvarez's arguments).
421. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 307; see also Jones, supra note 184, at 544-45 (discussing
Professor Alvarez); Sandrino, supra note 69, at 326 (arguing, also, against Chapter 11, adopting a
traditional developing world skepticism to foreign investment, stating "[t]he open investment regime in
NAFTA, with no provisions addressing either development objectives of the host state or TNC
operations, in essence places the state in a position in which its sovereignty and autonomy are
comprised").
422. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 304, 307-08.
423. Id. at312.
424. Id. at 304.
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Mexico. In negotiating Chapter 11, NAFTA Parties realized-including Mexico--
that investment is just as critical to economic growth and development as trade.
Investment, after all, is the impetus for long-term economic growth in any
economy. This is especially true for developing economies. Foreign investment is
necessary to promote the efficiency of investments m a particular market by
infusing that market with new ideas and new technology This in turn leads to, on
an aggregate scale, greater productivity greater profits, rising incomes and hence
rising standards of living. A treaty provision that has the intent to raise standards
of living m Mexico is certainly not derogatory to human rights.
As discussed earlier, foreign investment covering a wide variety of sectors in
Mexico continues to increase.425 Moreover, for as much as Chapter 11 does do to
stimulate investment in Mexico, its mandate is not to effect issues pertaining to the
redistribution of wealth in Mexican society, which is the real issue for sustainable
development. If the investment is not there in the first place, however, issues
regarding sustainable development are not even reached.426
Second, Professor Alvarez correctly notes that Mexico abandoned its
traditional policy by accepting Chapter 11, which is based on U.S. law
perspectives.427 But those perspectives happen to be in line with customary
international law practices. The historical reality and position in the international
political economy in which Mexico finds itself today illustrates that Mexico's
outright rejection of international law pertaining to foreign investment was perhaps
not the best course of action. Moreover, it is anti-progressive and borderline
senseless to suggest that Mexico should reject Chapter 11 standards simply
because they are in line with U.S. standards. Mexico has now, through a highly
technical treaty, correctly chosen to accept international norms regarding foreign
investment because that is what stimulates investment, and those standards are as
much a part of Mexico now as they are of the United States and Canada.
Third, there is no basis in asserting that Mexico will not or has not derived a
benefit from Chapter I I because Mexican investors have not "taken advantage" of
Chapter 1 1 dispute resolution. The point of Chapter 11 is to stimulate investment,
particularly in Mexico, and that should be the measure of Mexico's benefit. The
perceived benefit should not be measured as a tally card on how many Mexican-
based firms invest in the United States and Canada or on how many Mexican-
based firms have sued other NAFTA Parties under Chapter 11.
Fourth, the basic framework of Chapter 11 dispute resolution does not ignore
power imbalances between Mexico and other NAFTA Parties, as has been
suggested. In fact, it does just the opposite by establishing a neutral, rule-based
dispute resolution mechanism for investment disputes. In discussing the
differences between power-based diplomacy and rule-based diplomacy, Byrne
425. See supra notes 108-110.
426. Alvarez, supra note 420, at 309. Alvarez somewhat admits that his comparison of Chapter I I
to human rights is somewhat tangential, stating that "[i]t might be said that the comparison between the
NAFTA and human rights instruments is, in itself, rhetorical stance that is as questionable as the
NAFTA's invocation of 'equal rights' Id.
427. Id. at 312.
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astutely asserts that Chapter 11, as a rule-based regime, is more conducive to the
development of international law.428 This is especially advantageous for Mexico.
By removing foreign investment disputes to a neutral, international mechanism,
Mexico is not directly threatened by power-based political maneuvering by the
United States or Canada with regard to a given investment dispute.429
Under Chapter 11, there is no altering of the rules of the game in the middle
of an investment dispute to appease political demands adverse to Mexico's
position. In this setting, then, "Djiustice and fairness demand that Canada and the
United States live up to the same substantive rules and procedural mechanisms as
have been accepted by Mexico.' 430  This is essential for the development of
international law among NAFTA Parties and the rule of law in Mexico. And,
because the role of power politics is diminished in investment disputes, it provides
a framework within which Mexico can develop confidence in its decision to
abandon its traditional policy regarding foreign investment.
Disallowing private investors direct access to dispute resolution would further
exacerbate power differences between Mexico and the other NAFTA Parties, and
would represent a step backward for Mexico. Leaving investor-state disputes up to
NAFTA Parties for resolution "can be highly mefficient, arbitrary, and politically
explosive. 43' This would do nothing to encourage foreign investment in Mexico,
and it might in fact serve as a deterrent to such investment. Brower and Steven
stress that "[w]ith each new case commenced, the NAFTA countries will be
arguing their interpretations of international law and urging their views. [and]
will gain expertise through their regular participation in such proceedings., 43 2 This
is particularly important for Mexico, given its traditional stance on the applicability
of international law to foreign investment. This new practice, m and of itself, is
critical for Mexico's successful participation in an increasingly complex
international political economy
Thus, Chapter 11 dispute resolution does not ignore power differentials
between NAFTA Parties; rather, it successfully obfuscates those differentials by
offering a neutral, international body for dispute resolution.4 3 And, it is through
this framework that Mexico can participate in and experience the link between
international law and economic integration, which is imperative to Mexico's
participation in the international political economy and economic growth.
F Sovereignty in General
A note on the sovereignty argument in general is appropriate here. At base,
428. See Byme, supra note 333, at 419-20.
429. Id. at 429.
430. Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 200.
431. Id. at 197.
432. Id. at 201. The authors underscore that this enables NAFTA Parties to influence and shape
investment policy in North America. Id. This gives Mexico an extraordinary opportunity to play its
hand in such development along with two developed countries.
433. Id. at 200.
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"[i]t is illogical for governments who have willingly incurred limits on their
sovereignty in order to respond to a perceived common threat to their international
competitiveness, to then argue against flexible private remedies on the basis of a
sovereignty argument., 434 Historical trends in integration in the Americas indicate
that countries in the Western Hemisphere have acknowledged a common interest
in establishing supranational frameworks in order to prosper economically, which,
in essence, is an effort to protect themselves. The economics of global capitalism
are in some ways outside the control of any particular country, and multilateral
frameworks represent governmental efforts to join the system and make it more
orderly for the benefit of their citizens.
Developing countries in the Americas, and in particular Mexico, have taken
bold steps to build the groundwork for multilateral governance. Mexico took a
more progressive step in agreeing to Chapter 11, acknowledging that in the world
of foreign investment, international standards are the best ways to guarantee fair
participation by itself and private investors in the investment dispute resolution
process.435 This in turn establishes a good environment for investment in Mexico,
which in turn enhances its prospects for prosperity. It is an action of protection-it
is a bold act of sovereignty that takes under consideration the realities of the age of
globalization.
Notably, an international arbitration tribunal with binding or even non-
binding authority serves as a "challenge" to traditional notions of sovereignty- but
the evolution of international law and the representations made by NAFTA Parties
seem to obscure the line between exercising sovereignty in an era of globalization
and maintaining sovereignty under archaic Westphalian conceptions of the
international system.436 Without international law and nation-states' concessions
to it economic integration, and more importantly progress, is impossible.
Elaborating on the purpose of Chapter 11, Brower and Steven have offered the
following insight:
434. Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 120; see also Price, Safety Valve, supra note 337, at 7
("[A]II treaties, all international agreements are in a sense a compromise of sovereignty. However, they
are, first, an exercise of sovereignty.").
435. Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 85.
436. For good discussion on the changing notions of sovereignty today, see Ronald A. Brand,
Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System in the Twenty First Century,
25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279 (2002). Professor Brand notes the growing trends in
international economic law, wherein private parties are increasingly receiving more rights in the
international system. Id. at 290. Moreover, in discussing the historical origins of sovereignty and the
relationship between nation-states and individuals, he concludes, most correctly, that "[r[ecognition that
international law now limits the conduct of states in their relationships with individuals is not a bad
thing, nor does it necessarily represent diminution of the 'sovereignty' of states. Id. at 294. See also
Robert Paterson, supra note 126, at 119:
In the future, there is likely to be less need for negotiations than for increasingly
effective means of enforcing compliance with existing interstate rules. Without efficient
means for private parties to secure enforcement of rules, such as those contained in
NAFTA, the credibility of such agreements is undermined. At a time when the power of
sovereign states to control transnational economic activity is at an all-time low, it seems
contradictory that private international actors lack the ability to enforce new rules that
are a direct response to this reality.
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In establishing this investment regime, the NAFTA Parties wanted to achieve
three main objectives: (1) to tear down existing foreign investment barriers by
eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions; (2) to build investor
confidence throughout the region through the elaboration and enforcement of clear
and fair rules; and (3) to 'depoliticize' the resolution of investment disputes by
eliminating the need for State-to-State adjudication. Any criticism of the Chapter
11 regime that fails to take account of these three factors is, literally, beside the
point.
437
The concerns with Chapter I I discussed herem in many ways do not take these
motives into account. They not only give cursory effect to the actual Chapter 11
text, but they also refuse to acknowledge the tremendous amount of investment
that continues to flow among NAFTA Parties, and into Mexico, beyond the realm
of politics. Chapter 11 has so far achieved NAFTA Parties' goals and after some
years of application, as discussed, Mexico is not any less sovereign.
The Chapter I I rule-based regime is also a lesser challenge to Mexico's
sovereignty, and all NAFTA Parties' sovereignty, by virtue of its structure.
Without the arbitration option, a NAFTA investor would be left with the options of
either litigating in foreign courts or pressuring the investor's home government to
use political channels to resolve the dispute. This, among other things, would not
serve as a catalyst to investment in Mexico. In this respect, international
arbitration may be viewed as the best means of preserving Mexico's sovereignty
for the time being. Given Mexico's historic stance on protecting its sovereignty
from outside influences, coupled with the reality of economic integration and the
importance of foreign investment to Mexico, the arbitration option is less intrusive
on Mexico's sovereignty than say, legal harmonization with its common law North
438American partners. Perhaps most importantly, from a Mexican standpoint
dealing with the litigious character of North American investors in general,
Byrne's comments may be appropriate: "one of the greatest attributes of the kind
of effective resolution that is provided by direct access is that 'it encourages
dispute avoidance. When potential disputants, whether they are party-nations or
private entities, can anticipate the uniformity with which the law will be applied,
they will be less likely to 'break the rules. ,,
439
Lastly, taken as a whole, the Chapter 11 arbitrations against Mexico so far
represent Mexico's participation in the development of iternational law while it
reaps the benefits of increased investment and enjoys a more equal footing with
other NAFTA Parties. Metalclad and Feldman represent good examples of when
and to what extent awards against a Party are appropriate, and further provide
guidelines for Mexican regulation with respect to foreign investment. On the other
side, Azinian and Waste Management demonstrate that Mexico will prevail when
investors' claims are either unsubstantiated or when investors do not follow the
proper rules for resolving investor-state disputes. Rather than a detriment to
national sovereignty and democratic governance in Mexico, an informed
437 Brower & Steven, supra note 86, at 195 (footnotes omitted).
438. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
439. Byme, supra note 333, at 429.
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discussion of the Chapter 11 and its application reveal that the system as is has
been successful m balancing Mexico's economic goals, historical political realities
and the reality of international law in economic integration.
V CONCLUSION: A HEALTHY MIX
Historical policy interests in the Western Hemisphere have placed the
Americas on a path toward economic integration. Modem trade and investment
agreements are the main tools for governance of such integration, and they serve to
fuel dramatic increases in cross-border business transactions and to create an
environment in which the intersection of international law, economics and politics
is a reality Such integration creates the need for effective dispute resolution
procedures, and this is especially the case with regard to disputes involving private
investors and countries under trade and investment agreements. Investment is just
as important as trade for deeper economic integration, and foreign investment is
critical for growth in developing countries. And, it entails the interaction of
private economic actors with sovereign entities in a way that begs adherence to
objective, international norms.
International arbitration has emerged as a preferred method for international
dispute settlement, and as an alternative to transnational litigation and diplomatic
pressure it provides a sound, manageable framework for dispute resolution. It does
so without forcing countries to engage in the monumental task of legal
harmonization. This allows international law and economics to progress side-by-
side.
NAFTA is a prime example of integration trends in the Americas. The
Chapter 11 framework represents a historic, positive step by NAFTA Parties to
grow and develop together and collectively aid in the development of international
law. The significant changes made by Mexico to conform to Chapter 11, together
with the Chapter 11 arbitrations involving Mexico thus far, serve as major stepping
stones for the developed Mexico of tomorrow. Notably, some commentators offer
potentially useful suggestions for future modification of Chapter 11 dispute
resolution. However, although some concerns regarding Chapter 11 raise
important questions regarding, for instance, appellate review, transparency and
sustainable development, the record does not evince that Chapter I I is detrimental
to Mexico--or even to all Parties for that matter.
The broader criticisms that Chapter 11 Is a threat to national sovereignty and
an abrogation of democracy are unfounded. With respect to Mexico, this is
supported by both a close look at the NAFTA text as well as the arbitrations
involving Mexico so far. Rather, direct access dispute resolution, as an
international law-based framework for investment dispute resolution, is an impetus
for progression in Mexican law and a catalyst for increased investment in Mexico.
It is also a platform for political equilibrium between Mexico and other NAFTA
Parties. Indeed, Chapter 11 direct access dispute resolution is a healthy mix of
international law, economics and politics for Mexico, and it is but one necessary
tool for Mexico's successful participation in the international political economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Beatrice Okum, a Christian woman from Southern Sudan, fled her village
during attacks by the Sudanese National Islamic Front.' She was separated from
her family and has never heard from them again. At age 15, she was forced into
slavery in Kenya, where she spent fourteen years. She finally escaped and fled to
America.'
Upon arrival, she was handcuffed, shackled and taken to a detention facility 5
There she "watch[ed] daily the hopelessness, the ache, the anguish on the faces of
fellow inmates as they [we]re filled with fear and uncertainty, because we are
subjected to a system where hope often dies before it is realized.' '6 As she suffered
flashbacks to her time in slavery she said, "I am only fighting for freedom. I only
want to be safe."7
This dream is shared by the rest of America, especially in these times.
September 11, 20018 marked the United States' full engagement in the War on
Terrorism. That name is given from an American perspective. The terrorism that
has been driving refugees to our shores for years now threatens Americans. U.S.
interaction with these refugees will be an integral component of winning this war.
Theresa Sidebothom was raised in Java and graduated summa cum laude from Wheaton College. She
and her husband taught English and assisted with development projects in Sumatra for seven years.
This paper was originally written for Prof Ved Nanda's International Law class at the University of
Denver College of Law, for which she received a Scholastic Excellence Award. She would like to
thank her husband, Dr. Bruce Sidebothom, for his ideas, inspiration, and feedback.
1. Refugee Women at Risk: Unfair US. Laws Hurt Asylum Seekers, Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, 11 (2002) at http://www.lchr.org.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Media Alert, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Women Fleeing Persecution
Face Unfair U.S. Laws (Jan. 14, 2003) at http://www.lchr.org/media/2003_alerts/01 14.htm.
5. Refugee Women at Risk, supra note 1, at 11.
6. Media Alert, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Women Fleeing Persecution
Face Unfair U.S. Laws (Jan. 14,2003) at http://www.lchr.org/media/2003_alerts/01 14.htn.
7. Id.
8. This was the date when AI-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. airplanes. Suicide terrorists crashed two
of the into the World Trade Center into New York City, bringing the two towers down and killing
thousands. Another plane crashed into the Pentagon. The last group of terrorists was thwarted when
passengers overwhelmed the terrorists, and the plane crashed in a remote area. No passengers or
terrorists from the planes survived.
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The threat that western secularism poses to Islamic societies may be no more
intentional than was wiping out native Americans with measles, but for the
survival of fundamentalism in the Muslim world, it is just as deadly Secularism
spreads via satellite dishes, computers, McDonalds, Coca-Cola, multinationals, and
air travel.9 The entertainment industry and globalization are its missionaries.
Refugees are often its proponents.
This war began long ago, in a titanic clash of cultures. Secularism, on the one
hand, promotes religious plurality and freedom for conscience and expression, but
also allows sexual promiscuity, redefines the family and disfavors state
established religion. Opposing secularism is fundamentalist seventh century Islam,
which features a rigid social structure withclearly defined moral values and state
authority that is defined by particular beliefs about God and the after-life.
Islam is in crisis because its well-remembered glorious past does not match its
present. As Bernard Lewis says, "Compared with its millennial rival,
Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant."' 0 There is
a profound debate within the Muslim world about the causes of decline in the Dar
Al-Islam (rule of peace or Islam)." The fundamentalists say that what is needed is
a restoration of authentic Islam.' 2 The modernists see more of a problem in the
retention of the old ways, including beliefs and practices that are not successful in
the modern world, and they see fanaticism as stifling.I"
Resurgent or fundamentalist Islam sees itself as the solution to the problem.1
4
This type of Muslim fears the West, sees Western culture as corrupt, and believes
"Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality" are "worse evils than the
Western Christianity that produced them."' 5 Secularism, although perceived by
certain Christians as a threat to their religion as well, did m a sense spring out of
Christian thought. The early years of persecution by impenal Rome made it clear
that a separation of church and state was possible and later conflict between
competing traditions eventually persuaded enough Christians that separation of
church and state was necessary for peace to give birth to the modern secular state.
16
Christianity now and historically, survives when it is a minority and persecuted
religion. 17 This is not true of Islam, which is inexperienced at being a minority
religion, and has a theological vision of a religious state.I1
9. Bruce Sidebotham, Kingdoms in Conflict: Radical Islam Collides with the American Way, Dr.
Bruce Sidebotham, Operation Reveille Shofar (Sept./Oct. 2001) at http://www.oprev.org/
SepOct0i .htm#featurel [hereinafter Sidebotham II
10. BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? WESTERN IMPACT AND MIDDLE EASTERN
RESPONSE 151 (Oxford Umv. Press 2002).
11. Id. at 151-156.
12. Id. at 156.
13. Id. at 157.
14. Sidebotham 1, supra note 9.
15. SAMUEL HUNTINGDON, THE CLASH OF CrWLIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 213 (Simon & Schuster 1996).
16. LEWIS, supra note 10, at 96.
17. Id. at 96-97
18. Id. at 100-103.
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Qutb is probably the greatest of the fundamentalist Muslim thinkers. 19 In the
Shade of the Koran is his greatest work and Osama bm Laden is his disciple. He
hated the West for its schizophrenia in putting religion in one comer and the state
in a different one.20 He hated the split in the sacred and the secular and "wanted
Muslims to appreciate that, if God is the only god, God must rule over
everything.",
2 1
Qutb hated America, not because America did not uphold its principles, but
because of the very principles it holds, because it is a liberal society.22 He and his
followers truly feared an annihilation of Islam caused by liberal ideas.23 Kemal
Ataturk and his secular reforms in Turkey in 1924 were a despised example 24 and
Osama bm Laden referred to that event in his first video after 9/11 when he said,
"Our Islamic nation has been tasting the shame for more [than] eighty years. 25
Qutb-believed that "Islamism's truest enemy was not a military force but instead,
an insidious penetration of cultural influences and ideas, which could exterminate
Islam.
26
Qutb's answer is that "Koranic truth, to be grasped properly, requires not just
a serious experience of religious commitment, but of revolutionary action on
Islam's behalf."27 And so, although Qutb died in an Egyptian jail, his ideas spread
and the killing started. 28  The Islamist movement was successful: civil war in
Algeria, genocide in the Sudan of up to 2 million, noting in Nigeria, the
Palestinian Hamas, and revolution in Afghanistan.2 9 Torture, repression, and death
were the fruits which grew in the shade of the Koran as interpreted by the
fundamentalists.Although extremist Islam is a splinter group within broader Islam,
its use of violence in the form of terror has triggered the current War on Terrorism.
An ideological clash like the Cold War, it must be fought with ideological weapons
as well as military ones. Soviet style Communism eventually collapsed because of
perceived internal moral inferiority. One of the main battlegrounds of the War on
Terrorism is the minds of the Muslim majority 3 0 Most Muslims are moderate in
practice, but unwilling to oppose extremist groups for two reasons. One is their
own fear of violent reprisal. The other is that extremist groups correctly articulate
fundamentalist Islam; that is, Islam according to the literal meaning of the ancient
19. PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALiSM, 60 (W W Norton & Co. 2003).
20. Id at 79.
21. Id. at 87 Christianity maintains the same conviction, except that because it holds that the
Kingdom of Heaven starts with internal transformation of the soul, deficiencies in the expression of
faith in society are less threatening.
22. Id. at 89.
23. Id. at 91.
24. Id. at91.
25. Id. at 117
26. Id. at 183.
27. Id. at 67.
28. Id. at 101-104.
29. Id at II1-12.
30. Fatima Sayyed, Bush Nominates Daniel Pipes to Board of US Institute of Peace: Moderate
Muslims Welcome the Appointment, PAKISTAN TODAY (April 15, 2003) at http://www.paktoday.com
/pipes.htm.
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writings. The modernists, who hold moderate and liberal strains of theological
thought within Islam, interpret problematic texts figuratively or as limited in
application to an ancient historical context.3' For instance, Mahmud Muhammad
Taha, founder of the Republican brothers in the Sudan, was hung in 1985. He had
called for a "liberal, openly-debated, and humanistic revision of Shari'a, and had
a vision of a democratic state. 2 He was executed for heresy on hearsay evidence.3
In large part, world peace depends upon which interpretation of the religion
captures the minds of the Muslim world.
This ideological war will be partly waged at America's own borders. The
primary human intersection of America and the Muslim world is where people
from Muslim countries (whether Muslim, Christian or other minority) immigrate to
this country. American immigration policies and how they are applied,
particularly to refugees, will affect the War on Terrorism. This paper discusses
several aspects of international refugee law and U.S. immigration law with respect
to refugees from Muslim countries. It makes recommendations related to the dual
goals of respecting human rights and furthering the U.S. objectives m the War on
Terror, with respect to both specific issues and overarching policy considerations.
I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. REFUGEE LAW
And if a stranger dwells with you in your land, you shall not mistreat him. The
stranger who dwells among you shall be to you as one born among you, and you
shall love him as yourself for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. 3
The United States has been a nation of immigrants and refugees from its
beginings. Its entire history has been marked and marred with the tension
between the principles of human rights and the ingrained human tendency to
dislike and persecute those outside one's own group. In 1783, George Washington
said, "the bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent and
respectable stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and
religions. ,35 The League of Nations, which the United States helped to form m
1921 but ultimately did not join, established the position of High Commission for
Refugees. 36 America's own immigration laws of 1924 were "designed to exclude
31. "The commandment to 'slay the pagans where you find them' in verse 9:5 speaks of the
hostile Arab tribes surrounding Medina. When sincere scholarship and exegesis is applied, it
becomes quite clear that verse 9:5 is one of self-defence and not a carte blanche to kill all non-
believers. Distortion ofIslam, THE INDEPENDENT (BANDGLADESH), Nov. 21,2001.
32. Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North Africa,
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 139, 151-52 (1996).
33. Id
34. Leviticus 19:33-34.
35. Is This America? The Denial of Due Process to Asylum Seekers in the United States, I. The
Asylum Tradition and Expedited Removal, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1, (Oct 2000) at
http://www.ichr.org/refugees/reports/due-process/duejprocess.htm. (hereinafter Is This America?)
36. Kenneth Regensburg, Refugee Law Reconsidered: Reconciling Humanitarian Objectives with
the Protectionist Agendas of Western Europe and the United States, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 225, 229
(1996).
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Asians and restrict Immigration from southern Europe" but had exemptions for
people fleeing political and religious persecution. 7
During the 1930s, the United States sharply limited the number of refugees
from Nazism, and m 1939, more than 900 Jewish refugees aboard the St. Louis
were turned away within sight of Miami. 38 Hundreds who were refused entry died
in the concentration camps.39 During the 10 years of 1933 to 1943, the "refugee
quota from European countries dominated by the Nazis was underfilled by more
than 400,000 places."
4°
The United States, ashamed of its failure towards the Jews, admitted 350,000
people displaced by World War II.. 41 It also led the effort to establish the United
Nations and a concept of universally recognized human rights.42 The General
Assembly established the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR).43 America, during the following years, gave asylum to more than one
million refugees, especially those fleeing Communism.4
The concept of asylum, deriving from the Latin counterpart of the Greek
"asylon," means freedom from seizure.45 Sacred places have provided a refuge
from ancient times.46 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(1)
says the individual has a right "to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution. '47  Article 13(2) says that "everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own." 4 However, this is only a right to seek asylum, not to
receive it, because "an individual has no right to asylum enforceable vis-a-vis the
state of refuge. 49
In 1951, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
defined a refugee for the first time. 50  The United States did not sign this
convention, but did sign the 1967 Protocol which strengthened it.5i The Refugee
Act of 1980 adopted the same definition of refugee, that of a person who "owing to
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion" could not or did not
37. Is This America?, supra note 35, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ld. at 5.
41. Regensburg, supra note 36, at 229.
42. Is This America? supra note 35, at 6. The Dental of Due Process to Asylum Seekers in the
United States, I. The Asylum Tradition and Expedited Removal, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 6, (Oct. 2000) at http://www.ichr.org/refugees/reports/due_.process/due_process.htm.
43. Regensburg, supra note 36, at 229.
44. Is This America? supra note 35, at 7
45. Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1994) [hereinafter Boed 1].
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 9.
50. A. Roman Boed, Past Persecution Standard for Asylum Eligibility in the 7'h Circuit: Bygones
are Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 154-55 (1993) [hereinafter Boed 2].
51. Id.
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want to return to his/her country of origin. 52 The Committee drafting the 1951
Convention said that "well-founded fear" means the person has either actually
been a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he/she fears
persecution. 3 Persecution is not defined in the Convention or Protocol. 4 The
High Commissioner said in a UN Handbook that a "threat to life or freedom on
account of race, religion, nationality political opinion or membership of a
particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human
rights for the same reasons would also constitute persecution."5 5 The Supreme
Court's comment on the Handbook accepting this definition, is that the Handbook
"provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress
sought to conform."
5 6
When there have been changes in the country of origin, a person is generally
no longer eligible for asylum. 7 The 1951 Convention does exempt those who are
"able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of past persecution,"" for the
reason that there may not be a complete change either in local attitudes at home or
in the mmd of the refugee. 59
The principle of non-refoulement m Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention is
that states are not to return a refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opumon." 6 The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment also prohibits refoulement with respect to anyone who would be in
danger of torture.6 1 As Paul Weis, Legal Division Director of UNHCR says,
Asylum entails admission, residence and protection; non-refoulement is a
negative duty, not to compel a person to return to a country of persecution. 62
However, a state may send a person to another country where he would not be
persecuted.63 The reason there is no express duty to allow asylum seekers to enter
is that "states have a legitimate interest in the control of their borders and m the
maintenance of internal safety two areas affected by the amval of aliens." 64
Whether the principle of non-refoulement has become part of customary
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 159.
58. Id. (citing United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259).
59. Id. at 160.
56. Ved P Nanda, Introduction, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES
8 (Ved P Nanda ed.) (Greenwood Press, NY 1989).
61. Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees under International Humanitarian Law, in REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 35 (Ved. P Nanda ed.) (Greenwood Press,
NY 1989).
62. Boed 1, supra note 45, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 31.
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international law generates disagreement.. In practice, refugees are often rejected at
borders.65  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave the Attorney
General discretion to withhold deportation where an alien would face "physical
persecution" upon return.66 It also allowed aliens to be paroled temporarily into
the United States, and this clause was often used for people fleeing Commumst
countries.67 The Refugee Act of 1980 established annual parole programs subject
to discretion and influenced by public policy 68 For instance, the Act showed
"congressional preference for refugees fleeing states that were hostile to the United
States."69 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the non-refoulement provision
to have no extraterritorial effect, i.e., it is acceptable to reject aliens who have not
yet entered the country 70 If refoulement does not apply to these people, there is no
barrier to sending them back. The Umted States accepts non-refoulement in such a
limited form that unless non-refoulement is not an accepted principle of
international law, the United States is in breach of it.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), of which the 1980 Refugee Act
is part, and the regulations under it, govern the asylum process in the United
States under the supervision of the Attorney General. 71 The Attorney General
delegates the implementation of the INA to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). 72 The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is an
adminstrative body in the Department of Justice.73 It has a trial division, run by
Immigration Judges and an appellate division, which is the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).74 From the BIA, an alien may appeal to a federal court, which is a
limited review based on the administrative record.75
If the alien is granted asylum, he may stay in the United States for one year
then be examined for admission as an immigrant.76 Unless the refugee status has
been revoked, the alien can become a lawful permanent resident and remain in the
U.S. to qualify for naturalization. 77 The two hurdles are to qualify as a refugee
under the definition of the Refugee Act and to obtain a discretionary grant of
asylum from the Attorney General. 78 The two grounds for eligibility to qualify as a
refugee are "well-founded fear of persecution" or "past persecution., 79 If an alien
no longer qualifies as a refugee (because of changed situations in the country of
65. Id. at 22.
66. Regensburg, supra note 36, at 222.
67. Id. at 233.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 234.
70. Boed 1, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993)).
71. Boed 2, supra note 50, at 149.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id. at 151.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 152.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id. at 159.
79. Id. at 180.
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origin), his/her asylum can be revoked.8 0 He/she is still eligible for a claim for past
persecution, but the courts have rarely accepted claims based purely on past
persecution.ui If an alien is denied asylum or it is revoked, he/she can only appeal
when the INS begins exclusion or deportation proceedings.8 2
A critical U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1987 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
explained the difference between asylum and withholding of deportation.8 3 The
Attorney General must withhold deportation if an alien demonstrates that either
life or freedom would be threatened8 4 This is a "clear probability" standard,85
requiring that persecution is more likely than not, which is controlled by U.S.C. §
1253(h), also called Section 243(h) of the Act.8 6 A second type of broader relief,
found in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) or Section 208(a) of the Act, authorizes the Attorney
General to grant asylum "to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his
home country 'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.' 8 7 As
the Court said, "the 'well-founded fear' standard which governs asylum
proceedings is different and in fact more generous, than the 'clear probability'
standard which governs withholding of deportation proceedings."'8
In a second critical U.S. Supreme Court decision m 1992, LN.S. v. Zacartas,
Zacarias asked for asylum on account of his political opinion and the Court
interpreted the phrase "on account of' to require proof of the persecutor's motive
or intent. 9 The 1980 Refugee Act had used the international definition, departing
from the prior U.S. standards of admitting refugees on a basis of geography or
ideology 90 However, the Board of Immigration Appeals, by adopting an intent
based analysis, effectively divorced the U.S. determination of refugee status from
international human rights norms.91  For example, the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and
Belief is a non-binding declaration which proclaims and promotes religious
freedom in international law. 92 An intent based analysis, which makes refugees
prove an intent to persecute on the basis of religion, "falls short of providing
protection from religious persecution in asylum cases" by making persecution
80. Id. at 176-77.
81. Id. at 179.
82. Id. at 153.
83. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,424 (1987).
84. Id. at 423.
85. Id. at 425.
86. The modem version of § 8 U.S.C.S. 1253(h), amended in 1996, reads, "(h) Withholding of
deportation or return (1) The Attorney General shall not deport any alien to country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
87. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423.
88. Id. at 425.
89. Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human
Rights Norms, 15 MUIL 1179, 1180 (1994); I.N.S. v. Zacanas, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
90. Id at 1184.
91. Id. at 1213.
92. Id. at 1218.
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much harder to prove.93
The United States has made efforts, although imperfectly, to align itself with
international law concerning refugees and to develop international and U.S. law in
humanitarian directions. America is one of the main havens for refugees m the
world. U.S. policy has attempted to balance a concern for human rights with
furthering its domestic and foreign policy interests, hence the limitation on
immigration and the deliberate preference towards refugees from Communism
during the Cold War.94 Next this paper examines a more recent development in
refugee law
II. EXPEDITED REMOVAL
Ifyou look at our history and our immigration policy, our best days. have been
when we reached out and said, 'Yes. We are this country that is different. The
few times in our history when we have turned our back on people who are
persecuted. .we have lived to regret it. 95
-- Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH), May 1, 1996.
In 1986, Congress passed a law requiring non-citizen workers to have work
permits.96 Illegal aliens who wanted work permits found a loophole.97 If they
made an affirmative asylum application, they were granted a temporary work
permit.98  The number of asylum applications rose, creating an enormous
backlog. 99 As the applications were processed so slowly, there was even more of
an incentive to make the asylum application so that one could work.'00 Therefore,
a system driven by two good motivations, the humanitarian desire to provide
asylum on the part of the U.S., and the desire to work on the part of aliens, was out
of control by the early 1990s.10i
In January of 1993, a Pakistani gunman who had filed an affirmative asylum
application killed two CIA employees.102 Tis was followed by the discovery that
one of the perpetrators of the car bomb under the World Trade Center had
requested this asylum.'0 3
In 1993, the INS began a major administrative overhaul, which both
93. Id at 1219.
94. Is This America? supra note 35, at 7 7, (Oct. 2000) at http://www.lchr.org/
refugees/reports/due_process/dueprocess.htm
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 10-11.
100. Id. at 12.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id
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streamlined the process and canceled the temporary work permit provision'
°4
There was an mumediate drop m asylum applications and the asylum approval rate
was up to 38% by 1999 105
Congress, concerned about the same problem, passed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act m 1996, also referred to as expedited
removal. 0 6 Congress was also acting on its finding that "thousands of aliens arrive
m the U.S. at airports each year without valid documents and attempt to illegally
enter the U.S."'0 7 In an effort to block immigration of criminals, Congress added
crimes such as selling marijuana and drunk driving to the list of felonies that were
grounds for deportation, and included prior offenses. 08 The law also applies to
illegal aliens within the country who have not been physically present for two
continuous years.'°9
Here is how the 1996 law works. First an alien seeking entry presents
documents at the primary inspection."0 Any discrepancies, including a suspicion
of fraudulent use of facially valid documents, trigger a referral to a secondary
inspection."' If the officer at the secondary inspection determines that the alien is
inadmissible, he/she is subject to either expedited removal or regular removal12
Expedited removal is not only more prompt, but bans re-entry for five years.
1 13
This decision is reviewed briefly by a supervisor, but there is no federal judicial
review. 114
At the secondary inspection, aliens must be given the following information
about asylum in a language they understand: "If you fear or have a concern about
being removed from the United States or about being sent home, you should tell
me so during this interview because you may not have another chance.""' This is
the time when the alien needs to state his/her well-founded fear of persecution. 116
The alien is allowed no representation at this point." 7 Although there is supposed
to be an interpreter, it is not guaranteed. 18 The lack of representation is because
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at J17.
106. Id. at 19.
107 Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d 38,42 (D.C. 1998) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 104469, pt. I at 158 (1996)).
108. Anthony Lewis, A Bad Time for Civil Liberties, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP L. 1, 8
(1999).
109. Thomas J. White, Center on Law & Government, The Expedited Removal Study: Report on
the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 ND J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4
(2001).
110. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d at 42.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Is This America? supra note 35, at 22.
114. Id., Am. lmmigration. Lawyers Ass 'n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d at 56.
115. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass"n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d at 43, 44.
116. Id.
117. Is This America? supra note 35, at 122.
118. Id.
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the INS conducts more than 10 million [sic] secondary inspections a year. 19
Aliens who express this fear of persecution are scheduled for a credible fear
interview within seven days.12  Detention is mandatory until the credible fear
interview 121 Applicants are informally allowed to have an attorney at this
interview. 22 Credible fear approval rates are about 88%, and Muslim countries
overall have high approval rates.123 Also, if a person is determined not to have a
credible fear, he/she may request a de novo review by an Immigration Judge,
though without a right to representation. 24  Once credible fear has been
established, aliens are allowed to apply for asylum.'12
Mr. A., a 26 year old Algerian, was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), a major opposition political party which was outlawed by the Algerian
government in 1992.126 In 1994, he was detained and tortured by the police. 127 In
late 1994, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) abducted him and tried to coerce him to
plot to assassinate his employer, a former Algerian president. 28 He fled to a
friend's home.' 29 Months later, he and his friend were caught by the GIA. 30 Both
were beaten and his friend was shot. 13' After being arrested and tortured again by
Algerian security forces, he fled to the United States via China and asked for
asylum in San Francisco.
32
He was referred to secondary inspection where he was shackled and placed in
a room with a shackled Iraqi man, whom he was afraid of.133 Mr. A's English was
poor.134 The INS officer seemed angry at hun and told Mr. A he would be sent
back to China. 135 Mr. A said he would be killed. 136 The INS officer said he did
not care.'3
When the officer left, Mr. A grabbed a coffee cup, smashed it, and stabbed
himself in the abdomen with a shard, causing a deep wound. 138 He began
slamming his head into the table 139 and had to receive 10 to 15 stitches at the
119. Am. Immigration. Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d at 54.
120. Is This America? supra note 35, at 24.
121. Id. at 77.
122. Id. at 13.
119. White, supra note 109, at 60.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Is This Amerca?, supra note 35, at 24.
126. White, supra note 109, at 71.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 71-72.
133. Id. at 72.
134. ld.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. ld.
139. Id.
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hospital. 140 His medical report said that he was "alert, "cooperative, and "in
handcuffs." 41 He was finally interviewed in Arabic. 42 Mr. A was referred to a
credible fear interview and two weeks later he was found to have a credible fear. 143
INS policy only requires shackling when an officer has "reasonable, articulate
facts, such as known crmmnal behavior, observed dangerous or violent behavior, or
other indicators of risk of escape or assault to support the decision to restrain."'"
Rita Joy Martins-Beckley, a marned Sudanese woman fleeing religious and
political persecution, was ordered deported although she expressed a fear of
persecution.145 Her husband had come through separately and gotten his credible
fear interview, She however, was sent to detention pending her expedited
removal.' 6 After a pro bono lawyer and the husband's lawyer intervened on the
wife's behalf she eventually received asylum.1
47
INS policy requires that Any applicant for admission who expresses a
fear or concern about physical or psychological harm from any individual or
organizations, or who mentions past physical or psychological harm" should be
referred for credible fear, as well as any "applicant who exhibits any non-verbal
clues-such as crying, hysteria, trembling, unusual behavior, or fear of
harm 11148
Mr. C, a 25 year old Egyptian Coptic Christian who worked as an accountant
and baked bread for his Coptic Christian Church in Egypt in his spare time, had
been harassed and assaulted many times, including one serious beating. 149 He
came to the United States on a tourist visa and went home when his extension
expired. 15 While home mn his country a Muslim group tried to make him convert
or pay a fee.' 5' He fled back to the United States to ask for asylum and entered at
JFK airport in 1999 152
He was referred to secondary inspection and shackled for eight hours to a
bench. 153 He tried to explain the problems he had from Muslims in Egypt. 154 The
140. Id. at 72.
141. Is This Amenca? supra note 35, at 30.
142. White, supra note 109, at 73.
143. Id.
144. Id at 74 (citing Memorandum from the INS, Expedited Removal Regional Training P III (H)
(4) (1998)).
145. Is This America? supra note 35, at 19.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. White, supra note 109, at n2l Expedited Removal Study: Report (citing Memorandum from
the Office of Program, INS, Supplemental Training Materials on Credible Fear Referrals 1-2 (Feb. 6,
1998)).
149. Id. at 79.
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id.
153. Id. at 80.
154. Id
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INS officer said, "I am a Muslim. What is your problem with Muslims?' ' 55 Mr. C
was told the INS would contact his government, which frightened him so he said
he wasn't seeking asylum and was not referred for a credible fear interview 156 He
called his sister in Egypt from detention and was told it was not safe to return.'
57
From solitary confinement, "he wrote a desperate note to an INS asylum officer,
which finally prevented his deportation" and was eventually granted asylum.' 58
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 bars the INS from using
interpreters "with potential biases against individuals on the ground of religion,
race, nationality. etc. 159 The INS has been told to avoid the use of airline
interpreters wherever possible, but to Improve the use of contracted interpreter
services.16 INS also requires training for its officers "on the nature of religious
persecution abroad, including country-specific conditions"' 16 1 and training in
internet research access.
62
Mahamoud Farah, an asylum seeker from Somalia, arrived at JFK in 1997 163
He was insulted, cursed, pushed over backwards, and had his ear pulled.i64 His
wrists and ankles were shackled to a chair while he was mn a bent over position.
165
He watched others being kicked and spent fourteen hours in chains without food,
water, or a bathroom break.'66 Then he had to discuss his fear of returning "with
the same people who were being abusive to [him]." 67
The INS says it is "committed to ensure that all claims for refugee and asylum
protection are treated with fairness, respect and dignity ,,68 In practice, this area
still needs work.
Ms. A., a pregnant Nigerian who had been tortured and suffered a miscarriage
as a consequence, was told she would be sent back to Nigeria, that she was a liar,
and that she would be jailed for five years. 169 She was shaking and vomiting n the
airport.' 70 Officers said, "Die if you want to, we're not getting you a doctor."'
17 1
She was not informed about U.S. law and protection for those facing torture and
155. Id. at 80.
156. Id.
157 Id.
158. Is This America? supra note 35, at 21.
159. White, supra note 109, at 82.
160. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: APPENDIX D, INS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, 6 (Sept. 5, 2000).
161. White, supra note 109, at 82.
162. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUs FREEDOM, supra note 160, at 3.
163. Is This America? supra note 35, at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id at 27
168. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGious FREEDOM, supra note 160, at 1.
169. Is This Amernca? supra note 35, at 50.
170. Id. at 62.
171. Id.
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did not find out about asylum until she was in detention. 172
The INS Inspector's Field Manual says, "if the alien indicates in any fashion
that he or she has a fear of persecution, or that he or she has suffered or might
suffered [sic] torture, you are required to refer the alien to an asylum officer for a
credible fear determination."'
173
Mr. 0., a Nigerian theology student, was whipped and thrown mn jail us
Nigeria because of his political views. 174 Upon amvmg in the United States, he
was told he could not apply for asylum. 75 He was stripped naked and given a
body cavity search in the hallway of the airport. 1 76 When he cried he was mocked
by the INS officer, who said, "I have been in this business a long time. I have seen
people like you crying and pretending. I send them back for lying, whether they
cry or not." 177 Mr. 0. was later granted asylum.
179
INS policy requires that strip searches or body cavity searches are to be
conducted in private. 79 Body cavity searches are to be supported by a search
warrant and recorded.180 This is not always the case.' 8 l
There are some innate difficulties with the expedited removal process.
Refugees are unlikely to have documents. 182  If they have been tortured and
persecuted, they may be frightened of officials. 83 There are language problems,
they are worn out with traveling, and they may be ill or injured.184
Some officers are reported to be polite, courteous, professional, and follow
INS regulations scrupulously 185 Some refugees are treated kindly 186 Others are
treated badly 187 One bipartisan group of congressional staffers investigating
expedited removal conditions at JFK said that the INS officers had hostile body
language and tone and "acted as if every asylum claim was a personal affront."188
Refugees may not understand the process. In some countries, refugees do not
apply for asylum until after entering the country, so seekers may not be aware of
the need to express their fear of persecution and desire for asylum at the secondary
inspection unless the purpose of the inspection is explained.1 89 If refugees think
172. Id. at 50, 62.
173. White, supra note 109, at 74 (citing INS, Inspector's Field Manual 17.15 (b) (2) (1999)).
174. Is This America?, supra note 35, at 39.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 36.
180. Id
181. Id.
182. Id at 1.
183. Id. at 6.
184. Id. at 6, 7, 12.
185. Is This America? supra note 35, at 64.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 68.
188. Id. at 75.
189. Id. at 47
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
they will be deported, they may be afraid to criticize their own government for fear
of reprisals at home.'90
Despite public outcry over some of the flaws in the expedited removal law, it
seems unlikely that the law will be, or perhaps even should be, changed at this time
because of U.S. security concerns. Because this law means that an enforcement
officer of the INS, rather than a trained Immigration Judge, can turn refugees
away, the INS enforcement officers should undergo the same training that the
asylum officers do. Open access to secondary inspection, allowing monitoring of
the process by outside groups, would hold INS officers accountable. Refugees
should be allowed to contact family, friends, and counsel for support, even if they
are not allowed to participate in the secondary inspection.
Although opinions differ as to whether the law is fair, it appears that the worst
abuses happen when existing regulations are flouted. Aliens should be treated with
courtesy and respect. Inspectors must remember that the consequences of their
decision can mean life or death for the refugees. Enforcing existing regulations
would ensure appropriate privacy during (justifiable) searches, that only people
who seem dangerous are shackled and all refugees have access to adequate food,
water, and the bathroom.' 9' Regulations about interpreters should be followed as
well. 192 Having a brutal attitude or callously breaking regulations should be
sufficient cause for ending an INS officer's career. Random, but regular exit
surveys of asylum applicants, would be a good way of checking "customer
service.
Besides the fact that people should be treated with respect and dignity, there is
an important U.S. policy concern. Each and every alien, whether granted asylum
or not, is a talking advertisement of U.S. attitudes (as embodied in INS inspectors)
and values. Each person has many links to friends and families. Many asylum
seekers may be well known in their own countries. International travelers entering
a foreign country are always a little frightened and impressionable; how much
more so those fleeing persecution and seeking asylum. Those first hours form a
permanent impression of our country Their views, collectively, are taken around
the world by word of mouth. The United States is engaged in an ideological war
about freedom and should make sure that this "advertising" is positive and a
recommendation for this country
190. Id. at 49.
191. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F Supp. 2d 38, 63 (D.C., 1998).
192. ld. at 54.
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III. DETENTION
Being a refugee in America has become a crime, we are handcuffed, shackled and
treated like criminals. 
193
--July 20, 1999 letter from Olufema Abdulai, Nigerian asylum seeker
Once someone has been referred for a credible fear interview, detention is
mandatory 194 After the credible fear interview, the refugee is eligible for parole
while the asylum case is pending. 195 Unfortunately, refugees are more commonly
kept m detention1% with the average detention being fifty-seven days.1 97 Refugees
from Sudan averaged 167 days, and those from other Muslim countries are also
high above the average.
198
The INS has been building and expanding detention facilities and contracting
jail space as well, so that refugees are sometimes put among criminal mmates.' 99
The cost ranges from $58 to $100 per person per day, and was estimated to exceed
$500 million annually by 2001 .20 Curiously, while "it is INS policy to favor
release of aliens found to have credible fear of persecution, provided that they do
not pose a risk of flight or danger to the community,' m actuality, very few are
202paroled. Detention makes it difficult for detainees to prepare their asylum pleas
with counsel.20 3 If the facility is far away it can take counsel most of a day just to
spend a few minutes with the detamee.
204
Whether refugees have family or friends willing to support them does not
appear to matter.0 5 One Somali seeker who was detained nearly four years had
U.S. citizen relatives willing to support him, but his parole requests were denied or
ignored.20 6
Mr. Ladipo of Nigeria, who was repeatedly arrested and beaten m Nigeria
because of pro-democracy activities and whose brother was killed, came into the
U.S. without documents. 20 7 He asked to be paroled to his six cousins who were all
193. Refugees Behind Bars: The Imprisonment of Asylum Seekers in the Wake of the 1996
Immigration Act, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1 (Aug. 1999) at
http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descripuonsbehindbars.htm [hereinafter Refugees Behind Bars].
194. Is This America, supra note 35, at 77.
195. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 1.
196. Id.
197. White, supra note 109, at 68.
198. Id at 69.
199. Alisa Solomon, A Dream Detained, THE VILLAGE VOICE, March 30, 1999, at 46.
200. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 1-2.
201. Id at 4.
202. Id. at 1.
203. Id at 3.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 4.
206. Id
207. Id at 6.
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
legal residents, andone being a U.S. citizen.208 He was refused parole. 209
Dr. Z, an Afghani tortured by the Taliban because he touched a woman while
helping to deliver her woman baby escaped to the United States.2 '0 His cousin was
willing to support him, but his parole was demed for two and a half months. 21 I
Yudaya Nanyonga, from Uganda, was a high school student who was forced
to quit school to work and buy food and clothes for the rebels.21 2 Military officials
suspected her as a collaborator and she fled to the United States.. 21 3 Her sister
disappeared and her brother was killed the following year.21 4
She was put in chains at secondary inspection and chained to a chair for 20
hours.21 5 She spent nearly two years dressed in prison uniform.216 Part of the time
was m a county jail.217 One day she was crying hysterically and was put m
maximum security for not paying attention to orders.28 At that point, "five guards
forced Nanyonga to disrobe, took her to a small cell, and fastened her to a cot.
219
She was "secured spread-eagle onto a coverless bed in four-point restraints while
men in not gear laughed at her nakedness." 20 They sedated her by roughly
injecting a needle.22 "No one ever saw me naked like that. They made it even
worse because they were laughing and making fun of me. 222 She was injected
again and woke up two days later "wondering who had put her bra and panties
back onto her body and wondering what else they might have done."22 Jail
officials justified it by saying she was suicidal.Y 4 Next she spent a month and a
half in maximum security with cruninals who called her "African monkey , 225
Although she has since been granted asylum, she is clinically depressed.226 "I have
no desire to go anywhere, to do anything. I am afraid of being outside. I don't
trust anyone."' 1
Conditions can be very poor in detention. The only access to fresh air may be
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 10.
211. Id.
212. Elizabeth Llorente, A Young Woman's Search for Safety Puts Her in Chains, THE RECORD,
(BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.), Feb. 13,2000, at AIO.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id
220. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
221. Llorente, supra note 212, at A10.
222. Id.
223. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Llorente, supra note 212, at AIO.
227. Id.
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"an hour in a walled-m cement courtyard with a chain-link roof."22 Refugees
must wear a prison uniform, which is difficult for women who culturally wear long
dresses. 229 A typical setting is a large dorm-type room and open showers and
toilets separated by three foot walls and no doors.23°At times there have been
unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, and physical and sexual abuse.23'
One active tuberculosis patient at Wackenhurt apparently exposed 90 other people,
who then tested positive for tuberculosis. 232 Sometimes detainees are mixed with
criminals and sometimes shocked with stun guns, cursed, or beaten.23' Guards
have been prosecuted for putting detamees' heads in the toilet, pulling their
genitals with pliers, and forcing sexual acts.23 a
Adelaide Abankwah, a woman from Ghana who spent two years in
detention235 said, "Please tell [the INS] that I am not a criminal. I just want to be
free. .1 feel like I am dead here. There is no fresh air. I cannot eat. I feel that
this is where I will die."
236
District Director McElroy said that paroled applicants are unlikely to appear
at hearings, but Ms. McClenahan of Catholic Legal Immigration Network says that
check-m requirements and other procedures can be very successful. 237  The
Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom said, "The
unnecessary detention of already traumatized victims of religious persecution, as
well as other types of persecution, should be examined with the goal of providing
release ,238 Torture victims, for instance, can experience panic attacks and
flashbacks from being detained.239
Because the INS has recommendations but not regulations, it would be
helpful for Congress to clarify that detentions after the credible fear interview are
not the desired policy and for the INS to issue regulations providing for parole of
asylum seekers who pose no danger to the community 240 This would achieve a
human rights policy goal, and save a great deal of taxpayer money.241 The INS
should be regularly accountable for detention conditions. Detainees should be kept
away from criminal populations. Besides releasing detainees to friends and
families of good character, the INS can use refugee accommodation centers, group
homes, and supervised release programs. Refugees can also be released on bond
228. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
229. Refugee Women at Risk supra note 1, at 10.
230. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
231. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 17-2 1.
232. Id. at 28.
233. Id. at 18-19.
234. Id. at 20.
235. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
236. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 23 (crtmg Ginger Thompson, Asylum for Woman
Threatened with Genital Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1999).
237. Solomon, supra note 199, at 46.
238. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad to the Secretary of
State and to the President of the United States, May 17, 1999, at 48.
239. Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 193, at 29.
240. id. at 7-8.
241. Id. at 6.
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or to a guarantor. Non-profit groups spend money more efficiently than the
government at no cost to taxpayers, and should be encouraged. This frees both
money and energy to more fully investigate those who might actually be a danger
to the community.
IV WHEN DOES RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BECOME PERSECUTION?
The very God! think Abib; dost thou think? So, the All-Great, were the All-
Loving too- So, through the thunder comes a human voice. 242
--Robert Browning
Zaid b. Aslam reported that the Apostle of Allah (may peace be upon him)
declared that the man who leaves the fold of Islam should be executed.
-- Muwatta Imam Malik
243
The INS has seen an increase m religious asylum claims from Muslim
countries. 24 The majority of these claims are Christian, either ethnically Christian
or converts from another religion, usually Islam.245 Sudan and Iran retain the
Shari'a rule of apostasy m which conversion from Islam is "punishable by death or
imprisonment," while in other countries converts are executed as spies. 246 Some of
these refugees flee their country out of fear of persecution, but others are sur place
asylum claims, resulting when "an asylum applicant claims religious conversion
while m the United States."
247
The international law standards on religious freedom are expressed m the
1981 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.248 This was an "update" of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which said in Article 18 "Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief m
teaching, practice, worship, and observance., 249 The 1981 Declaration provides a
242. ROBERT BROWNING, An Epistle, THE POETICAL WORKS (New York: Hurst & Co., 1872).
243. John Gilchnst, The Social Laws and Customs oflslam, in MUHAMMAD AND THE RELIGION OF
ISLAM, orig. JESUS TO THE MUSLIMS, at 4 (Benoni, Republic of South Africa 1986), at
http://answenng-islam.org/GilchristfVoll/8d.html.
244. Tuan N. Samahon, The Religion Clauses and Political Asylum: Religious Persecution Claims
and the Religious Membership-Conversion Imposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J. 2211, 2211 (2000).
245. Id, see also cases discussed in this article.
246. Samahon, supra note 244, at 2211.
247. Id. at 2214.
248. Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining
the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. R EV. 217, 217 (2002).
249. Id. at 224.
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"comprehensive list of rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."5 0
However, it does not specifically include the right to change religion because of
protests from Muslim countries. 25' In compromise, Article 8 says, "Nothing m the
present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right
defined m the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,,52 Therefore, by
implication, the right to change religion may be preserved.253 The Declaration is
limited because it is not a convention or binding international law but it still has
the "most prestige among all the international human rights documents; it has
become the highest standard by which religious human rights are upheld."2"4 As
such, it should guide the United States in its refugee policy and in determining who
has been persecuted on account of their religious beliefs.
Congress, m passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act,255 wanted
to "heighten the awareness of religious persecution as a ground for refugee
status. 256 It developed guidelines for INS office training, for interpreters, for
training in understanding religious persecution, and for evaluation.257 There were
also to be annual reports on religious freedom in different countries, which were to
be used as a resource. 2, s The changes were "intended to ensure that victims of
religious persecution receive the same consideration given to refugees fleeing
persecution" for other reasons.259 The Congressional intent, which has probably
not been effectively carned out, is worth noting.
For a well-founded fear, the "asylum applicant bears the burden of
establishing that he or she qualifies as a refugee 'either because he or she has
suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of future
persecution. ' 260 In an unpublished case, Dib, a native of Syria, was denied
application for asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 261 His father
was an evangelical preacher and he and his father had both been warned to stop
preaching the gospel and stop providing humanitarian aid to Christians.262 They
were both beaten until they were unconscious, and his father died of the injuries.263
Although the Immigration Judge mysteriously did not find that this rose to the
250. ld at 226.
251. Id. at229.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 232
255. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (H.R. 2431); U.S. Committee for Refugees,
Compromise Religious Persecution Bill Passes, at 1, http://www.refugees.org/
world/articles/religiousrr98_i 0.htm.
256. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Compromise Religious Persecution Bill Passes, at 2,
http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/religious-rr98-10.htm.
257. id. at 7, 10, 14, 15.
258. Id. at 15.
259. Id. at 5.
260. Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (C.A. 2003).
261. Dib v. INS, No. 96-70524, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10807 at *2 (9th Cir. 1997).
262. ld. at 3, 4.
263. Id. at *4.
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
level of persecution, 264 the Ninth Circuit overruled and granted asylum, saying that
he was both personally threatened and had a reasonable fear because of his father's
death for his faith. 26
Asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution satisfies a subjective test
of genuine fear and an objective test of "credible, direct, and specific evidence in
the record" supporting a reasonable fear.2 s Muslim Abkhaz Separatists gamed
control in Abkhazia, part of Georgia, and starting killing and torturing non-
Abkhaz.267 Melkoman and his wife Angela were Armenian Christians with a large
farm and a herd of cattle. 2 Angela's father spoke out against Muslim tactics, and
then had to flee with Melkonian to Russia.269 Separatists stole all the cows and
murdered an elderly woman and man associated with the family 270 Melkonian and
Angela eventually made their way to the United States and asked for asylum.271
The lower court denied asylum, but the Circuit Court said that the proper standard
was whether he had a credible subjective fear and whether it was objectively
reasonable. 272 The Court decided that with the campaign of ethmic cleansing and
the possibility that Melkonian would be killed "because of his prior support of the
Georgians (political opinion), and because he is an Armenian (ethnicity) and a
Christian (religion), the Immigration Judge (IJ) was in error.273
In granting or denying asylum, the court must consider past persecution.274 El
Moraghy, a young Coptic Christian, applied for asylum after his tourist visa
expired "to escape the persecution of the Muslim Fundamentalists in Egypt,
because I am a Coptic Christian." 275  Four fellow students, members of a
fundamentalist Muslim group, beat him up, dislocating his shoulder and giving
him a concussion.276 He suffered violence other times as well. A Muslim woman
friend of his asked to visit the monastery with him.277 They were stopped and
forced out of her car by Islamic fundamentalists, who told him that because of their
relationship, El Moraghy must convert and marry her.278 He was forced to sign a
paper promising to convert, but since the official in charge of conducting
marriages was not available, they were told to return to complete the marriage
later. 279 Fearing for his life because he did not intend to convert, El Moraghy left
264. Id. at 5.
265. Id. at *7-8.
266. Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1065 (C.A. 9 2003).
267. Id. at 1065.
268. Id. at 1066.
269. Id
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1066-67
272. Id. at 1068.
273. Id. at 1069.
274. Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 198 (2003).
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277. Id. at 200.
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279. Id at 200.
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280the country, and applied for asylum. He argued that the "government could not
control fundamentalists and did little to protect Coptic Christians. ' '2Si The
IJdisimssed the State Department country condition reports for Egypt, which
described anti-Coptic terrorism, because a "review of those documents does not
refer to the respondent or any members of his family m Egypt."2 2 The IJ did not
address whether El Moraghy had suffered past persecution and concluded that he
was not likely to be persecuted.28 3 The Circuit Court remanded, ruling that this
was improper use of the country reports, and the court must make findings on past
persecution. 2s
If the government is doing the persecuting, it should be possible to
demonstrate a lack of safety in the country. Abdel's claim as a Sudanese Christian
under the Islamic military government was that he had been arrested and beaten
twice during protest demonstrations and the government was looking for him.
285
The BIA did not find that this rose to the level of persecution, but the Circuit Court
found that while the previous beatings were not persecution, there was "little
reason to generally suppose that a government's past actions m this respect create
an 'outer limit' on its future actions. ' 2  Conditions in Sudan showed that the
government was promoting a plan to impose Shari'a on all citizens and that there
was civil war raging against Christians in the southern part of Sudan.28 7 The
Circuit Court reversed.288
Courts usually deny a claim when the attacks are made by individuals;
"persecution must be at the hands of the government or a group the government is
unable or unwilling to control. '2 9 In an unpublished case, Morgan, a 42 year old
Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Christian who applied for asylum in 1982, had been
arrested and beaten by the police in 1972, to the point where he had broken
bones.29 In 1981 he was threatened with death because he was a Christian.29' The
court denied his claim, saying that "Copts have full constitutional protection in
Egypt 292 and that "Morgan had failed to establish that the Egyptian authorities
were unwilling to help him in such circumstances. 293
In another unpublished case, Lma Mozian, a Lebanon-born Palestinian
Chrstian, was threatened and interrogated by Christian militia because she was
280. Id. at 201.
281. Id
282. Id. at 202.
283. Id
284. Id. at 198.
285. Abdel-Masieh v. U.S. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1996).
286. Id. at 584.
287. Id. at 586.
288. Id. at 586-87.
289. Mozan v. INS, No. 95-70551, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1380 at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1997).
290. Morgan v. INS, No. 92-70818, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23893 at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994).
291. Id. at *3.
292. Id. at *4.
293. Id. at *5.
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Palestinian and tortured by Muslim groups because she was a Christian. 294 The
court was unsympathetic because she did not establish that the Lebanese
government could not or would not control the problem.295
Courts seem to think that having "full constitutional protection" is meaningful
m Muslim countries. They also are reluctant to call "isolated incidents"
persecution. This is analogous to lynchmgs which occurred in the South m the
last century Afican-Amencans had "full constitutional protection, at least of
their lives, and lynchmgs were, relative to the number of black people, merely
isolated incidents. However, an entire race of people lived in terror because the
laws protecting them were not implemented. This is exactly the situation today in
many Muslim countries.
The writer of this article saw a young Pentecostal preacher dying m a hospital
m a predominantly Muslim area of Indonesia from a beating that occurred when he
was m police custody, which left marks of burns and electric shocks. What was the
reason? At a revival service he led, converts to Christianity from ammism burned
their magic charms. A Muslim observer accused hun of burning a copy of the
Koran. He died on his 2 2 d birthday The whole proceeding was illegal and
unconstitutional in that secular country, and was statistically unlikely to happen to
the other 20 million Indonesian Christians, so a U.S. court would have been
unlikely to give protection to an Indonesian Christian threatened m this way
Sadeghi was an Iranian teacher who did not agree with the Islamic principles
of the 1979 revolution.296 He was teaching in 1982 when he advised a fourteen-
year-old student not to go fight m the Iraqi war to be a "martyr for God."
297
Because of this episode, four armed men came to arrest him, and while other
teachers and students distracted them, Sadeglu fled.298 He managed to leave the
country and asked for asylum from America.299 Despite the fact that he presented
evidence that he was still on a wanted list, the decision to deny asylum was
affirmed. 30 ° The dissent indignantly pointed out that assuming Sadeghi's behavior
was subject to legitimate prosecution was wrong, as "Iran has ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child which prohibits nations from permitting or
requiring children to participate m fighting wars. 3 °1 This judge believed that
denying Sadeghi asylum was "ignoring the very purpose of our immigration laws
as intended by Congress. 30 2 Moreover, our court essentially aided the Iranian
regime, which was violently anti-American, to persecute its own dissidents who
were promulgating a viewpoint consistent with a democratic one.
Courts can have a very narrow definition of persecution. In an unpublished
294. Mozian v. INS, No. 95-70551, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 1380 at *4.
295. Id.
296. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th Cir. 1994).
297. Id
298. Id at 1144.
299. Id. at 1140.
300. Id. at 1140.
301. Id. at 1145.
302. Id. at 1148.
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case, they denied a claim for Ghali, a Christian Syrian woman, on the grounds that
what she experienced was merely harassment.0 3 The dissent brought out some
interesting facts. She was insulted by a male Muslim supervisor in the government
Ministry where she worked who said, "Christian women are all whores, and "I
know your [sic] a virgin and you want to give it up, and put his hand on her body
whenever he saw her. ° Once the supervisor and two of his bodyguards detained
her for an hour, groping her and saying, "Let us see if you really are a virgin.
30 5
The bodyguards held her down while the supervisor simulated rape.3°  She
appealed to higher Mimstry officials, who told her that "because she was a
Christian, she would have to solve the problem herself. 30 7 She then complained to
the police, "who also refused to help because she was a Christian. 30 8 After that,
she received a letter threatening her life because she had complained to the police,
whereupon she fled the country.3 9 It is hard to see why this is not considered
persecution, and one cannot help but wonder if a judge would see this differently if
it happened to a member of his/her family
Sometimes it is hard for an applicant to articulate what is happening,
especially if the court is unsympathetic. Grachik and Anik Rostomian were
Armenian Christians, age 80 and 77 respectively, who had fled to the United States
to live with their only daughter because of their Christian beliefs. 10 Their
application was denied. 31 ' The dissent pointed out that Muslim Azens had beaten
Mr. Rostomian and cut his back with kmves, that the Azeris had come back
"constantly, and the Rostomians had fled because there was no police
protection.31 2 Their claim was denied because it was not detailed enough, but the
court had insisted on questioning Mr. Rostomian who was "an elderly gentleman
[who] has difficulty remembering a lot of things that happened" and refused to
allow his wife to speak.313  The dissent protested, "Leaving aside the
fundamentally unfair treatment they received at their deportation hearing, what
purpose does it serve to send this elderly couple back to Armenia?"
314
Courts will deny the claim if there is a subjective fear, but not enough
objective evidence about the country.. In an unpublished case, Fatmir Visha was a
native of Albania and a Muslim convert to Christianity who filed for asylum after
studying in the United States.31 5 He said he feared being killed as an outspoken
convert from Islam and that he had been harassed and threatened. 16 The INS
303. Ghali v. INS, No. 98-70947,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19156 at 4(9th Cir. Aug. 4,2000).
304. Id. at *7
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at *8.
310. Rostomian v. INS, 210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000).
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315. Visha v. INS, No. 00-3446, 51 Fed. Appx. 547, 548 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2002).
316. Id. at 549.
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agreed that his fear was subjectively genuine but denied Ins claim saying he had
not shown objective evidence and his country reports were too general.31 7
Sometimes the court can get confused between ethnic and religious groups.
Mansour, a 42 year old native of Iraq and an Assyrian Christian, made an asylum
claim because of religious persecution.318 The Iraqi army, m which he served, beat
him up, broke his leg, and damaged the vision m one eye because of his faith and
because "they thought I had joined the Kurdish rebels." 319  The BIA denied
Mansour's claim, but the appellate courts questioned "whether the BIA adequately
comprehended and addressed Mansour's torture claim," 320 because the BIA called
his group Syrian Christian rather than Assyrian Christian. 321 "Mansour is not a
citizen of Syria, as the phrase 'Syrian Christian' may suggest.322 He is an Iraqi
national, an ethnic Assyrian, and a member of the Chaldean Catholic Church.,
323
Pointing out that the U.S. Department of State Report (1998) said that Assyrian
Christians were abused, the Seventh Circuit vacated the BIA s decision against
Mansour.
324
In other cases the court has sometimes applied its own limited experience.
Bandari, a 25 year old Armenian Christian from Iran, fell in love with Afsaneh, a
Muslim girl, and kissed her one mght in the street. 325 The police arrested him for
breaking a law against public display of affection, but when they found he was a
Christian, they knocked him down, beat, and kicked him.326 He was beaten with a
rubber hose, and they wanted him to confess to rape.327 Bandarl was given the
choice between conversion and being convicted of an interfaith relationship. 32s
When he would not convert, he was sentenced to 75 lashes and a year in prison.329
His grandfather got urn out of prison with a bribe.330 When it became clear that
the situation was not over, he fled Iran, where there is still a rape charge
pending.331 The BIA judge did not find is testimony credible however, because of
minor discrepancies and because she did not believe that beating with a rubber
hose would not cause him to bleed.332 (Bandan said his back swelled but did not
bleed.)33 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed.334
317. Id. at 549, 550.
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Rape is a common charge against Chnstians m the Muslim world. Again, this
is analogous to the common accusation prior to a lynching that a black man had
raped or slept with a white woman. The author of this article has personal friends
in Indonesia whose family sheltered Defi, a teenage Muslim girl who ran away and
converted to Christianity. When Defi's family found her, she denied that she ran
away and converted voluntarily to protect herself. Despite a statement that the girl
had signed when she moved m with the family rape and kidnapping charges were
filed against the father of the host family and two pastors. When a lynch mob
threatened to burn down the court and kill the judge and the defense counsel as
well as the defendants, the court quickly convicted the three men to a several year
jail sentence.. When released, their lives will be m danger. It is sobering that they
might not be eligible for asylum m the U.S.
Sometimes the court has limited cultural experience. In an unpublished case,
Wissa, a 3 8 year old Coptic Christian, experienced multiple threats, detentions, and
beatings by both police and Muslim fundamentalists because of his religion.
335
There was a fraud issue as well and the BIA found it incredible that he had not
contacted a lawyer about being defrauded by fundamentalists.336 The conversation
went as follows:
Immigration Judge: "The question is why didn't you contact a lawyer.
Wissa: "I didn't know how to get in touch with a-
H: "How about-you happen to be sitting here with a beeper on your pants on your
belt. Do you know how to use a telephone?"
"In Egypt, we don't have telephones or beepers.
"Oh, you don't have telephones in Egypt? I see.
"In my pocket just like now, no. ' 337
The Ninth Circuit remanded, commenting that he was "less concerned about being
defrauded and more concerned about being beaten or killed."
338
One difficulty for refugees from Muslim countries is that Westerners do not
understand that Islam is not monolithic and has more than one tradition. 3 39 For
instance, Shari'a law can impose a death penalty for conversion (apostasy) and
many families throughout the Muslim world will kill a relative who converts.
335. Wissa v. INS, No. 98-70974, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8212 at *2 (9th Cir. 2000).
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339. Susan Musarrat Akram, Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claits, IJRL
2000.12(7), at 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
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Poison was a favorite method m areas where this author has lived. The death
penalty for apostasy is of long tradition, but there "does not seem to be any
Qur'amc authority for this extreme form of punishment The Hadith, however,
openly states that Muhammad demanded the death sentence for those who turn
their backs on Islam ,,40
However, many modem Muslim jurists disagree that the death penalty for
conversion is part of Islamic law.34i They also differ on whether violence should
be used on unbelieving outsiders. One writer said,
The commandment to 'slay the pagans wherever you find them' in verse 9:5
speaks of the hostile Arab tribes surrounding Medina When sincere
scholarship and exegesis is [sic] applied, it becomes quite clear that verse 9:5 is
one of self-defense and not a carte blanche to kill all non-believers.
342
Moreover, what a government professes and what extremist groups do is often
different. Muslim government officials often do not intervene on behalf of
Christians or minorities to whom they are not very sympathetic anyway because
they fear violence to themselves or widespread nots by sympathizers with the
extremists.
The court must consider how different governments react to apostasy. Najafi,
a native to Iran, lived in the United States for a number of years and converted to
Christianity.343 He asked for asylum as a refugee because apostasy is a capital
crime M IrMa. 3 " The lower court denied his claim, apparently unsure as to whether
Najafi was really a Christian.345 The ugher court said that how "apostates are
treated m Iran is at the heart of the asylum mqury" and remanded the claim, giving
Najafi some good advice as to what sort of evidence he should present.3 6
Without understanding how complex Islamic thought is, courts will not
understand a Muslim refugee who has a genuine Islamic belief but is also being
persecuted by an Islamic government. 47 It is important for the INS and the
immigration court system to understand these complexities, both for human rights
reasons, and because it is current U.S. policy to encourage moderate positions
within Islam.
Asylum seekers on religious persecution grounds are rightly questioned about
their faith but not always m sensible ways. The questioning tends to take the form
of a doctrinal quiz.34 Sometimes a new convert, or an uneducated applicant, or an
applicant from a country where his/her religion has been repressed cannot answer
340. Gilchnst, supra note 243, at 3.
341. Akram, supra note 339, at 48.
342. Distortion ofIslam, THE INDEPENDENT (BANGLADESH), Nov. 21, 2001.
343. Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1997).
344. Id at 948.
345. Id
346. Id. at 949-50
347. Akram, supra note 339, at 6-7.
348. Testing the Faithful: Religion and Asylum, Summary Results of Survey, Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, 1-2 (Nov. 2002) at http://www.lchr.org.
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detailed questions.349 In once case a Shi'ite Muslim knew the names of the main
unams, but could not name all twelve, which caused the judge to deny his claim
(which was later granted on appeal.)350 In another case a refugee from Russian
Tatarstan, who had converted from Islam to evangelical Christianity, could not
answer a series of questions about the difference between Orthodox and
evangelical beliefs (and neither could most American Christians).3 5 1 He knew the
"Lord's Prayer" but not the English name for it.352 The judge found this so
outrageous that he started jumping up and down and yelling at him. 35' An Iraqi
Chaldean Christian had to recite the Ten Commandments and demonstrate prayer
for about half an hour until his translator refused to keep translating.
354
Particularly in conversion cases, it is a problem if either the translator or the
decision-maker is a member of the group the asylum seeker fears.355 Some
adjudicators seemed to believe that the right to practice faith freely is important,
while others appeared to want refugees to go home and be quiet about their
religion.35 6 On the whole, "U.S. immigration judges were generally receptive to
learning about religions that they [we]re not familiar with. 357
A better approach than quizzing applicants about details of their religion is to
elicit information about how they practice their religion, what the religion means to
them personally, and their experience of persecution.358 Judges should have a
respectful attitude and also be aware that not all refugees can afford expensive
expert testimony 359
One concern about convert applicants is whether or not they are imposters,
and no doubt some are. There is a perception that asylum applicants abuse
religious asylum to avoid deportation and to get welfare benefits or work
authorization.360 Asylees who apply sur place (from within the United States)
because they have converted "likely will only have recourse to the religion ground
for protection. ' 3 6 ' They do not need to have suffered past persecution but must be
identified with a religious group that would be subject to persecution.362 Tuan
Samahon argues that the INS cannot define religion too explicitly without
interfering in the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise clause and points out
that mainstream Christianity has a lack of verifiable outward observances.363
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350. Id. at 11.
351. Id. at 10.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 10.
354. Id. at 12.
355. Id. at 17.
356. Id. at 4.
357. Id. at 5.
358. Id. at 6.
359. Id. at 7.
360. Samahon, supra note 244, at 2215.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 2218.
363. Id. at 2215-16.
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
While lack of outward observances is a problem, those working with Muslim
converts widely accept that the watershed of true commitment is baptism. Baptism
is seen by Muslims as the point of betrayal and by Christians as full commitment.
It is generally the one single act that puts the convert's life at risk. Furthermore,
the community, the brotherhood of the faith, (ummah Islam) is absolutely crucial in
Islam. Leaving the ummah Islam will bring personal rejection at a mminmum.
Generally, people are unlikely to sever these important ties without some real
conviction. Those whose conversion is not entirely genuine are usually fleeing a
dysfunctional and unhappy background. Supporting even doubtful conversions is
good public policy because conversions within an ethnic group spark more
conversions and any encroachment on the monolithic practice of Islam tends
towards pluralism and moderation.
V SPECIAL ISSUES FOR WOMEN
Around the world women often suffer persecution because they are female,
and experience persecution differently because they are women.
Female refugees outnumber males, 365 but unless gender-related claims are
acknowledged, female refugees are less likely than men to be found eligible.3 "
The 1951 Convention does not include gender as a ground of persecution367 and
some even argue that women are not a social group because it would be too
broad.3 " Sometimes women face the same persecution as men and sometimes
persecution is gender-specific. 369 At times women are persecuted for having
transgressed the mores of their culture, and sometimes just for being a close
relative of another persecuted person.370 For a long time, gender-specific
persecution was not recognized, but that is changing.37' The 1979 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimmation Against Women, Article 1, defines
"discrmmation against women" as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human nghts and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.
372
364. Refugee Women at Risk, supra note 1, at 1.
365. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26
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Muslim countries make a number of reservations to this treaty based on Shari'a
law.3 73 The argument is that the reservations are based on religion and expressions
of religion are protected by international human rights law.374 Religion however,
"may not be used as a justification for the derogation of rights that are universally
recognized and upheld., 375 The U.S. government is trying to develop appropriate
responses and its "leadership in recognizing gender-based asylum claims is crucial
in settling an example for many other nations and should be applauded. 376
Rape is now legitimately considered persecution, though it was not m the
past.377 As recently as 1989 the Fifth Circuit denied the claim of a Salvadoran
woman whose male family members were hacked and shot to death.378 She was
forced to watch and then she was raped.379 The rape was found not to be political
but personal. 380 However, it has become increasingly known that while men are
tortured in other ways, women are often raped or sexually tortured by the same
actors for the same reasons. 31 Rape and sexual assault on female family members
of political opponents is seen more and more as persecution.
382
Women who have been raped and assaulted have difficulty talking about their
experiences, especially to a male interviewers or judges.383 In some cultures, a
woman will be ostracized if a sexual assault becomes known. 384 One Albanian
woman fled to the United States in May 1997 after being gang-raped by armed and
masked men who were hunting her husband for political reasons.38 5 She was put
into expedited removal and was too ashamed to talk about the rape to an Albanian
male interpreter, because of the shame in her culture.3 6 She was then deported to
Albania.3 7 Later on, her case became known in the press and the INS allowed her
to return and be granted asylum. 388 If women are suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, they may be unable to talk about their experiences at all.389 The
INS should provide female staff and interpreters, and where this is not possible,
make an assumption that they may be needed, and be generous in granting a
credible fear interview.
373. Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari 'a and the Convention
Compatible? 44 AMULR 1949, 1951 (1995).
374. Id. at 1962.
375. Id at 1963.
376. Refugee Women at Risk, supra note 1, at 4.
377. Kelly, supra note 365, at 647
378. Id at 638.
379. Id
380. Id at 638-639.
381. Id. at 647.
382. Kelley, supra note 367, at 5.
383. Kelly, supra note 365, at 630.
384. Id.
385. Is Thits America? supra note 35, at 7.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Refugee Women at Risk, supra note 1, at 6.
VOL. 32:3
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Women seem to be more frequently subjected to expedited removal, perhaps
because they present themselves more often-without proper travel documents, or
perhaps the law is applied in a way that disfavors women.390 The interviews are
not necessarily conducted m private, and shackling and strip searches add to their
fear.
391
In detention, parents are separated from their children who are detained in
separate facilities. 392 Lengthy separation from small children causes some women
to abandon legitimate claims, 3 93 as the "INS has refused to provide some mothers
with contact visits, even with young children."39 People caring for young children
should be paroled routinely. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
signed by the United States and most other countries, gives guidelines on how
children should be treated.395 As the United States has signed the treaty, it is
binding international law upon the United States. Article 2(2) says that "States
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected
against all forms of discrunmination or punishment on the basis of the status,
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members."396 This would imply that a child should not be separated from
his mother or father just because they are refugees. Article 9(1) is even more
explicit, saying "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from
his or her parents against their will, except that such separation is necessary
for the best interests of the child. 3 97 It would be hard to argue that it would be in
the best interests of a refugee child to be tom away from his mother. Article 22(1)
talks specifically about refugee children, saying that "States Parties shall take
appropriate measure to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status .shall,
whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other
person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the
enjoyment of applicable rights. ,398 By separating refugee parents from their
young children, the United States is in breach of international law and must move
to find more humanitarian solutions to detention.
Under the 1996 law, refugees have one year to file an asylum claim when
they are in the country. 399 The only two exceptions are if circumstances affecting
their eligibility have changed or if there are extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay.4°0 More than 13,000 women have had claims rejected because they
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missed the filing deadlines. 40 1 Refugee women, who may be illiterate, abused, or
caring for young children, may not even know about asylum. Not knowing the
English language is a problem, as is finding legal representation. °2 Women are
often less familiar with dealing with the government and legal authorities.40 3 The
deadline can be long past before they realize they are even eligible.
40 4
Women have attempted to make persecution claims because of gender-
specific oppressive treatment, though not very successfully Ms. Sargis, a 71 year
old Armenian Christian from Iran, did not want to go back partly because she did
not want to conform to the dress code.4°5 Women would be spray painted or even
sprayed with acid if their face wasn't covered.4°6Their lips would be rubbed with
glass if they wore lipstick often.40 7 She argued that her social group was Christians
"who fear the threat of persecution for failing to conform to the dress code
unposed by Islamic laws." 408 The court said it was not persecution because she had
complied with the dress code before.4 °9 It can be even more difficult for Muslim
women, who are not prepared "to articulate their objections to the particular
'Islamic' regime in question as a fundamental rejection of the faith itself.' '4 1
Saideh Hassib-Tehram, who did not want to follow the Iranian rules for women,
and who previously had confrontations with the religious police and been fired
from her job, was denied asylum.4 ' Susan Musarrat Akram suggests that perhaps
she could have made the argument that she disagreed with the government's
interpretation of Islam m a way that repressed women, and that she held a different
and valid Muslim interpretation. 1 2
Bangldeshia Muslim author Taslima Nasrn wrote about a Hindu family being
tormented by Muslims and has also criticized the treatment of women in Islamic
413
states. The Council of Islamic Soldiers formed a 100 person death squad to kill
her.414 When a newspaper quoted her as saying that the Koran (although she
insists she said the Shari'a) should be "thoroughly revised to eliminate passages
which discriminate against women," a crowd as large as 200,000 supported
demands for her death, and a local court issued a warrant for her arrest for
"deliberately hurting religious sentiments. 41 5 After two months in hiding, the
401. Id. at 14.
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European Umon offered her asylum.416 For Muslim dissidents to be able to speak
out about the treatment of women, there needs to be some place to seek asylum.
Female genital mutilation is gradually becoming recognized as a ground for
asylum. Before 1996, two judges ruled in opposite directions about two women
from Sierra Leone who were abducted and mutilated.417 One judge granted
asylum, but the other denied it, saying "she could choose to support the practice to
maintain tribal unity ,,418 In 1996, the "Board of Immigration Appeals issued a
ground-breaking decision recognizing that asylum could be granted based on fear
of female genital mutilation. 419
Female genital mutilation (FGM) dates back to the time of the Pharaohs and
is a traditional belief strongly associated with Islam, though it is not officially
required by Islam, and a few Christian and animist groups practice it as well.
420
Some Asian Muslim groups who do not ethnically have the tradition, such as the
Minangkabau, practice it in order to be good Muslims, although according to this
author's informants, in a very mild form not involving the removal of the clitoris.
FGM involves 85 to 114 million women42' and is practiced as early as infancy and
as late as pregnancy with the first child.422
There are three main forms of FGM. Clitondectomy removes the clitoral
prepuce and is the least severe, though there is still horrible pain and a danger of
death from shock and blood loss when the clitoral artery is cut,42  Excision
removes the labia mmora and the clitoris.424 Infibulation, known as Pharaonic
circumcision because it is traditionally practiced in upper Egypt, involves
removing the clitoris and labia minora, then sewing together the labia majora and
binding the legs together twenty days or more to let scar tissue form.42 5 A tiny
opening is left for blood and urine.426
Because FGM is usually done without anesthetics and with non-sterile knives,
razors, or pieces of glass, infection is common and the woman may contract
tetanus or AIDS.427  Side effects include constant pain, painful intercourse,
infertility, dangerous childbirth, urine retention, urinary infections, back pain,
accumulation of menstrual blood with offensive odors, blood clots, cysts, and
psychological fear of sex. 28 In the more severe form, nothing is left of the genitals
416. Id
417 Kris Ann Balser Moussette, Female Genital Mutilation and Refugee Status in the United
States-A Step in the Right Direction, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 355 (1996).
418. Id.
419. Refugee Women at Risk supra note 1, at 4.
420. Moussette, supra note 417, at 360.
421. Id. at 359.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 358, 364.
424. Id. at 358.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 359.
427. Id. at 364.
428. Id. at 363, 365-7.
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but a long, ugly scar.429
Proponents say that it maintains tradition, enhances fertility, prevents
promiscuity, and protects virginity (by removing sexual desire), maintains hygiene,
and is aesthetically pleasing. 30 It is perpetuated by women themselves. 3' One
woman of the Meru tribe felt that it proved one was part of the communityand
recalled her circumcision "as if it was something sweet. 43 2 Mothers will do it to
ensure a good marriage for their daughters, as men will not marry an
uncircumcised girl, considering her unclean and oversexed.433
Lydia Olulero, a Nigerian citizen with two American-born daughters, was to
be deported and asked for asylum because her little girls would have been subject
to FGM had she returned. 34 She had been circumcised herself and her family
strongly believed M it.435 The court said it would be an extreme hardship for the
little girls and granted the application for suspension of deportation.43 6
As FGM becomes more a matter of common knowledge, it is agreed to be
gender-based persecution. 7 The INS has adopted guidelines that will make it
easier to get asylum for FGM claims.
43 8
Women who transgress the mores of their culture may be subject to
persecution. Abankwah, 3 9 from the Nkumssa tribe of Ghana, which worshiped
the goddess Kwasi Nkumssa, had converted to Christianity, and because of or
despite her new beliefs, had a premarital sexual relationship with a man."0 Her
tribe condemns women who practice premarital sex by punishing them with
FGM.4 ' Abankwah's mother was Queen Mother of the tribe, and when she died,
Abankwah was to become the next Queen Mother." 2 However, it was required
that the Queen Mother remain a virgin until she was installed.443 For part of the
ceremony, they would pour water into her cupped hands, and if it spilled, she was
not a virgin.444 In any case, when a husband was selected for her, he would
discover she was not a virgin. 4  Abankwah requested asylum.4 6  The
Immigration Judge believed that Abankwah was genuinely fearful, but did not
429. Id. at 363.
430. Id. at 360.
431. Id. at356, 357
432. Id.
433. Id. at 360-361.
434. Id. at 388-389.
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have objectively reasonable fears. 4 7 The Second Circuit pointed out that the
"practice of FGM has been internationally recognized as a violation of women's
and female children's rights," 8 and pointed out that it is criminal under federal
law if done to a minor, regardless of cultural practice." 9 Between 15 and 30% of
all women and girls m Ghana had been subject to FGM, so Abankwah's fear was
objectively reasonable.450 In reversing the decision, the judge pointed out dryly that
"a genuine refugee does not flee her native country armed with affidavits, expert
witnesses, and extensive documentation. 45'
Recent asylum rights for women have been expanding into the arena of
domestic violence. Janet Reno vacated a 1999 BIA Appeals decision that "would
have prohibited a victim of severe domestic violence from receiving asylum.
45 2
There are also some limited protections against domestic violence for victims who
are already m the country under the Violence Against Women Act 4 3 and the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 454 which provide some
additional means to obtain visas.455
Many women's asylum clais are made by women from Muslim countries.
Women in these countries are beginning to challenge the traditional order and it is
no longer extraordinary for a woman to be a Muslim feminist. If women, either
Christian or Muslim, are to make challenges to repressive regimes, they need a
place of asylum if those challenges fail and they are endangered. Freedom for
women is one of the most appealing characteristics of American society for women
worldwide. One of America's best chances to moderate repressive ideology is for
it to support those attempting to reform their societies.
V POST 9/11 DEVELOPMENTS
The common stereotypes are that we re all Arabs, we re all violent, and we're all
conducting a holy war 456
--Ibrahim Hooper
Right after the terrorist attack which destroyed the World Trade Center on
447. id. at 21.
448. Id at 23.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 25.
451. Id. at 26.
452. Refugee Women, supra note 1, at 4.
453. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55, 8 U.S.C. §§
1151, 1154, 1186a, 1254, and 2245 (1994).
454. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1464, Pub. L. No. 106-
386 (Oct. 28,2000).
455. Gail Pendleton & Ann Block, Applications for Immigration Status Under the Violence Against
Women Act, THE COLoRADo LAWYER (March 2003).
456. Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States
in U.S. Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 301 (2002).
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9/11, the program to admit refugees shut down almost completely for three
months, stranding more than 22,000 people who had already been given
permission to enter.457 U.S. INS offices m Europe, Turkey, and Pakistan canceled
immigration interviews.458 Some refugees had heard no decision.459 Others who
had been granted asylum were waiting to fly.40 Because they had no legal status
in Europe, they were often stranded or deported to face more persecution.46i On
December 11, 2001, the program resumed, but much more slowly 462 By
December of 2002, Canada, with one-tenth the population of the United States, had
accepted more refugees than the United States since 9/11.463
Moreover, in February of 2001, before the terrorist attack, the INS in Europe
had begun to require transit visas for refugees coming into European countries, but
because "of restrictions and persecutions faced by many Muslim convert Christians
[sic], it [was] nearly impossible for them to obtain such a visa.''464 One solution to
the problems of expedited removal would be to make it easier for refugees to
obtain the visas they need to legally enter the United States and then apply for
asylum.
After the 9/11 attack, the 2001 Foreign Terrorists Tracking Force was
formed.465 Attorney General John Ashcroft commented,
We will arrest and detain any suspected terrorist who has violated the law. If
suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have violated the law,
they'll be released. But terrorists who are in violation of the law will be
convicted, in some cases deported, and in all cases be prevented from doing
further harm to Americans. 4
6
Around 1200 people were detained, mostly Arab, South Asian, and Muslim
men. ' 7 Some were charged with criminal activity related to the investigation.468
Some were held as material witnesses.46 9 Some were deported for fraudulent
documents, illegal entry overstaying visas, etc.470 The courts are busy sorting out
457. A Year of Loss, Chapter 3: Treatment of Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities, Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights, 3 (2002) at http://www.lchr.org/us, law/loss ch3a.htm.
458. Letter from Abe Ghaffart, Executive Director of Iranian Christians International, to U.S.
government official (2002).
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. A Year of Loss, Chapter 3: Treatment of Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities, Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights, 4 (2002) at http://www.lchr.org/uslaw/lossch3a.htm.
463. Abe Ghaffan, The ICI Partner Prayer Letter (Iranian Christians International,lnc.), Dee. 2002.
464. Ghaffan, supra note 463.
465. A Year of Loss, Chapter 3: Treatment of Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities, Lawyers
Committee on Human Rights, 11 (2002) at http://www.lchr.org/us law/lossch3a.htm.
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whether rights were violated. 7
The USA Patriot Act of October 26, 2001 gave the Attorney General (AG)
power to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism.472 The AG is required to
charge them with a crime, initiate deportation, or release them within seven
days.473 Certification of a suspected terrorist must be reviewed every six months to
be renewed or revoked. 474  The administration has used this detention power
sparingly, if at a1l. 475 Also, INS regulations have been expanded to let a detainee
be held 48 hours without charge, or for an additional "reasonable period of time"
in an extraordinary circumstance. 47 6 Apparently some people have been detained
for a longer period.477
In January 2002, "Operation Absconder" removed 6000 Middle Eastern
young men who had ignored deportation orders.478
Also m 2002, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System was
implemented, also known as special registrationY 9 The point of the law is to track
visitors to prevent future terrorist attacks. Immigrants who are not permanent
residents and who pose "national security risks" as determined by the federal
government, are subject to fingerprinting, photographing, and special
registration.i The current group for special registration is males over the age of
sixteen from certain countries, all of which are heavily Muslim except for North
Korea.48 1 The law has resulted in the arrests of seven hundred Muslim men in
Southern California.48 2
Shah Afshar, an Iranian Christian and legal resident, commented on the
special registration, and went on to say, "Well, many people including some of my
church members were arrested. FBI broke into one of the member's house arrested
[sic] and within a month sent him back to Iran. 48 3 This is despite the fact that a
Christian immigrant from the Middle East is one of the least likely people in the
world to sympathize with Islamic terrorism. In fact, this man was here illegally
because his asylum claim had been denied.48 Mr. Afshar went on to say, "My
own parents who live in Iran and have permanent residency in the U.S. are having
471. Id. at 21.
472. Id. at 25.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id..
476. Id. at 28.
477. Id. at 29.
478. Akram & Johnson, supra note 456, at 342.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Kar Moreno, New Immigration Law on the Books, THE WRIT, Denver University, Feb. 2002,
at 7.
482. Id.
483. E-mail from Shah Afshar to Bruce Sidebotham (Mar. 10, 2003)(on file with the author).
484. E-mail from Shah Afshar, to Theresa Sidebotham (Mar.13, 2003, 16:53) (on file with the
author).
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a hard time getting here.'
It is important to note that "INS Special Registration does not discriminate
between Christian Indonesians and Muslim Indonesians or between Jewish
Iranians and Muslim Iranians or Christian Iranians. ' 486 Although discrimination
within special registration would not be legal and would be inflammatory, it should
be possible to expedite legitimate asylum claims. Extremist Muslims are unlikely
to be eligible for asylum. Special registration ends once a person is a permanent
resident.
487
The tension is between protecting the human rights of individuals and
protecting the security of the country Considering that all of our terrorist attacks
have been perpetrated by Arab Muslim non-citizens, it is not unreasonable to track
that group carefully. U.S. immigration laws have always discriminated between
groups488" for instance, people from certain countries are not even required to have
visas to enter the United States. Measures such as fingerprinting and tracking the
location of immigrants are commonly accepted worldwide. This author
remembers being fingerprinted on every finger every year, along with each of her
small children, and having to register with the police every time she moved.
Concerns have been raised as to whether this will antagonize Muslim
countries. Most Muslim countries practice equal or greater control over their alien
residents, so U.S. measures should come as no great shock. Although there will
undoubtedly be formal protests, Muslim cultures historically despise weakness and
respect strength, including firmness, force, and control. U.S. concern for human
rights and hesitancy to use force is generally perceived as a weakness. If people
have ignored deportation orders, it is appropriate that they be removed. If special
registration picks up immigrants who are here illegally with invalid visas, it may
create hardship m the short run to remove them, but it will create a more orderly
system as immigrants realize they must comply with U.S. laws. Perhaps there
could be an option to seek asylum as well as discretionary immunity granted to
those who would be separated from citizen spouses or Amencan-born children, or
to those who can demonstrate they have contributed positively to their U.S.
community. Greater control of the immigrant population will not harm the United
Statesm the eyes of the Muslim world.
It is important however, not to slide into the other extreme of hostility towards
a group of people just because some enemies of America can be found within the
group. The United States stands to repeat the injustices perpetrated against
Japanese-Americans if it allows such attitudes to develop. American Arabs and
Muslims are frightened by the hostility some hold towards them. Muslims are
actually a minority among Arabs in this country (because more American Arabs
are Christian), and Arabs are a minority among Muslims (because more Muslims
485, Id.
486. E-mail from Ahmed Jabn, U.S. Committee for Refugees, to Theresa Sidebotham (Feb. 20,
2003, 13:34 EST) (on file with the author).
487 Moreno, supra note 481, at 7.
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are from Asia).489 America must not turn against innocent people as she roots out
the guilty During World War II, the country did not successfully come up with a
way to deal with possible Japanese spies without indiscriminately punishing all
Japanese-Americans. 490 With thought and care, perhaps America can do better this
time.
The Attorney General should ensure that INS officers and others who are
questioning detainees treat them respectfully. He will have to work out with the
courts what are violations of civil rights and how to balance individual rights
against tipping off the terrorist networks. The United States should solicit the aid
of the Arab and Muslim communities in this country in reporting possible terrorist
activity It should reassure all its people that appropriate measures are being taken,
as fear will often trigger an irrational lashing out against a group of people.
And indeed, appropriate measures must be taken if we are not to be the
victims of repeated terrorism. Terrorism is now an ever present threat. The evil of
a few causes citizens and immigrants to suffer.
Some who suffer the worst are the refugees fleeing from fundamentalist
Islam. "It is important to note that Muslim convert Christians [sic] from the
Middle East are often fleeing the very same extremist Islamic regimes or groups
who sponsor terrorism."49' In fact, the campaign against terrorism has made their
plight worse, as the hostility of fundamentalist groups has been stirred up against
them.492 As Mr. Ghaffari, an Iranian convert to Christianity says, "In this light,
non-Muslims, and particularly Muslims who have turned from Islam and embraced
Christianity, are seen as Western spies and traitors by these fundamentalist
Muslims. '493 Christians are associated with the West, and both ethmc Christians
and converts are facing increased persecution.49 4
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The two policy goals for the United States with respect to immigrants are to
provide security within the country and to preserve human rights for immigrants.
These goals are not morally incompatible, as they involve the pursuit of safety and
freedom for both society and individuals, including immigrant and citizen.
The War on Terrorism involves the ideological clash between secularism, as
represented by the West, and fundamentalist Islam. President Bush "spoke bluntly
of a 'freedom gap' between the West and totalitarian Arab regimes." 495 However,
there is also an ideological clash within Islam itself.The President commented that
some leaders in the Middle East "speak of a new Arab Charter that champions
489. Akram & Johnson, supra note 456, at 312.
490. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
491. Letter from Abe Ghaffan, Executive Director of Iranian Chnstians international, to U.S.
government official (2002).
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495. Joel C. Rosenburg, FlashTraffic, WORLD, Mar. 8, 2003, at 10.
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internal reform, greater political participation, economic openness, and free
trade." 496
The extremist, fundamentalist groups are only a fragment of Islam.497 As a
minority position they may be compared to the splinter of Christians who bomb
abortion clinics. The analogy does not extend fully however. By far the vast
majority of Christians, even those who are actively pro-life, outspokenly and
routinely condemn violence as unacceptable and un-Christian. The vast majority
of Muslims would not perpetrate violence themselves. However, a large
proportion agree theologically with the principles animating terrorist groups and
admire them to some extent. Terrorist groups make an appeal to the masses.
The Taleban are Muslims working for the establishment of the Shari'ah, and
Muslims in the East and West therefore have an obligation to support them. .0
Muslims, stand together and unite to fight. .The Book of Allah calls you, and
Paradise awaits you. Verily, Allah (SWT) orders you in the Qu'ran: "Go and
fight, young or old and sacrifice your wealth and life in order to get Paradise."[Q
9-41]' 1
Muslims who speak out against terrorism are in the minority although more
would speak out if not for the risk of being targets of violence themselves. Tins
silence contributes to the Western perception that Islam is monolithic and to the
hostility and suspicion towards Muslims and Middle Easterners in the United
States.
There are signs that this is changing in the Muslim world. Recent attacks
against obviously innocent people, including children, are sobering to many
Muslims. A newspaper in Bangladesh said, "I don't think any Islamic country can
support such sort of terrorism because Islam itself is a religion of peace.''499 In
Indonesia, the Bali bombing killed Muslims or relatives of Muslims as well as
foreigners. 500 The financial impact of the loss of the Bali tourist trade had
repercussions throughout Indonesia.5  It is human nature to ignore atrocities that
are committed far away to someone "other. This is demonstrated constantly m
the American news media, when catastrophes are ignored unless there are
American deaths. The impact of terrorism perpetrated m Indonesia by Indonesian
Muslims (rather than by Middle Easterners against Westerners) is horribly
surprising, and "moderate Muslim organizations are finally speaking out to support
and encourage the police in this work., 50 2 One devout elderly Muslim man said,
.it's the first time I've ever heard them preaching what I've always believed
496. Id.
497 Irshad Manji, A Muslim Plea for Introspection, GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 8, 2001.
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that we should be friends with people of other religions. "503
It should be a goal of U.S. policy to support influences that moderate Islam,
with the goal of secularizing it enough so that pluralism is acceptable. Once
pluralism is accepted, the violence against Western secularism will fade away and
human rights conditions will improve. During the Cold War, the United States
supported pro-democracy activity within Communist countries. For instance,
Alexander Solzhenitsyn was able to publish his body of work, which had a
profound influence within Soviet Russia, only because he had asylum in the United
States. A comparable figure is Salman Rushdie, the Muslim writer of The Satanic
Verses.5°4 Because of his criticism of Khomeini, a fatwa was issued, offering a
huge reward for assassinating him or his publishers.50 5 This was no idle threat, as
59 exiled Iranian dissidents were assassinated between 1979 and 1993.506
Technically Shari'a law only applies within the Muslim world, but an exception
was made for Rushdie and other dissidents.50 7 America should support those in the
Muslim world with views that will tend to moderate extremist Islam, including
Christians seeking freedom to worship, Muslim women working against
oppression of women, pro-democracy advocates, and anyone who is fighting
oppression. In order for courageous people to be able to speak out, there should be
a safety net or somewhere to flee. Asylum for people like this should be quickly
and easily secured.
For example, Abbas Zahedi, an Iranian, was nearly denied asylum by both an
Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, but was declared
eligible for asylum by the Ninth Circuit.50 He heard Khomeini's fatwa against
Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and concluded that the government was
"trying to hide something from people, from us." 509 With great difficulty, he
obtained a copy of the book.5 10 His friend Moshen started translating it, while
Zahedi copied and distributed the chapters.5 ' However, after about four chapters,
Moshen was arrested, tortured, and killed. 512 Zahedi fled the country and asked for
asylum.513 The IJ found that although he might face criminal charges if he went
back, "[tihat is a matter for the government of Iran to decide. This is not a basis
for the grant of asylum." 5 14 Fortunately for Zahedi, the Ninth Circuit granted his
appeal. 5
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Another reason for this is that the United States is putting these people at
more risk in pursuing the War on Terrorism. Just as America gave special
preference to refugees from Communism during the Cold War, so now the United
States owes it to the asylum seekers whose suffering has intensified due to the war
on terrorism.
Another area that should be considered is witness or agent protection. Those
who are willing to help track down terrorist activity or speak out against
oppressive regimes such as Saddam Hussem's, should be given immunity and
residency Illegal aliens within the country who help U.S. security interests should
be rewarded with legal residency. Pragmatically, the United States should both
protect and reward those who are helping it pursue policy interests.
For U.S. policy to be fair towards refugees or useful in the War on Terrorism,
it needs to be more finely crafted. During the Cold War, the United States
managed to distinguish between Communists, defectors, and pro-democracy
refugees. It should do the same in this conflict.
Asylum rights should be granted quickly to those with a genuine credible fear.
Groups that are not a threat to national security such as Christians, Jews, women
fleeing oppression, children, and Muslims fleemg repressive regimes, should be
identified. Detention after the credible fear interview should be nearly eliminated
in favor of releasing people to the care of relatives and nonprofit organizations.
The money saved can be used to investigate real security risks.
America should begin with the assumption that its own Arab and Muslim
citizens and permanent residents are loyal to the United States. That is usually the
reason they or their forebears came here.
All immigrants should be treated with the fairness and respect they deserve as
humans, and in keeping with this country's traditions. People are not nearly as
likely to resent procedures, such as special registration, as they are attitudes of
racism, condescension, or hatred. Each encounter with an immigrant should be
treated as a public relations opportmunity to spread U.S. values. Arab and Muslim
immigrants realize that we are dealing with a massive security threat. Those who
want to be here regret, by and large, the activities of extremists. As Shah Afshar,
an Iranian immigrant, said, "Their angers should be directed at the Arabs who
created this mess rather than the U.S. government!"5 6 As long as security
measures are carned out with respect and decency immigrants will understand.
Mr. Afshar also commented, in response to a question about racial profiling,
You may find my answer a bit different than what you might expect from a
Middle Eastern, but if he acts like a duck and quacks like a duck, he could very
well be a duck. I have no problem with racial profiling. As one who travels
much, for me, no amount of security is just enough. We have to do what we need
to do in order to protect our people, those who live in tus country. By the way,
for a while after 9/11 while traveling, I would wear an American flag as a
516. E-mail from Shah Afshar to Bruce Sidebotham (Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the author).
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bandana.
5 17
Mr. Afshar acknowledges the real enemy and is prepared to make sacrifices of
convenience and the embarrassment of being profiled on behalf of his adopted
country 518
Those who are not permanent U.S. residents and who have been proven to be
anti-American and who support violence should be deported. Living in America is
a privilege,not a right for aliens and there can be certain obligations attached to the
granting of a visa.
INS officials should be informed of U.S. policy and human rights objectives
and held accountable. Officials who are brutal should be dismissed and the INS
should actively recruit workers who are compassionate towards refugees and
concerned about human rights.
While there has been great concern expressed about the INS being placed
under Homeland Security, the new arrangement is an opportunity to consistently
pursue the goals of improving the INS' human rights record, improving internal
security, and supporting U.S. international policy objectives. The
recommendations in this paper do not involve a great deal of extra expense, or a
radical overhaul of U.S. laws. They do involve changes of attitude and approach,
better traming of iumigration officers, and more consistent implementation of
existing recommendations. However, they would better the situation for refugees,
catalyze change that would benefit millions in the Muslim world, and contribute to
America's own security
517. Id.
518. Id
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THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 2(4):
A CONSIDERATION OF THE STATUS OF THE U.N.
CHARTER'S LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE
John D. Becker
INTRODUCTION
Following the devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States launched a military campaign
against the terrorist network, AI-Qaeda.1 This campaign included attacks against
the Taliban government m Afghanistan for its support and protection of Al-Qaeda
leadership, which ultimately resulted in the collapse of that government.2  U.S.
military action also disrupted and dispersed the various elements of Al-Qaeda and
its affiliated terrorist groups.
The United States undertook that campaign with the tacit support of many
countries of the world, including the United Nations, although without the formal
invocation of Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter.4 The United States' argument for
use of force rested on claims under customary international law of self-defense and
under Article 5 1's provision for self-defense, of the U.N. Charter.
John D. Becker is a third-year law student at the University of Denver where he is also pursuing a
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More recently, the United States initiated an invasion of Iraq, based in large
measure upon claims that the government of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). 5 That possession, in turn, posed a threat of some
sort--be it minmnent or be it further in the future-to the security of the Middle
East region and the Umted States. 6 The subsequent war toppled the Bath Party
regime and has lead to a U.S. occupation, pending the implementation of a new,
democratic government.7 The justification for the war against Iraq was m part
based on the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war.8
Prior to U.S. action, an acrimonious debate was waged within the United
Nations and the Security Council. 9  The resulting split between permanent
members has lead to continuing strained relations, ongoing animosity and lingering
bad feelings, as well as a sense of the futility of future collective action. 10
These events have culminated in Secretary General Kofi Annan's new
appointment of a high-level panel to conduct a through review of global security
threats, and the role that collective action plays in addressing these threats." The
panel is also charged with recommending changes necessary for that collective
action, particularly with the United Nations.' 2 In light of almost fifty years of
history, any consideration to change existing approaches, instruments, and
mechanisms of the United Nations is serious and self-evident.
Additionally, these events have led to a return to the old debate on the
effectiveness of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter in dealing with security threats. 13
Article 2(4) reads in its entirety-
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the hreat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent withthe Purpose of the United Nations.
14
5. See e.g., A Nation at War- Bush and Blair at Camp David, Acting Together in Noble
Purpose, N.Y TIMES, March 28, 2003, at B12.
6. U.N. Charter, Article 2(4) specifies that only "the threat or use of force" against the
"maintenance of international peace and security" justifies the use of force.
7. See "U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, in Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, at
httpJ/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._occupation of Iraq (last visited May 1, 2004.
8. See National Security Strategy of the United States, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.html (last visited May 1, 2004). Also see National Security Advisor, Speech at the Waldorf
Astoria Hotel, New York, New York (October 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/10/20021001-6.html (last visited May 1, 2004).
9. See N.Y. TIMES, from January 30, 2003 to March 14, 2003, for discussions of the debate on
Iraq.
10. See Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Views of Changing World 2003: War
with Iraq Further Divides Global Politics, June 3, 2003, available at http://people-press.org/
reports/display.php3?ReportID=185 (last visited May 1, 2004).
11. See U.N. Press Release SG/A/857, Secretary-General Names High-Level Panel to Study
Global Security Threats and Recommend Necessary Changes, March 11, 2003.
12. U.N. Press Release SG/SM/9051, Newly Appointed High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
Change to Meet 5-7 December.
13. As discussed later by Franck, Henkin, and others throughout this article.
14. See U.N. Charter, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
VOL. 32:3
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 2(4)
This debate on the prohibition of the use of force by states has a long history
among both practitioners and legal scholars.' 5 As early as 1970, Tom Franck
posed the question in his now famous article, in simple and stark terms, "Who
Killed Article 2(4)?" 16 Louis Henkm's reply, published the following year,
responded likewise with its title, "The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are
Greatly Exaggerated."'17  Since then, many have participated in ongoing and
cantankerous debate, which has led to some interesting and insightful
conclusions.'
8
This paper will trace the history and arguments of that debate, as well as some
of the debaters' conclusions, with the intention of reaching some preliminary
findings of where we are today and whether Article 2(4) is dead, alive, or
somewhere in between. It will also consider the idea behind the possibility of
changing the U.N. Charter, a suggestion put forth recently by scholars, and the
implications for such changes in addressing the problem of using force in our
contemporary world.
THE PREMATURE DEATH OF ARTICLE 2(4)
While Thomas Franck was not the first person to question the viability of the
U.N. Charter's prohibition against the use of force, he can be credited with
suggesting the framework of the debate by his evocatively titled article-Who
Killed Article 2(4)? 19 Franck opens his article by noting that U.N. prohibition
against the use of force by states was imperfect and somewhat obsolescent from
20the start. It was predicated on the false assumption that the wartime partnership
of the Big Five--the Umted States, the Soviet Union, the U.K., France, and
China-would continue and provide the means for policing the peace under the
auspices of the United Nations. 21 This presumption failed to take into account not
only the tensions of a continued partnership but also failed to recognize the
changing nature of warfare.22 While the partners could, and on occasion did,
address conventional military aggression,23 it would fail in addressing non-
conventional forms of military aggression.
Additionally, Franck notes that the Charter itself provided enough exceptions
15. Oscar Schachter, INTERNATiONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 129-31 (Martin Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands) (1991).
16. Tom Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
17 Louis Henkm, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 821 (1971).
18. Many of these points ofview and positions will be sketched out here.
19. Franck, supra note 16, at 809.
20. 1d. at810.
21. Id. Not foreshadowing the Cold War and the split between the Big Five.
22. Id. at 811-812. Changes in nature of warfare itself have been noted by a variety of authors,
including Phillip Bobbitt in The Shield of Achilles, John Keagan in A History of Warfare, and David
Halberstram in War in a Time of Peace.
23. Franck, supra note 16, at 812. The examples cited are Korea and the Congo.
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and ambiguities to open the rule to deadly erosion.24 Add to that, the temptations
of both powerful and not-so powerful states to settle a score, end a dispute, or
pursue their national interests, and it is clear that state practice has severely
shattered the mutual confidence m the rule itself.25 Without mutual confidence m
the sine qua non of an operative rule, the rule becomes only words without
meaning.
26
Based upon that analysis of the demise of the rule, Franck poses the open-
ended question of having violated it, ignored it, run roughshod over it, and
explained it away can the nations of the world live without it?
27
Franck's article is structured around five concerns. 28 First, he looks at factors
undermining Article 2(4). Beyond what he sketches out by way of faulty
presumptions m the introduction, he notes an invalid premise underlying collective
action by the United Nations: that the Security Council would be able to discharge
its responsibilities as the United Nations' pnncipal organ for world peacekeepmg.
29
Collective action by the Council-perhaps best defined as the decision that a threat
of peace exists or aggression has been committed and the steps taken by the world
organization to best remedy the situation-is predicated on the unanimity of the
great powers. Without the assent of all members, collective enforcement action
is an illusion.ii
With the sole exception of the U.N. action in defense of South Korea-based
on the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council-and the
United Nations' limited role in the Congo, it has not been possible to invoke
collective enforcement actions under Chapter VII (at least through 1970).32 This
lack of action didn't denote a peaceful world community As Franck notes, since
the San Francisco conference there had been some one hundred separate outbreaks
of hostilities between states.
33
Without the U.N. action, states had fallen back on their own resources and
military and regional alliances.34 These state responses to hostilities were
24. Id. This has effected a systemic transformation, discussed later by Franck.
25. Id. at 809. Blame should be shared here, by both the powerful and not-so-powerful states.
26. Id. at 809.
27. Id. at 810.
28. The bookends here are small-scale warfare--guerilla warfare-and global warfare-nuclear
warfare-for where Article 2(4) is placed.
29. Franck, supra note 16, at 810. Clearly one problem here is the lack of an independent military
staff and forces-or international police forces--4o support Security Council's decisions to take action.
30. This really means the affirmative vote or lacking that consent, at least the benevolent
abstention of each of the Big Five.
3 1. It is unclear as to whether or not the Charter requires assent or, if what has become the
common practice, abstention, qualifies as an affirmation.
32. Franck, supra note 16, at 810.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 811. Despite claims of the supremacy of the U.N. Charter to other treaties, regional
military alliances do not serve as subordinate systems to the U.N. organization, subject to command and
control. This was seen most recently in the case of NATO intervention in the Balkans, and specifically
in Kosovo. While U.N. resolution condemned the ongoing atrocities was issued prior to the
commencement of military action, and later, U.N. tribunal, at the time of this writing, is trying former
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facilitated by both Chapter VII being seen to rust and increasing reliance on the use
of U.N. Charter Articles 51, 52, and 53.3" The corresponding increase m the use of
exceptions to collective enforcement action have overwhelmed the rule and
36transformed the system.
Article 51 permits the use of armed force by a state responding in self-defense
to an armed attack." But the problem, Franck notes, is that there is no conclusive
way for the international system to establish which state is the aggressor and which
state is the aggrieved.38 With no system for objective fact finding, the concept of
self-defense remains a convenient shield of for self-serving and aggressive
conduct.39 In other words, as the facts about the initiation of a dispute are not
satisfactorily ascertainable, the operation of Article 51 is effectively and
dangerously unlimited.40 The temptation remains what it was before Article 2(4)
was conceived and implemented: to attack first and lie about it afterwards.
4 1
Franck then looks to the effect of small-scale warfare on Article 2(4).42
Small-scale warfare operates differently than conventional warfare.43  Manifest
most often in the form of guerilla warfare and tactics, this kind of warfare also
generates a corresponding different kind of assistance. Armies are not dispatched
across borders, rather they took the form of encouragement and assistance that the
Allies provided to resistance fighters in occupied countries. Neither the form of
warfare nor the assistance and support provided to it fits into conventional
international legal concepts and categones.44
Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic and others for war cnmes it was NATO forces, not U.N. forces, that
intervened.
35. Specifically, these articles address self-defense and regional arrangements, which in certain
areas, like Europe; have been utilized in lieu of the U.N. and its organs.
36. Franck, supra note 16, at 810.
37. Article 51 reads in its entirety, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Much has turned on how this article is
interpreted and that, like Article 2(4) itself varies.
38. Franck, supra note 16, at 811.
39. Claims of self-defense have been made in numerous situations, where the aggressor is clearly
identifiable, including North Korea invading South Korea, India into Goa, and Cambodia into Vietnam.
40. Therefore, what is and what is not self-defense isn't clear and many nations make self-defense
claims that are clearly not the case.
41. Franek, supra note 16, at 811.
42. Id. at 812. Context is important here for Franck is writing at the height of the guerilla war in
Vietnam.
43. Many texts note this difference in forms of warfare, but two important ones are Charles W
Thayer's GUERiLLA, (Harper & Row1963), which says "Guerilla warfare has been defined as "irregular
war carried on by independent bands. Id at xvi. .or another definition is found in Mao's observation,
"The essence of guerilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. MAO TSE-TUNG'S ON GUERILLA
WARFARE, 43 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Praeger 1961).
44. Franck, supra note 16, at 812. One major difficulty with intemational law is that is set-up to
regulate conduct between state actors, not conduct involving non-state actors. Therefore, guerillas and
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This encouragement by one state to a guerilla movement m another state does
not rise to the level of an "armed attack, at least m the conventional sense and
therefore cannot be said to have taken place.45 In fact, the more subtle and indirect
the encouragement, the more tenacious the analogy becomes to an "armed attack"
and Article 51 would not apply.46 Article 51 does not, on its face, recognize the
existence of these newer modes of aggression, or attempt to deal with the new
problems of characterization they create for international law
Franck traces the United Nations' then-history with small-scale warfare, from
actions in Czechoslovakia and Greece m 1948 through Lebanon a decade later to
Vietnam m the 1960's. 47 His consideration of U.S. conduct m Lebanon opens up
two further dilemmas: 1) that of deciding the factual question of who attacked
whom and 2) defining what the level of foreign intervention should suffice to
permit counter-intervention by way of collective self-defense.4 s
The first dilemma was "solved" by the establishment of an international
observation group, which was tasked with ensuring that no illegal infiltration or
personnel or supply of arms or material across the Lebanese borders occurred.49
Initiated by a proposal from the Swedish Government, and endorsed by the United
States, the observer group was able to report back within a month of its arrival in
Lebanon on who was at fault and who was not.
50
Yet, even this solution was not definitive, given its later rejection by the
United States, for other political purposes. 51 The second dilemma has been more
elusive in finding a definitive solution. Since each circumstance is different and
vanes in both scope and scale, the appropriate level of response is also
changeable.5 2  Franck passes over this unresolved dilemma and moves on to
another concern-the application of Article 51.53
The Lebanese crisis is illustrative of two problems inherent in applying
Article 51 f 4 The first problem is a procedural one and relates to the dilemma
mentioned earlier-how is the fact of an armed attack to be established? 55 The
terrorists present challenges to intemational norms.
45. Id.
46. Attacks by organized military forces such as tanks going across a border are clearly direct
attacks under Article 51, but terrorists blowing up buildings or guerillas infiltrating to blow up bridges
and power plants are not.
47. Franck, supra note 16, at 811-13.
48. Id. at 814.
49. Id. at 815-16. The Observation Group serves in the peace keeping role, as opposed to the
peace-making role. An excellent treatment of that distinction is found m The U.N.
50. Id. Interestingly, this predates the advent of the "CNN effect, where the media now often
serves an additional set or sets of eyes on the ground and shows the public what is happening where.
51. The role that "other" political considerations play in the Big Five decision-making is, in part,
behind calls for an independent military force, under U.N. auspices. But more will be said of that later
in this article.
52. Franck, supra note 16, at 817
53. Id. at 816.
54. These problems are defined as procedural ones and substantial ones.
55. This lack of procedure for establishing when an attack has occurred is one argument
advanced for revisions to the Charter. This issue is developed later in this article, specifically in
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Charter provides no answer, and in its absence, Article 2(4) can be virtually
nullified by self-serving allegations. The second problem is substantive-how to
define an "armed attack" in a way relevant to the modem conditions of indirect,
unlimited warfare without broadening it to the point at which disproportionate
armed force can be used under the guise of self-defense against imagined or slight
provocation. 56 And it too suffers from a lack of a definitive answer in the Charter.
The default position seems to be whatever levels the provider of assistance or the
requester of assistance cares to provide.
5 7
Franck analogizes the problems and dilemmas with what would happen if the
law were to leave two drivers m a motor vehicle collision the sole responsibility
for apportioning liability, helped only by the unruly crowd gathered around them at
the scene of the accident.
s8
This leads Franck to identify another of what he calls the great vulnerabilities
of the norm established by Articles 2(4) and 51. If grievous threats to world peace
are to appear to hereafter in the guise of civil wars or wars involving portioned
states with rival regimes, then Article 51 by itself is likely to be of very little use m
distinguishing individual or collective self-defense from aggression.5 9
It is worth noting here that the Charter doesn't have an answer to this
question, particularly in the situation where two great powers recognize different
regimes m the same country and both exercise their right to come to the collective
self-defense of the side each prefers. Franck does claim that ad hoc machinery has
played a role here- primarily that of the observers groups, as in Lebanon and
later, m Vietnam. But the problem with ad hoc machinery is that it does not allow
for a universally creditable method of determining the facts behind who attacked
whom.
Once again, m the absence of an objective international system of recognition
of governments for determining which party to a dispute is the aggressor and
which is the victim, Article 51 is a wide-open invitation to the great Powers to
engage each other in limited wars fought vicariously on borrowed terrain and with
other's lives.60
Next, Franck considers the effect of potential nuclear warfare on Article
2 (4 ).6 1 Whereas small-scale warfare has made the rules of the United Nations hard
to apply, the development of nuclear technology and nuclear delivery forces has
lead to far more devastating potentiality for states.62 Taken literally, Articles 2(4)
Franck's follow-up article on Article 2(4), 2003.
56. This is a further extension and consequence of the argument about the changing nature of
warfare, mentioned earlier supra note 22.
57. Another allusion to the role that Big Power's dominance plays in the U.N.
58. Franek's analogy seems to suggest that the lack of an independent adjudicator than damns us
to an unruly, and apparently unreasonable mob. Yet, reasonable people often play rational roles in
traffic accidents, including serving as witnesses in trials and even as "good Samaritans.
59. Franck, supra note 16, at 820.
60. Id. at818.
61. Id. at 820.
62. Franck is echoing the analysis found in the works of many nuclear war and deterrence
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and 51 together seem to require a state to await an actual nuclear strike against its
territory before taking forceful counter-measures. 6 ' The inanity of such a course of
action is clear and no state, it is safe to presume, would sit by while another
prepares it doom.
Clearly, a correction for this possible absurdity is required. As Myres
McDougal has noted, it would be against reason and nature, particularly m the age
of jets, rockets, and nuclear weapons, to interpret Article 51 so literally as to
preclude a victim from using force m self-defense until it has actually been
attacked.64
Customary international law accords a protection under the doctrine of
necessity, permitting pre-emptive strikes against an anticipated rather than an
actual attack.65 Of course, a concern is that one can over-correct, making the right
measure on the scale of anticipatory action important.66  The line between
imminent attack and between any threatening activities can be a broad one. On the
one end of the scale, even conventional military action does not raise to the same
threat of catastrophic destruction as nuclear attacks.
Few times are states really threatened with imment danger or attack and
required to take pre-emptive action. The one notable exception being the case of
Israel's invasion of the Arab states in 1967 which was undertaken in reasonable
anticipation of imminent large-scale armed attack for which there was
67substantiated evidence. Even here there seem to be circumstances that are
unusual-including the relatively small size of Israel-which lead to persuasive
demonstration of the case6s
The lack of any definitive determinative correction results in an on-going
problem for the rules of the United Nations. Furthermore, as recent events
demonstrate, the question of when an attack is imminent continues to be
problematic for states. 69
Regional enforcement and Article 2(4) is another central concern of Franck's
article.70 Changing circumstances in international relations, including the way
states perceive their self-interest, of strategy and tactics, have combined to take
advantage latent ambiguities behind the U.N. rules and in turn, have enlarged the
theorists, like Bernard Brodie's STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959).
63. Franck, supra note 16, 820-21.
64. See American Society of International Law, 1963 Proceedings, 164.
65. Franck, supra note 16, at 821.
66. Michael Walzer notes as much in his seminal work, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 77 (1977).
67. Cited m the "Anticipations" chapter of Walzer and also cited in numerous international law
texts, including Schachter's.
68. The case for smaller states is all the more compelling given that a failure to respond might
lead to complete collapse and surrender before the blow could be sustained and strike back.
69. CIA Director George Tenet's recent speech, February 5, 2004 at Georgetown University,
defending pre-war intelligence assessments that were the basis for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is
illustrative of this problem.
70. Franck, supra note 16, at 822.
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exceptions to the point of virtually repealing the rule itself.
71
Actions by regional organizations are a major part of that development.72
Specifically, Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter have been interpreted to legitimize
the use of force by regional organizations in their collective self-interest.73
Arguably these exceptions to Article 2(4) play an important role in the growth of
international violence.74
The regional organizations permitted by these articles have developed tight
codes of loyalty and they have not hesitated to enforce them against members
suspected of deviation. 7' Their enforcement actions have tended to be beyond the
reach of the larger world community, particularly if they happened to occur within
an organization lead by a Super-Power. 76 Intended to supplement the U.N.
peacekeeping system, these regional organizations instead have become
instruments of violence eroding the Article 2(4) injunction. 77
Tracing the struggle at the San Francisco conference between supporters of
regional organizations and those who stood firmly behind the United Nations as a
global organization, a compromise was reached.78  In essence, a regional
organization may act by means short of force to preserve the peace without having
to await an outbreak of hostility-Article 52-but it may engage in enforcement
action only after obtaining a fiat from the Security Council-Article 53.79 An
individual state or group of states may use force defensively prior to Security
Council approval but only to respond to an armed attack-Article 51.80
But the problem, Franck notes, is that since 1945, these three articles have
melded to produce an increasingly asserted right of regional organizations to take
the law into their own hands, to act militarily without Security Council approval
even in the absence of an actual armed attack, and to exclude the United Nations
from jurisdiction over disputes in which one member is being forcibly purged of
ideological non-conformity by the rest of the organization (or the Superpower who
leads it). 8 1
Two other issues have arisen and created tension between the United Nations
71. Franck's point is that too many exceptions break the rule completely.
72. These organizations include NATO and OAS, as well as others. See more on this issue later
in the article.
73. Examples are cited later in the article.
74. As it allows exceptions to the rule against aggression and even further, against self-defense.
75. Franck, supra note 16, 827-829.
76. Two representative examples were the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the U. S. and
NATO.
77 Franck, supra note 16, at 822.
78. Franck distinguishes here between regionalists--those seeking to provide more authority to
regional organizations-and Universalists-those favoring more authority to the UN.
79. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 53, which notes that enforcement action by a regional organization
maybe engaged in only after Security Council approval. Given this Article, we can see the problems
behind the Kosovo campaign by NATO in 1999, which occurred without fiat, in the eyes of the U.N.
and world opinion.
80. Franck, supra note 16, at 824.
81. Id.
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and regional organizations. First, m the event of a dispute between two members
of the same regional organization, who should have primary jurisdiction to bring
about a peaceful settlement.8 2 The ambiguity of this question is found both in the
language of Article 52-which provides that members of regional organizations
"should make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through
such agencies or arrangements before referring them to the Security Council"8 3 and
the language of Articles 34 and 35, which, in turn state, the "Security Council may
investigate any dispute " and that any "Member of the United Nations may
bring any dispute to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly "84 The result is really a double jurisdiction and, with it, a lack of clarity
as to who has priority and preference.
5
Second, is the problem of definmg who is a regional organization?8 6 The
multitude of potential regional organizations is vast and defining who qualifies is
not just a political question but also a legal one. For example, the Charter's
provisions for regional action using pacific settlement, do not, on their face, apply
to regional organizations established for collective self-defense-under Article
51-but only to those organizations under Article 52. Additionally, the fact that
regional organizations are accorded such extensive powers in derogation of Article
2(4) and have garnered much greater powers in practice, it is important to have a
clear view of which groupings of states are entitled to regard themselves as
regional organizations.88 The OAS, NATO, EEC, COMECOM, the WARSAW
Pact, as well as, the Organization of African States, the Arab League, and other
third-world regional groups have all set forth arguments for their inclusion mn this
grouping and yet, not all have been seen fit to be included.8 9
The unsatisfactory conclusion is that regional orgamzations which are lead by
superpowers have established regions where Article 2(4) does not apply.
90
Motivated by a duty to comply or conform, members are subject to superpower
unilateral military action, whenever they claim to see a threat to their security.
91
Finally, Franck looks at what he says is the way ahead (at least from the
vantage point of 1970).92 In essence, Franck's argument is:
that the prohibition against the use of force in relations between states has been
82. Id at 825.
83. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 52.
84. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 35.
85. Franck, supra note 16, at 825.
86. Id at 827.
87. One measure is the degree of coverage an organization has in both military and non-military
matters, like the OAS. This definition, however, can be considered too restrictive.
88. Given the NATO intervention in Kosovo, it also seems to matter in excuses for interventions;
like in criminal law, some excuses-we are a regional organization and therefore can use force-are
better than others in terms of punishments enforced on the perpetrator.
89. Recognition as a regional organization seems to be a function of Great Powers acknowledge as
anything else.
90. Franck, supra note 16, at 835.
91. Id.
92. As we shall see later, his views change a bit by 2003.
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eroded beyond recognition, pnncipally by three factors: 1. the nse of wars of
"national liberation"- 2. the nsing threat of wars of total destruction; 3. the
increasing authoritarianism of regional systems dominated by a super-Power.
These three factors may, however, be traced back to a single circumstance: the
lack of congruence between the international legal norms of Article 2(4) and the
perceived national interests of states, especially the super-Powers.
93
The result is one of two worlds: one where peacefully, co-existing superpowers
dominated regional spheres exist-a world of superpowers run ghettos, marked by
limited freedoms--or another world, arsing from the ruins of Article 2(4), which
is alive, vibrant, and meaningful, where national interest is not defined m numbers,
but rather where national interest is perceived to be congruent with a renunciation
of the use of military force in inter-state relations.94 The second world is only
reached, Franck argues, if we can redefine what national interests are and return to
an international legal system of norms such as those found in Article 2(4). 95
ARTICLE 2(4): A VICTIM OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, NOT MURDER.
Louis Henkm notes in "The Reports of The Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
Exaggerated, his reply to Franck's article, that the death certificate is premature
and the indictment for legicide must be redrawn to the lesser charge of aggravated
assault.96 Henkin concedes the validity of all of the arguments that Franck makes:
the ills of the Charter; the mistaken assumption of continued big-Power unanumity-
the changing character of war; the loopholes for "self-defense" and "regional"
action; the lack of impartial means to find and characterize facts; the disposition to
take the law into their own hands and distort and mangle it for their own
purposes.97 But, even granting all of those claims, he argues that to concede death
would mistake the lives and the ways of the laws.98
Henkin's principle critique of Franck's diagnosis is that it judges the vitality
of the law by looking only to its failures.99 It needs to be noted that the purpose of
Article 2(4) was to establish a norm of behavior and help deter violations.'o°
Further, despite common misimpressions, Article 2(4) has accomplished those
goals.
Granted, deterrence is hard to prove or measure-as in individual penology-
but war is less common now than before the advent of the U.N. Charter and the
rules. It is less likely, less frequent, and expectations of international violence do
93. Franck, supra note 16, at 835.
94. Id. at 837.
95. Id.
96. Henkin, supra note 17, at 544.
97. Henkin notes Franck as a pathologist for the ills of the international body politic, although like
Franck he acknowledges the legitimacy of his claims.
98. Henkin, supra note 17, at 544
99. Id. at 545.
100. Part of Henkin's argument is that the Cold War was a result of the controlling norm of Article
2(4), in places like Cyprus, Kashmir, and Berlin.
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not underlie every political calculation of every nation or state.' 0 ' While indeed
we have outbreaks of hostilities, not every one of them became a full-fledged war;
many of the one hundred hostilities cited have not. Most have remained subject to
Cold War constraints. Threats to peace have remained just that, threats, and issues
only remained m regard to peaceful settlement or non-settlement.10 2 Cyprus,
Kashmir, and Berlin are cited as examples. 103
While it is possible to credit the lack of traditional war to other factors,
including the changing nature and character of war, to more territorial stability, and
to other changes in national interests, that does not make Article 2(4) any less a
norm. 1 4 Law often reflects dispositions to behavior as much as it shapes them.1°S
If we accept Franck's claun that "new forms of attack were making obsolete all
prior notions of war and peace strategy, one may conclude that development
reflected and supported Article 2(4) and made it viable.1° 6 Alas, nothing has
rendered war obsolete as indicated by conflicts between India and Pakistan, India
and China, Turkey and Greece, Honduras and El Salvador, Egypt and Israel. 107
The causes of war remain but what has changed is the notion that states are free to
indulge in it whenever and wherever they want. The death of that notion is
accepted in the Charter.
°10
Even the supposed transforming effect of nuclear weapons is erroneous.
Neither the era when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, nor
the era when the Soviet Union and the United States had a duopoly, was
aggression induced by either party.1°9 Nor have the superpowers" caches of
nuclear weapons deterred war by lesser Powers as demonstrated by repeated
conflicts in the Middle East.
0
The fissures of the Charter are worrisome but they are not as wide in
international life as they are in the academic imagination. Pre-emptive war as
"anticipatory self-defense," illegitimate self-defense claims by states attacking
under the guise of Article 51, and even regional loopholes are not as prevalent and
widespread as suggested."i There is danger out there m the international arena but
it is not always fatal.
The differences here are ones in degree, not in kind. Article 2(4) remains.
101. Henkin, supra note 17, at 544
102. It means that the use of force is not the only action that needs to be considered here but other
options too.
103. Henkin, supra note 17, at 544.
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107 Recall this article was written in 1971; perhaps what is interesting is that many of the same
states would be on any similar list in 2004.
108. Henkin, supra note 17, at 545.
109. Id. at 545.
110. Id at 545-6. Part of the deterrence argument of the Cold War rested on this premise-that
nuclear weapons would have chilling effect on other forms of conflict. As Henkm notes, that was not
proven out.
111. Id. at 546.
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Donning the mantle of regionalism does not dispose of it. Not even the most
stringent advocates of doctrines like the Brezhnev doctrine have suggested that
Articles 52 and 53 afford it any legitimacy. 11
2
Franck notes that war has not been eliminated but simply channeled into more
or less blatant intervention m internal wars and affairs, often by more than one
Power, often by major Powers." 3  The emergent triangle of superpowers-the
United States, the Soviet Umon, and China, has made competition in intervention a
dominant political determinate." 4 Even so, Henkm argues, if Article 2(4) has not
precluded these types of interventions--and clearly it has not-it may have
signaled the effective end of conventional war. 15  If it has accomplished this
change in the international order, it would signify a substantial advance and a
worthy one to note. It would mean that we move from terrible destructiveness m
war to lesser losses in life and property as a result of interventions."16
Interventions are problematic m themselves. They cannot be undertaken
alone, even by superpowerss.' '7 And if they do intervene, they can only be
successful if they do so for a limited tine, for limited objectives, and only if they
are willing to accept political consequences from both their allies and their
enemies.' 8 Even small-Power intervention is limited and hampered, as indicated
by the example of Syria's support of Palestine guerillas against Jordan.' 19
Henkm concludes by noting that Franck's warning makes its point and his cry
of alarm is warranted and necessary. 120 But they can be co-opted by those super-
realists who claim that the U.N. Charter is as irrelevant as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
But rather than condemn Article 2(4) to its death, it is enough to encourage the
changes m individual and national perceptions that Franck recommends. 2 1 We
need to remmd everyone--citizens, policy-makers, national societies, transnational
and international bodies--that this law is indeed in the national interest of all
nations. War, however, prefers one interest over another, depreciates the tangible
costs of life, and usually prefers the immediate and short-term to the deeper and
longer-term national interest.1
22
112. Id.
113. Including the previously mentioned regional organizations and their ideological wars.
114. Id. at 547.
115. In this way then, we see a value from Article 2(4) as it stands. If it cannot preclude war per se,
it can reduce the effects through pushing states to the use of lesser forms of war, like intervention.
116. Henkm, supra note 17, at 547.
117 The recent example of Iraq simply validates this claim about superpower limitations. Other
examples that are illustrative include the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan and the U.S. in Vietnam.
118. In fact, interventions of any kind carry this caution. Causal connections lead to effects that
intervening states have to deal with their action. For example, the U.S.'s intervention in the Middle
East tn 1991 had effects on their later intervention in Iraq in 2003, including the debate at the U.N., the
assembly of a coalition, and the post-war occupation and nation building efforts.
119. Syria could send tanks but not air support to help their allies. The Superpowers would not
allow more.
120. Henkin, supra note 17, at 547.
121. Id at 548.
122. ld.
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IS ARTICLE 2(4) STILL WORKABLE?
Almost fifteen years after the Franck-Henkin exchange, the debate over the
U.N. Charter and the use of force continued. The number of wars-significant
armed conflicts-had increased to over one hundred and twenty, with one study
listing 65 major conflicts between 1960 and 1982.123 More than 25 million men
and women were under arms and world military budgets approached 700 billion
dollars.' 24 Correspondingly Article 2(4) continued to be central to the debate-
with assessments ranging from it being still-born, to being ailing, to being out of
date and senile, to even once again, it being dead! 1
25
In a panel presentation at the American Society of International Law
Proceedings of April, 1984, seven panelists and commentators addressed issues
relating to Article 2(4).126 Domingo Acevedo opened with the topic of "Collective
Self-Defense and the Use of Regional or Subregional Authority as Justification for
the Use of Force."' 127 Drawing upon two case studies--the Malvmas-Falklands
conflict and the invasion of Grenada, he notes that regional authority clearly tried
to subvert prior U.N. claims.1
28
In the first case, the Security Council's passage of Resolution 502-
demanding an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Malvinas-
Falidands Islands-had occurred before later action by the Organization of
American States (O.A.S.) requesting British Forces withdrawal.' 29 There were
additional problems with regional action including the fact that one of the parties
was a major Western power that was not a member of the O.A.S., creating a
serious obstacle to the effective use of a regional forum and that the O.A.S.
machinery's usefulness is dependent upon the support of U.N. resolutions.
1 30
In the second case, U.S. reliance on regional authority of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S) treaty, Article 8(4) is questionable at best. 13
1
Under that article, the collective action provided for is against external aggression,
which was not the case m Grenada. 32 It also required the unanimous decision of
the seven state parties.' 3 While stronger arguments can be made under customary
international law for protection of intervening state's own nationals-rn this case
123. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 68. Reference is made to Ruth Leger Sivard's, study of World
Military Expenditures, accounting for more than 10 million deaths.
124. Id.
125. The panel discussion referenced here offers that range of opinions.
126. Presenters are referenced below, in order of presentation.
127. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 68.
128. Interestingly, the U.N. claims could only be enforced in these cases by regional authorities.
129. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 71.
130. Id., The tension was also evident between Britain and the U.S. and the O.A.S. in this case.
131. 78 AM. SoC'YINT'LL. PRoc. 72.
132. Protection against outsiders, as opposed against other members of the regional organization
puts strain on the system as well.
133. The member States of the OECS, founded m 1981, are Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
Grenada Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines. The British
Virgin Islands and Anguilla are associate members.
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approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens were at nsk---and based on the request of the
troubled state-m this case, by the Governor-General of Grenada, the argument for
treaty authority fails. 1
34
Acevedo concludes that one can hardly argue that Article 2(4) is unworkable,
unless one is willing to concede that the use of force as an instrument of national
policy is acceptable-clearly not a tenable position. 135
Michael Reisman's contribution is titled Article 2(4): The Use of Force in
Contemporary International Law." 136  In it, he traces the developments in
international law that lead to Article 2 (4 ). 137 Specifically, he argues that the rule
was never meant to be an independent ethical imperative for pacifism. 138 While
persuasion was certainly preferred, it was also clear that coercive force was
acknowledged as a means to maintain community order. And while unilateral
force was discouraged by the rule, it wasn't eliminated.1
39
What happened to the international system following the establishment of the
United Nations and Article 2(4) was the equivalent of what happened to a "Wild
West" town m the 19h century when a new sheriff arrived. People were
encouraged to follow the laws, put up their own guns, and rely on the force of the
lawman. 140 But, n much the same way as what would happen if the Sheriff turned
out to be incapable of maintaining law and order, the international system saw the
United Nations as being ineffective at all policing and, therefore, returned to its
own self-reliance on the use of force. 141
Self-help, particularly in the cases of self-defense and mn the cases of
decolonization, was not uncommon. 142 Nor was it uncommon for cases of
humamtarian intervention and intervention by the military instrument for elite
replacement-Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Cambodia are illustrative
of the later situation. 143 Reisman also sketches out cases for use of the military
instrument m spheres of influence (specifically critical defense zones or CDZ's),
treaty sanctioned interventions, gathering of evidence for international
proceedings, and for international judgment enforcement. All of these later cases
are determined by the particular facts in the case at hand, although the last one has
little scholarly support.' 44
The conclusion is that some unilateral coercions are effectively treated as
134. 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 72-3. Sir Paul Scorn, the Governor-General, at that time, he
asked for help, not an invasion.
135. Id. at 74.
136. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 75.
137. Id. With a focus on the 19
'b Century and onward.
138. 78 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 76.
139. Reisman notes that there is a full acknowledgment of the indispensability of the use of force to
maintain community order.
140. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 77
141. The domestic analogy is often seen in international legal paradigms, including that of Michael
Walzer.
142. The Corfu Channel Case is a case where self-help was claimed. See 1949 ICJ 4.
143. 78 AM. SOC'YINT'LL. PROC. 79-81.
144. Id. at 83-84.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
permissible or lawful, Article 2(4) notwithstanding. 145  The challenge for
international lawyers is to find the criteria for a comprehensive set of guidelines
for assessing lawfulness or permissibility of coercion in these settings. 146 Reisman
suggests that a key and constant factor is found in asking whether a particular use
of force-whatever its justification-enhances or undermines world order. 147 If it
enhances world order, the next key question is whether it enhances the right of
peoples to determine their own political destinies. That is the end for Reisman,
and Article 2(4) is the means.' 48
In sum, the only control on coercion, at least impermissible coercion, is the
clear conception of the licit community objectives for which coercion may be used.
In other words, the basic and enduring values of contemporary world order.
Edward Gordon follows with a piece called Article 2(4) and Permissive
Pragmatism."' 49 Permissive pragmatism is a destructive trend among Western
international lawyers, where what is lawful seems to be a function of the result one
favors, rather than being a matter of compatibility with the prevailing rules of
law. 50 A (recent) example of this approach is cited m the Kissinger Commission's
Report on Central America (1983), which appeared to reach conclusions in a legal
vacuum, oblivious to the fact that existing legal rules and treaty agreements
required adherence. 15 1 Its focus was instead on U.S. court decisions favoring a less
international perspective. 152  Permissive pragmatism is overcome only by
recognition of these laws, rules, and obligations by all states and keeping faith with
them in inter-state relations. 53 We need to look to the core meaning of the law to
understand it.
Turning to Article 2(4), Gordon notes that even though it is ambiguous in
important respects, even though it has been violated with disconcerting frequency
and impunity, even though events subsequent to its adoption have shown it to be
less than perfectly suited to contemporary affairs, nevertheless it contains a solid,
inalienable core of objective meaning independent of the judgment of national
government officials and eminently worth protecting and preserving.""' The
principled conduct of foreign relations requires championing the cause of Article
2(4), rather than dwelling upon its plasticity and overreaching idealism.155
It also requires a willingness to argue against disingenuous claims by
145. Id. The real challenge is limiting those exceptions.
146. This criteria needs to go beyond the tradition ones of necessity, proportionality and
discrimination.
147 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 85.
148. Id. at 86.
149. Id. at 87-8.
150. Gordon directs his comments on permissive pragmatism by referring to U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N., Jean Kirkpatrick.
151. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 89.
152. Id
153. The concept of core meaning concept comes up clear later in this article, under Arend and
Beck.
154. This absolutist view sees the Article as something beyond or more than a mere treaty element.
155. 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 90.
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perrmssive pragmatists, like those who argue that Article 2(4) is not special or
significant, it is just one of many articles in the Charter and, therefore, a mere
incidental means to a particular set of goals-as opposed to what it really is---an
objective rule of treaty law and, by now, general international law. 156
Jordan Paust offers a comment on Article 2(4), noting that the restriction on
the use of force is really a limited one.' 57 The limitation affects only the territorial
integrity of a state, the political independence of a state, and any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter, but that it is not an all-inclusive prohibition. 58 Self-
determination actions seem to be permitted; as do actions like evacuation of
nationals-the rescue mission at Entebbe- and other actions which do not violate
territorial integrity nor political independence but which may otherwise meet
traditional norms or principles of necessity and proportionality '59 Finally,
humanitarian intervention appears justified by these rules. 160
Nabil Elaraby's comment focuses on the nonuse of force. 161 He argues that
the prohibition of Article 2(4) is an absolute one-the use of force must not be
sanctioned under any circumstances. 62 The key to doing so is found in reviving
the interest and faith of the international community in the dormant potentials that
would no doubt accrue by introducing improvements in the available U.N.
machinery 163 A number of suggestions are presented including the development
and institutionalization of peacekeeping, reconsidering the rule of unanimity in
voting by the Security Council, and possible amendment of the U.N. Charter
itself.164
Finally Robert Rosenstock's comment was essentially a response to several
of the previous speakers.1 65 He highlights that changes in the U.N. machinery, if a
reasonable case could be made, were worth consideration, as well as other uses of
force, which are not aggression, but rather fall in the domain of Articles 2(4) and
51. 16 Finally, he considers the case of Grenada and argues that it surely doesn't
become another example of the demise of Article 2(4).167
The panel presentation concluded with a general discussion that included
many distinguished commentators addressing overall topic comments and
156. Id. at92.
157. 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 92-3.
158. So anything undertaken to maintain self-determination would appear to be allowed by Paust.
159. In other words, Article 2(4) may either allow these exceptions or at least not prohibit them.
160. Paust actually claims this supports the "human right to participate in armed revolution.
Others, like Boyles, Falk, Nunes, and Weston suggest otherwise.
161. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 94.
162. Elaraby adds, "its (Article 2(4) provisions should always be observed. No exceptions.
163. 78 AM. SOC'Y iNT'L L. PROC. 95.
164. Id. at96.
165. 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 97.
166. Rosenstock also offers the caution about analogizing too much from history.
167. Rosenstock also considers the role of the OECS in decision-making m Grenada and offers it as
at least plausibly justified invasion and peacekeeping operation, opposed to another nail being
driven into the coffin of Article 2(4).
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questions, as well as the pertinent issues of the panel. 68
HAS ARTICLE 2(4) LOST ITS LEGAL FORCE?
Oscar Schachter joined the fray in 1991, with a section from his book,
International Law in Theory and Practice, where he posed the above highlighted
question.16 9 Or to put it another way, are the existing rules of force so vague and
uncertain to allow states to offer a plausible legal justification for any use of force
it chooses to exercise?1
7 0
He also posed a related question - m the absence of an authontative body to
decide conflicting positions objectively, must the rules, however clear their
meaning, be regarded only as paper rules m that they may be disregarded or
violated to a degree that renders them no more than nominal?1
7
'
Schachter argues in response to the second question, in sum, that the U.N.
political organs-the Security Council and the General, Assembly-provide an
institutional mechanism for authoritative judgments on the use of force, but it is
only under some circumstances that they can obtain the requisite authority and
consequential behavior to endow their decisions with effective power. 172
He goes on in his reply to the first question to say that Article 2(4) is really an
all-inclusive prohibition against force. 173 In doing so, he follows up by rejecting
the call for a revision of the Charter principles based on the arguments of special
circumstances (consent, territorial claims, human rights, self-determination and
national liberation, overthrow of repressive regimes, protection of life, and
safeguarding legal rights), changed circumstances and state practice inconsistent
with the declared rules. 174
Schachter's position, in a nutshell, is that international law does not and
should not legitimize the use of force across national lines except for self-defense
(including collective self-defense) and enforcement measures ordered by the
Security Council. 175 Neither human nghts, democracy, nor self-determination are
acceptable legal grounds for waging war, nor for that matter, are traditional just
war causes or righting of wrongs. This conclusion is in accord with the U.N.
Charter as it was originally understood and also m keeping with the present
interpretation by the great majority of states. 76
In responding to the question of whether article 2(4) has lost its legal force,
Schachter considers several arguments, including:
168. 78 AM. SOC'YINT'LL. PRoC. 100-7
169. Schachter, supra note 15, at 129-34.
170. Id. at 130.
171. Id. at 130-131.
172. Id.
173. Id. Schachter notes no state has argued that Article 2(4) is no longer in force.
174. Id. at 131.
175. This position might be construed as an absolutist one, where regardless of what else is
happening, there rule is self-defense and U.N. collective action only, in terms of the use of force.
176. Schachter, supra note 15, at 106-111.
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1) That the prohibition on force was part of the comprehensive agreement
contained in the Charter, for maintaining international peace and security States
would not have agreed to give up their unilateral recourse to force if the United
Nations did not have enforcement powers (and an enforcement mechanism).
Inasmuch as the United Nations does not, states should be released from their
renouncement. 7
a) Original intent of the parties (states) to the Charter 178 is plausible, but it
does not follow that the parties intended the obligation to be conditioned on
effective collective measures. It is not recorded in Charter discussions at San
Francisco. Additionally, having an enforcement mechanism does not equal having
an effective mechanism. 179 Nothing in the Charter or in general international law
provides any grounds for implying an independent right to use force because the
Security Council has failed to adopt collective measures.
b) It is incorrect to conclude that collective security has. failed when legal
rights have been infringed and no remedy, short of force, is available in a particular
case.1 °  UN enforcement measures were intended to maintain or restore
international peace or security They were not meant to ensure compliance with
the law or to bring about justice. It cannot be maintained that collective security
has failed because it has not provided a remedy for a legal violation.
1 8 1
c) The Article has been violated so many times that it has been nullified.18 2
Three probable legal grounds provide for this claim, including: 1) The general
principal of reciprocal observance: a state should not be bound by a rule that others
flout or ignore; 2) Rebus sic stantibus: infringements of Article 2(4) have so
changed the positions of states that any party may invoke the violations as a legal
reason to disregard or suspend its obligations to refrain from force; and 3)
violations are evidence of state practice sufficiently widespread to be taken as
evidence of a general interpretation of the Charter and customary law. 183
While there is some truth to these claims, even these legal grounds suffer
from the fact that no state-however powerful or resentful-has argued that
Article 2(4) should no longer be in force. Instead, violators have relied on
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, or more frequently,
self-defense, under Article 51.184
There is a reluctance of states to abandon Article 2(4), for the basic reality is
that a stable society of independent nations cannot exist if each is free to destroy
177. Id. at 129.
178. This is an argument that parallels the strict constructionalist's interpretation of constitutions in
American legal history.
179. The domestic analogy comes to mind again with the clumsy constable. You can have a law
enforcement officer but that does not mean you will have an effective one.
180. Maintenance or restoration of peace or secunty is not the equivalent of ensuring compliance
with the law or bnnmg about justice.
181. Certainly no other are of the law takes this view as a legitimate one.
182. Schachter, supra note 15, at 130.
183. Id.
184. Even recognized in the ICJ case of Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 ICJ 14.
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the independence of the others. The legal constraint on the use of force reflects this
reality Neither the failures of the United Nations, nor the violations of the Charter
justify a conclusion that would allow states to wage war freely Infringements by
some, under principles of reciprocity or changed circumstances, have not released
all from a rule so fundamental for world order. i85
A CHANGED LEGAL OBLIGATION: A SHIFT IN PARADIGMS?
In Anthony Arend and Robert Beek's piece, "International Law and the
Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, the authors argue that a number of
significant developments since World War II have challenged the validity of the
U.N. Charter's paradigm.s 6 This paradigm, defined as the paradigm for a
contemporary notion of jus ad bellum, was composed of three elements-a legal
obligation, institutions to enforce the obligation, and a value hierarchy that formed
the philosophical basis for that obligation.i87 The failure of international
institutions, the emergence of new values, and a new legal obligation have
presented a paradigm shift--that of a post-Charter self-help paradigm.88
First, in the post-Charter period, international institutions have failed to deter
or combat aggression. '8 9 The international community has faltered in its efforts to
address tis profound problem. Additionally, the international community has
seen a shift from a focus on peace to that ofjustice.' 90 This includes, as legitimate,
claims to use force to promote self-determination, claims to resort to "just
reprisals, and claims to use force to correct past "injustices."' 9 '
Finally, the legal obligation is changed. Scholars have been compelled to ask
whether Article 2(4) is still good international law' 92 and, is it still authoritative
and controlling? 193  A review of scholarship and practice suggests three
fundamental approaches to this question. The first has been labeled the "legalistic
approach,"' 194 the second the "core mterpretist" approach, 195 and the third the
"rejectionist" approach. 196
After lengthy analysis, Arend and Beck conclude that of the three approaches,
185. Id. at 131.
186. Anthony Arend & Robert Beck, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSiC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS, 285-315 (20 ed.
2003).
187. Arend and Beck flesh out these by associating these elements with 1) Article 2(4) (of the U.N.
Charter), 2) Charter VII (of the U.N. Charter), and 3) the underlying value structure.
188. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 286-87.
189. These institutional problems of the veto, lack of formal mechanism for collective action, and
lack of support for limited collective action.
190. The shift from peace to justice is what constitutes the shift in values here.
19 1. Arend and Beck note that at times, justice must take precedent over peace.
192. Putative norms, like Article 2(4), are only a rules of international law if authoritative and
controlling.
193. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 288.
194. Id. at 288-90.
195. Id. at 290-92.
196. Id at 292-93.
VOL. 32:3
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 2(4)
the "rejectionist" approach reflects most accurately the reality of the international
system today. 197 They start, however, by considering the legalist approach, noting
that while it recognizes that problems exist, adherents adhere to the basic belief
that the principle enunciated by Article 2(4) is still good law. 98 Several points are
stressed in their argument. First, the norm remains authoritative since no state has
explicitly suggested that Article 2(4) is not good law.199 Second, despite the
problems of the article, it remains controlling in state behavior.200 Finally, Article
2(4) must be understood as a treaty obligation for those states that have ratified the
U.N. Charter, not just. an obligation under customary international law.2Oi Hence,
the procedure for a normative charge is much more specific and defined: "states
may not simply walk away from them."
20 2
Clearly, there are problems with this approach. First, while it is true no state
has explicitly declared Article 2(4) as not good law that fact alone does not mean
the norm is authoritative. Other political reasons exist for not doing so. Yet, states
ignore the rule in their own actions. While it still commands some legitimacy, it is
not that required for a healthy law. Second, the argument advanced by the legalists
is inconsistent with the realities of the international system. The norm has been
violated frequently and with impunity m some of the most important cases of state
interaction. Even legalists like Henkin and Gordon are forced to deal with a
number of these incidents: Arab-Israel hostilities, India-Pakistan's clashes over the
Kashmir, the Czech invasion by the Soviet Union, as well as Ethiopia-Somalia and
Vietnam-Cambodia-China. 203  Finally, the legalist's use of the treaty-nature of
Article 2(4) is problematic. Regardless of whether it is treaty law or customary
international law, if a rule lacks authority and control, it is no longer authentic
"international law." In the decentralized system that exists today, international law
is constituted through state practice.
2°4
The core interpretists argue that although the narrow, legalist interpretation of
Article 2(4) no longer represents existing law, the "core" meaning of the Article
can nevertheless be identified and it is still authoritative and controlling.2 5 While
the members of this school range in opinions as to what constitutes that core, they
contend that the basic prohibition remains in place. ° 6
Some believe that the Article 2(4) that the exceptions are only modified by
authoritative interpretations confirmed in state practice, thus permitting uses of
force as anticipatory self-defense, intervention to protect nationals, and
197. Id. at 288.
198. Professors Edward Gordon and Louis Henkm, for example, represent this position.
199. Arend and Beck note that despite this claim, Article 2(4) is not held in high regard.
200. Controlling for the most part; for example, most states are not using force as a rule.
201. The contrasting argument is that we look to practice and what we see is that it is not working
as a treaty.
202. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 289.
203. The point made supra about increased incidents of war throughout the world.
204. Id. at 290.
205. Professor Alberto Coil is a representative of this camp.
206. Core interpretists allows for exceptions to the basic prohibition against the use of force.
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humanitarian intervention. °7 Others take the core as being much smaller,
including Alberto Coil, who suggests that "insofar as there is a remnant of a legal,
as opposed to a moral, obligation left m Article 2(4), it is a good faith commitment
to abstain from clear aggression that involves a disproportionate use of force and
violates other principles of the Charter. ' '20s
For Coil, clear aggression would include the types of actions that the Germans
and Japanese used to start World War 11.209
Core interpretists argue for holding on to Article 2(4) for several reasons,
including a belief that rejecting the norm entirely might be premature, given that
states do refrain from certain uses of force. 1 Consequently, any rejection would
actually contribute to the dissolution of whatever restraining influence that 2(4)
still exerts. 21 1 Another reason is the symbolical nature of 2(4) and its service as an
aspirational norm.21 2 To do otherwise, would serve to reject this noble goal.
The problem here, critics note, is that holding on to Article 2(4) may be doing
more harm than good to the international legal system.21 3 Its restrictive use
otherwise may serve to perpetrate a legal fiction that interferes with an accurate
state practice.21 4 Article 2(4) is more than a smple prohibition on the use of force
for narrow purposes-it is supposed to prohibit all uses of force that were against
territorial integrity or political independence of a state or otherwise inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. 215  In other words, the Article 2(4)
prohibition was much broader than simply the "core." If only this small subset
remains, than it does not seem appropriate to describe the law by reference to the
full set.
Lastly, the rejectionist approach argues that Article 2(4) does not apply in any
meaningful way nor constitute existing law.216 The contention is that because
authoritative state practice is so far removed from any reasonable interpretation of
the meaning of Article 2(4), it is no longer reasonable to consider the provision
"good law.",217  This follows Franck's position, first in his classic article
(previously discussed) and later, in his The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,
where he reaffirmed the rejectiomst understanding of Article 2(4), noting that the
extensive body of international law forbidding the use of force is not predictive of
207. As long as the accepted practice can be shown or demonstrated to be an accepted
interpretation of the Charter.
208. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 291.
209. For example, "clear aggression" would include the use of force to gain territory.
210. In other words, some prohibition or restraint is better than no prohibition or restraint.
211. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 291.
212. An aspirational goal is a noble goal worth pursuing.
213. The issue here centers around the idea the Article itself is larger than the core itself, including
the notion of threats.
214. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 292.
215. Id.
216. In short, the difference here is one between what is normally meant by "theory" and
"practice.
217. Franck is representative of this last school or approach.
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the ways of the world.218
Franck analogizes Article 2(4) with the one-time U.S. Government mandated
55-mile per hour national speed limit.21 9  While both rules possess "textual
clarity," they, nevertheless, do not describe or predict with accuracy the actual
behavior of the real world.22 °
While not having a large school of scholars in support of the position, Arend
and Beck argue this position seems to offer the most accurate description of the
contemporary jus ad bellum.22 ' The legalists seem too far removed from the
realities of the international system while the core mterpretists seems to do little
more than perpetuate a legal fiction.2m Neither what states say nor what states do
is reflected in anything other than the rejectionist approach. 223
Arend and Beck go on to flesh out their post-Charter approach, which
essentially involves modifying the current Charter to accommodate additional uses
of lawful force including a broader interpretation of self-defense (including against
armed attack, unmient attack, indirect aggression), covert action, support of
rebels and against terrorists actions (as measured by factors such as the nature of
support, the severity of the effect, and temporal duration), intervention to protect
nationals, and force authorized by the Security Council. 224 All other uses of force
are unlawful.
225
There are several advantages to their proposal, Arend and Beck argue,
including the elimination of some of the interpretative problems of the Charter
framework, it addresses the changing nature of international conflict, the need for
self-help for the protection of nationals, and the critical importance of a restrictive
jus ad bellum for international order.
226
RESHAPING THE UNITED NATIONS: MODIFYING THE NOTION OF THREATS TO
PEACE.
Within the last year, the debate on the U.N. Charter and Article 2(4) has seen
renewed rancor.2 7  One suggestion by Anne-Mane Slaughter has been that
following the U.S. victory in Iraq, there is an opportunity to reshape the United
Nations.Y2 8 By committing the United States to leading the world, rather than
defying it, the Bush administration can make the United Nations a more effective
218. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 292.
219. Id. at 293.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Neither sees the reality of the current system.
223. Here is reality, argue Arend and Beck.
224. The argument is that while this might not reflect the most desirable regime, it does reflect the
existing regime.
225. Id at 302-7.
226. Id at 307-8.
227. The recent dispute about the Iraqi war.
228. Anne-Mane Slaughter, WASH. POST, April 13, 2003, at B7.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
protector of the international order.229
Slaughter accepts that the claim that the institutions of the post-World war II
era are yet adapted to address the threats of the post-Cold War era.230 The answer,
however, is found in reform, not destruction of the institutions. Beyond working
with the other members of the Security Council, the United States needs to redraw
the lines of how the Security Council defines which threats to international security
are sufficient to require the use of force.
The solution is to utilize a new approach-one which links the human rights
side of the United Nations with its security side. In other words, the United
Nations must formally link the kind of moral arguments presented against Saddam
Hussem-arguments made outside of the Security Council-with the kind of
arguments that it made for disarmament inside the Council.
What follows from Slaughter's analysis can be set forth as follows. If the
Security Council were to adopt a resolution recognizing that the following set of
conditions would constitute a threat to the peace sufficient to justify the use of
force, including: 1) possession of weapons of mass destruction or a clear and
convincing evidence of attempts to gain such weapons; 2) grave and systemic
human rights abuses sufficient to demonstrate the absence of any internal
constraints on government behavior; and 3) evidence of aggressive intent with
regard to other nations. This cluster of actions sets a very high threshold for the
use of force, but also acknowledges the reality of the world, with terrorists, WMD,
and human rights violations.
The advantages of this type of resolution are that other nations would agree to
it, since in the end, it makes all nations stronger and safer with the existence of
robust international institutions. These institutions would have both the political
will and the means to enforce their mandates. They also would serve to help the
United States overcome mounting anti-Amencanism in both Europe and the
Middle East. Instead of seeking to restore the status quo at the United Nations, the
United States should reinvent it.
As Slaughter notes, we now have the chance to reach out to other nations to
strengthen and equip the United Nations to meet a new generation of global
challenges. If we miss the chance, we and the world have a frightening amount to
lose.23'
ARTICLE 2(4) AFTER IRAQ.
In 2003, Tom Franck returned to the subject of the United Nations with his
recent article, "What Happens Now9 The United Nations After Iraq. ' 'zi2 He recalls
the conclusion of his original piece on Article 2(4):
229. This rethnkmg will produce new rules and procedures for the Unted Nations.
230. Recognizing that the instituions need not be destroyed but rather simply reworked.
231. Id.
232. Tom Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607
(2003)
VOL. 32:3
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 2(4)
The failure of the U.N. Charter's normative system is tantamount to the inability
of any rule, such as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over
the behavior of states. National self-interest, particularly the national self-interest
of the super-Powers, has usually won out over treaty obligations. This is
particularly characteristic of this age of pragmatic power politics. It is as if
international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been demythologized.
It seems this is not an age where men act by pnnciples simply because that is what
gentlemen ought to do. But living by power alone. .is a nerve-wracking and
costly business.
233
The major difference that Franck notes between now and then is that the
demise of the Cold war has left a new form of unilateralism.234 Additionally, in
1970, unlawful recourses to force were accompanied by a fig leaf of legal
justification, which at least tacitly recognized the residual force of the requirement
m Charter Article 2(4).235 Now, the leaders of America no longer bother with such
legal niceties. Instead, they boldly proclaim a policy that repudiates Article 2(4).
The new principle seem derived from the Athenians at Melos: "the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must.
236
The lustory of U.N. action since 1970 is sketched out in basically three parts:
1) the remaining Cold war normative balance of power era, which ended in 1989
with the collapse of both the Berlin Wall and later, the Soviet Union; 2) the
Optiustic 1990's, when the international system seemed to be moving in the
direction best expressed by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution at the United
Nations; and 3) the relapse of 2003, where the United States m its invasion of Iraq,
caused Article 2(4) to die again, perhaps for good.2 "
Franck analyzes the question of whether the Iraq invasion violated the U.N.
Charter. 238 And despite arguments for self-defense against future use of WMD and
previously sanctioned action by the Security Council, with continued reliance on
Resolution 678, he concludes that indeed the invasion was illegal. 239 Even the
positive after-affects do not change that assessment.
240
Another question considered is that posed by Slaughter--can the invasion of
Iraq serve as an opportunity to reform the Charter and make the law more
realistic. 24' Franck acknowledges that the Charter can be revised-he argues
elsewhere that the Charter as a quasi-constitutional instrument is capable of
evolving through the practice of its principle organs.242 Even the Charter text is
subject to reinterpretation m practice, but as he sees it, the problem is not that
233. Id.
234. Id. The post-Cold war model has evolved to this state of unilateralism.
235. Id. at 608.
236. Franck suggests that this American "might is right" point of view is really neo-Melian
doctrine.
237. Franck, supra note 232, at 607-609.
238. Id. at 610.
239. The more sophisticated argument of self-defense is presented by the British side.
240. Franek, supra note 232, at 611-614.
241. ld. at 615.
242. Id.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
one.243 The nub of matter goes beyond the criterion for the use of force.244 Instead
it goes to who gets to decide what to do regarding the use of force. 245
In essence, the Iraqi crisis was not primarily about what to do, but rather who
decides what to do.246 This action can best be seen as a repudiation of the central
decision-making premise of the Charter system than as a genuine opening to
reform.
24 7
After reviewing the Bush Administration's new security strategy, which he
finds problematic at best, Franck closes with a consideration of what can be
done?248 In sum, he suggests that international lawyers stand up for what it is they
practice and protect-the rule of law-the rule of international law. 249 Franck also
notes that the realists are probably right and m the present imbalance of power, the
time for any positive and meaningful action is in the future. International
lawyers then should zealously guard their professional integrity for a tune when it
can again be used in the service of the common weal.25'
CONCLUSION.
For the past thirty odd years, the question of whether Article 2(4) remains
relevant or not has been subject to ongoing debate. This debate has been engaged
in by both practioners and scholars. In fact, a recent series of popular articles m
the Wall Street Journal, titled "The U.N.. Searching for Relevance, suggest this
debate is not simply confined to the halls of the United Nations and academia; but
rather, it is a concern for the citizenry of the United States and the broader citizens
of the world. 2
Among the central issues that bear further discussion and resolution are three
primary issues. The first issue is the structure of the institutions themselves, to
include the Charter with the provision of Articles 2(4) and 51, 52, and 53, as well
as the Security Council itself. As noted here, for the Charter and its Articles to
have any particular meaning, it is necessary for them to be reflective of the actual
practices and aspirations of states. 3
Some modification of the criteria for the use of force to capture the realities of
the post 9-11 world is needed. As Slaughter and Franck suggest, terrorists, WMD,
243. So it is not the reinterpretation that is problematic, but how it is interpreted.
244. Id. at 616.
245. International lawyers are Franck's claim and solution, both here and later.
246. Franck, supra note 232, at 616.
247. Id. at 617.
248. Yet, they ought not to take an aggressive or assertive role but rather they must wait for the
appropriate moment to act, Franck says.
249. Franck, supra note 232, at 619-20.
250. Id
251. Id. at 620.
252. See WALL ST. J. series titled, The UN.. Searching for Relevance, on Oct. 1, 2003; Oct. 21,
2003; Dec. 16, 2003, and Dec. 19, 2003.
253. Interestingly, President Bush's recent remarks at the National Defense University focused on
the role of failed states. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases2004/02/20040211-4.html.
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rogue states which engage m human rights violations systematically, and failed
states are the new security threats of the 21't century 254 For the Charter and the
United Nations to remain engaged and relevant, it must be able to deal with those
threats and that reality Additionally, the changing nature of warfare will continue
and the Charter needs to be able to address such concerns. We are not far removed
from a world where information and computer systems can engage in direct
attacks, across borders, which have at least as devastating effect on items like the
financial markets, the electronic grid, and communications systems.
Second, the instruments are only as effective as they relate to the decision-
makers. As Gordon and Franck note, the means of determining decisions is more
important than whether the actions are right or wrong. 255 Consideration has to be
given to modifications of the burdensome and unanimous system of the Security
Council. The continued use of the present system does not reflect the real world
-changes need to be undertaken.
How decisions are made, who makes them, how quickly they are made, and
who they affect, are clearly concerns that transcend national self-interest or
regional concerns. Bringing together complimentary, if occasionally competing,
systems is key m decision-making too.
Lastly, a renewed commitment must be made to collective security action and
collective self-defense. Cases like Afghanistan and Iraq were global, not simply
U.S. concerns. Likewise, we see them in cases like Liberia, where a failed state
presents problems for not only the evacuation of nationals but also for regional
security and stability. The United Nations has proven itself capable of handling
some actions better than others and similarly, the United States and the European
Union, as well as Russia and China, can manage some things better than the United
256Nations. Collective action will meld these actions into a more effective system
for dealing with the issues of the use of force in a changing world.
254. See Slaughter, supra note 228, at B7" Franck, supra note 232, at 615.
255. Arend & Beck, supra note 186, at 289; Franck, supra note 232, at 611.
256. In terms of quick reaction forces, the U.S., Britain, and France have a distinct advantage in
their force projection capabilities-putting boots on the ground quickly. The U.N. is better at some of
the adinistrative and coordination efforts, like herding the NGO's, and some forms of peacekeeping.
2004

AN EMERGING LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW'
DEVELOPMENT LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE
Reviewed by Heather K. Beattie
RUMU SARKAR, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW- A DEVELOPMENT LAW
PERSPECTIVE, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands
(2003); ISBN: 90-411-9921 7" 419 pp. (hardcover).
RUMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE,
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands (1999); ISBN: 90-
411-9743-5; 275 pp. (paperback).
The field known as international business transactions (IBT) continues to play
a critical role m relations between developing and developed countries. For this
reason, Professor Rumu Sarkar's work in this area is unique and important. She
deserves praise for her ability to take the enormous amount of information m the
IBT field and apply it m a development context. In Ms. Sarkar's first book she
outlines the basic legal and theoretical principles of development law and
international finance. Her second work contains a more practical application of
development law to the everyday international business environment. Both books
outline the importance of international business and investment for the economies
and societies of both developed and developing countries.
Ms. Sarkar's most recent work, Transnational Business Law: A Development
Perspective is a text book intended to give concrete illustrations and guidance to
beginning international practitioners and law students. She takes a development
law approach because many cross-border (transnational) transactions take place m
the developing world. Accordingly practicing attorneys ought to be familiar with
the concerns of their host country counterparts regarding critical economic and
political decisions. The fundamental starting point for any transaction should be a
basic understanding of what each party hopes to gain in both a narrow and broad
sense from the particular transaction so that both parties can benefit and advance.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I explains the conceptual
framework. These first two chapters explain the essential elements of a contract
for the sale of goods or services. An international contract of this sort will
The author has received her MA from Univensty of Denver's Graduate School of International
Studies and is currently law student at the University of Denver's College of Law. For the academic
year of 2004-2005, she will be the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy's Alumni Editor,
coordinating the Journal's outreach to its former student members.
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generally be governed by the United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods and Services (CISG) unless another source of law is stipulated or one of
parties to the transaction is not a signatory to the convention. , Moreover, a
contract usually includes which taxes will be paid, when and where delivery will
be made, what warranties apply, and who bears risk of loss among other things.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) publishes "International
Commercial Terms" referred to as INCOTERMS that define common terms used
in the international context such as FOB vessel NYC 2 means the seller pays all
charges until the goods are actually boarded on the transportation vessel. Then
seller receives a clean bill of lading and title of the goods passes to the buyer, who
assumes the risks of damage, loss, cost of insurance and transport to NYC. These
standardized terms help prevent miscommunications between buyer and seller, but
they must be specifically referenced in the contract.
The second half of Chapter 1 addresses letters of credit. There are many
different types of letters of credit and they are common in IBT Ms. Sarkar
includes annotated forms at the end of almost every chapter so that one can look at
the form and refer to the text to explain the significance of each provision of the
form. For example, at the end of Chapter 1 there is a sample international sale of
goods contract and a sample Irrevocable letter of credit. This functional approach
is useful for any practitioner, especially those new to the field.
The second half of Part I discusses technology transfer and intellectual
property rights. In the international sale of services the transfer of technology is a
critical issue. Within the technology transfer area there are a number of sub-issues
including whether the agreement is for a license, joint venture, sales agent, or
distributor. These agreements are one of the most important for developing
countries because of the potential they carry for increasing production of goods as
well as increasing the ability of locals to work with advanced technology.
Increasing productivity generally gives rise to increasing economic development.
3
The remaining two parts of Transnational Business Law explain how to
structure a cross-border business transaction. Part II includes managing issues of
commercial risks such as: credit enhancement, loan guarantees, and debt issues.
Ms. Sarkar explains how to negotiate the terms of a loan agreement as well as what
principles of negotiating to use. The international financial framework is
incorporated throughout the book. This framework incorporates the
responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is in charge of
stabilizing currencies world-wide, and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) also known as the World Bank, which is in charge of
financing development projects world- wide. There are many regional
development banks that nation-states will borrow from to finance their domestic
projects. Ms. Sarkar includes examples of development projects and how they are
1. RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss LAW- A DEVELOPMENT LAW PERSPECTIVE 4-5
(2003).
2. Id.at 11.
3. Development in its narrowest sense means increasing per capita Gross National Product
(GNP) for a country.
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funded are at the end of the chapter.
Part III manages issues of non-commercial risks such as: political risks,
investment risks, and risks of litigation. This part of the book is perhaps the most
recognizably pertinent to a development analysis because of the need m
developing countries for additional credit enhancement. For private investors the
most important issue is whether the pertinent countries have a bilateral investment
treaty (BITS). There are now hundreds of these treaties covering private
investment overseas.4 The second way private investors may be protected is by
obtaining political risk insurance from such companies as the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) or the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA). These compames will provide insurance against the classic credit risks
such as coups, war and political violence, nationalization and expropriation, and
currency inconvertibility 5 Ms. Sarkar has a wonderfully useful comparison of the
equity cover provided by OPIC and MIGA at the end of Chapter 6.
The second half of Part III covers information regarding the resolution of
disputes. Ms. Sarkar addresses three possibilities for when "things fall apart.",
6
First, mediation may be appropriate under the circumstances, particularly if the
problem is an intellectual property issue. Second, arbitration is similar to litigation
except the contracting parties may agree to the arbitrators, who are non-judicial
and non-governmental. The parties also agree to the law that will be applied in
their case. Most important is that arbitration awards under the New York
Convention will be recognized almost anywhere7 whereas judgments from a
country's domestic courts will not generally be recognmzed in another country.
International litigation can be costly and confusing so the key is to negotiate for
alternative dispute resolution prior to signing the final agreement. One common
forum is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), which is part of the World Bank Group. ICSID is governed by its own
rules and procedures.
8
In sum, Rumu Sarkar's text book takes a clinical teaching approach to a field
that is generally taught by using either case book method or a form-based/protocol
supplement method. It is a refreshing methodology to actively incorporate a
development law perspective into an international corporate cultural that generally
leaves such issues beneath the surface.
Ms. Sarkar's first book, Development Law and International Finance lays the
theoretical groundwork for understanding cross-border transactions. The book is
full of interesting historical and legal underpumings of economic development.
The book's functioning premise is that most frameworks for cross-border
transactions fundamentally do not have compatible legal mfi-astructures, cultural
beliefs on which both parties may rely, or similar economic principles. Economic
4. RuMu SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss LAw 237 (2003).
5. Id. at 235-36.
6. Id. at 349.
7. As long as the countries are both signatories to the NYC.
8. Id at 361.
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development is its narrowest sense is defined as raising per capita standards of
living. However, development occurs socially, legally as well as in the economic
sphere.
Part I explores the Rule of Law programs addressing theoretical principles
and development law principles. Rule of Law programs aim to systematize legal
changes in a country including constitutional principles, substantive principles, and
institutional frameworks. Ms. Sarkar uses a definition of development law that
emphasizes interdisciplinary international corporate principles overlaid with
economic, political, sociological, and historical issues. The reason practitioners
should be aware of this perspective is because out of 180 countries in the world
more than 120 are considered developing.9
Part II, entitled Structural Legal Reform, focuses heavily on nation-state
macroeconomic reform. It begins with an overview of international borrowing
including the role of the state m financing its development by borrowing from
private commercial entities and public multilateral banks (IMF or IBRD). This
borrowing has given rise to serious debt crisis and the restructuring of debt loans to
include structural adjustment policies. These policies have come under severe
criticism in recent years because of the focus on cutting state spending at all levels
to improve the government's fiscal deficit and because the policies encourage
privatization of former state owned enterprises (SOEs). These policies have been
generally successful in keeping inflation low and providing economic stabilization.
However, the "human cost" has been born by the sections of society least able to
afford it, namely women, children, and the disabled. The policies have increased
unemployment rates, lowered wages, and severely reduced social services.
10
Part III discusses a human right to development. Ms. Sarkar cites the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights for this proposition and further explores
the individual's relation to the state." Correctly, Ms. Sarkar observes the
increasing gap between developed and developing countries. She analyzes what a
right to development means and how it has worked in various countries and finds
that the right to development exists, but countries must actively shape this right to
give it real force in international law.1 2 The book suggests a rule of law program
that will integrate local needs and cultures to an international principle of
development.
Ms. Sarkar's unique perspective is a welcome one in the international
business transactions field. The theory and practice outlined in her two books are a
meld of human development and economic reality applied to transnational business
law.
9. Rumu Sarkar, Development Law and International Finance 1 (1999).
10. Id at 104-5.
11. Id. at213.
12. Id. at 249.
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